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Abstract
The twin processes of "economic development" and "state behaviour" 
are explained by the major paradigms through reference to 
economically "reductionist" methodologies. In particular Marxist and 
Late Development theories have helped perpetuate this methodology. 
This thesis provides an alternative framevrork for understanding the 
above-mentioned processes. In particular, the " autonomous powers" of 
the state will form a central approach throughout each chapter. Not 
only do states have multiple powers, but these vary across different 
political regime forms.
These powers are revealed through an eirpirLcal examination of the 
determination of tariff protectionism as it emerged in Europe in the 
late 187(y s. The argument will focus on a multi-causal approach. Thus 
the causal iiput of economic interest grou^ will be examined. 
Althou^ these will form a part of the e^qilanation offered here, they 
will have less salience than is commonly found in the social science 
literature. The interests of the state are mainly those connected to 
the demands of "fiscal accumulation!'. Overall "state interests" are 
neither monolithic nor unified. Thus it will not be possible to speak 
of the state as an "actor". States are not so rational as the term 
would iirply. Moreover, "the state" turns out to be a conplex 
political arena of struggling factions, all vying for exclusivist 
political power.
These autonomous state struggles inpacted i;pon economic development; 
in this case, tariff protectionism. As well as explaining the rise of 
protectionism in Germany and Russia, as wall as America (chapter 2, 3 
and 5), the maintenance of British free trade will be also be 
explained throu^ the model presented here. In addition, 
industrialisation in Russia will be explained, also from the approach 
of statist-economy. This approach will be developed more fully in the 
final chapter.
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CHAPIERl 
THE PBOBLEM STATED 
SECnCN 1
Establishing the " Economistic Consensus" Theories of Free Trade and
Protection
This thesis is concerned to provide an alternative analysis of 
economic development to those currently on offer. Specifically, it 
will focus on the rise of protectionism in Europe (and America) as it 
emerged in the late nineteenth century. Central to the analysis will 
be a redefinticn of "power" in order to e^glain econcmic development. 
This will involve a structural (rather than conjunctural) examination 
of the "autonomous powers of the state". Before going on to lay down 
the parameters of such an analysis, the first section of this chapter 
will unravel the conception of causal pcwsr focussed on by past and 
present theories of economic development/tariff protectionism, in 
addition, the Statist-Economy approach adopted here will advance a 
non-reductionist approach to the polity. This involves a two-way 
process of analysis. TO understand protectionism, we will need to 
examine the effects of the state ipon the process of economic 
development. In doing so, we shall simultaneously be able to 
conceptualise the autonomous powers of the state and political 
processes.
Most theories of protectionism and free trade focus at the 
explanative level ijpon a country* s level or stage of economic 
development. Three fundamental stages require different trade 
regimes;
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(1) When industrialisation is in its infancy, industries "require" 
protection in order to be able to initially develop, (for exairple 
Russia 1870-1914, United States 1790-1840s).
(2) However v^en the economy has reached a stable and advanced stage 
of development and the "infant" industries have grown up, protection 
is no longer "required". Such a level of development, (especially if 
a country has some claim to economic dominance over its competitors), 
will "require" free trade. Ihat is, free trade will ensure maximum 
economic gains. (For example, British industry post 1840, German 
agriculture upto 1879, and increasingly German industry post-1890.
(3) When the economy eventually declines, tariffs are once again 
"required" in order to protect the weakening economic sphere vAiich 
can no longer fend off foreign competition, (for example British 
industry post-1880/1914, German agriculture post-1879).
In this schema various trading regimes are determined by the 
" requirements" of economic interest groups. Uiis is essentially an 
economically functionalist causal statement, reducing state policies 
of protectionism/free trade to the requirements of the econony. The 
above formula finds its classical expression in the works of 
Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton. List pointed out pace Smith 
and Ricardo, that the British policy of free trade after 1846 did not 
accord the status of a collective public good in the international 
arena, since it clearly benefited Britain at the expense of her 
competitors. Before true freedom of trade could be attained this 
imbalance would have to be made good.
"... in order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less 
advanced nations must first be raised by artificial measures to that 
stage of cultivation to which the English nation has been 
artificially elevated" (List 1885; 131).
This was therefore backed up by the fact that Britain had grown up 
with protectionism (List 1885: 119-127,147). In fact List turned
Smith, Ricardo and " cosmopolitical econony*' on its head;
'"The system of protection, in as much as it forms the only means of 
placing those nations v^ch are far behind in civilisation on equal 
terms with the one predominating nation... the system of protection
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regarded froti this point of view appears to be the most efficient 
means of furthering the final union of nations and hence also of 
promoting true freedom of trade" (1885; 127).
List rejects the methodological individualism of classical political 
economy at the domestic level, vMch is transposed to a laissez-faire 
doctrine of international relations (1885: 163-172,262). Instead he 
advocated a "nationalist" solution to acquire the international 
public good of future long term economic growth and development;
"It is the task of national economy to acconplish the econcmcal 
development of the nation, and to prepare it for admission into the 
universal society of the future" (1885: 175).
The short term policy of national economy involves the use of 
selective tariffs in order to protect infant industries, so that the 
long term goal of growth for all nations can be achieved (1885; 
127, 131, 164-165).
Following on from this classical position is the advancement of the 
Neo-Iistian school, represented in the first instance by Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962; 1963; 1970). Protectionism is fundamental for the 
successful laying down of a broad based industrialisation programme 
by industrial latecomers. Ibis is classically represented by Russia 
1885-1913, (to be critically evaluated in Ch^±er 3). Dieter Sen^iaas 
has made a general case for the advantages of protection for late 
starters (as well as early starters). Like List before him he states 
that;
"Free trade is a doctrine vAiich caters for the interests of highly 
productive economies" (1985: 218).
Thus the Listian position clearly covers the first two stages of 
development as outlined above. Hoæver as we shall see shortly, the 
"infant industries" argument, v^ch consciously inverts the classical 
political economy approach, is common to most if not all theories 
with the obvious exception of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, as 
well as Public Choice theory..
A summary of what shall be termed the "basic-force" model of 
hegemonic stability (HST hereaifter), is as fdllCRa. Market systems
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are inherently unstable, or nonhomecstatic. The effective running of 
the international econary " requires" the active involvement of a 
hegemon. A hegemon is defined primarily by its economic potential. 
More specifically, economic potential is defined by; " relative 
efficiency" (Gilpin 1975); ".relative size and level of econanic 
development of the state" (Krasner 1987: 48, 1976: 323); "relative 
size - small, medium or large" (Kindleberger 1981: 22; or relative 
size and relative labour productivity (Lake 1988: 29-44). Despite the 
"realist" foundations of this approach, political and military power 
are as explanatory variables downplayed. Hence Krasner argues that 
military force is not likely to create compliance and in any event, 
it is "unlikely to be enployed against medium states" (1976/1987: 
52).
Indeed the HST model, especially in the works of Stephen Krasner and 
Robert Gilpin return us to the status .quo ante. Ihat is they invert 
the "national-economy" approach, ly arguing that the international 
market is subject to disrvptions due to the actions of states 
pursuing their own short term national interests at the expense of 
long term economic growth. A far-si^ited hegemon is required to 
circumvent the self destruction of the international, and hence 
ultimately, the national economy, by individual states. For Gilpin 
and Kindleberger in particular, the hegemon must be willing to bear 
the costs of providing the collective public good through self-less 
leadership. Already we have returned to the economic functionalism 
already encountered in the nationalist school. With the HST model, 
this problem becomes particularly acute, as is revealed by its 
explanation of free trade and protection.
Essentially the theory states that free trade regimes, (1846-1879 in 
Europe, and post 1945), were the creation of hegemonic leadership, 
(Britain and America respectively). Britain in the nineteenth century 
favoured free trade and thus spread it throuÿiout the international 
system. It is also assumed that various institutions and methods 
(bribes /side-payments - Kindleberger; side payments and coercion - 
Lake (1988: 50), or positive economic incentives and at the
margin, coercion - Krasner 1976/1987: 52), are instigated by the
hegemon to ensure the spreading of the free trade system. However
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these assuiTçtions are enpirically incorrect, on many if not all 
counts, particularly for the nineteenth century.
However, hegemonic regimes are also nonhomeostatic and thus 
ultimately unstable (Kindleberger 1981: 251; Gilpin 1987: 78), or as 
John A Hall and G. J. Ikenberry characterise this formulation, "... the 
exercise of hegemony is necessarily self-liquidating" (1989: 84. See 
also Hall 1990: 117). The result of this "long term!' decline is the 
return to conflictuel national " beggar-thy-neighbour" policies. Thus 
protectionism is returned to \^en hegemony declines. Hence the rise 
and fall of protectionist/free trade regimes is premised 'upon the 
condition of hegemony, measured in economic terms. The theory 
however, is particularly weak in explaining the rise and fall of free 
trade and protectionism (T. J. McRecwn 1983: 73-91; A. A. Stein 1984:
357), and indeed the rise of hegemony in the first place. The basic 
force HST model assumes that the correlation between hegemony and 
free trade can be couched in causal terms. Claiming that a hegemon 
has a clear interest in free trade is not synonymous to explaining 
the emergence of the latter, just as in the same way the assertion 
that liberal capitalism requires hegemony does not explain the 
latter's emergence. Nevertheless, noting the crude economic- 
functionalist approach to causality does not undermine the essential 
ejqjlanatory base of the HST model. That is, both free trade and 
protectionism (as well as hegemony), are e^qalained in accordance with 
the long term requirements of international capitalism, as the 
Listian problematic ultimately argues, (thou^ the "long term!' has 
proved to be empirically something of a misnomer).
For Gilpin in particular, tariffs are the result of interest grouçs 
within individual nation states seeking to protect their own domestic 
markets (1987: 48; see also Krasner 1976/1987: 48). The rent-seeking 
literature forms a complete theoretical approach to explaining tariff 
protectionism. Bruno Frey has recently lamented that the public 
choice approach to explaining protectionism has been "almost totally 
disregarded" (1984: 200). One reason for this is the lack of the 
theory's application to historical analysis. Indeed there is barely 
any public choice literature on nineteenth century protectionism. 
Nevertheless, the theory is certainly worthy of review.
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Public choice theorists vrork essentially within a normative framework 
which stipulates the primacy of economic efficiency through 
competition within the free market system. Rents, handed dcwn by 
governmental interference, produce artificial blockages to the free 
flow of the market. Tariffs for example distort prices in favour of 
those monopolist groups \hich can capture them (Tullock 1967). 
Stigler (1971) classically argued that economic regulation/tariff 
protectionism serves the private interests of politically effective 
groups, (also Wilson 1980). For the most part this approach focuses 
on the competing struggles of various interest groups - or "special 
interests" as Mancur Olson (1965) has classically argued (see 
especially A. Q  Krueger 1974; J. J. Pincus 1977; R. E. Caves 1976; 
R. E. Baldwin 1986). It is important to note that these interest groups 
are hi^üy differentiated. To the extent that small and pc^ '^ erful 
interests can win tariff policies is a function of their superior 
capacity to organise. Ihat is consumers as a »^hole are too unwieldy 
and disparate to effectively organise to win exclusive policies from 
the state. This in effect rests on certain pluralistic assumptions 
about the composition of interest groups and the multiple notions of 
the distribution of pcifær within society. Ihis aspect above all 
differentiates this approach from Marxism.
Though operationalising a more narrow definition of the cocposition 
and distribution of pcwer within society, Marxist theories to a 
certain extent overlap with the " capture" approach. Karl Marx, argued 
that protection was for the most part an obstacle to economic 
progress, though he did state that tariffs could aid capitalists in 
the early stages of industrialisation. At this stage of economic 
development protectionism would "... serve the bourgeoisie... as a 
means for the concentration of its own powers" Poverty of Philosophv 
(in McClellan 1977: 250). In general however, Marx believed, somevdiat 
naively according to Anthony Brewer (1980: 86), - as did his mentor 
David Ricardo - that free trade was the most efficient system in the 
spreading of capitalist social relations around the globe. Thus he 
stated that;
"... the free trade system is destructive. It breaks up old 
nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the
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bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system 
hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary sense 
alone... that I vote in favour of free trade" fPoverty of Philosoohv 
in McClellan 1977 : 270).
Rudolf Hilferding similarly argued that free trade maximised British 
industrial si.^remacy (1981: 310). He subscribed to the "3 stage
economistic model" whereby educative tariffs for infant industries 
"would accelerate the emergence of industry within the protected 
borders" (1981: 310). But once protection had fulfilled its role,
free trade facilitates exports. Before decline sets in Hilferding, 
like many other theorists, recognised a further stage or scenario. 
That is even under conditions of economic sijgiremacy, cartels can 
rationally maximise their gains through protectionism. In this 
instance cartels use tariffs to increase their gains at the expense 
of other indigenous producers (1981: 311-314). Ihis clearly overlaps 
with the theories of economic regulation, and in particular the 
Public Choice approach.
Ihe classical belief in the long term good in the spreading of 
capitalism around the globe, preferably through free trade, has been 
largely discounted by the various guises that modem Marxism has 
adopted. First and foremost is the " Dependency School" vMch in 
common with Immanuel Wallerstein claims that the spreading of 
capitalism leads to an ever increasing gsç between first and third 
world countries. Undevelopment becomes intensified to 
"underdevelopment" throu^ the extraction of perLpheral profits by 
the metropolitan countries (as classically stated by A. G. Frank 
1967, 1972; 0. Sunkel 1969; C  Furtado 1971, 1973; Dos Santos 1970/1973). 
In this formulation therefore withdrawal from the capitalist system 
is necessary if an autonomous and sustained industrialisation is to 
take place (Sutcliffe 1972; S. Amin 1974, 1976; Cardoso & Faletto 1979; 
Wallerstein 1974). Ihe trade regime prescription therefore is an 
inversion of the classical position. Ihus the rational course of 
action for third world countries is the adoption of Inport 
Substitution Industrialisation .
A return to the classical liberal (and indeed Marxist) terrain is 
witnessed with the widespread adoption of the theory of "Free Trade 
Inperialisirf' (originally expressed by J. Gallagher and R  Robinson
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1953: 1-15). Thus Britain adopted free trade after 1846 in accordance 
with the desires of the industrial class through which it would 
achieve international supremacy (A. Brewer 1980: 95-96; Gamble 1985; 
B. Semmel 1970). In addition a common Marxist position has been 
established in the case of nineteenth century Germany (see Chapter 
2). Indeed a spate of works have been produced, which explain 
aricultural protectionism after 1879 as a function of the exclusive 
power of the landowning Junker class. Thus being able to capture the 
state they were able to extract a policy of protectionism at the 
expense of the consuming population (H. Rosenberg 1943, 1985; F. Fischer 
1975; aavfehler 1985a, 1985b; V. Berghahn 1973, 1982, 1985). Such an 
analysis is not unique to Marxism. Indeed this theory has found its 
strongest expression in the liberal analysis of Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1943).
Whilst these approaches focus on the exclusive ability of the 
dominant economic class to appropriate state policies for itself, the 
neo-classical theory invokes a " factors of production" analysis 
foUcwing the Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Chlin theorems. This 
envisages a wider conception of economic interests than that of 
Marxism, v^ ien focussing on the causes of free trade and 
protectionism. RogcwskL (1989) has provided an exhaustive analysis of 
free trade and protectionism particularly for the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries for much of the world. PogcwskL notes three 
possible combinations of the three factors of production; land, 
labour and capital. These are located for two types of econony - 
advanced and backward. In turn these are analysed in terms of a 
country* s insertion into the world econony under conditions of either 
expanding or declining trade. Under conditions of expanding trade, 
abundant factors of production will favour free trade, as they will 
under conditions of declining free trade. Scarce factors will favour 
protectionism under either set of trade conditions. This theory has 
the advantage over Marxism in that it can explain vAiy factors or 
classes other than the dominant class can come to secure and indeed 
benefit, from protectionism.
By way of a summary it should be clear by new that all these major 
theories of free trade and protectionism rest \jpon an essential
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"economistic base". Trade regimes are e^qslained through recourse to 
the outcome of economic group preferences (variously defined), within 
civil society. The effects of the various trade regimes are 
considered only in terms of the economic benefits provided. The HST 
explanation of trade regimes also has recourse to economic factors; 
namely the economic distribution of power within the international 
system. This economistic base is also prevalent in current theories 
of the state, particularly those vMch emanate from the above 
mentioned theories of economic development.
SBCHCM z
Establishing the Econccdstic Consensus Theories of the State 
Econcmio reductionisin in Marxist and Liberal Political theory
Either inplicitly or explicitly, these analyses of free trade and 
protection are bound up with a theory of the state. For the most part 
such theories assume the state to be a passive intermediary (trager); 
that is a bearer of external econanic requisites within civil 
society, whether these be the wishes of the dominant class, or, any 
one of a mixture of factors of production/economic interest groups. 
Thus the major paradigms - Marxist, Neo Classical, Liberal and 
Pluralist - all reduce the state to economic externalities.
Modem Marxists have claimed that there are two theories of the state 
in the works of classical Marxism. The first position - which is 
usually discounted on the grounds of its crude reductionism - is 
found in the Communist Manifesto, vhere it is claimed that,
"The executive of the modem state is but a committee for managing 
the common ciffairs of the vhde bourgeoisie" (Marx 1848/1977: 35).
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Thus the bourgeoisie has "conquered for itself... exclusive political 
sway" (1848/1977: 35. For a similar position see also; Critique of the 
Gotha Programme 1875/1972: 26-33, Engels; Anti-Duhrinq 1894/1955:
386), The second position involves a "nominal" and an "actual" 
theory. Focussing on The Eighteenth Bnmwirp. of Louis Naooleon. Neo- 
Marxists have claimed that Marx conceived a position ^ere the state 
had acquired a degree of independence or autonony. However, this is 
the nominal or "bourgeois" view, to vMch we shall return. The 
anomaly between these two formulations was quickly and formally 
resolved by Meuoc in this latter work. Marx wrote time and again that 
a strong state such as Bonaparte's was necessary so that capital may 
defeat and achieve hegemony over the proletariat. Thus in The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Naijoleon , Marx wrote;
" Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard Bourgeois 
order... by protecting its material power, he generates its political 
power anew" (quoted in McClellan 1977: .322).
This was reinforced by Engels;
"From the moment \jhen it was no longer a question of protecting the 
nobility against the onrush of the bourgeoisie, but of protecting all 
propertied classes against the onrush of the working class, the old 
absolutist monarchy had to go over completely to the form of state 
expressly devised for this purpose: the Bonapartist Monarchy" (The 
Peasant War in Germany 1850/1957: 27).
Thus Marx argued that v^lst the state appeared to be autoncmous, in 
reality, "... state pcwsr is not suspended in mid air. Bonaparte 
represents a class... " (Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon quoted in McClellan 1977: 317)
Thus the key words in this analysis are "appearance" and "reality". 
These words lead us to the very core - the rational kernel - of the 
Marxist method. Marx' s critique of the Physiocrats -such as Turgot 
and Quesnay; of classical political economy - Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo; of " vulgar" economy - James Mill and Nassau Senior; of 
anarchism - notably, Proudhon; and also of German philosophy - 
notably Feuedcach, was that they had analysed only the siperficial, 
phenomenal or "apparent" features of social life and had failed to 
penetrate them for their "real" underlying essence (Capital I.
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1867/1954: 14-16, 66, 94-96, 155-157, 159-160, 290-291, 412-421, 504;
Capital III. 1867/1966: 168,392-393,817-818,827; 1868a/1983: 148-149; 
Theories of Surplus Value Vol. 3 1862/1972: 454-523). For Marx, and in 
contrast to Althusser, this method is central to his "mature” as wall 
as the " early” works and forms the rational kernel of his 
specifically "scientific" principles. "All Science would be 
superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things did 
not coincide" (Capital III: 817). This was central to his notion of 
" fetishism!'.
Fetishism arises v^en a phenomenon, for exargle a commodity, appears 
to have a value or power inherent within itself; that is, independent 
of the social relations vhich had produced it. Indeed for Marx it was 
fetishism (rather than siitply the media, religion or the state, as 
neo-Marxists have tended to argue), that constituted the major form 
of "bourgeois mystification". Commodity fetishism "has its 
origins... in the peculiar character of the labour that produces theirf' 
(Capital I: 77). Thus a "...definite social relation between
men... assumes in their eyes the fantastic form of a relation between 
things" (Capital I: 77. Also, 54-88; ttt«. 172,826-827; h
Contribution to A Critique of Pol itical Economy 1859/1976; 31,51-52).
However, it is not just commodities that give rise to fetishism. Thus 
Marx discerned "capital" fetishism, \diich refers to industrial 
capital. This refers to the illusion of capital as productive, 
whereas it is in fact merely derived from labour (CnTpdHsga 
1857/1971: 267, 297, 308, 528-9, 585, 684, 700-2, 745, 758, 759, 822; Capital
I: 366,483,567-570; Capital II: 385; Capital III: 45,47-
48, 168,392,827; Theories of Surplus Value 305,389-392). Marx also 
referred to the fetishism that occurred throu^ " interest-bearing” 
capital, or, commercial capital (Capital I: 529-530). "The relations 
of capital assume their most externalised and most fetish-like form 
in interest bearing capital" (Capital III: 391. Also, 392-399,829- 
831; Theories of Surplus Value Vol. 3: 453-468).
In addition money creates the illusion of an independent pcwer, 
particularly as the effective realisation of "exchange value". Money 
however cannot inpart value to a commodity (Çj^ pitAi T; 95-96;
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fir-iiTTfjri 59-69, 160; Critique of Political Ecorottv: 31,51-52;
Theories of Surplus Value: Vol. 1: 204-209). This is also found in the 
money form of vages vMch appear as the "fair*' remuneration of labour 
(Capital I; 501-507, 532-533; Can-it^ T TTT; 826-827).
The separation of the commodity, and in particular money, as a power 
independent of the social relations of production is mirrored in the 
bourgeois distinction between "exchange" and "use" value. Exchange 
value is specifically the fetishised realisation of the exploitation 
of labour (Contribution to a Critique: 30-31, 51-52; CnnviHqgft
1857/1973: 59-69). It is the outward "market" expression of an inner 
social contradiction lying within the "productive" sphere. Thus we 
have returned to our starting point - ccanmodity fetishism.
In sum we can observe a general feedback loop within the "economic 
sphere". This is represented by the "bourgeois" notion of the 
"Trinity Formula" (see Cap-ii-ai ttt? 814-831; Theories of Surplus 
Value. Vol. 3: 454-523). The exploitation of labour (or specifically) 
labour power gives rise to a product ^Aiich appears to embody an 
"exchange value" independent of the exploitative productive sphere. 
This value - unique to the capitalist system - entails fetishism 
through the apparent belief that the commodity has its own unique 
value and that capital embodies productive power. Money merely adds 
to the confusion. However the Marxist "scientific" method penetrates 
through these illusions to reveal the essence of reality - 
contradictory social relations of production.
Marx applied this method not only to the economy but also to all non­
economic phenomena, or the " siçjerstructure" (Preface to a 
Contribution to A nnntriHition to a Critique). In the fourth thesis 
on Feuerbach, Marx argues that Feuerbach resolves “ the religious 
world into its secular basis". However this secular basis fails to 
recognise the contradictory nature of social reality vMch still 
remains. The Sixth thesis argues that reducing religion to man still 
leaves the problem intact. Marx also applied this method to the 
state. This was done through a two-fold theoretical movement. Firstly 
he invoked Rousseau's argument, whereby citizenship within a liberal 
parliamentary system is seen to be a sham. That is, " citizenship^'
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must be penetrated to its political essence vAiere the masses have no 
real say in politics due to the inadequacies of the system which 
involves voting for so-called representatives once every five years; 
(as Marx stated in his Introduction to A Critique of Heoel's 
Phil06oohv of Right, individuals may be equal in the " heaven" of 
their political world, they are most certainly unequal in the earthly 
existence of society (see McClellan 1977; 63-74). However, to go
beyond the liberal paradigm of Rousseau involves the "scientific" 
economic penetration of citizenship to show that the state itself is 
merely the outward e:q)ression of the dominant economic class (See 
especially The Civil War in France; Ihe Critique of the Gotha 
Programme). Wb can new return to Marxf s original project in Ihe 
Eighteenth Brumaire.
Ihus for Marx, vMlst the state pcwer ' apparently' soared h i ^  above 
society, in reality it served merely to renew the conditions and 
means ' for the enslavement of labour by capital'. Ihat is, the 
appearance of autonomy is in fact a "bourgeois" sham, vMch must be 
penetrated for its real underlying essence; its "bourgeois/class" 
basis, dearly therefore, Marxist "science" specifically embraces the 
method by ^^ch all phenomena - religious, political, ethnic and 
certain economic phenomena - exchange value, capital, money etc, - 
are reduced to an essential reality; namely the exploitation of one 
class by another. Fetishism ultimately rests i;pon the Labour theory 
of Value as it is expressed within capitalism (as opposed to 
communism). To fail to reduce these phenomena in this way is to fall 
into the "trapP that the "bourgeois" theorists such as James Mill, 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Feuerbach and a later Max Weber fell into. 
Ihat is they failed to realise that Capitalism embodied the 
dialectical seeds of its own destruction and was therefore only a 
transitory phenomenon. Ihus classical as well as neo-classical 
economics merely "eternalised" capitalism, by giving the laws, of 
supply and demand, prices, wages, rent and profit a natural character 
(Capital I: 23-24,85,483,504,528; TT: 229; Iheories of
Surplus Value Vol. 1: 49; Ihe H d v  Family quoted in Mcdennan 1977: 
132-133). In doing so, they contributed to the process of "bourgeois 
mystification".
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Shunning the "crude reductionisirf' of the Communist Manifesto, many 
neo-Marxists have focussed exclusively on the " nominal", or 
"bourgeois" position advocated in The Eicrtiteenth RrniTnaire and have 
attenpted to conceptualise the notion of an autonomous state. In line 
with the original problematic of Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar and 
Ni cos Poulantzas, (the French " Eurocommunist" School), they have 
argued that the state is not sinply a passive agent of the dominant 
economic class (something which those in the Weberian canp have been 
arguing for decades ) but has rather a degree of independence 
expressed as "relative autonomy". That is, the state often intervenes 
in the economy against the short term interests of individual 
capitals. However the reason for this is sinple. The state must be 
far enough removed from the economic arena so as to be able to ensure 
the "long tenrf’ r^roduction of the capitalist class (J. Or Connor 
1973: 6; R. Miliband 1973: 85,88; 1975: 316; 1977: 31,66-74;
G. Therbom 1980: 219-244, 1982: 242-244; C. Qffe 1974; Offe & Ponge 
1982: 249-257; S. Hall 1984: 22-23. S. Clarke 1988: 131; E. Mandel 1975: 
Ch. 15, 16, 18; E. d  Wri^t 1978; I.Gou^ 1979; 1983: 157-158;
N. Poulantzas 1973: 44-56,187-189,255-321, 1978: 25-27; L. Althusser
1971: 131-132).
It should be immediately apparent that we have re-entered the 
econanic-functionalist problematic. The state is understood only in 
so far as it is required by capitalism and the dominant economic 
class. That is it functions meiely to maintain not the short term but 
the long run interests of the bourgeoisie. All that these analyses 
have done is to substitute the phrase "long term?' for "short term?'; 
the content of economic reductionism of the original statement in the 
Canmunist Manifesto however remains. The conclusion is sinple. As far 
as state power is involved, "relative autonon^ is a sham. Indeed 
this has been recognised within Marxist circles. Laclau has correctly 
pointed out that "determination in the last instance" (a logical 
consequence of "relative autonomy" ), lacks a precise theoretical 
content (1979: 73-79. See also A. GLucksman 1972). Laclau goes onto 
argue however that these Althusserian non-reductionist raw materials 
can be upgraded into truly theoretical concepts. Unfortunately in 
doing so he would have returned us to a bourgeois status quo ante.
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These " relatively autonomous" theories are in fact synonymous in 
content with the "actual" position found in Nfeirx. That is the state 
in itself has no real or effective power. In practice, these versions 
are synonymous to the ejglicitly reductionist theories of the state, 
vhich include; the State Monopoly Capitalist School - Fine and Harris 
(1979); Corporatist - Mandel (1975); more generally - Glyn and 
Sutcliffe (1972). All such Marxists in practice have remained true to 
the reductionist cause, even though many continue - at least at the 
rhetorical level - to discount such a sinplistic approach. Sadly it 
would seem that such Marxists have ignored the analytical logic of 
their methodological approaches in favour of espousing self- 
contradictory rhetoric.
An equally reductionist methodology is found in more overtly liberal 
analyses of the state. Topical in this respect is Alexander 
Gerschenkron, v^ iose understanding . of the state is barely 
distinguishable from the Marxist position. This is classically 
expressed in his analysis of the nineteenth century Kaiserreich In 
Bread and Democracy (1943) he argued that the Junker class was able 
to secure protectionism on wheat, rye and oats by virtue of its 
monopolist position within the state and bureaucracy (see also; 
F. B. Tipton 1976; 120; Ber^iahn 1973: 9-10, 12 - see also Ch. 2 in this 
thesis). In common with the Marxist position, this is an 
"exclusivist" version of the "capture" theory of the state. This is 
due to the fact that the landlords were able to secure protection at 
the e^q^ense of the welfare of small producers and peasants. The 
parallel is continued further for he argues that the landlords 
effectively duped the peasants into siding with them, [hence the 
peasants suffered from false class consciousness] (see also 
Kindleberger 1978a; 34). This analysis mirrors the majority of the 
Marxist approaches to the German state, utilising an instrumentalist 
view of the state. That is owing to the strong personal ties between 
the state and the Junker class the former acts in the interest of the 
latter.
A differing liberal position is found in the neo-classical position. 
The Hecks cher-Ghlin and StolperrSamuelson models have clear 
implications for state policy. In this vein Ron Rogcwski^ s recent
24
book invokes an explicit and unashamedly reductionist approach. As we 
have seen, protectionist or free trade policies are invoked by the 
state as it responds to the inç)eratives of the differing strengths of 
the various factors of production as they in turn face up to the 
constraints of expanding or contracting trade. He takes this a stage 
further by arguing that major political movements have an explicitly 
economistic base.
American populism he argues is the result of an urban conflict vhere 
the only abundant factor - land - fights against the defensive 
(protectionist) coalition of labour and capital. "Neither 
E. E. Schattschneider nor Walter Dean Burnham could have described more 
succinctly the history of the populist movement or of the election of 
1896" (1989: 9). Under conditions of declining trade in advanced
economies, ^ere land is assertive (scarce) and labour and capital 
defensive (abundant), Western European Fascism occurs. Uhder the same 
trading conditions, vhere land and capital are defensive and labour 
assertive, we can observe the foundation of the U. S. New Deal (1989: 
7-13). He also claims that the model can explain not least Socialism, 
South American Populism, Asian and East European Fascism.
Public Choice theorists invoke a similarly reductionist view of the 
state and political processes. As with Poulantzas, the state is 
viewed as nothing more than a locus of struggle between conpeting 
societal groips. This clearly overlaps with the pluralistic view of 
the political process. Bruno Frey has summarised this conception as 
follows. "Protection is demanded ty particular groips of voters, 
firms, and associated interest groups and parties, and supplied by 
politicians and public bureaucracies" (1984: 209). Once again, the 
state acts as nothing more than the supplier of interest groups' 
needs
This thesis will attenpt to go beyond the analytical assumptions of 
the "economistic consensus", to provide an alternative theory. The 
first point to make is that the economistic consensus is only 
partially correct. Groups within civil society can gain advantages 
from the state. However, vhy is that these are only ever viewed as 
"concessions"? In contrast this thesis will advance an alternative
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formulation, vAiereby the state will be seen to determine policies of 
protection in accordance with its own autonomous political interests. 
Far from functioning as an irput-output mechanism meeting the needs 
of society (pluralism) or the capitalist class (Marxism), or the 
needs of special interest groups (public choice), or the needs of 
certain factors of production (neo-classical), the state will be 
conceptualised in this thesis not as a passive bearer of societal 
agents, but as an active autonomous agent shaping economic policy and 
society according to its own interests.
Specifying the autonomous powers of the state will be done by 
examining the determination of the twin processes of fiscal (tax) and 
trade regimes. This will require a fiscal-sociological approach vhich 
links in a fundamental way, the state, taxation and the economy.
SECTECN 3
Ihe Fiscal Sociological Origins of the Statist-Economy e^sproach to 
Protection and EccncRdo Development
Peter Christian WLtt, a major pioneering force in the field of 
taxation, made the inportant point, that fiscal sociology has 
lamentably become "yet another specialised branch of historiography*' 
siitply to be added to "existing approaches such as social and 
economic history, constitutional history, administrative history or 
business history" (1987a: 1). This thesis will free fiscal sociology 
from its narrcw shackles by using it as part of an overall approach 
to understanding political and economic development. In syirpathetic 
agreement with WLtt, it seems a mystery as to vAiy a general analysis 
of taxation has been so fundamentally neglected within political, 
social and economic theory, the development of states and economies 
have been indissolubly linked to taxation policies. The connection 
between social turmoil, state power and tax policies is illustrated 
in numerous historical uprisings. The obvious and uncontentious 
exanple that springs to mind is the 1381 peasants* revolt, mirrored
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by Wiat has euphemistically been called the "Battle of Trafalgar" in 
London, March 31, 1990 (The Poll Tax riots). But much of history's 
struggles have been witnessed in the form of tax revolts. Furthermore 
such revolts have been conducted against the state rather than the 
dominant economic class.
An important underlying theme to this thesis is the notion of 
taxation as an exploitative mechanism. An integral assumption of this 
notion is the differentiation between political struggles and 
economic/class conflict. The tvro are not synoi^mous. Indeed most of 
the "working class struggles" conducted in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were conducted to extract political 
concessions from the state (political, economic and social 
citizenship to use T. H. Marshall's terms). It can be clearly seen that 
there is an almost perfect correlation between "class struggle" and 
state regime types. Put simply, those authoritarian and autocratic 
states vhich repressed the working classes (Germany and Russia 
respectively), witnessed the growth of militant labour movements. 
Those liberal regimes such as Britain and America vhich granted the 
working classes political, social and varying degrees of economic 
(and fiscal) citizenship witnessed more reformist, non-Marxist labour 
movements (for similar discussions see S. M. Upset 1985; J. M. Mann 
1987, 1988a; J. A. Hall 1988a, 1988b, 1989; T. McDaniel 1989; I. Katznelson 
1985, 1986; A. Zolberg 1986). Historically there is only a very weak 
correlation between capitalism and revolution (especially of the 
Socialist variant) at the empirical level. There is however 
overwhelming evidence to sipport the connection between authoritarian 
state regimes and revolution.
From the angle of this thesis, it is also important to note that one 
vital aspect which led to the political alienation of the labour 
movements (in Germany and Russia), was the application by the state 
of hi^iLy regressive (indirect) as well as hi^ily oppressive tax 
bases (in contrast with the U. S. and particularly with Britain). The 
revolts of 1917 in Russia, and 1918-1919 in Germany were to a certain 
extent tax struggles (which became particularly evident in the German 
Weimar period). One aim of this thesis vri.ll be to analyse the fiscal 
origins of the post wvar revolutions in Germany and Russia. In sum it
27
is being argued that revolutions and reformism, liberalism, 
authoritarianism and autocracy are inseparably linked to central 
issues of states and taxation policies.
A further area for vMch fiscal sociology is important, is an 
analysis of the historical development of state building. This is 
recognised by a host of modem writers (see especially J. M. Mann
1980b, 1986, 1988, 1992; J. Brewer 1988; M. Levi 1988; C. Tilly
1975, 1985, 1990; G. Ardant 1975; R. Braun 1975; S. Finer 1975; J. A. Hall 
and G. J. Ikenberry 1989, and classically by RVfeber 1922/1978). The 
relative neglect of the discipline of " fiscal sociology" has been 
lamented by such historians. As Margaret Levi has pointed out, for 
the most part political analysts have given scant attention to the 
process vAiereby states acquire revenues. Where there is a recognition 
of this process, such vrork has been either enpirically thin, or 
lacking at the explanatory level (Levi 1988: 6-7).
A study of the state itself must begin with an analysis of government
revenues and expenditures. Analysing expenditures allows us to 
understand exactly vAiat the state does. The comparative work of 
Michael Mann shows that certainly ipto the late nineteenth century 
states - both authoritarian and liberal - were primarily occupied 
with achieving a strong militsuiy capacity (Mann 1986; 1992). For a 
similar analysis applied to the British state see J. Brewer 1989; 
P. KaBrien 1989; P. Mathias and P.OBrLen 1976; M. Levi 1988). Each 
chapter in this thesis will examine the expenditures of the various 
states. This will provide the backdrop (or rather the demand side to 
states' budgets) for the analysis of taxation and tariff policies.
Historically, as states sou^t to develop their military capacities 
so they were forced to develop more lucrative and efficient systems 
of revenue extraction. Skocpol states that "... with recurrent warfare 
within the European states system, ncmrchs and statesmen looked to 
centralise, regiment, and technologically upgrade fiscal 
administration and armies" (1979: 21). As was often the case, states 
came up against a major obstacle to tax maximisation collection. 
Because they lacked sufficient infrastructural power or reach into 
civil society they became dependent upon the landed classes, since
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only they could extract taxes from the peasantry owing to their close 
proximity. Naturally the landowners were anxious to minimise tax 
extraction from the peasantry since this would diminish the surplus 
peasant product available for exploitation. Thus for their own 
selfish reasons, landowners tended to shield their peasants from the 
tax-seeking activities of the state. As a result an extremely tense 
relationship developed between landlords and state. To circumvent 
this problem the state sou^t to expand its own infrastructural reach 
by developing a bureaucracy, vdiich could replace the landlords as 
collector of taxes. And even if the landc^mers joined the bureaucracy 
they would then be under legal-bureaucratic obligation to hand over 
the revenues. Ihus as states sought to extract revenue, they 
simultaneously became bureaucratised. Taxation lies at the heart of 
state building.
The fiscal sociology of the state also enables us to understand
better the process of economic development. Historically the
extraction of revenues to fund military activities inpacted directly
on the development of capitalism. Between 1485 and 1688, as changes 
in military technologies made warfare more expensive (the First 
Military Revolution), and monarchs consequently set about increasing 
revenues, so they became more dependent on trade to finance warfare. 
They protected merchants in return for financial resources. Thus 
customs and excise became important as a means to fund the stats' s 
military activities (Mann 1980b, 1986ei; Giddens 1985). Whilst this 
stimulated the emergence of the centralised nation state, it also led 
to the development of capitalism. Hence states established 
bureaucracies to collect and administer taxes, vMch in turn promoted 
increasing commercialisation and the emergence of national markets 
for capital, labour, goods and services, corresponding to political 
boundaries. As Otto Hintze put it,
" The rise and development of capitalism remains unintelligible 
without insight into hew they (states) \iere conditioned "by the course 
of national formation" (1975: 427).
Hence the state, through its military and fiscal activities played a 
central part in the development of capitalism. Such an approach will 
form the lynchpin of this thesis, for as we shall see it was the
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process by vMch the state, in following "its" own multiple
political, military and fiscal interests, that led ultimately to the 
choice of protectionist or free trade regimes after 1870. In the late 
nineteenth century, Europe underwent the second military revolution. 
The fusion of the military and industrial revolutions [vAiich were 
inextricably linked], in the climate of increasingly unstable 
international political relations, led to rapidly rising government 
costs. To cover these rapidly rising government e:q5enditures, great 
power states looked for new sources of fiscal revenue. Hiis provided 
a vital iirpetus to the rise of the late nineteenth century phenomenon 
of " neo-mercantilism!'. Indeed as in the original mercantilist era, 
customs and excise became inportant in the funding of certain states' 
military activities. Hence chapter 2 will focus on the shift to 
protection by the German (authoritarian) state regime . In chapter 3, 
such an analysis will be used to explain the process of autocratic 
Russian tariff policy and industrialisation. Chapter 4 will focus on 
the alternative free trading formula in liberal Britain. Chapter 5 
will explain tariff policy in Liberal (federal) America from 1789- 
1913. Such an analysis rests ultimately upon the complex area of the 
"autonomous powers of the state". These must be carefully analysed if 
we are to be able to explain the process of protectionism, free trade 
and economic development, (see the final chapter for a comparative 
theory).
As a final point, it is important to point out that, we need to be 
careful of the term ' the state* ; for in reality there is no such 
thing as "the state" with a single set of interests, vhich enacts a 
long term rational plan of economic policy. "The state" is rather a 
highly differentiated forcefield of conpeting bureaucratic elements. 
Policy is often the outcome of the clash of various logics that are 
specific to the state as an arena of conpeting pcx^ er actors. 
Moreover, state power is not a singular phenomenon. Thus vre will be 
able to differentiate various aspects of the autonomous powers of the 
state. These will be central to the analysis of protectionism and 
taxation developed in the following chapters.
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The Tax Premise
All this may be summarised through recourse to the "tax premise". 
That is, before the state can operate it must first be able to 
extract revenue. Or to paraphrase Marx' s " labour premise" (German 
Ideology: quoted in NfcClellan 1977: 165),
We must begin by stating the first premise of political existence, 
namely that states must be in a position to live in order to be able 
to "make history". But political life involves before everything else 
revenue collection, sovereignty, coercion and legitimacy and many 
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of tax 
revenue itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental 
condition of all history.
As Rudolf Goldscheid poignantly put it;
"The budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading 
ideologies" (quoted in Schumpeter 1918/1954: 6). >
Equally as pertinent are Schunpeter's own comments;
"the public finances are one of the best starting points for an 
investigation of society... The spirit of a people, its cultural 
level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare - all 
this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all 
phrases. He ;Ao kncws hew to listen to the message here discerns the 
thunder of world history more clearly than anyvAere else" (1918/1954: 
7).
Thus tax revenues are the lifeblood or the sinews of the state. (See 
M. Levi 1988). The connection between taxation and state power are 
nicely captured by Jdin Brewer's title to his book The Sinews of 
Power 1989). Indeed, just as capitalists accumulate capital, so 
states seek to accumulate revenue. Any theory vMch purports to 
understand the state therefore, must begin with (or at the very least 
address) the issue of taxation (see G. Ardant 1975: 164-242; R. Braun 
1975: 243-327; F. K  Mann 1943: 225-235). To understand the state, we 
shall develop the concept of the mode of taxation. In turn, the 
inperatives of fiscal accumulation led in the period 1870-1914 to 
fundamental trade regime changes in several European states. In 
addition, the relations of extraction (upon vhich groiç) the tax
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burden lies) also aiffected the political choice of both tax and trade 
regimes.
This thesis will explain the so-called " switch to protectionism" 
between 1870-1914. In doing so we shall utilise an activist theory of 
the state, \drLch shapes economic development through the unintended 
and intended consequences of its multiple actions. Such an analysis 
builds on the neo-Weberian approach developed by the likes of Michael 
Mann (1986; 1988; 1992), John A Hall (1985; 1988; 1989), G John
Ikenberry 1986; 1988a; 1988b; 1989), Iheda Skocpol (1979; 1985a;
1985b; ), Linda Weiss (1988), Anthony Giddens (1985), Charles Tilly 
(1975a, 1975b, 1985, 1990), Peter Katzenstein (1985), Stephen Krasner 
(1978), Tim McDaniel (1988), and Eaidall CoUiis (1986).
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CHAPTER 2
THE STATE AND TARIFF PBOIEOHCNTSM IN FEDERAL (AUTHORITARIAN) GERMANY
1875-1913
Section 1 
The 1879 Tsudff
The Econoniistic Argument
In 1862, the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty substantially Ic^^ered 
the inport duties of the Zollverein. In 1871, the first year of the 
Reich, Germany had a free trade tariff similar to that of Britain. In 
1873 her last main protective import duties - those on pig-iron, 
steel ingots and ships, \^re abolished. The remaining iron duties 
were to be repealed in 1877. Up to 1876 protection had very little 
sipport, both in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Parliament. Free 
trade gained an overwhelming majority at the highest levels of 
government. However, in the late 1870's, the grain of the "virgin" 
lands, Russia and America, began to exert serious pressure on the 
unprotected German grain production, intensifying the crisis of 
German agriculture, (in addition to the bad European weather). 
American wheat production in 1870 stood at 235, 884, 700 bushels rising 
to 448,755, 100 bushels in 1879, whilst exports wvent from 52,774, 111 
bushels in 1870 to 150,502,506 in 1879 (Lambi 1963: 132). Not only had 
grain production vastly increased, tut in Russia and especially the 
U. S, the railways had opened iq) the plains, leading to a vast 
decrease in prices (kindleberger 1978a: 19-21). Furthermore the cost 
to transport a bushel of grain from Chicago to New York decreased 
from 21. 1 to 11. 8 cents in 1879 (see table 2.1).
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Table 2. 1 The Reduction in Transijort Costs per bushel of Grain fto
(e^gressed in cents)
From 
New York 
Actual Base
From
Odessa
Actual Base
1870 16. 7 100 26. 3 100
1875 15. 1 90 19. 3 73
1880 8. 8 53 14. 0 53
1885 6. 3 38 10. 5 40
1890 5.0 37 9. 4 36
Source; H. C  Famsvrorth (1934: 294-296)
Between 1873 and 1879 v^eat prices fell from 171 to 127 cents per 
bushel (Farnsworth 1934: 347). Expressed in German currency, the
freight rate for a ton of \dieat from New York to Liverpool fell from 
33 marks in 1873 to 19.3 marks in 1879 (K.W. Hardach 1967: 74-75). 
According to W. G. Hoffinan ^ eat prices fell from 231 marks per ton in 
1871 to 204 marks in 1879, vMlst rye fell from 156 to 138 marks per 
ton (1965: 552-554; see Appendix 2 in this thesis; also Hrrell 1951: 
25; cf. Lambi 1963: 133). With the expansion of cheap inports, 
Germany's trade balance in grain became unfavourable. After 1873 the 
inports of rye increased considerably. From 1876-' 9 the surplus of 
rye inports over exports averaged more than 1 million tons per annum, 
as compared to the 0. 5 million tons per annum in the first part of 
the decade. After 1876 the trade balance of vdieat similarly became 
unfavourable, running a deficit of 272,000 tons per annum, ip to 
1879. Germany like Britain, was now becoming a grain inporting 
country (Lambi 1963: 132). Ihouÿi the bulk of the grain came from 
Russia (between IBBO-' 4, 56% of rye and 35% of vdieat) and the Danube 
basin , North American and Austrian grain had an equally crippling 
effect ipon German agriculture. By 1880 Germany's ^eat imports were 
provided as follows; Austria-Hungary 37%, Russia 24%, United States 
39%, whilst Russia provided 62% of Germany's rye inports (Hrrell 
1951: 20)
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The ecoronistic argument states that in 1879 as a "response", 
Germany reintroduced tariffs to protect the manufacturing and 
especially, the Junker classes [East-Elhian/Pmssian landc^mers] 
(Bohme 1967: : 231-236; Gourevitch 1977: 285-291; Puhle 1986: 81-89;; 
Krasner 1976/ 1987: 61; RogowskL 1989: 38-40; Calleo 1978: 13-15;
Lambi 1963: 134-147; Peck 1978: 7-10; Clough aixl Cole 1952: 610-612; 
Stolper 1967: 35-37). The general argument may be summarised as
follows. Ihis radical turning point was accoitplished by the switch of 
the Junkers from alliance with the commercial interests of the 
northern cities to alliance with heavy industry. With the onset of 
agricultural depression, the Junker landlords of East Prussia came to 
favour protection, in order to shore up their declining share of 
domestic grain markets. According to Alexander Gerschenkron, the 
troubled Junkers were able to gain protectionist concessions from the 
state owing to their dominant political power base. (1943: 26-27,72- 
76 ). Gerschenkroh s liberal position is entirely congruent with 
Marxist analyses as v^l as non-Marxist. The similarity is continued 
by his claim that the Junkers gained in effect a monopolistic and 
privileged economic position, by virtue of the negative protection 
accorded the peasantry and the proletariat (Gerschenkron 1943: 16,26- 
27, 57-58, 74-76, 85, 87; see also, F. B. Tipton 1976: 120; H. Holbom 1969: 
371; RPogowski 1989: 38-40; RU.Wëhler 1985a: 36-39; V. P. Ber^iahn 
1973: 12; F. Fischer 1975: 6; D. W. Urwin 1980: 96-97).
Such an analysis has become widely accepted. Furthermore, it has 
provided the theoretical base for a comparative explanation of 
protection and free trade. Thus Kindleberger argues that the ultimate 
cause of protection was the loss of export markets for grain and the 
threat of imports. Kindleberger also argues that in Britain , the 
decrease in v^ ieat prices led to the final liquidation of the feudal 
landowners, and vtoLly benefited the bourgeoisie (1978a: 22,27). He 
counterposes the case of "bourgeois" Britain to those of "feudal" 
Germany, France and Italy, ^Aere in each of the latter countries, the 
farmer was protected by the imposition of tariffs (1978a: 19-30; see 
also Calleo 1978: 67-69; Malenbaum 1953: 34-36).
In similar vein, Kenneth BarkLn argues that it was those countries 
with strong agrarian classes that caused a return to protection;
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"... is it not ingenuous to expect a semi-feudal agrarian elite with 
enormous political clout to sacrifice their existence on the altar of 
a bourgeois economic philosophy, that the bourgeoisie of France and 
the U.S., I might add, shed without a tear? In every major grain 
inporting nation strong protectionist movements developed and in 
several, the tariffs were higher than in Germany*' (Barkin 1987: 231; 
see also, Pollard 1981: 257-260; Rostow 1978: 165-166).
Simon Clarke has extended the notion of the Second Founding of the 
Reich by arguing that,
"... the call of the landowners for protection was closely connected 
with the resurgence of a conservative desire to restore social order 
by restoring patriarchal social relations in the countryside. It was 
this political threat that the decisive factor in the turn to 
protectionism in Europe" (1988: 183-184).
So the critical variable that separated Britain (representative of 
the " Free Trade response" ) from Germany, Italy and France was the 
weakness or strength of the agrarian landed class, (weak in the 
former and strong in the latter). Ihis economically reductionist 
argument stands as the consensus in explaining the 1879 tariff, (and 
indeed all later tariffs). It will be argued here, that there was 
indeed an economic input in the determination of the tariff. Heaver 
in 1879 it focuses only minimally rpon the protective side of the 
tariff. Rather, enphasis is accorded the factor of tax relief for the 
agrarians. Furthermore, this economic input, is only a partial 
determinant of the tariff. As ws are about to show, the agrarian 
economic input in 1879 was only very weak. Indeed had it not been for 
Bismarckf s intervention, the 1879 tariff mi^t never have been 
instigated. Bismarck s reasons for instigating the tariff in 1879 
were prompted largely by reasons of state; principally to establish a 
firm financial footing for the Reich. Vfe shall begin therefore by 
examining the motives for Bismarck s " switch to protection".
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Bismarck s Switch from Free Trade
In 1850, Bismarck was unequivocally in favour of free trade though 
not as a doctrinaire free trader. He told the Reichstag in that year
'"The Deputy for Crefeld regards the protective duty as a protection 
of the manufactories against foreign countries, vAiile I, on the other 
hand, regard it as a protection against the liberty of the native 
population to buy where it may appear cheapest and most convenient, 
in other words, the protection of the home country against the home 
country. Protective duties and cotpulsory guilds iirpose a sacrifice 
upon a part of the population for the benefit of the other part, 
especially the obligation to buy goods at a higher price than would 
otherwise be the case, in order that this other part of the 
population maybe ensured bread and be protected. But protective 
duties have also the disadvantage that in the main they only enrich a 
few factory proprietors. This is their sole result for I have never 
seen that factory operatives have put away large savings or become 
rich. On the contrary I have known rural labourers, on manors of the 
Eastern Provinces thorou^y familiar to me, vAio have been able after 
working during their best years to buy settlements or small peasant 
holdings. I knew of no poor on the manors of the Eastern Provinces, 
but I wish I could say the same of the Western factory districts" 
(quoted in Dawson 1904: 41-42).
Although this was partially inspired Ta^  Bismarck " the
agriculturalist" speaking up against the tcwn and industry, it is 
nevertheless clear that he disliked protection as it favoured the 
minority industrial ruling class, (or so he argued) as against the 
labouring masses. He argued against protection therefore, on 
egalitari an grounds.
Throughout the I860's he remained pro free trade, concluding in 1862 
a free trade treaty with France. Indeed in 1873 he agreed to the 
abolition of the remaining iron duties and they did in fact disappear 
in 1877. In 1875 he advocated the restriction of the tariff to ten or 
twelve articles, with a view to the retention of merely fiscal 
duties.
Nevertheless Bismarck was never a "free trader". As he stated in the 
Reichstag in 1881:
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"... never in my life have I been a doctrinaire: all systems by which 
parties are divided and bound together are of secondary inportance 
for me. The first place I give to the nation, its position abroad, 
its independence, the organisation necessary in order that we as a 
nation may breathe freely in the world" (quoted in Dawson 1904: 46).
This statement is entirely borne out by Bismarcks s actions. Holding 
theory so lightly and insisting that practical considerations as he 
recognised them must be the sole determinant of his action, it was 
not difficult for him to come forward as a protectionist. Indeed he 
had never missed the opportunity to renounce the idealism of the left 
wing parties in the Reichstag, vÆiich included the National Liberals. 
Furthermore, since Bismarck's advocacy of free trade in the I860's 
was strongly influenced by politics, it was therefore perfectly 
natural that vAien at last he resorted to protection, it was under the 
spur of financial necessity rather than any pure economic conviction.
Hie reform of Iitperial taxation was ‘perhaps the most significant 
underlying motive impelling the tariff. Ihis reform of taxation was 
primarily undertaken with the object of providing the Empire with a 
sufficient independent revenue, so that it need no longer rely on the 
states and their legislatures. In the forefront of domestic needs 
Bismarck had for many years placed fiscal reform. "The entire reform 
of taxation, inclusive, of the customs duties - \dio does not wish it?" 
(Reichstag speech: November 1875, quoted in Dawson 1904: 46).
The Fiscal Crisis of the Late 1870's
The Constitution adopted in 1871 had provided that in so far as the 
expenditure of the Empire was not covered by revenue set apart for 
its special use, the deficit should be made ip by matricular 
contributions from the federal states according to population, 
(Matrikul arbeitrage ). Article 70 states that:
"The surplus of the previous year, the common revenues derived from 
customs duties, from the common excise duties and from the postal and 
the telegraph services shall be applied to the defrayal of all 
general expenditures. In so far as these expenditures are not covered 
by the receipts they shall be provided for, as long as no taxes of
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the Ertpire shall have been established, by assessing the several 
states of the Enpire according to their population (matricular 
contributions ) ; the amount of the assessment to be fixed by the 
Chancellor in accordance with the budget agreed upon" (quoted in 
Ashley 1909: I, my additions).
The problem as it emerged after 1875 was that the "conmon revenues" 
were diminishing. In 1873, customs revenues declined from 122.6m 
marks to 100. Om marks in 1877 - 12m marks of which were lost upon 
liquidation of the iron tariffs (Pflanze 1990a: 446). In addition the 
reduced supply side of the Iitperial budget (revenues) was antagonised 
further by the increased demand side (expenditures). These conprised 
the state owned telegraph network and in particular the anry and 
navy. Upto 1875 the Reich had been financially buoyant. However, the 
French war indemnity of approximately 5 billion francs (4,207 marks) 
played only a very small part in this buoyancy. Much of this sum went 
to the federal states. Thus 1480m marks went to the sinking fund of 
the North German Federation, and 890m went strai^t to the federal 
states. In addition, much of the money was put aside for future 
spending. Thus 560m marks were put aside for the war pension fund, 
(spent ipto 1904); 216m was put aside for the fund for fortress 
building (spent ipto 1891); 129m went to building fortresses in
Alsace-Lorraine, and 109m went to the fund building railways in 
Alsace-Lorraine. Of the total 4,207m marks supplied, only 1826m went 
to the Reich, and this was earmarked not for current expenditures, 
but rather for the sinking fund for short term loans (Witt 1970). 
However their ending in that year coincided with the beginning of a 
fiscal depression at all levels of government. By 1878 this 
depression had developed into a fully blown fiscal crisis. Without a 
new, independent and healthy source of revenue, Bismarck felt, the 
Reich would become fiscally paralysed. As a result of the revenue 
shortfall, the Chancellor - in accordance with Article 70 - resorted 
to increasing the matricular contributions of the federal states. All 
states felt the inpact of the inpending crisis..
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TmblA 2. Fiscal Crisis at staat l e w ! fMat,riciu3 ar Çnnt-riHitinnsl 
(in millions of marks)
Year (a) Total Staat 
Contributions
Prussia Bavaria
1873 73. 9 33. 3 16. 7
1874 67. 1 32. 9 14. 7
1875 69. 0 32. 1 15. 3
1876 89. 2 31. 7 20. 1
1877/1878 81. 1 44. 4 19. 7
1878/1879 87. 3 41. 6 19. 7
1879/1880 89. 4 43. 6 18. 9
Source: W. Gerloff (1913: 40ff, 106,526); S. Cohn (1972: 206-207)
(a) Upto 1876, the fiscal year went from 1 January to 31 December; in 
1877, the budget year went fron 1 January 1877 to 31 March 1878 (15 
months); thereêifter the budget year went from 1 April to 31 March.
The increase in the matricular contributions led to an increase in 
the direct tax burden, \^ch in the 187(X s was an inportant means of 
state and local government finance. Between 1871 and 1879, direct 
taxes increased by approximately 20% (from 133m marks to 160m), 
whilst indirect taxes decreased by as much as 28% in the same period 
(Prochncw 1977: 40-41). Furthermore, in Prussia the surplus of 73. 9m 
marks in 1873 had turned into a treasury deficit of 30. Im by 1878/9 
(Gerloff 1913: 524-525) and 73.2m in 1879/80 (Pflanze 1990a: 446), 
though the 1878/9 deficit was partly induced by Bismarck, vAio as 
Prussian Prime Minister, manipulated the budget in order to exert 
pressure on the Reichstag to grant his various proposed fiscal 
reforms (particularly government monopolies).
Tahift 2. 3 Tiift Balance of Payments of the Prussian Budget
(in  millions of marks)
Year Budget
Surplus/Deficit
Total
expenditures
1872 64. 5 583
1873 73. 9 664
1874 22.2 696
1875 -3.0 674
1876 17. 7 672
1877/1878 38.3 826
1878/1879 -30. 1 695
Source; Gerloff (1913: 524-525)
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The problem was corrpound.ed by several factors. Firstly, the onset of 
economic depression after 1873 led to reduced revenues from state 
owned forests, mines and railways. In addition the depression meant a 
lower level of direct tax revenues (H. Rosenberg 1943: 67-68; Von
Kreudener 1987: 115). Upto 1875 the states had used their treasury 
surpluses to abolish taxes and retire debts. Ihus between 1869 and 
1875 the Prussian state's consolidated debt was reduced fron 1,334m 
marks to 919m, or, by 415m marks (Gerloff 1913: 106). Some states, 
for example Prussia, had devolved fiscal responsibility (especially 
education) to the City and Village governments. Iheir response was to 
iirpose surtaxes on the class and classified income tax, as well as on 
the land and building tax. This had the effect of disproportionately 
increasing the tax burden of urban property owners, and village 
landowners. Not surprisingly, this proved to be a major cause of 
agrarian resentment in the face of the developing fiscal crisis, 
(thou^ it is inportant to note that many Junkers, were absolved of 
this fiscal burden, owing to the fact that they came outside the 
jurisdiction of the village government (WLtt 1970). Many property 
owners however were burdened further by the increases in direct tax 
imposed at state government level.
Even more serious was the position of the poorest income groups, vho 
were disproportionately affected, as evidenced by the substantial 
numbers of tax executions inposed upon defaulters. Between 1878-1881 
the average number of defaulters subject to attachments was; 24. 6% 
for Class 1; 25. 8% for Class 2; 18. 6% for Class 3; 10. 2% for Class 4. 
The rate of default in the cities was even hi^ier. In Berlin, the 
average number of defaulters was a staggering; 70% for Class 1; 65. 6% 
for Class 2; 41. 9% for Class 3; and 14. 3% for Class 4 (Pflanze 1990a: 
448). Equally as inportant was the fact that the lower to lower- 
middle income groups paid in real terms hi^ier direct tax rates than 
the upper earners (to be explained later).
Bismarck aimed to find a new and bountiful source of revenue which 
would enable him to firstly, liquidate the entire class tax and the 
lower brackets of the classified income tax (thus relieving all
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earners). Secondly, he aimed to transfer the remainder of the 
classified inccane tax and the Land and Building tax to local 
government. This would have the double advantage of ending the fiscal 
crisis in the cities and would simultaneously enable the Junkers (who 
controlled the county and village governments) to fiscally relieve 
themselves further. The main Bismarckian strategy was to effect tax 
relief to the upper income earners, by a two-fold method. Firstly, by 
seeking to abolish matricular contributions he hoped to effect a 
healthy fiscal situation within the staats, which would then allow 
them to reduce direct taxes. This was linked to a secondary method, 
by vÆiich he hoped to produce sufficient regressive revenues (from 
indirect taxes/tariffs) at central level, vÆiich would then be 
reallocated to the staats, and later on, the gemeinde. This 
regressive fiscal subsidy would allow a relief to the upper income 
earners at local, though not at central level Indeed in preparation 
for the 1878 Heidelberg Conference (5-8 August), Bismarck stated that 
fiscal policy,
"should provide the Peich with such an amount of own income derived 
from indirect taxation, that the pressure on the federal states' 
budgets would be lowered to such an extent, that the states would be 
put into a position to abolish or reduce taxes, vhich they regarded 
to be oppressive, and to transfer such taxes in part or totally to 
the local authorities \^ch the states regarded appropriate for that 
purpose" (quoted in Gerloff 1913: 134).
However the main aim was to provide the enpire with enou^ revenue 
so as to make it fiscally independent of the federal states; in other 
words to abolish the matrikularbeitrage. This was important in 
reducing the Reichstag's parliamentary limitations upon the 
executive.
Bismarckf s two-fold strategy of upper income tax relief struck a 
chord particularly at the agrarian level. In the period ipto 1879, 
State dissent over taxes was evidenced by the increasing calls to the 
Bundesrat for a decrease in the tax burden. Ironically this opened up 
the way for Bismarck to attack the matrikul arbeitrage, (vhich had 
hitherto represented the political preserve of the local states in 
their fight to maintain their autonomy vis-a-vis the Reich). Not 
surprisingly therefore, Bismarck agreed that the revenue from local 
taxes should not be referred to the Iitperial Treasury, but rather.
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should be kept at home for welfare purposes. If the Enpire secured a 
source of plentiful revenue from an independent source, local social 
services would be better provided for and more significantly, it 
would allow farmers and landowners to be relieved of the hateful 
burden of the land tax (Lambi .1963: 170). However, it should be noted 
that the burden of the land tax fell heaviest upon the middle to 
small, rather than large estates. It was likely therefore, that a 
substitution of indirect for direct taxes would enable significant 
tax relief for the small and middle-sized estates (to be discussed 
further in chapter 6). But most inportantly, it would open up the way 
for the Reich to achieve financial independence from the federal 
states.
Finance is the first prerogative of the state (the tax premise). 
However, establishing the tax premise in the Second Reich proved to 
be a source of political controversy. .Hiis was inparted upon German 
politics by virtue of the fact that it was not a unitary state. Ihe 
federal system provided a political contradiction at the heart of the 
system. Indeed it would be fair to conceptualise a dialectical 
relationship between the Reich and the states, as both struggled to 
gain power over the other. Ihis contradiction impacted most clearly 
upon the system of government finance. In providing revenue for the 
Reich, there were two obvious courses - either the separate states 
could be required to contribute proportionate quotas, each state 
being left free to raise the necessary amounts in the most convenient 
way, or, certain specified sources of revenue could be assigned to 
the federal government, the states being excluded from the use 
thereof. In practice thou^ the constitution allcwed for a 
catpromise, since the states were determined to keep a strong 
political check over the Reich. Hence a pc^^ struggle between 
central and local government was bom. In the run up to 1879, 
Bismarck s hostility to the states was most visible in his attacks on 
direct taxes, vMch of course constituted their fundamental politico- 
fiscal preserve. His constant calling for indirect taxes, with the 
simultaneous reduction of direct taxes was primarily precipitated by 
his desire for financial independence and a weakening of the states' 
power (in relation to the Reich), and secondly, to effect tax relief
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for the içper earning groups, particularly those of the agricultural 
variant.
Ihe Political Struggle between the Reich and the States
In 1872, Bismarck stated in the Reichstag:
"... I regard the Enpire's independent revenues so inportant that I 
do not believe a Chancellor conscious of his responsibility and 
actuated by a proper concern for the stabi lity and development of the 
Enpire could consent to the diminution of these revenues [ie. salt 
tax], unless an adequate substitute were provided. Dependence upon 
other contributions I cannot accept at all. Ihe great cement of a 
strong common financial system is lacking to the Enpire so long as it 
is founded only on matricular contributions. Ihat these contributions 
fall unequally is a question of justice, but to diminish them is in 
my opinion the task of a well considered policy. " (quoted in Dawson 
1904: 51; also LambL 1963: 169; Henderson 1975: 219).
In 1875 he stated:
"To give the German Enpire a solid unshakeable financial basis vMch 
will give it a dominant position and yet bring it into an organic 
relation with all public interests in state, province, county and 
community, that would be a worthy task which could stimulate me to 
devote the last breath of my failing strength to it" (quoted in Craig 
1981: 90).
In November 1875 he told the Reichstag:
"Speaking entirely from the standpoint of the Enpire I seek as great 
a reduction as possible if not the complete abolition of the 
matricular contributions... " (quoted in Dawson 1904: 50).
Cki still another occasion he stated:
" Ihe Imperial Contribution presippcses that the condition of 
matricular contributions will be a transitional one, lasting only 
until Imperial taxes shall have been introduced... Ihe consolidation 
of the Enpire will be promoted ^ e n  the matricular contributions are 
replaced by Imperial taxes; it would not lose if these taxes were so
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prohibitive that the individual states received fron the Enpire 
instead of their having to give in a way that is not always 
conputable and is for them inconvenient" (quoted in Dawson 1904: 52).
Bismarcks s attack on the states was also made through his constant 
criticism of direct taxes, [ie, the preserve of the federal states] 
and through his approval of indirect taxes, [ie. the preserve of the 
Reich]. For exanple in November 1875 he told the Reichstag;
"I declare myself as essentially favourable to the raising of all 
possible revenue by indirect taxes, and I hold direct taxes to be an 
onerous and avdward makeshift... Indirect taxes, whatever may be said 
against them theoretically are in fact less felt. It is difficult for 
the individual to calculate how much he pays and hew much falls upon 
his neighbours, but he kncws hew much income tax he pays... With 
direct taxes a man is not asked - can you on a pinch do without your 
beer: can you smokeless: can you use less light [petrol] of an
evening? No he must pay the direct tax vAiether he has money or not, 
whether in debt or not; and vdjat is worse distraint follows, and 
nothing has a greater effect on a mah s disposition than execution on 
account of a few pence v^ch cannot at the moment be extorted from 
the one who ewes them!' (quoted in Dawson 1904: 54).
But since Bismarck cared little for the pliait of the commoner, it 
seems clear that this argument served merely as an ideological gloss 
to sell his cwn political desire; the need for an independent fiscal 
revenue, throuÿi indirect taxes. Indeed it contradicts his 186Œ s 
stance, v^ iere he criticised indirect taxes on the grounds that these 
were prejudicial to the interests of the minority against the 
majority.
Bismarck, Protection and Indirect Taxation
As yet Bismarck had made little advance into the e^qilicit advocacy 
of protection. However, in 1876 Delbruck resigned. Once freed from 
his economic mentor's tutelage, Bismarck, vdio had never subscribed to 
free trade as a theory began to formulate his own viev® on the 
increasingly inportant question of tariff policy. Protectionist 
influences gained hold of him. Ihe Enperor favoured protection, 
(though on industrial goods; he remained in favour of free trade for 
foodstuffs). Many of Bismarcks closest associates ware also 
protectionist, notably WLlhelm von Kardorff and Christopher TLedemann
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(the Iitperial secretary). They helped Bismarck to take a strong 
interest in retaliatory tariffs. On October 21, 1876 Bismarck
justified tariffs against France on the grounds that "We should 
obtain through our own legislation those securities for German 
production vMch we cannot find in the benevolence of foreign 
governments".
In 1877, his "year of leisure", Bismarck studied the tariff question 
more fully, reading the memoranda of various protectionist 
organisations. By February 1878, he began to take the initiative in 
the controversy between free trade and protection. By new he was 
clearly linking his advocacy of indirect taxes with his desire for 
protection.
"Indirect taxes are preferable to direct not merely because of the 
advantages in the mode of raising them, the superfluity of executions 
and distraints, and the fact that the tax payer fixes both the time 
and measure of his tax... as for taxed articles iirported from abroad 
the producing country wholly or partially bears the tax since the 
indirect tax is, as a rule, incorporated with the other conpeting 
factors which go to the formation of price as one of the less 
inportant elements of a new indivisible vdiole, its burdensome effect 
upon the individual not apparently, but to a great measure, actually 
disappears... The financial capacity of the individual tax payer is 
not always expressed in his income, apart from the general 
inpossibility of calculating that income even approximately. Family 
position, health and local and other circumstances vMch direct tax 
disregards, and must disregard create the greater diversity in the 
actual financial position even among persons of equal income" 
(Reichstag speech, February 1878, quoted in Dawson 1904: 55-56).
Ihe taking of a protectionist course was facilitated by Canphausen 
and Achenbach s resignations in February 1878 over the fiscal issue. 
Hobrecht, from whom Bismarck served the promise of sipport for his 
fiscal plans and the introduction of some protectionist duties, 
became the new Minister of Finance, vAiile Maybach succeeded Achenbach 
in the Ministry of Commerce. On ^ril 5, 1878 Bismarck raised the 
question of the restoration of the iron tariffs in the Prussian 
ministerial council - his first practical move towards protection. He 
had also decided to include agricultural tariffs in his protectionist 
plans. Ihe advocacy was due in part to the influence of Kardorff s 
arguments for an all-embracing protectionist system, and in part, due 
to his personal association with agriculture.
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It was at the beginning of 1878 that Bismarckf s plan to reform the 
tariff came to be linked closely with fiscal and political 
considerations. He told Kardorff that he wanted a tariff system, 
"based on our own needs", vAiich would differ greatly fron the 
previous principles of German tariff policy.
plan is to present a bill to the Bundesrat before the end of 
this session of the Reichstag which would be kncwn in the country 
before its dissolution... I want tariffs on tobacco, spirits, sugar, if 
possible coffee, and shall not flinch fron imposing duties on grain 
which might be useful in our dealing with Russia and Austria" (quoted 
in Lambi 1963: 166; also Pflanze 1990a: 454-455).
On March 29 Bismarck told the South German protectionist Professor 
von Mayr to work out a memorandum connecting the protectionist system 
with the fiscal plan. These fiscal and political plans enconpassed 
some of the most vital problems of the recently founded nation state. 
The outstanding problem that faced his internal policy, apart from 
the fiscal aspect, was the management of the political parties along 
lines as to secure a pliable right wing government majority in the 
Reichstag, with \^ch he would aim to increase his executive power. 
This went hand in hand with Bismarcl^ s attack on his former 
associates, the National Liberals.
The Tariff, Party Coalitions and the "ProbLem of Parliainentarianism!'
Since the early years of the Enpire, the major political parties in 
the Reichstag had been divided on two main issues - the question of 
German unification and the problem of parliamentary government. There 
were five main political groups in the Reichstag, firstly, the 
Catholic Centrum and secondly, the Prussian Conservative party. They 
were both unhappy with Bismarck s policy of unification. Furthermore, 
they both felt isolated, for Bismarck had allied himself firmly with 
the National Liberals throuc^iout the 187(y s. In addition Bismarck had 
waged a "holy war" against the Catholics. However the Rulturkanpf had 
forced their different premises into an entente that opposed 
Bismarck s religious policy. On the other hand there were the Free
47
Conservatives, National Liberals and the Progressives, ;vho all whole­
heartedly accepted the creation of the Bismarckian Enpire, but 
disagreed among themselves on the relationship between the Inperial 
government and the Reichstag.
The Free Conservatives were closest to Bismarck on this question 
agreeing to the preservation of the monarchy and the maximum 
independence of the executive fron the Reichstag. The Progressives 
agreed with Bismarck and the Enpire but distrusted Bismarck? s halfway 
constitutionalism. They remained as isolated from Bismarck on the 
question of monarchical power as the Centrum was on the issue of 
German unity. The National Liberals held an intermediary position 
between the Progressives and the Free Conservatives - "Freiheit und 
Einheit". For on the one hand they favoured individual liberties and 
the development of full ministerial responsibility to the Reichstag 
and on the other, they favoured the- consolidation of the Enpire 
(Lambi 1963: 167).
Until the mid 187CX s Bismarck was close to the National Liberals, 
vto had provided him with essential sipport in consolidating the 
Enpire. However, this relationship became strained towards the end of 
the decade due to firstly, the intransigence of the left wing of the 
party under Lasker; secondly, over the opposition of the party to the 
Chancellor's financial plans, and thirdly, linked to the second 
point, was the desire of the party for a strengthened parliamentarism 
vis-a-vis the executive. After the Austro-Prussian war the majority 
of the National Liberals had been willing to shelve tenporarily the 
concept of the "Rechstaat" on the condition that a unified empire 
('• Einheitstaat” ) vrould be created. By 1871, with the creation of the 
latter, the former requisite was increasingly favoured by the party. 
This principle would shortly call for parliamentarism, or more 
specifically, ministerial responsibility. This lay at the foundation 
of their opposition to Bismarck? s tax proposals.
Bismarck s tax proposals were aimed in part to by-pass the ''checks'* 
of the federal states and the Reichstag. Indeed, increasing executive 
power over the legislative and increasing the pcwer of the Reich over 
the federal states was fundamental to his fiscal project. Not
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surprisingly, the National Liberals rejected these proposals. 
Clearly, if Bismarck was to secure these objectives, he would have to 
marginalise the National Liberal Party. In 1877 the elections offered 
him some hope in doing precisely this. The outcome had weakened 
Lasker's left wing and had strengthened the position of the moderate 
Bennigsen, had shown in his speech of ^ril 13, 1877 that he at 
least realised the inportance of regulating the finances.
Then in 1878, a measure of devolution, known as the Substitute Law 
was passed with the object of relieving Bismarck of such work as did 
not require his own immediate attention. Hiis law allowed the 
Chancellor to appoint a deputy for his office or any part of it, and 
its result was the creation of secretaries of State, for the 
direction of various branches of Inperial administration, -subject 
still to the Chancellor, ;Ao was entitled to resume at any time the 
delegated functions. In the interest-of "unity of policy" the more 
inportant of these offices were all filled ly ministers holding the 
corresponding portfolios in the Prussian cabinet.
Ihe National Liberals then demanded that the Inperial Chancellor, 
should be replaced by a collective ministry, in vAiich he should be 
only one member amongst many, and subject like the rest, to the 
bidding of the legislative assembly, vMch meant in reality of the 
party or parties, \^ch mi^t happen to form a majority. Bismarck had 
only overcome strong opposition to the bill in the federal council by 
giving the assurance that it was not intended to pave the way for an 
Inperial Cabinet and should not have that result. In the Diet he 
refused point-blank to consider such a ' degradation^ of his position, 
and referring his critics to the constitution, told them that though 
constitutional questions \^re for him questions of expediency, he was 
quite prepared to respect the status quo, "if the advocates of 
parliamentary government would agree to do the same" (quoted in 
Dawson 1967: 72). Clearly on this issue, this man was not for
turning.
So by February 1878, the National Liberal Party made ministerial 
responsibility the sine qua non for their approval of the Bismarckian 
tax project (Lambi 1963: 171). Bismarck had tried to court Bennigsen
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by offering him a pest as the Prussian Minister of the Interior but 
revoked the offer v?hen Bennigsen insisted that he be joined by 
Forckenbeck and Stauffenberg. Ihis of course was out of the question, 
for with three National Liberal politicians in the government the 
door would have been opened to ministerial responsibility. In any 
case, it was Bennigsen v^o eventually declined the offer, as he was 
only too well aware that Bismarck had made preparations "vAiich would 
allow him to topple his new colleague at any moment by discrediting 
him on purely personal grounds. In the last analysis, this and 
nothing else motivated Bennigsen to decline such an offer" (Max Weber 
1922/1978: 1388-1389). On February 20, 1878 Bismarck broke off
negotiations with Bennigsen, and set about to split the National 
Liberals once and for all. His aim was to eliminate the threat of 
ministerial responsibility v^ch would continue to stand over him, 
vAiile the National Liberals continued to exist.
Bismarck s Attack on the National Liberals
As long ago as 1875, Bismarck had conteirplated effecting a shift 
among the political parties in the Reichstag. He remarked that he had 
no synpathy for the liberal parties and collaborated with them only 
because he had been, "deserted by the Conservatives". In 1875 the 
Prussian Conservatives had made it clear that they wanted to come out 
of the wilderness. Ik^æver, the Chancellor realised that it would be 
difficult to come to a permanent agreement with them unless 
concessions were made to the Centrum. In February 1878, \^ ien Bismarck 
terminated his negotiations with Bennigsen, the irreconcilable Pius 
IX died and Cardinal Peed was elected as Leo XEII. Just before his 
election Pecci had expressed hope for the inprovement of relations 
between Berlin and the Vatican. Bismarck s opportunity to build a new 
government majority was thereby handed to him (Henderson 1975: 219). 
He moved immediately towards the Centrum. Heaver, it was not a party 
which would come to cin agreement on his own terms, and as events 
turned out, by May 1880 Bismarck was denoundng them as the "common
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enemy" (Reichsfeinde). He thou^t only of immediate conciliation, for 
if he was to form a new government coalition with the Conservatives 
and Free Conservatives, the Centre party would hold the balance of 
power in the Reichstag. This would allow him to push throu^ the 
tariff proposals, and of course free him frcan his hated dependence on 
the National Liberals.
The issue of protection was the one inportant tie between Bismarck 
and those parties he was drawing closer to. For, the industrial 
tariffs were favoured by the Free Conservatives and the ri^t wing of 
the National Liberals. Agricultural tariffs were favoured by the 
majority of the reorganised Conservatives. The Centrum combined both 
industrial and agrarian protectionist sentiment. The Progressives and 
the left wing of the National Liberals however, were the only forces 
in the Reichstag that were solidly against protection. Hence through 
the tariff, Bismarck could crystalise the political alignments that 
he wished to achieve.
He therefore determined to split the National Liberals and at the 
same time to marginalise the Progressives A^io not only wanted 
ministerial responsibility but also posed a threat to Bismarck^ s 
newly founded Enpire. This is vhere we find, thou^ in partial form, 
the origins of the strong anti-Liberal ethos that was so predominant 
from 1879 onwards; a theme ^Mch many authors have picked up on, 
espoused in its clearest form throu^ the concept of "The Second 
Founding of the Reich", (Die Zweite Reichsgrundung). In contrast, we 
may note that a partial determining factor to the anti-Liberalism of 
1879 and beyond is not economic but rather political, derived from 
the "regime structure" of the polity - that of an authoritarian mode 
of domination. In May 1878 an attenpt was made to assassinate the 
Enperor. Bismarck thought his chance had come and tried to put 
through an anti-Socialist bill in the Reichstag. However, the 
National Liberals and Progressives combined to defeat it. Then on 
June 2nd there was a second attenpt on the life of the Enperor, this 
time by Karl Nobiling. When the news of the attenpted assassination 
reached Bismarck he exclaimed,
"Now I have got thenf'. "The Social Democrats?" he was asked. "No, 
the National Liberals!" (quoted in J. Sheehan 1978: 183).
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Bismarck saw in this a perfect "opportunity to destroy the only 
powerful party of the time" (Max Weber 1922/1978; 1390). He pronçtly 
dissolved the Reichstag, and another election was held on June 30. 
During the canpaign the Conservatives strongly attacked the National 
Liberals and the Progressives for voting against the anti -Socialist 
bill. Furthermore the Chancellor's instructions to local officials 
for the conduct of the elections were aimed more against the National 
Liberals than the Social Democrats. The officials were told that, "no 
government can accept the tutelage of a faction ^^ch does not 
possess a majority" and that they should secure the election of men 
had a "practical attitude towards economy, and who were not mere 
theorists or idealists". The policy of Free Trade was blamed heavily 
for the Depression by the Press, and although the government did not 
set up a protectionist electoral programme, the fact that most Free 
Traders came from liberal ranks directly connected the canpaign 
against liberalism.
In this aim Bismarck was entirely successful. It precipitated mass 
hysteria against the "Socialist spectre" and thereby undermined the 
National Liberals, vdiose rejection of the first anti-Socialist bill 
was held responsible for the second attenpt on the Enperor's life. 
The elections saw a clear swing to the ri^t:
2, 4_________ The Shifting RaTanre of the Reichstag before and
after the 1878 Election
Party 1877
Seats
1878
Seats
Difference
1878/1877
National Liberals 141 109 -32
& Liberals
Progressives (a) 39 29 -10
Social Democrats 12 9 -3
Free Conservatives 38 57 +19
Conservatives 40 59 +19
Centrum 93 94 +1
Others (b) 34 40 +6
Total 397 397
Source Sheehan 1978: 184)
(a) This category includes; Libérale Vereinigung, Deutsche , Deutsche 
Volkspartei [Left Liberals]
(b) Poles, Danes, Guelphs & Alsace-Lorraine
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The Tariff, Taxation, Class and Economy
The tariff as a fiscal resource was upto a point linked to 
considerations of class interests. This link became accentuated frcan 
mid-1878 onwards. On 5 May, Bismarck instructed Hoffman and Hobrecht 
to work out a programme that combined the establishment of fiscal 
tariffs with the restoration of the iron duties. Detailing the " first 
stage" of his fiscal package "to shift from the false track of 
indirect taxes", Bismarck wished to raise enou^ revenue to 
conpletely abolish state assessments, \^lst also being able to 
distribute revenues to the states in order to provide further tax 
relief. He wished to abolish direct taxes on individual incomes upto 
6,000 marks, which would benefit warking, lower and upper middle 
class groL^, and to a lesser extent, the Junkers (Pflanze 1990a: 
463-484). It would only be at a later date that he would attenpt to 
relieve village and local governments, (and hence the Junker 
landowners).
In July , Hoffman and Hobrecht reported. The Inperial revenue, they 
stated, should be increased by 245 million marks, to be obtained by 
tariffs. These proposals received strong backing fron each federal 
state. A convention inviting all states to discuss their problems was 
held in Heidelberg between 5-8 August. There it became explicitly 
clear that all states faced serious fiscal problems. General 
agreement was secured on the proposed tax bill; to liquidate state 
assessments; to relieve state and local budgets; and to avoid further 
inposition of direct taxation. Indeed the invitation to the 
Convention stated that the meeting would attenpt to make possible 
the, "relief of the budgets of the individual states over the course 
of time, so that it would be feasible for them to eliminate or reduce 
oppressive taxes, or, if they considered it advisable, to give up 
certain appropriate taxes vAolly or in part to the provinces, 
counties and municipalities" (cited in D. S. White 1976: 66). In
October, a coalition of 204 Deputies (forming a majority of the
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Chamber) declared tJieir overwhelming support for protectionism. This 
body was known as the Free Economic Association of the Reichstag and 
was chaired by Friedrich von Vambuler. Perhaps the most remarkable 
feature of this organisation was its political constituency; the main 
groups comprised 87 Centrists, 36 Conservatives, 36 Free 
Conservatives and 27 National Liberals (Lambi 1963: 207-208). This 
was grist to the mill for Bismarck vho clearly saw in this the 
makings of a new right wing Kartell, which could be constructed 
around the tariff issue.
In November Bismarck formally proposed to the Bundesrat that a 
Tariff Commission be set up in order to prepare the tariff 
legislation. In the Reichstag the protectionists were by new in the 
majority. On 15 December Bismarck provided the Bundesrat m t h  the 
guiding principle for the revision of the tariff (worked out between 
28 October and 15 December).
"For myself the interests of financial reform take the first place, 
the diminution of the wei^it of direct tax by the increase of the 
revenue of the Entire, A^iich is based on indirect taxes. Hew far 
Germany lags behind other states in the financial development of its 
customs system is shewn by the accenpanying conparLson, and this 
compari son would shew Germany in a still more unfavourable li^it if 
to the revenue from customs and duties credited to Austria, Hungary, 
France and Italy were added to the sums ^Aiich these states levy in 
the form of a tobacco monopoly instead of a duty on foreign 
tobacco. ..It is no accident that other great states and especially 
those of a very advanced political and economic development seek by 
preference to cover their expenditure by the proceeds of duties and 
indirect taxes including the communal inposts, have reached a hei^t 
which is oppressive and appears to be economically unjustifiable. The 
people vto suffer most from them at present are those members of the 
middle class vAiose income ranges ip to 6,000 marks ameliorations that 
reach this limit, it must begin with the revision of customs duties 
on a broad a base as possible. Ihe more productive the customs system 
is made financially the greater can and must be the relief in direct 
taxes; for it is self evident that the increase of the indirect 
revenues of the Enpire cannot imply an increase of the aggregate 
burden of taxation. Not in the increase of the burdens ^Anch are 
necessary for the purposes of the Enpire and the States but in the 
transformation of a larger part of these unavoidable burdens into the 
less oppressive form of indirect taxes, consists of the financial 
reform vMch it is the purpose of the revision of the customs tariff 
to effect" (quoted in Dawson 1904: 63-64).
It is clear from this that Bismarck was strongly prompted in his 
fiscal policy ly the iirperatives of the farming producing community.
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in general. His equation of an income of 6, 000 marks with the " middle 
class" earners amounted to little more than an eloquent piece of 
demagoguery. In Prussia in 1878, 5. 3 million paid income tax; of this 
168, 000 paid classified income tax and had an annual average inccane 
of 7, 120 marks; but as many as 5. 11m paid the class tax, on an 
average annual income of a mere 815 marks, ^proximately 36m people 
had an income of 537 marks per annum (W. G. Hoffmann & J. H. Muller 1959: 
68-72). Thus it is clear that those on 6,000 marks per annum were in 
the upper income bracket. In other words, Bismarck was keen to 
provide tax relief ultimately to the \:pper earning groups. Ihus, if 
the aggregate amount of tax is to remain equal, should 
customs/indirect taxes rise, then the proportion of direct tax 
(especially the land tax) levied should, (ceteris paribus), 
necessarily fall. Ihrough the tariff Bismarck could provide the 
" urgently" required tax relief to the farming community. Since 
indirect tariffs on essential items (eg bread) disproportionately 
hurt the working classes, Bismarck hoped that he could shift the tax 
burden from rich to poor. Bismarck hoped to diffuse working class 
resentment by simultaneously reducing its direct tax burden (throuÿi 
abolishing the class tax). Ihus Bismarck s claim to effect tax relief 
for the Icwer earners - that a reduction or even abolition of the 
class tax (vMch was levied ipon all income earners over 800 marks 
per annum) - was really little more than a political sleight of hand. 
Ihis was reinforced by various statements made by Bismarck, for 
exairple;
"Ihe minority of the nation which does not produce at all but 
exclusively consumes will apparently be injured by a customs system 
favouring the entire national product. Yet if by means of such a 
system the aggregate sum of the values produced in the country 
increases and thus the national wealth be on the lAole enhanced, the 
non-producing parts of the population - especially the state and 
communal officials vAio are dependent ipon a fixed money income - will 
eventually be benefited; for means of counterbalancing hardships will 
be at the command of the community in case the extension of customs 
liability to the entire imports should result in an increase of the 
prices of the necessaries of life. Yet with lew duties such an 
increase will in all probability not take place to the extent vMch 
consumers are accustomed to apprehend, just as on the other hand the 
prices of bread and meat have not fallen to an appreciable degree in 
consequence of the abolition of the duties on corn-grinding and 
cattle-killing in the parishes where these used to exist" (quoted in 
Dawson 1904: 65-66).
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Increasing indirect taxes (vMlst simultaneously reducing direct 
taxes) had the added benefit of appearing to reduce the tax burden of 
the lower income groups, as was revealed in his February 22nd 1878 
speech to the Reichstag, vhere he stated,
"Indirect taxes are preferable to direct not merely because of the 
advantages in the mode of raising them... (But) since the indirect 
tax, is as a rule, incorporated with the other corrpeting factors 
vMch go to the formation of price, as one of the less inportant 
elements of a now indivisible vAole, its burdensome effect upon the 
individual, not apparently, but to a great measure actually 
disappears" (quoted in Dawson 1904: 55-56).
It seems most unlikely that the intended shift to indirect taxes 
embodied a notion of social-welfare optimality. As the above quote 
demonstrates, Bismarck^ s real intention was to relieve the average 
landowner's tax burden at the expense of the masses. An indirect tax 
had the distinct advantage over other fiscal weapons, in that its 
incidence is far less visible (particularly in relation to the direct 
tax). In addition, Bismarkfs "concern for the masses" in the 1850's 
and I860's had led him to argue that they would be better off under a 
system of free trade rather than protection. New it seems he was 
contradicting himself by arguing the opposite.
Ihe 1870's Agricultural Depression Redefined
A full understanding of the tariff legislation after 1878 requires a 
precise analysis of the agricultural depression. As noted earlier the 
economistic consensus posits that the agricultural depression 
conprised a flooding of cheap foreign grain inports into Germany 
principally from the United States and Russia Ihere are several 
problems with this formulation. Ihe most glaring inconsistency is 
that the Junkers (usually taken to be the independent causal variable 
in the construction of the tariff), were in fact in sipport of free 
trade for their agricultural economic/business interests, though many 
favoured industrial tariffs for their non-agricultural business 
interests. Vfe shall see that there was no such thing as "the Junkers" 
in the terms ascribed by modem historiography.
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In January 1879, the German Council on Agriculture (Der Deutsche 
Landwirtschaftsrat) voted for fiscal against protectionist tariffs; 
that is they rejected grain tariffs. However according to Lambi, this 
body was not representative cmng to the fact that it had been 
elected in 1877. This date marks a watershed for Lambi in that 
agricultural prices fell only after that year, in turn according to 
him, the reason for the landowners' "switch to protection" (1963: 
133-134). Ihus he argues that the Council did not reflect the changed 
climate of agricultural opinion (1963: 148). Such an argument
however, is not convincing. If agriculture had been free trading upto 
1877 and had moved over to protection in the two years follcwing - as 
Lambi argues - there is reason to sijppose that the German Council on 
Agriculture would similarly have shifted to protection. After all, 
the council was elected in order to represent the interests of 
agriculture rather than protect the cause of free trade per se. In 
any case, Lambi's argument was wide of the mark because this council 
voted against protection ri^t Lpto 1885 (cf. BA [Bundesarchiv der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschlands ] Abt Potsdam, Heichskanzlei Nr. 1108, 
"Promemoria des Deutschen LandwLrtschaftsrat, 25/12/1893). In 
addition, there was the major agrarian interest group, the 
Association for the Reform of Taxation and Econoniy. Ihis was founded 
in 1876 with only 500 members, 450 of whom were owners of a Rittergut 
(a special privileged large estate). As will be discussed later, this 
association was founded in part to maintain agricultural free trade. 
With their considerable industrial interests, they came to favour 
tariffs in industrial goods, rather than on foodstuffs. However, in 
1879, it was clearly recognised that the maintenance of authoritarian 
state policies could be best maintained by an alliance of "iron and 
rye". As we shall see later, the major agricultural interests 
favoured tariffs mainly for political reasons.
Iheire was still a strong commitment to free trade among many Prussian 
landowners, since as Karl Hardach (1967) classically argued, many 
continued to benefit from grain exports. Furthermore, althou^ rye 
and oats wei^ied more heavily than wheat in terms of overall 
production (Webb 1982: 311; also Brocmhall 1904: 77; Hoffmann 1965: 
284-289), the fact remains that German wheat (vMch was soft) had to 
be mixed with imported (Russian) hard \^ieat before it could be
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exported (Brocmhall 1904; 75; Jasny 1936: 75-76,81; Hardach 1967: 73- 
77; Pflanze 1990a: 283). Ihe lower prices of 1878/9, though not
particularly significant, would have aided rather than hindered much 
of Prussian agriculture, through the enabling of higher export 
earnings, and would have therefore been warmly welcomed. Thus German 
wheat producers, (particularly in Prussia), were dependent on cheap 
inported vAieat. Therefore, a tariff on such v^eat would merely 
increase the cost of the German export product, and would therefore 
significantly harm the economic/trading interests of the Prussian 
landlords. However it is true that the law of 1879 stipulated a 
refund of the inport duty paid on foreign grain if it was to be re­
exported. Would this therefore, have persuaded the agrarians to 
favour protection?
The problem with the 1879 law in this respect was that for the 
German exporter to obtain the refund, .it was necessary for him to 
prove by means of a certificate of origin that he was exporting the 
very same inported vAieat. In other words, German grain could not be 
substituted for the inported Russian. This affected the producers of 
East Prussia; specifically, Danzig, Konigsberg, Memel and Stettin. 
These areas therefore lost a vital means of disposing of their grain 
in large quantities (Tlrrell 1951: 270-271). Before the introduction 
of the certificate of identity, the agricultural export trade of 
Danzig and Stettin vrere dependent ipon the export of German and 
Russian grain in a mixture kncwn as the " Danzig" or " Stettin" mix. 
This feature of the tariff adversely affected the needs of Prussian 
agriculture such that in the 188(X s much effort was made to have the 
certificates abolished; (even on the part of shipcwners, grain 
dealers and brokers), thouÿi it would not be until 1894 before the 
much needed relief (that is, the abolition of the certificates) was 
granted to agriculture (Jasny 1936: 81; Farnsworth 1934: 320; TLrrell 
1951: 271-272). It was likely that this 1894 concession to
agriculture embodied an implicit recognition on the part of the 
chancellor, that hitherto, German vAieat producers had lost out as a 
result of the 1879 Tariff statute.
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In addition^ as the chart below shows, German wheat e:qx)rts 
increased after 1877, in turn necessitating an increase of cheap 
vh.eat inports, particularly frcan Russia
(in quarters - 4801bs)
Imports Exports
1875 2, 292, 200 1, 805, 300
1876 3, 146, 400 2, 618, 300
1877 4, 317, 700 1, 782, 300
1878 4, 069, 100 3, 376, 300
1879 4, 209, 280 3, 606, 000
Source: The C o m  Trade Year Book (1904: 78; figures taken from 
Statistiches Jahrtauch fur das Deutsche Reich)
The 187CX s decadal averages were as follows; wheat exports, 
2,417,979, ^^ leat inports - 2,605,728. Taking the average as a base 
(100), vdieat exports for the years 1878 and 1879 were 140 and 149. If 
we take the 1877 figure as base 100 (the critical year as identified 
by Lambi), then we find an even bigger increase; 189 for 1878, and 
202 for 1879. Either way these were substantial export increases; 
significant enough to warrant anti-protectionist sentiment in large 
areas of German agriculture, especially in Prussia. Furthermore, 
these were just below the average decadal inport increases. Taking 
the decadal average (2,605,728) as base 100, 1878 was 156, viiilst 
1879 was 162. But compared to 1877 (base 100), the increase for the 
years 1878 and 1879 stood at 94 and 97 respectively. Ihese were well 
below the export increases. Ihus vheat farmers would have benefited 
from the lower inport prices (under conditions of free trade).
Ihere was a further reason ;hy the "prLce-reductions" after 1877 
would not have prompted a change in agriculture's calling for free 
trade. Ihe high price of grain in 1877 was prompted ly a poor harvest 
vMch sent prices ipwards. Ihen in 1878, a good harvest brought 
prices down (Pflanze 1990a: 284). Ihat is, grain prices were
determined to a large extent ly the exigencies of the harvest. But
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mcst inportantly, the "low" price of 1878 led to the maintenance of 
farmers' incomes because the increased yield absorbed the lower 
price. Similarly the effect on farmers' incomes of the high 1877 
price was offset ty the poor harvest yield. That is, farmers were no 
better or worse off in 1878 than in 1877.
In addition to this fact, there were several other factors involved 
that led to the maintenance of the desire for free trade, 
particularly amongst rye producers. Rye producers were not as market- 
orientated as their v±ieat producing counterparts. This was because 
only 20% of total rye production was destined for the internal 
market; the remaining 80% went to feeding animals. An inportant 
agrarian faction involved in rye production were the non-Junker large 
landowners. In particular, those owned a rittergut, tended to 
have many of their estates abroad and soumit to inport their produce 
into Germany. Ihus the largest and most powerful landowners 
unequivocally favoured free trade in rye. A further inportant factor 
was that, given the low market orientation of rye producers, a 
reduction in prices in 1878 would not have been sufficient to 
inaugurate a shift away from free trade. It would take considerably 
more than just one or even two years of low prices to stimulate such 
a shift.
Not surprisingly therefore, was the fact that early in 1879 the 
provincial diets of East and West Prussia, Oldenburg and Lippe 
rejected protectionism; so too the Farmers' Associations of 
Brandenburg, Konigsberg and Silesia (Pflanze 1990a: 474; Lambi 1963: 
147). In addition, the Prussian minister to Vfeimar reported in March 
1879, that mary farmers vho had signed petitions in favour of 
protection had done so only half-heartedly. In addition, the tariff 
manifesto in the Reichstag received the signature of 87% of Centre 
Party members (predominantly peasant based), whereas it received only 
60% of sitting Conservatives (Barkin 1987: 227). Furthermore, not 
only did the Junker dominated Deutsche Landwirtschaftsrat oppose 
protection, but the provincial agricultural councils of East Prussia, 
Mecklenburg and other Junker dominated areas remained staunchly 
opposed until the mid 1880^  s, \hen the depression in agriculture had
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continued without respite. Grain prices did not collapse until after 
1881.
By 1886, vAieat prices stood at 162 marks per ton, corrpauæd to 225 
for 1881, and 204 for 1879 (Hoffmann 1965: 552-554, see Appendix 2 in 
this thesis; cf. Timoshenko 1928: 99; Lamhi 1963: 133). Ihe 1886 price 
represented a 21% fall on the 1879 figure, a fall of 28% on the 
1870's decadal average, and a considerable 31% fall on the 1877 
price. This dwarfed any decrease in grain prices in the 1870's. More 
significantly, vheat exports dried up only after 1880, thus making 
protection more favourable to farmers. Ihus clearly the Junkers, as 
well as much of agriculture, would not have felt the full force of 
this until the early 1880's (as opposed to 1878/9).
However Hardach was wrong to state that protectionism was in the 
interests of no farmer in Germany. It is of some irony to state that 
if we are to understand tariffs not as purely protectionist but 
rather as fiscal, ve can gain a more spEhisticated insight into the 
condition of German agriculture. For example, the Prussian 
conservatives in 1876 formed the Association for the Reform of 
Taxation (a body that is commonly heralded as an embryonic 
manifestation of the grcwlng protectionist identity of the Junkers). 
They had two main aims; firstly to strengthen the political position 
of the conservatives; and secondly, to adjust their policy to the 
achievement of national unity. Niendorf argued that because the 
Inperial Constitution stipulated that indirect taxes and tariffs were 
to be the main source of Reich revenue, absolute free trade was 
therefore impracticable. While courting Bismarck, their own 
materialistic aims were clearly apparent. An increase in indirect 
taxes could lead to a reduction in matriculcu: contributions (and 
hence direct taxes), vÆiich particularly aggrieved the agrarians. In 
fact the large landwners had founded the Association with the aim of 
propagating "ideas and principles of a generally useful political 
economy based on Christian principles (Bueck, quoted in Bdhme 1967: 
231-232). To the Association, "Christian!' principles meant tax relief 
for their own estates and "the most extensive reform in all aspects 
of economic legislation" (Ihungen-Rossbach, quoted in Bohme 1967: 
232). After 1876, vhen the Reich began to rapidly increase state
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assessments, Conservatives began to talk about tax relief. Agrarian 
resentment developed rapidly and was often focussed or aimed at the 
rising urban capitalist/entrepreneurial class. Thus Wilhelm von 
Rauchhai;pt (Junker landlord) characteristically stated that;
"For about thirty years our entire system of production has been 
skewed so significantly toward the capitalistic side that the early 
foundation of our tax system, under vdiich landcwnership was regarded 
as the base for our vtoLe tax system, has likewise been skewed. Today 
the power of capital has become so great and has surpassed that of 
landowners hip by such a margin that landowners have even fallen into 
a considerable dependency upon capital. As a consequence it would in 
fact constitute an utter misunderstanding of the taxpaying capacity 
of individual classes of the population in this country, if we tried 
to continue the present system, under which everything is in the 
final analysis based on landownership^' (quoted in Pflanze 1990a: 
448).
However, as will be shortly discussed, not all large landowners nor 
all Junkers were reliant on purely agricultural income. Many relied 
to a large extent on industrial income - a fact that led to a major 
division within the "Junker class". Nevertheless all over Germany 
landowners could unite on the issue of tax relief, with initial 
differences expressed only over the source of the fiscal bounty. In 
particular the income tax (introduced in 1868), was particularly 
resented. The tax was based in part upon the old poll tax, and in 
part upon the rental cost of an individual's residence. This was in 
effect an extension of the land and building tax, vMch merely 
intensified agrarian resentment. However, it should be noted that the 
rental value of a house was estimated by the tax-payer. Ihus even in 
the 1910's many large landowners valued their homes at less than 300 
marks per annum [rou^ily the equivalent of the rent paid by an 
industrial labourer for a flat with 2-3 rooms of less than 50 square 
metres] (Witt 1970). Ihe fact is that the largest landlords as well 
as the Junkers managed to escape much direct taxation through a sytem 
of corrupt income reporting. Nevertheless, particular resentment was 
felt at the Junker level, as well as at the lower and middle segments 
of the agrarian community. Mjch of this resentment was aimed at the 
urban entrepreneurs, ;Ao, or so many of the agrarians believed, chose 
to live in houses v^ch did not reflect their large purchasing power. 
Or as Dan White aptly expressed it, a belief was developing that 
"visible objects by no means provided the best indication of how much
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a man earned. The frugal first generation of capitalist entrepreneurs 
did not live in palaces" (1976; 63). Finally there was discontent at 
the fact that such entrepreneurs paid no tax on incane from stock 
dividends and interest, (though this benefited the large landowners 
and many of the "Junkers"). Thus even as early as 1873, Johannes 
Mollinger argued in the Landtag that farmers in the Grand Duchy paid 
three times the amount of the income tax through the land tax, vhile 
businessmen paid only once over.
Beginning in the 187(X s, the situation in agriculture worsened as 
mortgage indebtedness rose sharply. This inpacted profoundly upon 
agriculture owing to the fact that in the past twenty years many 
landowners had junped on the mortgage bandwagon. In Prussia, it was 
the eastern provinces vMch were most heavily indebted, affecting 
large and Junker landowners much more heavily than small proprietors 
and peasants (Tlrrell 1951: 28-29). Mortgages of 80 to 90% of the 
purchase price were not uncommon (Pflanze 1990a: 284). Beginning in
the 187CX s the problem intensified such that by 1896, of the large
allodial estates, 42.9% were mortgaged at more than 60% of their
value (Pflanze 1990b: 11. See also Dawson 1904: 205; Dawson 1967:
245-247; Tlrrell 1951: 28). The Junker, observed Friedrich Engels, 
had the same problem as Mr. Micav^ Der: " hew to have an annual income of 
say 20,000 marks, an annual expenditure of 30,000 marks and not make 
any debts" (quoted in Pflanze 1990bc 11; Gerschenkron 1943: 45-46). 
This aptly summed i;p the position of the Junkers. For the rising 
mortgage indebtedness had several origins.
One cause of this debt problem was the expensive lifestyle of the 
Junker. In particular, the cost of paying for his sons' military 
training created a huge strain. A further cause was the steeply 
rising land prices, vMch had increased rapidly throu^iout the 1860^  s 
and 187Œ s. In order to be able to purchase new land, particularly 
for their sons, landcwners' mortgages rose sharply. This was 
antagonised further, because the lack of savings in Germany after the 
186(y s led to higher rates of interest being charged on the debt.
CX^ng to the lack of any mortgage tax relief, increased tax payments 
and surtaxes merely fuelled further agrarian resentment. As a result
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tax relief was becoming for many farmers (particularly of middle and 
small-sized estates) not just a luxury, but rather a matter of 
survival (D. S. White 1976; 65). After 1876 many farmers were blaming 
the increased matricular contributions as a major source of their 
problems. The Heidelberg Convention of 5-8 August 1878, specifically 
aimed to solve this financial crisis. It was the issue of tax relief 
vÆiich led many German farmers down the path of tariffs. Many farmers 
preferred an increase in tariffs on "non-essential” items. In Hessen 
for example, few fsirmers favoured tariffs for protection until mid- 
1878 v^en it became clear that it was the only method by vMch their 
desired tax reform could be inplemented (owing to the fact that 
Bismarck was unable to bring the tobacco industry under government 
control). Indeed it was this fact that had to a large extent pronpted 
elements within agriculture to sipport protection in late 1878. Thus 
on 26 February 1879, the central board of the Hessian Agricultural 
Association decided to support the chancellor "as a result of 
(financial) necessity". They argued that the prqpceed tariffs would 
not aid agriculture directly, but that;
" The indirect advantage... consisting in the fact that as a result of 
increases in the Reich s own revenues, the states will be put in a 
position to lower their direct taxes, would be achieved in a far more 
productive manner if a certain number of articles not considered 
everyday necessities of life but as superfluous luxuries would be 
subjected to substantial increases of the tariffs levied upon 
them... and even the (tobacco) monopoly would be preferable to the 
introduction of a general tariff on all inported articles" (cited in 
as. White 1976: 67).
Prussian Junker farmers were resentful of increased direct taxes, 
thou^ as we shall see later, they probably paid less tax than middle 
sized farms (as a proportion of their total income). Thus vMlst tax 
relief was canvassed by the Junkers, tariffs for protection were only 
ambivalently expressed. Still dependent on exports and on foreign 
(hard) grain and cheap industrial (machinery) inports, the Prussian 
landlords had to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of 
tariffs. The factor of tax relief pushed them down the tariff road 
v^le their economic/agricultural (trading) inperatives tended to 
pull them back. As already discussed, the 1879 vAieat tariff would 
damage their economic interests. The rye tariff was also economically 
problematic. It is usually argued that the tariff on iron goods
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penalised agriculture )vMch had hitherto relied on cheap inports. 
The argument that iron tariffs were antithetical to Junker and high 
agriculture's interests is only in part correct At this point, we 
need to analyse the actual foundations of the category known as the
"Junkers".
Junkers Divided;The false dichotaty between " Junkers" and "Industrial
Capital"
Much of modem historiography of the Kaiserreich perceives the 
"Junker" class as a monolithic category; the epitome of agrarian 
feudal power, particularly vis-a-vis the state. However, in reality 
the Junkers were divided along several lines of cleavage, mainly 
social and economic. The first demarcation to be drawn was between 
the Junkers and the " large" agrarians landowners. The Junker was an 
aristocrat ennobled at the lowest grade (the German "von"). This 
group tended to own no more than two or perhaps three " guter" 
(properties), vMch conprised no more than 1,000 hectares (ha). 
However, the large landholders cwned a minimum of between 1,000-2,000 
ha and a maximum of about 10,000 ha (thou^ a few exceeded this).
These large cwners were both socially and economically differentiated 
from the Junkers. It was the case that the vast majority of this 
group would have been deeply offended had they been confused with the 
" lowly" Junker. This group conprised the individuals of the hi^iest 
status. Thus it conprised mainly Barone (barons), Graf en (counts), 
Fursten (princes) and Herzoge-Mark (dukes). The hi^iest echelons in 
agriculture were therefore differentiated from the Junkers along 
lines of stand (status). In this respect, it is not possible to speak 
of a single economic/status feudal dominant class.
Furthermore the "hi^" landowners were not "feudal" in the sense that 
the term inplies. The majority of these landowners (1219, or 65% of
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the total) had estates between 1,000-2,000 ha. Of these, 418 (34%) 
were bourgeois. Of the 505 landholders owning between 2, 000-5, 000 ha, 
88 (17%) were bourgeois; of the 113 landholders owning between 5,000-
10.000 ha, 8 (7%) were bourgeois; vhilst of the top 44 who owned over
10.000 ha, 2 (4.5%) were bourgeois (K. Hess 1990: 56-97). Of the main 
category (1,000-2,000 ha) 65% were bourgeois; of the total, 27% were 
bourgeois. However, not only were much of this faction of bourgeois 
stock; most had inportant linkages with industry, particularly 
through the ownership of stocks and shares, as well as government 
bonds. Indeed the same was true of the highest echelons within the 
so-called Russian "feudal dominant class" (cf. Becker 1985). 
Furthermore, for most of the h i ^  agrarians, industrial 
revenues/income were more inportant than the wealth created on their 
estates. Ihus whilst they favoured free trade on foodstuffs, most 
welcomed tariffs on industrial goods, vAiich in turn enhanced their 
personal incomes.
Ihere were inportant lines of division and indeed harmony between the 
"haute" feudal class and the Junkers. It has been noted that there 
was a clear line of cleavage along status lines. Ihe industrial 
origins and interests of the h i ^  landowners both complemented and 
antagonised various sections within the Junker category. According to 
Hess, between 1879/1885, of the approximate 31,900 Prussian 
landowners, with estates of nearly 290 ha (approx. 715 acres) over 
50% were of bourgeois stock. More significantly, of the inportant 
16,400 estates of East Prussia with over 100 ha, more than half 
(7,850) were owned by bourgeois industrialists, while 7,160 were 
owned by aristocrats. Hoover, the bourgeois estates conprised as 
many as 7,071 individuals, whilst the 7,160 aristocratic estates 
conprised only 3,641 individual owners (Hess 1990: 56-97). Ihus of 
the East Elbian landowners, over 65 % were of bourgeois stock. Ihe 
Junker class therefore was no monolith, but was split down the middle 
between aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Thus, approximately two thirds 
of the Junker class had much (economically) in common with the high 
landlords, vAiile just about one-third would have clashed with their 
economic and social siperiors, (as well as with fellow Junkers).
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Ihis analysis conpli cates the social divisions that modem 
historiography has claimed to revolve around the tariff question. The 
all too ccanmon notion of the "alliance between iron and rye" is a 
problematic concept for several reasons. Firstly, it assumes that the 
two actors were economically antithetical. This however, is too 
sinplistic. There was both conflict and harmony in economic terms. 
Secondly, it assumes a co-existence of pure ideal type monolithic 
opposites. Neither " group" was purely constituted in economic terms. 
Much of Junker and high agriculture had inportant linkages with 
industry (for want of a better term - the capitalisation of 
feudalism), whilst much of the latter had inportant linkages with 
aristocratic feudalism (the "feudalisation of capitalism"). The 
significance of the 1879 tariff was not in any alliance between 
industry and rye, but rather betv^en bourgeois and feudal Junkers 
(the main cleavage within the Junker category), working with heavy 
industry and Hiÿi agriculture (vhere the latter had more in ccmmon 
with industry than its aristocratic feudal Junker counterpart). Thus 
much of the Junker class were against industrial tariffs, whilst many 
( probably a majority) supported them, alongside h i ^  agriculture.
This was clearly reflected by (selected) Junker ambivalence to unite 
with the iron industrialists for tariffs in 1879. The minority of 
feudal Junkers' deep suspicion of the industrialists was not 
determined by any fear of them being let down should they form an 
alliance. Hew could it have been vhen the agrarians held the upper 
hand politically, (the reason vhy the industrialists had approached 
the agrarians to sipport protectionist tariffs in the first place! ) 
Their "suspicion!' was entirely rational, for they valued cheap 
agricultural machinery which would be jeopardised by an iron tariff. 
David Calleo typically asks the question, "hew were the Junkers 
strong enou^ to inpose agricultural protection upon the German 
bourgeois commercial and industrial interests?" The short answer is 
that they wererf t. It was the Junkers lAo had displayed ambivalence 
toward protection, especially of the industrial variant , as even 
Lambi admits (1963; Ch. 9). Furthermore, it was the industrialists vho 
had approached the Junkers for the sipport of protectionism, and not 
vice-versa. Indeed the industrialists had been marshalling their
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protectionist canpaign even before 1875 (see Lambi 1963: Ch. 8, though 
this point is acknowledged by Calleo, 1978: 68).
If the Junkers had really desired tariffs for protection, why was 
the process of uniting with the industrialists in order to call for 
protection so half-hearted? Ironically, the fact of substantial 
bourgeois interests both within the Junkers and particularly within 
High agriculture provided the basis of a reconciliation of 
agriculture with industry. However, such an alliance could only be 
conpleted with the help of an external co-ordinating body. Such a 
body was at hand in the shape of the Bismarckian state. For the fact 
is, that had it not been for Bismarck^ s moulding of these two groips 
under the protectionist umbrella, the tariff of 1879 may never have 
been legislated; certainly not in the form that it actually, took. 
Ihus Bismarck took to persuading the Junkers that grain tariffs would 
be in their interests. He did this by a two-fold strategy, vMch 
brou^t the doubting Junkers round to protection on both grain and 
heavy industrial goods.
Ihe Bismarckian strategy of creating a Tariff coalition; Forging Uhity 
between Junker factions,, and an Alliance between the Junker class, 
Haute Agriculture and Heavy Industry
Bismarck made much of the factor of tax relief that the tariff would 
provide the agrarians. Ihus on 21 May 1879, Bismarck stated,
"If cheap c o m  is the goal at \^ch we have to aim we ou^t long ago 
to have abolished the land tax, since it burdens the com-grcwing 
industry at home, v^ch produces 400 million cwts., against the 27 or 
30 millions v^ch we inport. But no one has ever thought of such a 
thing: on the contrary the tax has been gradually increased
throughout all Germany, so far as I knew, and in Prussia it has 
increased 30 per cent since 1861, viz, from 30 to 40 millions" 
(quoted in Dawson 1904: 72; see also Henderson 1961: 49-50).
Ihrou^ enphasising tax relief he was able to manipulate much of 
German agriculture (especially the smaller farming estates). Indeed 
if the protectionist versus free trading element of the Junkers was 
ambivalent, upon the factor of tax relief all agrarians could
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unequivocally unite. Bismarck reinforced the agrarian conplaints. He 
claimed that estate owners paid excess taxation (though there is 
plenty of evidence to shew that this was categorically not the case, 
since the Junkers in particular were able to hide much of their gross 
income from the taxing authorities). Capitalists, Bismarck argued, 
were subject only to the personal income tax, and he reckoned that 
they paid approximately 3% of their incomes on taxation. In contrast 
he argued, the estate owner paid an extra 6%-7. 5% throu^ real estate 
taxes, vdiile the surtaxes added a further 10%-20% to their total tax 
bill (Pflanze 1990b: 47). Furthermore there was much resentment over 
the taxation of mortgaged estates, vrfiere the \diole amount borrowed 
was subject to land tax as well as surtax. Much to Bismarck s 
annoyance, there was no MERAS scheme (mortgage income tax relief at 
source) for the agrarians!
To co-opt the Junkers into protectionism, Bismarck therefore 
eirphasised the tax relief available upon their support. However, 
vMlst this strategy was inportant in shifting much of agriculture 
away from free trade, it was not alone sufficient to convert many of 
the Junkers, vÂio paid only small amounts of direct taxes, and thus 
were not so dependent upon possible tax relief. Instead, Bismarck 
enphasised the political benefits that would accrue to the Junkers, 
should they support grain tariffs. This revolved around the creation 
of a ri^tward shift in politics, vArLch would ultimately benefit the 
Junkers (as well as the industrialists). Ihrough the tariff, Bismarck 
would create a new right-wing government coalition, whilst at the 
same time, he would attenpt to split the National Liberals.
On 5 May 1879, the Reichstag debates revealed the rift in the 
National Liberal party and the final estrangement of the left wing 
under Lasker from the ri^it, under Bennigsen, as was intended by 
Bismarck. Bennigsen had finally taken a conciliatory stand towards 
the government's tariff bill. While he stated that both he and many 
of his party friends were neither Free Traders nor Protectionists, 
most of his speeches nevertheless served as a refutation of free 
trade arguments. He argued that, foreign states had not responded 
favourably to German free trade policy and that, German industry 
would benefit if it sold its goods at home rather than abroad, (as
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Vambuler had argued). Nor did he object to the low agricultural 
duties. He also approved of Bismarcks s intention of substituting 
indirect taxes and tariffs, for direct taxes. Nevertheless, he was 
vehemently opposed to any attenpt to limit the Reichstag's control 
over revenue.
On 8 May, Eduard Lasker publicly denounced Bennigsen and the 
majority of the party. He bitterly attacked the protectionists and 
saw agricultural tariffs as a construct to maintain the high standard 
of living of the Junkers. It was at this point that Bismarck attacked 
Lasker unleashing perhaps the most passionate speech he had ever made 
in the Reichstag. He referred to Lasker and the Socialists in general 
as, "those gentlemen vtan our sun does not warm, vton our rain does 
not wet, unless pejdiaps they forget their umbrellas at home... " 
(quoted in Sheehan 1978; 183). On 28 May, von Ballhausen noted in his 
diary that Bismarck was mostly interested in the fiscal question - 
how to dispose of the revenue that the new tariff would provide and 
yet satisfy the constitutional scruples of the parliamentarians. Ihe 
Conservatives and Free Conservatives would have supported almost any 
solution, but those parties could not give him a majority since the 
Progressives and the left National Liberals were utterly intractable. 
Ihe support of another group was needed and Bismarck s choice lay 
between the Centrum and the moderate National Liberals. He was to 
choose the Centrum for he knew that with them he could create a new 
government coalition \^ch was not pro-parliamentciry. It would also 
allow him to oust the National Liberals from the policy-making arena. 
In doing this, Bismarck was to pay a price (the Franckenstein 
clause), thouuÿi in practice, it proved only to be nominal.
Bennigsen had suggested subjecting the revenue from the tariffs to 
the Reich, thou^ with the added provision of its annual approval by 
the Reichstag. Ihis would of course have allowed the abolition of the 
matriki.ll arbeitrage vMch Bismarck had so desperately wanted. 
Furthermore, doubts had arisen in the Centrum, lest its support of 
the Bismarckian tariff project would lead to the undermining of the 
federal structure of the Enpire, and hence strengthen unitary 
tendencies. It was of course, this aspect of the tariff that had been 
central to Bismarck s plan.
70
Accordingly on 8 May, Windthorst suggested that a certain amount of 
revenue from the tariff should be set aside to cover the needs of the 
Enpire, and that the rest should be turned over to the individual 
states. If the Enpire was to incur any extraordinary expenses, the 
funds that were referred to the states should be returned to the 
Inperial Treasury through ' contributions' that were to be approved by 
the Reichstag. This proposal lent itself to the subscription by the 
Centrum to the Clausula Frankenstein, vMch initially proposed 
reserving 105 million marks of the revenue from the tariff for the 
use of the Inperial government, with the remainder going back to the 
states, vMch could in case of need make further contributions to the 
Enpire. Initially the Centrum also insisted upon the annual approval 
of the tariff by the Reichstag, but the Conservatives and Free 
Conservatives rejected this, and the party thereby dropped this 
requirement.
Furthermore, the Centrum, to please Bismarck raised the direct 
Inperial share of the tariff to 130 million marks. Bismarck accepted 
the Centre and not the National liberals' proposal, in spite of the 
fact that it retained the objectionable matrikularbeitrage (Article 7 
in the final tariff act) This would new allow him to form a new 
coalition around the parties of the Free Conservatives, Conservatives 
and Centrum. As noted, the essence of this coalition lay in its 
indifference to pariiamentarianism, ^Aich lay in stark contrast to 
his previous coalition with the National Liberals. VtLth the 
announcement of the Franckenstein amendment, the National Liberals 
immediately attenpted to do a final deal with Bismarck. But the 
parliamentary rights that were desired by the party were vehemently 
rejected by the chancellor, ;Ao clearly preferred the lesser evil, 
namely the maintenance of the matrikul arbeitrage (L. Gall 1986: 109; 
M. Weber 1922/1978: 1390, 1464) With the formation of this new right
wLng coalition the stage was thereby set for an increase in executive 
power. Furthermore, the tariff had not only allowed Bismarck to form 
a new politically desirable coalition, but had also split the 
National Liberal party.
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It was this strengthening of the executive, with the creation of a 
right wing government cartel that had attracted the Junkers into 
joining with the industrialists in favour of tariffs. The
marginalisation of the left wing parties and the split of the 
National Liberals was an inportant Bismarckian political strategy in 
co-opting much of Prussian agriculture into tariff protectionism, as 
well as increasing the pcwer of the executive. Ihe " alliance of Iron 
and Rye", ^^ch was so fundamental in creating a tariff platform was 
not determined by autonomous economic processes. In late 1878, vMlst 
Bismarck had found the industrial protectionists fully organised, he 
simultaneously found the agricultural interests still mobilised 
around free trade. Over the next six months, he applied his fiscal 
and political strategies to forging an alliance between bourgeois and 
feudal Junkers, and between feudal Junkers and haute agricultural 
interests. Ironically, it was probably easier to unite those 
bourgeois Junkers and high nobles with the industrialists, than it 
was uniting the more feudal Junkers with their fellow class members.
Ihe Tariff bill received Inperial assent by a vote of 217 to 117, on 
9 July 1879, part of it coming into operation on 15 July, part of it 
on 1 October, and the remainder on 1 January 1880. All the duties 
were intended to be revenue producing, thou^ some articles were 
singled out for special taxation on account of their proven fiscal 
productiveness, such as colonial goods and coffee, tea, petrol, 
tobacco, and wines and spirits (Dawson 1904; Ch. 5). Finally to 
complete the analysis of the 1879 tariff and to probe into subsequent 
protectionist legislation, an examination of the expenditures and 
revenues of the Reich will be necessary.
SECnCN 2 1879-1890;The Fiscal Politics of Military Expenditures
A m y  bills and other measures relating to national defence played 
from the first a prominent part in the proceedings of the Inperial 
Diet. As Bismarck argued, by force the Reich had been created, and by 
force it would be maintained. Moltke argued that Germany was to have 
a force so large and efficient that she should be able at all times 
to keep the peace of Europe and if need be, inpose it ipon her terms.
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The consolidation of the nation state throu^ geopolitics provided a 
certain boost to the maintenance and indeed future growth of the 
military. This was reinforced by the constant Prussian fear of a war 
on two fronts. As Bismarck had claimed, Germany was an exposed armed 
camp in the middle of the plains. A military build up was seen as a 
sure answer to the problem. In order to ensure this, constant 
additions to Germany s fitting forces were made, first to the land, 
and then to the sea This hœver, led to constant fiscal problems 
for the Reich.
Up to 1874 both peace-time army strength and expenditure had been 
approved for definite time periods. In 1874 the government sou^t to 
arrive at an understanding with the Diet, wanting to instil a more 
permanent solution to army and military budget increases, until a new 
law to the contrary should be passed, the total duration of service 
to remain at twelve years. This provoked a great controversy in the 
Reichstag, with the Conservatives being the only party in favour. The 
other groups objected to the retention of the pecu:e strength at a 
figure vMch in 1871 was seen as excessive, and they still more 
objected to its permanency. Moltke made an emotional speech to the 
■Reichstag but failed to impress. It took Bismarckf s intervention from 
his sick bed to win the Diet over. Finally a ccnpronise was proposed 
by Bennigsen. The peace strength was to be as the government wanted 
but would be fixed for seven year periods, (known as the military 
"Septennate” ). From the standpoint both of numbers and finance, the 
military authorities won a victory; thou^ as Craig points out, it 
was in fact a sanevhat hollow victory, because as soon as the bill 
had become legislation, it was felt to be inadequate (1964: 242). 
Nevertheless, the issue at stake was not just the establishment of 
the peacetime strength of the army, but equally as inportant for 
Bismarck, was the keeping of parliament out of military affairs.
In 1881 the Septennate agreement was renewed giving an increase of
26,000 men to the anry, (1% of the population of 1875). Before the 
second Septennial act had expired, the government in 1886 demanded 
its renewal on the basis of 1% of the population in 1875, giving a 
new total of 468,409 men. This time the Diet refused to renounce 
financial control for seven years but offered to bind itself for
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three. Typically, Bismarck then turned to the nation. The elections 
of February 1887 led to the formation of a ' cartel' of parties
consisting of the two Conservative groups and the National Liberals, 
pledged to the si;çport of the bill. Effectively assisted by the 
government and the electioneering machinery at its disposal, as well 
as by the never-failing cry of " the Fatherland", these parties
between them captured sixty-three seats at the expense of the 
Radicals and Social Democrats, with the result that they formed alone 
a large majority in the Diet. The a n y  bill was passed. Furthermore, 
because these numbers were felt to be inadequate, a new bill was 
drawn up and placed before the Reichstag in December 1887, followed
by a further request in 1890, taking the army size \;pto 486, 983
(Craig 1964: 242-243).
The rise of the navy escalated after 1896. Up till then, expenditure 
had been relatively modest. Indeed at the beginning of the 1880^  s 
naval estimates were still belcw £2 million per annum. The early 
additions to the Iirperial Navy ware made by the help of the French 
indemnity, but from 1875 onwards that source of revenue was exhausted 
and loans were resorted to. (Note that though the figures were lew in 
comparison to post 1896, they were nevertheless relatively hi<ÿi by 
1880 since there had been virtually no navy before 1871). Up to 1875 
therefore, the Empire had by painful effort paid its way, but then 
came the need to borrcw. Accordingly, matricular contributions were 
vastly increased. Each state faced huge financial difficulties. 
During the Fiscal Depression from 1875 onwards, all states found it 
especially difficult to pay the " contributions". Between 1875 and 
1879 the amount paid in contributions was 90 million marks less than 
that requested by the Reich. As an emergency procedure, the larger 
states were forced to increase their contributions, (see Table 2. 2 
for the Prussian and Bavarian figures).
With such a heavy burden on the states, and with the Reich accruing 
loans each year from 1876 onwards, the need for increased revenue was 
growing acute. As a consequence, in 1879 the reform of the fiscal 
system was made by introducing customs duties. This was thought to 
have cleared the way and given the Empire a new start as had been 
intended. But owing to the Franckenstein Clause and, thou^ to a
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lesser extent the desire of the Reichstag to retain parliamentary 
control, Bismarcks s hid it seemed, had been hairpered. The 
Franckenstein Clause, vMch constituted the Centre party's quid pro 
quo for voting with the government on the tariff, stipulated that any 
surplus revenue above 130m marks (£6. 5m) acquired from customs duties 
was to be redistributed to the states on a population basis. It 
seemed therefore, that the Reich had limited itself throu^ 
conciliation with the Centrum, to a self-defeating policy vMch would 
prevent it from acquiring future revenue throu<ÿi increased customs 
duties. In practice however, the opposite was true. As the chart 
(2,5) below reveals, whilst the states received substantially higher 
amounts of revenue from central government, they repaid much of this 
back to the Reich.
As Ashley points out, the net demands, that is the matricular 
contributions in excess of payments to them by the Reich (from the 
customs revenue) rapidly diminished until they became insignificant 
from 1882 until 1898. Given the substantial hike in the matricular 
payments in the late 188(y s it was clear that the states were in 
receipt of a vital tax subsidy. This subsidy was the surplus of 
indirect revenues (tariffs) in excess of the stipulated 130m marks 
(£6. 5m). Put more siitply, the Reich vMch gained increasing revenue 
from customs channelled the surplus (ie. everything in excess of £6.5 
million) to the states. Though a small amount was kept by the states, 
the vast majority of this was returned to the Reich through a 
commensurate increase in the matricular contributions. The net fiscal 
subsidy (received from the Reich) was equivalent to an average annual 
injection of 31.6m marks (that is, after the payment of the 
matricular contributions had been made), covering the period 1883- 
1898
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Table 2. 6 Net Gains and Losses to the States from Imperial Levies 
and Tax Distributions. 1880-1914 (a)
(in Millions of Marks)
Year
Levies
(b)
on
States
Distri­
butions
to
States
Diff­
erence
Year
Levies
on
States
Distri­
butions
to
States
Diff­
erence
1880 64 38 -26 1898 455 468 +13
1881 85 68(c) -17 ' 1899 490 477 -13
1882 85 84 -1 1900 528 509 -19
1883 74 85 +11 1901 571 556 -15
1884 64 105 +41 1902 580 556 -24
1885 103 116 +13 1903 566 542 -24
1886 119 137 +18 1904 220 196(e) -24
1887 171 176(d) +5 1905 213 189 -24
1888 208 278 +70 1906 230 206 -24
1889 215 355 +140 1907 227 195 -32
1890 301 379 +78 1908 220 195 -25
1891 316 383 +67 1909 169 121(f) —48
1892 316 353 +37 1910 228 180 -48
1893 369 339 -30 1911 212 164 -48
1894 385 382 -3 1912 247 195 -52
1895 383 400 +17 1913 255 203 -52
1896 399 414 +15 1914 246(g) 194(h) -52
1897 420 433 +13
(a) 1880 to 1911, from W. Gerloff 1913: 522; 1912 to 1914 from
Statistiches Jahrbuch fur daa dairtsche Reich; both sources quoted in 
M. Newcomer 1937: 23. [Staat levies also presented in S. Cohn 1972: 
206-207], (b) These figures do not include the special payments by
the Southern states for the privilege of retaining beer and spirits 
taxes and the postal and telegraph service
(c) Stamp taxes added.
(d) i^rits tax added.
(e) Distribution of Customs and Tobacco tax discontinued.
(f) Distribution of stamp taxes discontinued.
(g) Discontinued 14 August, 1919.
(h) i^rLts tax distribution fixed.
Thus, the Reich in effect, managed to retain almost all of the 
revenue acquired from customs (Newcomer 1937: 21-22). Hence the
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Franckenstein provision proved to be only a nominal constraint. In 
practice rather, not only did it give the Enpire more independence 
from the states, but also allowed it to accrue far more revenue. Hiis 
was the most significant aspect of \ihat von Kruedener (1987: 111-123) 
has aptly termed the "Franckenstein Paradox". The 1879 tariff proved 
to be the first step towards the goal of conplete financial autoncmy 
of the Reich from the states.
The Run Up to the 1885 Tariff
Whilst accumulating new revenues from the 1879 tariff, RLsmarckf s 
hopes to provide tax relief to the states remained largely 
unfulfilled. Ihe main problem was that the Reich required increased 
sources of revenue over and above that acquired from the tariff. 
Increased esq^enditures on the military under the new septannate, 
meant that additional levies had to be extracted from the states. 
Prussia's contribution was to be approximately 15m marks, Wiich wiped 
out the surplus earmarked for the tax cut (Pflanze 1990b: 46).
Bismarck feared that unless tax relief was forthcoming, rural voters 
would desert the government in the approaching 1881 Iirperial 
elections. Thus in October 1880 he introduced two new tax bills in 
the Prussian Landtag. These were aimed to suspend the four lowest 
brackets of the class tax (incomes ipto 1200 marks), as well as to 
reallocate direct taxes to the local governments. However both were 
rejected; the second bill by the National Liberals, viio feared its 
anti-parliamentary nature. Also in 1880 a bill was introduced to 
extend the stairp duties. However, only the Conservatives were in 
favour and it failed to secure assent. Another novel tax was then 
proposed - a national defence tax. But since military service was 
regarded by most people as one of the hi^nest duties of citizenship, 
it was quickly rejected. Bismarck was no more successful with his 
proposals to increase the taxation of beer, having to face the 
jealousy and opposition of most of the federal states, especially in 
the south. Indeed as the southern states raised a large proportion of
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their revenue from the taxation of beer, (of \toch Bavarians drank 
four times as much as North Germans), any suggestion of a larger 
contribution to the Imperial Treasury from this source was vehemently 
opposed.
Then in November 1881 a bill was introduced to create an Iitperial 
tobacco monopoly, with vMch Bismarck hoped to produce between 130m- 
150m marks. Initially this was dressed up lay earmarking the revenues 
for a programme of old age pensions and disability insurance aimed 
for workers' benefit. But as finally drafted this was dropped. In any 
case the bill was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies, vAiere the 
unpopularity of the measure was clearly perceived. On 6 May 1882 the 
bill was withdrawn. However Bismarck achieved moderate success in 
1883 v^en a statute vdiich suspended the lowest two brackets .of the 
class tax was passed. Nevertheless it had little political or fiscal 
importance.
Thus by 1883 Bismarck had achieved little success in his desire to 
liquidate direct taxes at staat level. In desperate need for new
revenues, and having completely failed to instigate some kind of
Iitperial monopoly, once again he would turn to increasing indirect
taxes. A further factor had by now come into play. By 1883 the
growing agricultural depression was becoming increasingly based upon 
lower grain prices, engendered by the flood of cheap imports from 
Russia and the United States. As a result the government was flooded 
with petitions from agricultural communities in search of 
protectionist tariffs for their goods. Finally, Bismarck hoped to 
secure a new government bloc around the Centre, National Liberals and 
the Conservatives. An agricultural tariff could secure these three 
objectives in one fail swoop. Accordingly, in 1885 Bismarck saw to 
the raising of grain tariffs from 10 to 30 marks per ton.
As Table 2.6 below shews, the new tariff enhanced the fiscal 
position of the government. In 1886 tariff revenues were 238m marks, 
compared to 139m in 1879 (Witt 1970; 56). Ifcwever, this still did not 
enable significant tax reductions at state levels - a project vMch 
had become an inportant political objective of the Reich 
chancellor. The hindrance was of a somevtot complex nature. In the
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first instance the " Lex Huene" had been passed in the Prussian 
Landtag on 14 May 1885. Introduced by Huene, this law permitted the 
Prussian Treasury to retain only 15m marks of the surplus revenues 
received from the Reich after payment of the matricular 
contributions; the rest was to be distributed to the city and county 
governments. This in itself however was not a problem and indeed 
harmonised in intent with Bismarck's strategy of agrarian tax relief. 
The problem was that whilst the majority of the sums distributed 
(42. 5m out of 49. 5m marks between 1886 and 1889) indeed went to rural 
circles, a large increase in local expenditures offset any tax 
reductions intended. As Mabel Newcomer put it, "thus any gains \hich 
may have accrued to the owners of agricultural land came in the form 
of increased governmental services rather than in tax reductions" 
(1937: 38. See also Von Kruedener 1987: 119).
Thus ly 1886 Bismarck was doubly frustrated in his long term fiscal 
project. Having failed to inaugurate the desired tax relief to the 
agrarians, he was additionally faced with an increase in Reich 
expenditures \hich were leading to annual deficits. The taking out of 
loans (upto 410m marks annually) to cover the deficits merely 
intensified the fiscal problem, since it led to higher interest and 
amortisation payments. It was not feasible to increase the matricular 
contritutions. In any case, the balance of payments between the Reich 
and states, \diich had favoured the latter after 1882, was rapidly 
diminishing. The balance of payments had slipped from 41m in 1884 to 
13m in 1885, and finally to only 5m marks in 1887 (see chart above).
With fiscal crisis staring him in the face, Bismarck attenpted to 
initiate yet another government mancpoly, this time on liquor. 
However on 27 March 1886 the hill was thrown out of the Reichstag by 
a clear majority. With the agrarians still calling out for higher 
tariffs even after the 1885 increase, the way was open for Bismarck 
to gain the urgently needed revenues through yet another tariff 
increase in 1887 (see chart 2.7).
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Table 2. 7 Net iiariff Revenues at Reich level 1879-1890
Years Revenues
1879 139. 9
1880 169. 9
1881 185. 3
1882 191. 4
1883 195.0
1884 213.3
1885 220. 6
1886 237. 9
1887 257. 8
1888 285. 1
1889 349. 9
1890 368. 9
Source P. C. Witt 1970: 56 (Table 5, coluinn 4)
(1) These revenue figures have had various administrative costs 
deducted. The gross figures were approximately 50m marks hi^ier per 
annum.
The Application of the Economic Variable in Tariff Policy, 1879-1887
The 1879 German tariff met with some success in offsetting the 
decreased prices. However it served the fiscal needs of the Reich far 
more than the protective "needs'* (assuming their unequivocal 
existence) of agriculture or industry. Indeed this factor provides 
further evidence of the lack of a dear protectionist will (in terms 
of protecting agriculture), on the part of the agrarians and the 
government in 1879. This point can be quantified ty an examination of 
v^eat and rye prices in the 187(X s decade, (calculated from %)endix 
2).
The tariff was well below 10% ad valorem, idiether calculated on an 
"effective" or "nominal" basis. General estimates of tariff rates on 
grain are between 5-7% ad valorem (Iambi 1963: 226; Pdlard 1981: 
258). In 1879, the nominal specific tariff rate calculated on an ad 
valorem basis, stood at 5% for vdieat and 7. 5% for rye. Even if we 
assume that the price of grain would increase by the whole amount of 
the tariff, then the "dip" in prices after 1877 fcy 13% on wheat and
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16% on rye would not be made good. Nor could the 5% tariff be 
"rationalised" by arguing that it would restore v^eat prices to the 
average for the period 1871-1879. Since the average price was 224 
marks per ton for v^eat, the 1879 price (204 marks), represented a 9% 
reduction. The 1878 and 1879 rye prices were 135 and 138 marks per 
ton respectively, vMch signified an approximate 13% reduction on the 
decadal average. Thus a concomitant tariff of between 9%-13%, (based 
on the price reductions on the average decadal price) or by about 
13%-16% (based on the price reductions witnessed post-1877) was 
required to " coirpensate" grain producers. As far as the rye producers 
were concerned the 7.5% tariff was clearly inadequate to restore 
prices vAien the econonic crunch occurred after 1882; a point that 
Bismarck openly conceded in 1885. Rather a tariff of over double this 
was required. Equally as problematic is the impact of the industrial 
tariff. As ejqxLained earlier, much of agriculture had been dependent 
on low tariffed industrial iron and steel inports, vMch had supplied 
it with cheap machinery. The fact that industry received protection 
(particularly given its much hi^ier rates), had contributed to 
various sections of agriculture's ambivalence over the tariff. After 
the legislation had been passed, it became apparent that 
agriculture's worst fears had been realised. Hius \diilst tariff rates 
were 5% on ^ eat and 7. 5% on rye, the rates for iron and steel stood 
on average, at between 15%-25% (8. B. Wsbb 1980: 310). Ihe differential 
meant that the (limited) gains that rye producers felt were at the 
very least partially offset by the substantially higher industrial 
rates (though much of haute agriculture and large elements within the 
Junker class would have benefited from industrial tariffs)..
More inportantly, the lew foreign vdieat prices would have been a 
considerable boon for farmers, especially in Prussia, vbose 
propensity to export was high and who were dependent on cheap foreign 
inportation of hard \dieat. As noted earlier, the import increases 
were matched by the growth of exports. It is likely that the 
importation of cheap hard ^Aeat was highly beneficial for German 
producers as it enabled them to increase their exports. Thus from 
1870-1876 vdieat inports averaged 1. 976m quarters, v^iilst from 1877- 
1879 they averaged 4. 199m quarters, (representing a growth rate of 
over 100%). Meanwhile for the period 1871-1876, exports averaged
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2. 107m quarters, whilst between 1877 and 1879 they increased to an 
average of 2.922m (thou<ÿi for 1878-1879 inclusive, they averaged
3. 491m quarters, this representing a 66% increase on the 1871-1876 
average). This being so, it is therefore problematic to conclude that 
wheat producers were desperately clamouring for protection \Æiich was 
granted them in 1879.
It is at this point that we can finally appraise the 1879 tariff in 
terms of the so-called benefits accrued to German agriculture. To 
return to a point made earlier, the 1879 tariff introduced a clause 
vMch enabled German vAieat producers to obtain a refund on the taxed 
inport if it was to be re-exported. This was necessary if the German 
producer was to ensure that his exportable produce was to remain 
CŒipetitive. However such a refund was only permissible with the 
presentation of a certificate of origin, to be produced by the German 
farmer. However, the refund could only be obtained if the foreign 
^Aeat to be re-e:ported was not mixed with the home produced good. 
And yet German wheat exports were dependent on precisely such a 
mixture - the Stettin/Danzig mix. That is, the soft German vdieat 
could only be exported (or sold in the domestic market) once it had 
been mixed with the foreign (Russian) hard vAieat. In practice this 
meant that if the Stettin mix was to be exported, no refund would be 
forthcoming.
Thus the German v^ ieat producer was less competitive, (to the tune of 
5% of the price per ton) in the foreign and domestic arenas than 
before the tariff was iirplemented. In other words, the 1879 \Æieat 
tariff, in conjunction with the refund statute led to a less 
conmercially efficient (Serman product. As a partial result, German 
vAieat exports dropped dramatically from 3. 6m quarters in 1879 to 0. 8m 
in 1881 and to a mere 0.004m in 1890. Thus whilst average \Aeat 
exports stood at 2. 4m quarters in the 187Œ s, (and a substantial 3. 5m 
average, 878 and 1879) they fell to a mere 0.5m in the 188Œ s 
(Broomhall 1904; 77). In sum, one of the major sources of income for 
Prussian agriculture had dried ip as a result of the 1879 tariff. Ihe 
^ l^eat tariffs benefited the stats' s fiscal needs largely at the 
expense of Prussian/German agriculture.
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This leads onto a further necessary revision of the 1879 tariff 
legislation as it affected German agriculture. For it means that the 
tariff could only benefit rye producers. But as already pointed out, 
a tariff of approximately 13-16% was " required" on rye inports in 
order to make good the price reductions of the late 187CX s. In this 
vein the 7. 5% tariff for rye producers was clearly insufficient. In 
any case, rye producers (particularly of the haute agricultural
interests) favoured free trade in 1879. The picture to emerge in the 
post 1879 era reflects this fact. Thus althou^ the tariff
contributed to raising prices in the years 1880 and 1881, thereafter, 
prices plummeted. In contrast to the picture painted by the 
economistic consensus, (most notably Lairibi), agricultural prices only 
significantly dropped in the years after 1881, rather than after 
1877. By 1886 v^ ieat had dropped to 162 marks per ton,. vÆiich 
represented a 21% reduction on the 1879 figure and a 28% reduction on 
the average figure for the previous decade, and a considerable 31% on 
the 1877 price.
Furthermore, the price reductions in themselves were not solely 
responsible for the agricultural switch to protectionist tariffs by 
the mid-188(y s. One of the main reasons for the vast reductions in 
vAieat exports in the 188(X s was the shift in consumer preference 
toward v^eat bread [away from rye] (H. J. Tteuteberg and G. Wiegelmann 
1972: 133-145). This meant that much of German vdieat production
became orientated to the domestic market. Cheap vdieat iitports had 
less benefit for the German producer, althou^ they were still 
required to mix the soft German with hard foreign v^ ieat for domestic 
consumption. But with the drastic reduction in vAieat exports, coupled 
with the lew prices in the years 1883-1886 [and even ipto 1890] the 
cause of tariff protection became much more attractive. For those
v^eat producers vÆio had never exported, the attraction was even
stronger.
The main problem that German farmers (^Aeat or rye, large or small) 
faced was that of rising mortgage indebtedness. This began in the mid 
187Œ s and was felt particularly from the early 188Œ s throu^ to the 
beginning of the 189Œ s. The problem stemmed from the huge rises in 
the price of land that took off in the 1860^  s. The mortgage problems
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were exacerbated by the rise in interest rates, Which had risen as a 
function of Germany lack of savings. All this impacted upon farmers 
mainly in the 188CK s. Indeed the estates that were sold due to 
mortgage indebtedness peaked in the late 188(X s and early 189(y s. 
Thus between 1886-1895, 21,247 estates caiprising some 738,625 ha 
were sold; between 1896-1905, 12,485 estates comprising some 384, 575 
ha were sold; whilst between 1906-1914, only 6,165 estates comprising 
some 150,347 were sold (K Hess 1990; 262-279). These substantial
problems were further exacerbated by the rising cost of agricultural 
labour; in turn a function of labour scarcity due to the rural 
vacation of the land in favour of urban centres.
These problems vMch were felt particulsirly at the beginning to irtLd- 
188Œ s, v^ ien coupled with the sustained reductions in grain prices 
led to a shift toward protectionism. Not surprisingly, mass based 
agricultural calls for protection were only heard after 1882/3. 
Petitions for protection accumulated rapidly after 1882 such that by 
1885, tariffs were urgently required at all levels of agricultural 
production. Such was the clamour, that Bismarck chose to meet its 
demands. The duties were raised from 10 marks per ton in 1879 to 30 
marks per ton in 1885. However, these increased duties were still not 
high enou^ to offset falling prices and the Junkers soon demanded 
further increases. This economic factor was a crucial variable to the 
further raising of the duties two years later in 1887 to 50 marks per 
ton. Gerschenkron (1943: 47), argues that agricultural tariffs were 
enacted by the state purely for the selfish interests of the Junker 
class. Similarly Hans Rosenberg sees the tariff as unleashing selfish 
interest group politics in contrast to the more, " elevated 
constitutional and political issues that prevailed in the 186Œ s and 
1870^5". However, it was precisely these " elevated constitutional and 
(fiscal) political issues" that were so fundamental to the creation 
of the tariff increases in 1879, 1885 and 1887. Vfe shall reveal this 
by an examination of the political realm involved.
CX^ng to these various reforms in taxation always for the purpose of 
higher revenue, the Enpire enjoyed a short period of financial 
prosperity after 1888. For vMle the average yields of customs and 
excise during the years 1872-1880 was about £12. 5m (280m marks) per
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annum, during the second decade, it was as much as £22m (493m marks) 
per annum (Ashley 1909; 10). This was crucial for Bismarck, in that 
it allowsd him to fiscally by-pass the federal states (see tables 2. 5 
and 2. 18). After 1885, and in particular after 1887, the increase in 
customs duties led to a growth, spurt in Reich revenues. The surplus 
remaining after matricular payments went to the states (due to the 
Frankenstein clause), and the local communities (via the Lex Huene), 
as was congruent with Bismarcks s project of effecting tax relief 
through central government tariffs. Bismarck was also content with 
the vast new sums of revenue vMch entered the Reich s coffers.
Section 3
State Autonomy and Class Power post-1890;Establishing the Causal Mix
The New Course and the 189a s Agricultural Crisis
The downward tendency of grain prices in the 188a s continued and 
indeed intensified after 1890. According to Dade, between 1860-1879 
the annual average price of ^ Aeat in Prussia fell belcw 180 marks per 
ton twice; between 1880-1889 it fell five times, and six times in the 
following decade (quoted in TLrrell 1951: 195). In December 1891,
vheat sold at 255m marks and rye at 203 marks per ton. These were 
healthy prices. But by January 1893, vÆieat sold at 156 marks and rye 
at 131 marks per ton (Hrrell 1951: 27-28; also Timoshenko 1928: 99 - 
see appendix 2 in this thesis). This represented a 39% reduction on 
the 1891 position, a 24% reduction in \Æieat prices over 1879, and a 
34% reduction on the 1877 figure. The extent of the 189a s 
agricultural crisis can be gauged by conparing post 1892 prices with 
those of the previous two decades. These are tabled in graph form 
below (Table 2. 8).
85
Table 2. 8. The Decline êmd Recovery of Grain Prices (Wheat and Rye). 
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The 189(y s agricultural crisis was a transnational phenomenon. From 
the period 1873-1900, world prices of ^eat have been estimated as 
follows: 1900 = 100, 1873 = 244, 1894 = 84. The world price averaged 
a mere 106. 5 marks per ton in the 189Œ s (Pollard 1981: 266; Rostov 
1978: 164-165). In Germany the effects of the depression were 
similarly felt. Indeed the price reductions after 1891 had not been 
witnessed since the period from 1820 to 1840. These reductions were 
dramatic even when we conpare the 189Œ s with the average prices for 
the previous two decades. From 1870-' 8 the average price per quarter 
stood at 48s lid This dropped to 44s 7d frcan 1879-1884, and fell 
further to 35s Id from 1885-' 7. There was a recovery after the 1887 
tariff to 42s hut then occurred a massive drop to a mere 34s 8d in 
the period from 1892-1900 (Broomhall 1904: 78). Expressed in German 
currency, the average price of vAieat 1870-1878 was 226 marks per ton; 
for 1879-1884 it stood at 201 marks; for 1885-1887 it was a mere 166 
marks; for 1887-1891 it was 195 marks, \diLlst between 1892-1900 it 
dropped to 162 marks. This reduction had been felt immediately cifter 
1892. In addition by the 1890^  s, the agricultural depression had 
reached all parts of the empire, most notably Bavaria \^ch had 
hitherto been relatively prosperous. The depression also affected 
small and peasant farmers, mainly throu^ substantial mortgage 
indebtedness. This was substantially worsened by the large price 
reductions of the 189Œ s agrarian crisis (Schissler 1986: 34; Puhle 
1986: 96). Finally, according to Dade, it cost between 170 and 200 
marks to produce 1 ton of wheat, and between 140-170 marks for i ton 
of rye. The average cost of 1 ton of vheat and rye was approximately 
185 and 155marks respectively. These figures coincided with the 
estimates quoted by Count Kanitz in various Reichstag speeches, made 
between 1890 and 1894. According to Dade's figures in 1891, farmers 
enjoyed profits of approximately 20-25% per ton of v^ ieat, and 
approximately 50% on rye, but by late 1893 they were making 
substantial losses (see Hrrell 1951: 27-28). However, these figures 
were subject to exaggeration since Dade was one of the leading 
agrarian figures interested in protectionism. Nevertheless, it was 
certainly the case that farmers' profit margins had narrowed at the
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beginning of the 189Œ s. Thus cifter 1892 the rationale for tariff 
protection in agriculture had never been so great. If the Junker 
class was so powerful and could sijpposedly dictate government policy, 
as much of the economistic consensus claims, then now would be the 
time for tariff rates to be substantially increased at the behest of 
the Junkers.
In 1892-' 3 throu^ a series of trade treaties Caprivi, the new Reich 
chancellor, significantly reduced grain tariffs on vheat and rye from 
50 - 35 marks and on oats from 40 - 28 marks per ton. However, it is 
inportant to note that these were specific tariffs, calculated on a 
fixed rate rather than on an ad valorem basis. Thus vhilst the 
specific rate was substantially reduced by 30% (over the 1887 rate), 
the actual reduction in ad valorem rates was only minimal. Stephen 
Webb has estimated that between 1889-1890 the ad valorem rate for rye 
was between 46%-49% and for vheat between 33%-34%. By 1894-1896 rye 
tariffs stood at betvæen 42%-46%, and for wheat between 32%-33%. 
These changes were therefore only very minimal. However, by 1900-1902 
rye ad valorem rates stood between 33%-37% and vheat, between 27%-28% 
(Webb 1982; 314).
The reason for these seeming anomalies stems from the impact of 
declining and rising grain prices. Thus after 1890, as the price of 
grain declined substantially, the specific rates led to the effective 
maintenance of the ad valorem rates. But by the early twentieth 
century, as world grain prices began to rise again, so the specific 
tariff rates led to a large reduction in the overall ad valorem 
rates. Up to a certain point, this fact offsets the argument made 
above. Thus the CaprLvi trade treaties did not lead to a substantial 
reduction in the tariff rates experienced by agriculture. J. A. NLchols 
has argued that the reduction of the \heat and rye tariffs still 
represented " a sacrifice made for agriculture by the vhde nation!' 
(1958: 147) This is indeed the case. However the implication is that 
agriculture was profiting at the expense of the nation. Whilst the 
state enjoyed the h i ^  tariff revenues, it is not the case that 
German agriculture was profiting to the exctent inplied by Nichols. 
Indeed the fact remains that at a time when German agriculture was 
facing ipto the lowest prices witnessed for half a century.
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particularly in the face of substantial mortgage indebtedness, the 
government was actually reducing tariffs vAien we would expect a so- 
called " pre-capitalist state" to be substantially increasing 
protectionist rates.
Seen from this perspective, Lambi^ s words seem most apposite;
" Caprivi's commercial policy... sacrificed the interests of 
agriculture to the conclusion of commercial treaties advantageous to 
industry" (1963: 231). Equally as apt are Uptonf s words, "By
1894... declining world grain prices and increasing indebtedness made 
the reduction of duties on Russian grain seem the culmination of an 
unspeakable betrayal" (1974: 965). What had caused this unprecedented 
attack upon the Junkers?
Politically, CaprLvi had sought a very different strategy to the 
problem of the Reichstag and its increasingly parliamentaristic 
tendency to limit the power of the executive. Unlike Bismarck, 
CaprLvi sought to reduce working class militancy throu^ appeasement 
rather than repression; "The government can subjugate and suppress, 
but that is not the end of the matter; the injuries wLth \^ch we are 
confronted can only be healed from wLthirf' (CaprLvi, quoted in 
Pflanze 1990b: 390-391). CaprLvi's more "reformist" approach was
witnessed in a variety of fields, not least in the sphere of 
taxation. In this respect he soumit to produce a somevAiat less 
regressive tax base than the one created by his predecessor. To this 
end he presided over several tax and tariff bills.
In November 1890, CaprLvi presented to the Prussian Chamber of 
Deputies, three tax bills. These sought to convert the Class and 
Classified Income Taxes into a single progressive Income Tax; to 
reform the Inheritance Tax by eliminating the duties on small estates 
under 1000 marks, abolishing tax exenptions on larger estates and 
inaugurating a new tax on invested capital; to transfer the Land and 
Building Taxes from the Prussian state to Communal Governments 
(Pflanze 1990b 390). In 1891, the Class tax was indeed abolished and 
the Income tax was made somevAat more progressive. According to 
E. R. A. Seliman (1908: 46-47), incomes below 900 marks (approximately 
£44), were henceforth exenpt, whilst incomes from 900-1050 marks
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(approximately £44-£51)/ would pay 6 marks rising to 4% on incomes 
over 100/000 marks (approximately £4/460). Hirou^ the Law of 14 July 
1893/ local payments of the income tax decreased from 143 to 105 
million marks between 1894 and 1895/ v^lst direct taxes at the 
Prussian state level were reduced from 202m marks in 1894 to 161m in 
1895 (Prochncw 1977: 6). In the same period/ land and building taxes 
increased fran 28 to 82 million marks/ thus increasing local revenues 
from direct taxes (Newccxner 1937: 35). This fiscal manoeuvre was a 
necessary remedy to the problem of the Lex Huene. Ihus not only was 
there little fiscal relief engendered as a result of the Prussian 
incone taX/ but the land and building taxes remained in existence/ 
having been merely transferred from staat to local level. 
Nevertheless/ many Junkers and large landowners obtained a hidden 
benefit frcxn this fiscal manoeuvre. Since many did not belong to a 
village/ they were able to avoid much direct taxation. Indeed as maiy 
as 17/ 000 large landowners and Junkers directly benefited (WLtt 
1970).
As part and parcel of his progressive tax package/ CaprLvi also 
soumit to lower the extremely h i ^  (regressive) indirect taxes, most 
notably the tariff on grain. Hiis was given a strong inpetus ty the 
1891 harvest failure \^ch had sent the price of c o m  to an alarming 
hei^t. "Hunger stalked the streets gaunt and menacing" (Dawson 1904: 
93). In Berlin for exanple/ 1kg of rye bread had cost 21. 2 pfennigs 
in 1888. By 1890 this had risen to 27. 2 pf and to 31. 6pf in 1891/ 
with a h i ^  of 40. 7pf in September (Nichols 1958: 141). As NLchols 
points out/ these prices provoked agitation amongst the free trade 
radicals and especially amongst the working class social democrats. 
In direct response/ CaprLvi lowered the tariff on wheat/ rye and 
oatS/ thus engendering some relief for the consumer at the 
landowners' expense. Ihe Prussian farmer had been doubly hit through 
CaprLvi's tax package/ via reduced grain tariffs and by having to pay 
sli^tly hitler rates of progressive taxation.
A second causal factor lay with the international system of 
protection. At this time Germany was rapidly industrialising/ and her 
need to secure access to foreign markets for her manufacturing goods 
began to press. Looking predominantly within the First World/ German
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industrial exports had been hanpered by the excessively high grain 
tariffs, (vMch had stimulated foreign retaliation against German 
inports). CaprLvi therefore saw, that some tariff concessions, mainly 
on agricultural goods would have to be made to foreign countries in 
order to persuade them to lower their tariff barriers. CaprLvi told 
the Reichstag: "Vfe must export. Either we export goods or we export 
men. The hone market is no longer adequate" (quoted in Henderson 
1975: 221).
However, the lowering of the grain tariffs heaver did not hinder 
the fiscal needs of the Reich. Thus \^lst the rates were reduced, 
grain inports significantly increased, thus enhancing revenues (Chart 
2. 10). This had been anticipated by the Prussian Finance Minister, 
MLquel (TLrrell 1951: 220). As the figures below show (Table 2. 9), 
customs revenue very nearly doubled between 1887 and 1902, and 
increased by over 40% between 1892 and 1902.
Tqbl A 2. Q Tariff Revenue YLeld 1887-1902
Year Total
Tariff Yield
Grain
Tariff Yield
1887 257.8 -
1888 285. 1 -
1889 349. 9 114. 1
1890 368. 9 139.4
1891 378.5 135.9
1892 360.0 133.5
1893 341. 1 95.4
1894 349.7 128. 9
1895 382.2 138.6
1896 433.7 175. 1
1897 441.0 170.5
1898 475. 8 194.5
1899 461.8 173. 3
1900 465. 8 171.9
1901 479. 0 200.2
1902 497. 6 200. 1
Source: P. CWLtt 1970: 56. Table 5,
(1) These figures are the net yield (after administration costs have 
been deducted). The gross figures are hiÿier by approximately 40-50m 
marks per annum.
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Table 2. 10 Graphic Representation of Grain Imports 1870-1902
10.00
m 7.00
'w 5.00 
o Wheat
Maize
(Source: see Appendix 3)
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Thus although the fiscal position of the Reich was enhanced by 
Capri vi's tariff programme, the lowering of the grain tariffs clearly 
flew in the face of the Junkers. This provoked the formation of the 
agrarian Bund der LandwLrte, vMch was established solely with the 
intention to pressurise the government for concessions. To this end, 
the agrarians advanced the Kanitz Motion, vMch proposed to increase 
tariffs on grain approximately 60%, attaching immediately a 
surcharge of 7% to the natiorf s foodbill (see Dawson 1904: 136-137). 
Essentially the motion was an attenpt to guarantee a minimum price 
for grain; 215 marks for v^eat and 165 marks for rye (Tirrell 1959: 
302). It is interesting to note that these projected prices were not 
much hi^er than the averages of the 1870-1880 decade, representing a 
mere 5% increase on the 1879 price for \^eat, though a 19% increase 
on the 1879 rye price. Despite having the full srpport of the 
Farmers' League, the motion was not turned into legislation.
The fcaprLvi Treaties affected the agrarians not only economically 
tut also politically. According to Ploetz (Farmers' League), the 
German farmer no longer viewed the Radical hut rather the Kaiser, as 
his enemy. In particular the Junkers blamed the enperor, \^ iose 
absolute power had been used against them. Thus according to Ploetz, 
the Junkers favoured constitutional monarchy, but considered the 
growth of absolutism to be a serious danger to the state "An 
absolute Enpire we do not have and we do not want" (Ploetz, in 
KbrresTDondenz des Bundes d^r Tandwi rtA, quoted in Tirrell 1951: 313). 
At the political level the Conservatives seemed to invoke a spirit of 
independence from the government ;diich had hitherto been unthinkable 
(Dawson 1904: 138-139). Furthermore the treaties had been passed in 
the face of vehement agitation on the part of the agrarians. Even 
when the treaties had been ratified the agrarians intensified their 
agitation; "We must tear up the treaties with Austria and Italy" 
announced the Kreuzzeitung. Later on, ;Aen the Russian treaty came 
into operation, the Kreuzzeitung stated, "the German farmer will now 
be inclined to regard the Enperor as his political enemy" (quoted in 
Dawson 1904: 131). In this formulation the link between
authoritarianism and Junkertum was far looser than that suggested by 
economistic theory.
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At this point it is wDrth pointing out various benefits that the 
state granted the agrarians. Firstly in 1894, a new iirport 
certificate scheme was adopted, vMch henceforth enabled the 
agrarians to mix foreign with domestic \^ ieat for export whilst 
gaining a refund - something \Aich the farmers had fou^t over a 
period of 15 years. Secondly and most importantly, the most 
substantial benefit that accrued to the large landowners as a result 
of government policy were the subsidies paid from the alcohol tax. As 
a result of the sugar excise, 3,900 large landholders received large 
subsidies from the state (see Witt 1970: table 2, pp. 47, table 3, 
pp. 48). Nevertheless, most landowners - small and large - felt 
aggrieved at the CaprLvi treaties.
Thus throu^iout the 189CX s agrarian opposition against both the 
government and the emperor continued. Thus for example, in 1899 the 
Bund der Landwirte pressurised Conservative members in the Prussian 
Landtag to vote against the construction of a canal connecting east 
with west Germany, since the East Elbian landowners recognised the 
subsidising effect that this waterway would have for western 
landowners (cwing to its cheapening of transport costs of grain to 
eastern markets). However this violated the InperLal sovereign vho 
had explicitly commanded the canal's construction. As a result, 
Mlhelm expelled twenty of them from government administrative posts 
as punishment. Whilst it would be wrong to conclude from this 
treatment of agriculture that the state could dispense with the 
agrarians simply as it pleased, it would be equally as incorrect to 
argue that the state acted simply as the political embodiment of the 
Junkers. Indeed it is the case that once again, the agricultural 
interests had been sacrificed not only at the altar of the Reichf s 
fiscal requirements, bit simultaneously at the altar of the 
industrialists.
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Tariffs and Taxation in the era of Weltpolitik
By the very early years of the twentieth century the Reich was 
facing the onset of fiscal crisis, both at the Reich and state 
levels. Up to 1892 the surplus of federal states' receipts over their 
matricular contributions was large - the maximum being 140m marks 
(approximately £6. 2m in 1889). The two years 1893 and 1894 saw the 
first years of deficits hut a recovery was quickly made. However, by 
1899 it was evident that the era in vMch the states received more 
from the Enpire than they had contrihuted, had at last come to an 
end. This was in part due to the fact that Inperial expenditure on 
the army and navy was rapidly expanding particularly after 1896 with 
the turn to Weltpolitik, (world powsr), in turn placing an excessive 
fiscal burden ipon the states.
In 1893 the increase of the peace strength of the army threw the 
Enpire to an increased degree upon the federal states. This led to 
the two years 1893 and 1894 of fiscal deficits for the states. By 
1899 they ware new facing an institutionalised deficit vdiich would 
last riÿit up to 1914 [see table 2. 5]. In other words, the states 
were paying back to the Reich everything they received from it plus 
an additional sum v^ch would come from their levying of direct taxes 
and various state property levies ( for example railways). 
Nevertheless this compares not unfavourably to the situation they 
faced between 1872 and 1875. For the fact was that in relative terms 
they were paying very little of their ' ownf revenue to the Reich. The 
additional sums required by the Reich did not constitute the sole 
source of the problem.
The problem that the states faced was that for many years between 
1879-1899, they had endured financial prosnerity (in contrast to 
1875-1879) throu^ their receipt of large sums from the Enpire, 
secured throu^ customs. Indeed in the twenty years following the tax 
legislation of 1879, the states received a net contribution from the 
Reich in fourteen years and made a net contribution to the Reich in 
only six years. The gain to the statœ was 448m marks, or 
approximately £20m (Gerloff 1913: 522). On the strength of this, they
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launched into a programme of heavy e:q)enditure. After 1899 however, 
not only had these surplus receipts declined, but the states had to 
simultaneously pay larger contributions. "Accordingly they have had 
to devise means for meeting both a positive loss of revenue and an 
actual increase in expenditure" (Ashley 1909: 11). The Reich was
therefore indirectly stimulating expenditure on the states' part and 
at the same time rendering it more and more difficult for them to 
give help in time of difficulty. Furthermore, the Reich did this at 
the cost of rapidly increasing its own indebtedness - for it was 
forced to take out loans since the states would not pay the vdiole 
deficit (Ashley 1909: 18,20; P. C  Witt 1970: 386).
The Reich policy of recourse to loans was also in part premised on 
the political motive of maintaining the financial independence of the 
Reich over the federal states. Ihe states were extremely dissatisfied 
for they all found it difficult to inpose fresh direct tax to meet 
the demands of the Empire, in addition to that necessary for their 
own purposes. So in 1903 the Inperial government commenced a reform 
of Article 70. From now on the whole net receipts from the customs 
would be retained by the Enpire - hence formally doing away with the 
Frankenstein clause. Ihis was however, nothing more than a mere book­
keeping arrangement, since \^lst on the one hand the Reich reduced 
the matricular contributions, on the other it reduced to a 
corresponding extent the amount \diich the states received. Ihese 
"postponed" contributions (by three year periods) continued to 
increase. State deficits to be made up by postponed matricular 
contributions after 1900 (in£ ) were as follows; 1900 - 0.86m; 1901 - 
0. 76m; 1902 - 1. 22m; 1903 - f. 22m; 1904 - 1, 185m; 1905 - 1. 21m; 1906 
- 1.575m [all figures in marks] (Ashley 1909: 10) These three year 
delays on payment of the contributions led the government even 
further into debt.
The Enpire only began to indulge in the luxury of being in debt in 
1876. In 1877, loans stood at 16.3m marks [approximately £727,000]. 
By 1890 they were at 1118m marks [E50m], \hilst in 1900 they stood at 
a colossal 2299m [£103m]. By 1910 the total debt would more than 
double to 4844m marks [£216] (P. C  Witt 1970: 386). With heavy
expenditure on the military, and particularly through the new Naval
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Programme after 1897, the need for fresh revenue became acute. In the 
five years upto 1896, average annual defence expenditures were 718m 
marks [£32m]. Fran 1897-1902 military expenditures increased to an 
annual average of 889m marks [£40m] (Andie and Veverka 1964: 262).
What was therefore required, was a tax to be levied at central level 
vÆiich could help relieve the states, as well as the Reich. To this 
end the tariff had hitherto proved itself to be extremely efficient. 
wa.th the agrarians also calling for further protection, the way was 
open for a renewed round of tariff increases.
The CaprLvi trade treaties were due to finish in December 1903 and 
their prolongation was discussed in the Reichstag as early as 1897. 
The agrarians were adamant for a return to h i ^  protection. CaprLvi 
had resisted the agrarians^ demands in favour of the industrialists. 
When Hdhenlohe succeeded Capri vi, the treaties of commerce were in 
full operation. Irrpotent to undo CaprLvi's policy the agrarians were 
conpelled to bide their time. On von Bulow becoming Chancellor in 
October 1900 the agitation of pressure re-doubled in intensity. Thus, 
desperate for more revenue, and under intense pressure from the 
landowners, von Bulcw legislated new protectionist duties. Von Bulcw 
calculated that these would add 17% to agricultural goods and 6% to 
industrial goods (Dawson 1904: 147). The Treasury expected to accrue 
over 100m marks [approximately E5m]as a result of the increased c o m  
duties alone.
The 1906 grain tariff led to a price differential between Germany and 
England of approximately 32 cents per bushel in favour of the former 
(For a fuller analysis, see Broomhall 1904: 78-79). After 1906 German 
agriculture became once more a going concern This was reflected both 
in the increase in land values (Jasny 1936: 82), as well as to the 
reduction in forced sales of land through mortgage indebtedness (see 
Hess 1990: 262-279). The pre-war tariff stood at approximately 32% 
for \heat and 37% for rye . The specific rate was increased from 3. 5 
marks per ton to 5. 5 marks for ^ heat, and from 3. 5 to 5. 0 marks for 
rye (Jasny 1936: 133). This represented the conversion to relatively 
h i ^  protection in agriculture. (That is, it was hic^ relative to the 
European averages in the era 1879-1913, but was only moderate \hen 
cotpared to the tariff levels in the post war period). Nevertheless,
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the fact remains that German agriculture vdiich had suffered terribly 
throughout the 189Cy s, saw little protectionist relief until 1906 - a 
full fourteen years after the CaprLvi tariff!
SECITŒJ 4. The Fiscal-Military, Political and Economic Origins of 
Tariff Protectionism 1879-1913: A Summary
The Fiscal Origins of the Tariff 
Table 2. 11 Reich ordinary income
Year
(1)
Indirect
(2)
Direct
(3)
NET State 
Property
(4)
NET Matricular 
Contributions
(5)
Total
1872 168 - 8 - 179
1875 247 - 0 - 258
1880 290 - 0 26 324
1885 346 - 47 - 381
1890 626 - 64 - 702
1895 660 - 83 - 764
1900 808 - 108 19 969
1905 952 - 252 24 1296
1910 1212 43 495 48 1874
1911 1347 45 481 48 1988
1912 1344 41 488 52 2002
1913 1339 46 485 52 2015
Source P. C. WLtt 1970: 56, Table 5, pp378-379. Table 13; Gerloff 1913: 
522
(1) Trv^ i Excises include. Tobacco, sugar, salt, beer, 
spirits, vinegar, sparkling wine, lifting provision, gun tax. 
Tariffs include Grain, coffee, cocoa, wine, fruit and petrol
(2) Inheritance tax
(3) State Property revenues include Railways, banking, post and 
telegraph, bonds, stanps, playing cards, fees, administrative income, 
growth tax. Note that these figures are net. That is, state property 
expenditures have been deducted
(4) Matrimnar Contributions. These are net. That is, the years of 
surpluses in favour of the Reich have been included. However, the 
years of deficits have not been subtracted.
(5) The total figure includes gross state property revenues.
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Table 2. 12 Proportions of the mai or Reich income categories in
percentages
Year Indirect Direct State 
Property
Total
1872 94 - 4 179
1875 96 - - 258
1880 90 - - 324
1885 91 - 12 381
1890 89 - 9 702
1895 86 - 11 764
1900 83 - 11 969
1905 73 - 19 1296
1910 65 2 26 1874
1911 68 2 24 1988
1912 67 2 24 2002
1913 66 2 24 2015
Source: see Table 2.
(1) Note that these figures will not consistently add up to exactly 
100% because the total cortprises gross state property revenues, whist 
the category of state property revenues (col. 3) are net.
Table 2.12A
The Proportion of Major Revenue Categories in %ages, 1872-1913
100
■  Indirect 
□  Direct 
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TRhip, 0.. 13 Reich Tariff Income 1872-1913 in atedute terms (millions 
of marks), and relative to total indirect and total tax revenues in
Year (1)
Tariff
(2)
Total
Indirect
(3)
(1) as % 
of (2)
(4)
Total
Revenue
(5)
(1) as % 
of (4)
1872 97 168 58% 179 54%
1875 114 247 46% 258 44%
1880 170 290 59% 324 52%
1885 221 346 64% 381 58%
1890 369 626 59% 702 53%
1895 383 660 58% 764 50%
1900 466 808 58% 969 48%
1905 626 952 66% 1296 48%
1910 663 1212 55% 1874 35%
1913 679 1339 51% 2015 34%
Source; See TaMe 2. 11 & 2. 12
As tables 2.11 , 2.12 and especially 2.13 show; the tariff (and 
indirect taxes) provided the mainstay of central government finance 
from 1879 throu^ to 1913, and indeed ric^t up to 1918/19. To this 
end the tariff was remarkably successful. Broadly speaking there were 
three periods in the financial history of the Kaiserreich. In the 
period 1872-1878, the EnpLre's ordinary revenue was small and the 
French War indemnity enabled much to be done \^ch otherwise would 
have necessitated loans, and/or new central taxes. Nevertheless the 
Etrpire was compelled, in order to meet ordinary expenditure to call 
upon the states for increased matrLcular contrihutions. After the 
indemnity payments ceased in 1875, and since for political reasons it 
was undesirable to charge the states heavily, the Reich took recourse 
to loans. In the seven years to 1879, the total deficit met out of 
loans or carried forward, amounted to rather more than 800 million 
marks (about £36m). With the tariff of 1879, and with subsequent 
increases at later dates, the immediate fiscal problems were solved.
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Œhus between 1879-1899, the demands on the states (Lander) 
disappeared as they more or less returned the money given to them by 
the Reich from increased customs takings. From 1883 onwards, except 
in three separate years, the states received more from the Etrpire 
than it received in contributions. In spite of this, the accumulated 
deficit and indebtedness continued to grew. Hiis was due partly to 
the increasing military expenditures, and partly to the Reich's 
political desire of remaining fiscally independent from the states. 
Finally from 1900-1913 InperLal expenditure rose to enormous 
proportions, (more than doubling in ncxninal terms), the character of 
vÈiich is revealed in the charts 2. 14 and 2. 15 bélovt:. dearly, income 
was falling more and more short. Ihe surplus payments to the states 
were replaced by a renewed demand for contributions vAiolly derived 
from the states' own sources (mainly direct tax and railways). Thus 
in 1901, matrLcular contributions stood at a mere 15. 2m marks. From 
1902-1906 they stood at approximately 24m marks. In 1907 they ware at 
31.6m marks rising to 48.5m in 1909, reaching 51.9m marks in 
1912/1913 (Witt 1970: 378-379, Table 13). The 1906 grain tariff had 
gone some way to alleviating the problem, but the military demands of 
the state led by 1913, to a severe fiscal strain. Whilst tariffs and 
excise provided the mainstay of war finance, the state preferred to 
resort to loans as opposed to increasing direct taxes. In sum, the 
tariff had a solid fiscal core
The Military Cddgins of the Tariff
The constant causal variable in the stats' s switch to protection, 
vhich commenced in 1879, was the Reich's fiscal needs. These fiscal 
needs were in turn derived from another major political source; 
namely military requisites. Belcw are presented two charts revealing 
this fact. Table 2.14 presents actual expenditures in millions, of 
marks. Table 2.15 separates out these figures further into the major 
expenditure categories. These are expressed as percentages of total 
expenditures.
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T^Me 2. 14 Reich T?yppnri-i tures. 1872-1913 in milliong nf nwrka)
(1) (2) (3)
BOO
(4) (5)
Year ADMIN DEF (a) SERV DEBT TOTAL
1872 51 295 [b] 
(295)
2 349
1875 43 434 [b] 
(434)
21 498
1880 57 426
(434)
24 8 515
1885 53 442
(459)
6 17 518
1890 84 778
(823)
12 45 919
1895 99 710 21 71 901
(781)
1900 109 882
(960)
34 78 1103
1905 149 1059
(1176)
68 117 1393
1910 225 1399
(1581)
75 182 1881
1913 _ 241 1909
(2091)
93 182 2425
Source; Andie and Veverka 1964: 262
(a) Since the major source of indebtedness was military expenditures, 
a more accurate figure would be derived from aggregating columns 2 
and 4. This figure is presented in the brackets in column 2.
(b) Andie and Veverka included expenditure out of war reparations, 
vMch exaggerated the defence expenditure figure for 1872 and 1875. 
Ihese have been omitted here. The Total figure has been amended 
accordingly.
(1) Administration and Law
(2) Military expenditure
(3) Trading services
(4) Debt repayment
(5) Total. Hiis does not include social expenditure, since these were
not paid for by the Reich.
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Table 2.15 The Proportions of the Main Categories of Reich 
ExpATYittures. expressed in Per Centacre of Total Expenditure
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Defence
1872 15 1 85 (85)
1875 9 4 87 (87)
1880 11 5 83 (84)
1885 10 1 85 (89)
1890 9 1 85 (90)
1895 11 2 79 (87)
1900 10 3 80 (87)
1905 11 5 76 (84)
1910 12 4 74 (84)
1913 10 4 79 (86)
CTVEL = Col. 1 from Table 2. 14 (col. 1)
EOCNCMEC SERVICES = Col. 2 frcan Table 2. 14 (col. 3)
DEFENCE = Col. 3 from Table 2. 14 (col. 2). Ihe bracketed figures are 
military expenditures + debt service.
Focussing on these charts, it is clear that the increase in 
expenditures of the 187(y s was primarily generated by defence 
requisites. Indeed as the table above shews, the military comprised 
in many years, over 85% of total Reich expenditure. Tiis military 
demand was met by the Reich's switch to tariffs as the main source of 
government revenue from 1879 onwards. Ihrou^Xfut the 188(y s defence 
continued to comprise over 85% of total expenditures. In actual 
(nominal) terms, military expenditures had almost doubled between 
1880 and 1890. It is interesting to note that military expenditures 
were to a large exctent increased by the constantly rising costs of 
military hardware and equipment. As the table below shows, in the era 
of weltpolitik, the rise in costs of military shipping were striking.
103
Table 2, 1.6 The rising MLlitary çcsts of naval building (in Millions
of marks)
Years Regular Large Small Torpedo U-Boat
Service Cruiser Cruiser Boat
Shipping Division
1905 24.0 21. 3 5. 6 7. 1 1. 9
Est 31.0 24.0 6.0 - -
1906
Estl906 36. 5 27. 5 6. 5 - -
1906 36. 5 27. 5 6. 5 8. 9 -
Estl907 38. 5 29. 5 7. 1 - -
Estl907 38. 5 37. 5 7. 1 - -
1907' 37. 2 37.0 7. 1 - -
1908 43.0 41.0 8.4 10.8 2. 6
Estl909 47. 1 44.0 8. 5 11.0 -
1909 47. 1 44.0 8. 5 11.0 2. 6
Estl910 49.0 44.0 8. 5 11.5 3.3
1913 49.0 44.0 8.5 11.5 3.8
Source P. a  m t t  1970; 143 (Table 8) 
(Est = Estimates)
Thus it would be safe to conclude that tariffs were increased in 
1879, 1885 and 1887 in order to meet the military requisites of the 
state For most of the 1890^  s not only did military e:q)enditures 
remain remarkably stable, but by 1895 they had actually been reduced 
by some 9%. This factor complemented the maintenance of the lower 
tariffs inaugurated in 1892-1894, (even thou^ these actuallly led to 
increased revenues.
However, with the turn to Vfeltpolitik after 1897, military 
expenditures began to "take-off", in turn necessitating an increase 
in taxes at the Reich level. In addition to taking out new loans and 
increasing local payments to the Reich (matrikul arbeitrage), the 
state also increased tariffs (mainly on grain) to foot the military 
hill. . The tariff therefore, had a solid military core.
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The Political-Fiscal Origins of TstrLff Protectionism
The principal factor that pushed the state into tariff protectionism, 
was the desire to acquire executive fiscal (and hence political) 
independence from the federal states. Thus whilst the Reich had been 
dependent upon the federal states in the period upto 1879, 
thereafter, and particularly after 1882 throu^ to 1899, the 
situation was reversed, with the states becoming vholly dependent 
upon the Reich This can be approximately quantified, as shown in the 
graph below. This chart shows the net balance of the Prussian state 
vis-a-vis the balance of matrLcular contributions.
Tabi A 2. 17 Granhic representation of the Fiscal Balance of Pavments 
(net matrLcular contributions) of the Prussian State vis-a-vis the
Reich
expressed in percentage of total Prussian Income
See ^ 3pendix 4
We can discern three clear periods; 1871-1880, 1881-1903, 19C)4-1913. 
In the first period, Prussia paid an annual average of approximately 
14% of its total income to the Reich (in the form of matricular 
contributions). In the second period, Prussia received approximately 
3% of her total income in the form of Reich tax redistribution, 
incurred from the 1879, 1885 and 1887 tariffs. Finally after 1903 
(despite the 1906 tariff), Prussia paid an annual average of 
approximately 2% of her total income to the Reich.
The 1879 tariff (and the subsequent two tariff acts) turned an annual 
average Prussian fiscal balance of payments deficit (vis-a-vis the 
Reich) from 14%, into an annual average surplus of 3% in the period 
1882-1903. However the actual subsidy received Prussia from the 
Reich in this second period, can only be calculated by estimating the 
difference between the Prussian contribution deficit in the 187Œ s 
and the subsequent surpluses , 1881-1903. Thus the Prussian state 
received approximately 17% of total net income from the Reich. This
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was in fact a considerable subsidy. After 1903, the Prussian state 
returned to a period of deficits vis-a-vis the Reich, thou^ these 
would have been considerably larger, had there been no tariff levied 
by the Reich. Thus after 1879, the Reich enjoyed considerable 
political autonony over the federal states as a result of its shift 
to tariff protectionism. Thus the tariff had a solid (executive) 
political-fiscal core
The Economic Origins of Tariff Protectionism
The economic origins have a dual nature. Firstly, there is the factor 
of tax relief for various social groups and secondly, there is the 
aspect of protection for agricultural producers within the domestic 
market place. The potential for a Reich redistribution of income 
through taxes (the displacement factor - see chapter 6), was only 
limited in WLlhelndne Germany (in contrast to Britain) This was 
largely due to the federal nature of the German state. Thus tax 
sources were demarcated between political levels. That is, the Reich 
relied on indirect taxes, vMlst the Staats and Gemeinde more or less 
monopolised direct taxes. Whilst the central British state was able 
to replace (regressive) indirect with (progressive) direct taxes, 
thus enabling tax relief to the lower income groups, such a system of 
income reallocation throu^ taxation was not possible in Germany to 
anything like the same extent. Instead of shifting the tax base from 
progressive to regressive taxes (or vice-versa), the only means 
available of reallocating income was hy abolishing or lowering the 
staats' matricular contributions and subsidising them with regressive 
indirect taxes. As shown above this is precisely what happened after 
1879 as a direct consequence of the tariff. The question to be 
answered therefore, is to A^iat extent did this political-fiscal 
manoeuvre reallocate incomes, and \toch groups benefited?
The conclusion found in the common literature is that the use of 
indirect taxes by the Reich benefited the Junkers at the expense of 
the peasants and particularly the working classes. To estimate the
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factor of tax relief available at staat level as a result of the 
tariff, requires a brief analysis of direct taxes (to be done at the 
Prussian staat level). Between 1871 and 1880, direct taxes 
represented on average 50% of total net Prussian income (or 151m 
marks per annum). VîLth a subsidy of approximately 17% of total net 
Prussian income, received from the Reich (or 55m marks per annum), 
Prussia could have reduced her direct tax bill in this period by as 
much as 36%. This was certainly a significant amount. This was not 
surprisingly, an influential factor in the calling of various groups 
for tariff protection in the late 187Œ s. Establishing the 
beneficiaries of such a reallocation of resources throu^ taxation 
however, is problematic. Certainly, the hi^iest income groi:çs would 
be expected to gain frcan such a fiscal manoeuvre, as the consensus 
stipulates.
However, this e^qpectation is grounded in the assumption that the 
largest income earners paid the most taxation. But there is much 
archiveal documentary evidence to shew that the Junkers were able to 
conceal much, thou^ not all, of their income for the purposes of 
taxation (Witt 1985: 137-154; 1987b: 144). Since only a small
proportion of their income was subject to direct taxation, any relief 
granted by the lowering of this tax would have represented only a 
small saving as a proportion of their total (taxable plus non- 
taxable) income. Nevertheless, the Junkers would have certainly 
welcomed the tax relief that would have been enabled by the 
reallocation of indirect taxes from central to staat level. The major 
beneficiaries of this system of tax relief would have been the middle 
income earners, particularly of the agricultural variant (owing to 
the high proportion of the land taxes in the personal total direct 
tax pac)(age). As will be shown in chapter 6, Table 6. 8 (col. 2) direct 
taxes wei^ied most heavily \:pon the middle-low/middle income groups; 
(the h i ^  burden upon the lowest class was determined by the impact 
of regressive indirect taxes, rather than direct taxes). And it was 
the middle and smaller sized farmers ^Ao favoured grain tariffs in 
order to provide them with tax relief. Thus the Bismarckian system of 
tax relief (through abolition of staat matricular contributions via 
the tariff/indirect tax injection) benefited the small and
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particularly the middle sized farmers and, to a lesser extent, the 
Junkers.
The second economic causal variable, involves the trading advantages 
that the tariff would bring to domestic producers. In the first place 
it is probably the case that ^eat tariffs would have actually hurt 
producers, particularly in 1879. By taxing particularly Russian 
(hard) grain, v^ch formed an essential input cost for German farmers 
wishing to export their own produce, the final exportable product was 
less competitive than that prior to 1879. Thus the Reich effectively 
taxed the German vAieat producers out of their hitherto lucrative 
export markets. producers fared a little better. By 1879 rye
prices per ton were 16% lower than the 1877 price. Thus the effective 
tariff rate of 7. 5% was not enou^ to recoup the reduced price. In 
any case most farmers would not have been adversely affected hy this 
price reduction since most rye was internally consumed (animal 
fodder); moreover the 1878 price reduction was reflective of a good 
harvest, thus helping farmers to maintain their incomes. Only after 
1883 did conditions arise leading to the desire for protectionism 
amongst rye farmers. Added to this was the fact that many (though not 
all) farmers relied on cheap industrial goods in order to s\:pply them 
with the necessary agricultural machinery. The substantially higher 
industrial tariff to a large extent would have offset the 
protectionist benefit accrued to rye producers between 1883 and 1885, 
since it would have considerably added to the cost of farm machinery, 
(an inportant reason for the free-trading preference of the farmers 
ever since the 186(y s). Of the position of agriculture on the passing 
of the 1879 tariff, we may conclude that vàieat producers were 
sacrificed on the Reich s fiscal altar, WiLlst many rye farmers were 
to a certain extent sacrificed on an industrial altar.
Not until 1887 did the German farmer receive adequate protection for 
his goods. MeanvÈiile the vÆieat producers were still being punished by 
the 1879 refund statute, \Mch had seen their exports drop from a 
healthy 3. 6m quarters in 1879, to a mere 0. 004m in 1890. It was not 
until 1894 that this law was revoked; by vAiich time nominal grain 
prices had sunk to their lowest level for over half a century, (and 
real prices considerably more so). Furthermore, it was at this point
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that Caprivi lowered tariff rates, precisely vdien fanners were 
desperate for higher levels of protection. Fanners then had to wait 
as long as 14 years before the rates went back up.
However, there can be no doubting the fact that the econcxnic variable 
played some part in the determination of tariff policy. Certainly the 
1885 and 1887 acts were in part premised on the economic trading 
needs of agriculture. Benefits were also acquired from the 1902/1906 
tariff. In addition there was the fiscal relief that the tariff would 
bring to all landowners' tax bills. As noted above, from 1887-1899, 
the Lander enjoyed high inflows of revenue from the Reich, v^ch 
allowed them (albeit to a limited extent) to reduce their own taxes 
(mainly direct).
Nevertheless, as pointed out above, the factor of Junker tax relief 
in the determination of the tariff should not be overplayed (thou^ 
it still predominated over the issue of Junker "trading" inperatives 
for protection in 1879). In this respect, the smaller sized estates 
stood to gain more from tariff tax relief. In addition , the fact is 
that in federal Germany , there existed only a very limited fiscal 
displacement factor. That is, there was only a limited potential for 
the central state to shift the tax burden between different income 
groips, by replacing one tax with another [in particular contrast to 
the British central state] (to be expanded upon in the final 
chapter).
In conclusion, the analysis presented here shows that the common 
enphasis on the trading requirements of the Junker class as forming 
the major determinant in the rise of German protectionism 1879-1913 
has been subject to exaggeration. Ihe Junker class was not some 
anthrqponorphic (nor monolithic/unified) entity ^ Aich simply dictated 
government policy, vAiether this be conceived on an instrumental or 
structural basis. Rather the state had its own autonomous political, 
military and fiscal interests in raising or even lowering tariffs. 
Sometimes these interests harmonised with those of the Junker class, 
vMlst at other times the stats' s fiscal interests clashed with those 
of high agriculture. Overall we may conclude that the stats' s fiscal 
interest were more constant than that of the Junker economic
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inperatives (fiscal or trading), and must therefore be given slightly 
more weighting in the determination of German tariff policy (1879- 
1913).
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CHAPTER 3
INDUSTRIAL!SATICN AND TARIFF PRCTECnCNISM IN AUTOCRATIC (UNITARY)
RUSSIA 1860-1914.
SECTECN 1 
Introduction
The central theme to this chapter is the relationship between 
economics and politics. Dominant theories envisage a causal 
relationship v^ere the latter is derived by the former. In each case 
an economic functionalism can be detected. That is, the state 
intervenes on behalf of or at the behest of, either the econaty or 
dominant economic groupings. The tables below conceptualise five 
different paths to economic development/industrialisation. Dominant 
theories are represented by the first path. (Note that the Marxist 
model presented in the chart 3. 1 is irrelevant to Russian development 
1860- 1914 and has only been included for easing comparison). The 
dominant model enployed has been termed here " neo-Iistian" 
(development path 1). Indeed it has come to play a dominant role in 
the general discussion of backward countries vMch have developed 
late (in catparison to the first developers - Switzerland, Belgium 
and especially Britain).
Following Friedrich List, such writers have observed a "late 
development" (or, " forced development" ) strategy embodying a rational 
long term plan for wide-ranging economic growth. In the case of 
Russia this theory s strongest advocates are Alexander Gerchenkron 
(1962, 1963) and Theodore H von Laue (1960,1963,). This theory has 
been adopted by most authors on the subject (for exairple, D. Senÿiaas 
1985, T. Skocpol 1979, P.M. Kennedy 1988). Whilst this theory has the 
advantage of recognising the state, it does so in an inadequate way.
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Moreover, the theory overlaps considerably with the dominant 
reductionist Marxian model. Ihe lowest common denominator is the 
advocacy of an intended strategy embodying a long-term economic 
rationality. All neo-Marxist models vAiich centre upon the notion of 
the "relative autonomy" of the state are founded i^ xon such a perfect 
economic rationality. Such theories view the state as an ideal 
intelligence far enough removed from the econcxnic arena to be able to 
calculate and ensure the long-term reproduction of the dominant 
class. This provides the basis of the vast majority of neo-Marxist 
theories of the state (see chapter 1). Hiis view of the state as 
embodying a long-term rationality is also typical of realist 
theories, (albeit of a political rather than economic nature).
All three major theories - "late development", "neo-Marxist" and 
"realist" envisage the state as a single homogeneous actor or rather 
as a "monolith". Late development theories in particular focus 
exclusively on the Finance Ministry as the embodiment of Tsarist 
state policy. However, it will be argued here that the state not only 
inaugurates a multitude of different strategies - economic, fiscal, 
political and military - hut will be seen to act in the short as well 
as the long term. This is referred to in the charts below under the 
heading of " strategic status". Michael Mann has examined the state's 
role in German industrialisation and refers to development in terms 
of "strategy" and "drift". A "strategy" indicates "considered choice 
(by the state) of the means appropriate to the goal of economic 
profit". A "drift" indicates that "those choices were being subtly 
changed by power processes emanating outside economic rationality 
itself" [1989a: 2]. In the model presented here, developnent paths 
2,3,4 and 5 r^resent such a "drift" in contrast to the neo-Iistian 
"strategy" (path 1) of stimulating economic development.
The essence of the model presented here is that all four development 
paths are enacted in no set order. Often they occur simultaneously. 
Furthermore economic development does not occur in a linear fashion. 
Rather it chops and changes, progresses and retards, often 
simultaneously as different political, military and economic logics 
interact, to produce intended and unintended consequences for 
economic development.
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Thus in strong contrast to Marxian, Late Develcpnent and Realist 
theories, the state will be seen to be hi^ily fractionated with a 
multitude of carpeting factions clashing over a wide range of 
political, fiscal, military and economic policies. This " centralised 
bureaucratic struggle" - totally ignored by the major theories due to 
their "monolithic" conceptions of the state - will be seen to 
constitute an iirportant motor of Tfearist economic development, 1860- 
1914. The argument will focus on v ^ t  is termed the patrimonial- 
bureaucratic state and its inter-relationship with the economy. This 
patrimonial state was essentially vhat John A Hall has termed 
"capstone government" (see 1985: 51-53). Tfearism prevented the rise 
of powerful economic and political groupings within civil society, 
which it feared, may ultimately challenge its rule. The state 
therefore wished to mobilise only a limited form of social energy. In 
contrast to liberal Britain and America, Russian autocracy was of an 
isolated or abrasive nature. It stands above society, autonomous from 
dominant groupings, and consistently limits their formation and 
consolidation. This is in contrast to the connected or adhesive 
British state, ^Aich harnesses and mobilises dominant economic 
groupings within civil society, from \Mch it derives political, 
social and military benefits.
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Tabl A 1. 1 The Conceutualisation of thm st Stats' s Relationship
with the Ecorottv 1860-1914
Path of 
Develcpnent
Propensity 
for Eco. Dev
Strategic
Status
Marxian POSCTEVE ECCNCMIC
(Class path)
The state intervenes in the economy in 
order to secure the rule of the 
dominant economic class
(ENABLEN3) STRATEGY
(1) Neo-Listian
(Late Develcpnent path) Positive POUTIOO-
(ENABLING) EOCNCMIC
Ihe state intervenes in order 
to develop the economy on a broad basis
STRATEGY
(2) Military Path POSITIVE PQEITIOOt
(Military Mütiplier) (ENABLING) MILITARY
STRATEGY
The state in following its own military 
imperatives creates unintended 
consequences for positive economic 
developnent
(3) Fiscal Path POSITIVE POLITICAL
(Fiscal-Miritary Multiplier)
Ihe state in following its own fiscal 
imperatives - largely for military 
purposes - creates unintended 
consequences for positive economic 
developnent
(ENABLING) STRATEGY
(4) Military Path Negative PQLITIOO-
MIU-
(Downward Military Multiplier)
The state in following its own military 
inperatives unintentionally " blocks" 
economic development
(BLOCKING) TARY
STRATEGY
(5) Patrimonial-
Bureaucratic Path NEGATIVE POLITICAL
(Downward Political Miltiplier
The state in seeking supreme despotic 
power attenpts to prevent the rise of 
autonomous economic & political groups 
from emerging within civil society
(BLOCKING) STRATEGY
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Tabi A 1. 2 The Causal Relationship between Economics 
and Politics in the Detenrdnation of Tsarist 
Industrial Tariff Policies
Causal strategic
Rel between
Development Path Econcanics & Politics Status
(1) Neo-Listian
[Late Dev] Eco ' ■> Pol Eco Strategy
(2) Military Path
[Military Multiplier] Pol ---> Eco Eco. Drift
(3) Fiscal Path
[Fis cal-Military Pol -- > Eco Eco. Drift
Multiplier]
(4) Military Path
[Downward Military Pol ---> Eco Eco. Drift
Multiplier]
(5) Patrimonial Path
[Downward Political Pol ---> Eco Eco. Drift
Multiplier]
The notion of "autoncxry" is a meet ambiguous term. Autonomy is 
usually linked to ”power", (if it is accepted to exist at all). 
However this term provides us with yet another paradox, or irony; 
namely that the isolated "autonomous" Ifearist state was founded rçon 
a fundamental weakness. Because it was suspended in a void and had 
accumulated a certain amount of despotic power, it became alienated 
fran civil society. Hiis fundamental precariousness was hei^tened by 
the fact that in remaining autonomous and therefore failing to fully 
mobilise social and economic groupings, its military capacity was 
severely undermined. As we shall see later this weakness would be 
found out hy its German rival in the international political/military 
arena after 1914 such, that by 1917 the autocratic state would cease 
to exist. In contrast, the British state was "connected" to civil 
society, and consciously "adhered" both to "doninant" and "lower" 
economic groi:pings. It may not have been " autonomous" in the despotic 
sense but it accrued vital political and military powers, vMch would 
especially allow it to weather the storm of 1914-18.
Although the Russian state has been defined as " capstone 
government", there was however a modicum of economic development and 
social energy stimulated by the state. A principal problem therefore, 
lies with explaining this seeming paradox of Russian economic
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development. For as Alain Besancon brilliantly put it, "vdiy was it 
radically inpossible for capitalism to be b o m  in Russia?" and yet, 
"why was it b o m  all the same in spite of this inpossibility - a 
birth that constitutes a sort of Russian 'miracle'..." (1988: 160). 
Thus the twin paradoxes of the Russian state and economy, namely 
those of state "autonomy" and its acconpai^dng military and political 
weakness, and of "capstone government" enabling a modicum of economic 
development, form an essential problematic to be explained in this 
chapter.
We shall see that Russia only "partially" industrialised and that 
furthermore the state never intended to fully industrialise. A major 
theme to be examined is the contradiction between full-scale 
industrialisation/capitalism and autocracy. That is, patrimonial 
autocracy sought to prevent the econony from " taking-off" into a 
stage of high mass consuirption (Development Path 5). Industrial 
development (that actually occurred) was in part the unintended 
consequences of the state following its own fiscal and military 
inperatives. It will be concluded that Russia was not in fact a "late 
developer" in the sense ascribed by modem social theory. This then 
is in strong contrast to Rostcw, Gerschenkron, Von Laue and a growing 
consensus of opinion in the field of international relations, vMch 
assumes that the state either inaugurates a "full industrialisation" 
programme in order to "catch ip/' with the first comers or, the state 
inaugurates a "full industrialisation" in order to be able to compete 
in the international military system (for the latter argument see 
especially P.M. Kennedy 1988).
The "Witte System!' as "Economic"
In his classic conception of Witte's policies 1892-1903, T. H. von 
Laue envisages a perfect long-term economic rationality. So much so 
that he has defined these policies as the "Witte System!' (1963: 71). 
This " system!' was based upon Friedrich List's national system of
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political economy, vMch sought to found political power upon a broad 
industrialised base, the ultimate purpose of which was to catch up 
with the first developers particularly Britain. This has given rise 
to the theory of " late development", proposed originally ty 
Gerschenkron (1962). In this conception the state's intentions were 
abundantly clear. It would intervene in the econony with a long-term 
programme of full industrialisation to such an extent that after 1907 
Russia would take off into sustained autonanous development
(represented by the neo-Iistian Development Path 1).
Ihe Witte System revolved around the immediate creation of a vast 
railway network. Ihis would lead to a strong demand for iron and 
steel so the argument goes, and would lead on through the state's use
of tariff policy, to the development of such industries.
Simultaneously once in place the railways would extend forward, 
enabling the exploitation of the vast but idle resources of Russia 
v^ch had lain dormant for so long (von Laue 1963: 76-79). In
addition to tariffs the government would guarantee railway 
construction and also provide subsidies to heavy industry. Ihus the 
first years of the Witte System were conceptualised by von Laue as 
" Railroad construction plus capital ism equals industrialisation" 
(1963: 99).
Furthermore, Witte sou^t to attract foreign capital into Russia so 
as to further her own industrial base, Ihis had been prevented in the 
past by the weakness and volatility of the rouble. Accordingly Witte 
immediately set about the stabilisation of the currency and throu^ a 
mixture of tariffs and heavy taxation managed to convert Russia onto 
the gold standard in 1897. New, foreign capital could at last be 
attracted. Conversion to gold revised the formula of the Witte system 
to read: " Railroad construction plus capitalism plus the gold 
standard equals rapid industrialisation" (von Laue 1963: 113-114).
Ihis project would lead to an overall prosperity, for railway 
construction would provide the " fly-vheel" by promoting heavy 
industry \^ch in turn would help the grcwth of light industry 
finally leading to the stimulation of rural production and prosperity 
(1963: 77). Gerschenkron develops this idea throu^ his notion of the 
"Great Spurt". Ihe great spurt in industrial growth that occurred in
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the 189(y s was, he argues, the result of an intended industrial 
strategy enacted by Sergei Witte (the finance minister). Gerschenkron 
claimed that this growth spurt laid the foundations for a second 
growth phase (1907-1914), vhich was based on an autonomous based 
consumer demand rather than the actions of the state (1962: 119-142; 
1970: 122-124).
A parallel argument is that Witte favoured the stimulation of a broad 
based consumer led industrialisation, as this would intum enable him 
to extract higher taxes. Indeed Witte legitimised his project in 
terms of an increase in tax revenues vhich would accrue to the state 
frcan a general increase in wealth. Such an argument has been made 
into a normative prescription by Ardant along the lines that "it 
behoves the state and is in fact vital to its existence to bring its 
powers to bear upon the economic structure and to shape it into a 
structure better able to sipport taxation" (1975: 196). However,
v^lst there was a rudimentary growth in peasant purchasing power 
after 1860, it was more the result of the unintended consequence of 
the state's (military) actions, as opposed to the effects of an 
intended economically rational wealth-making strategy.
In sum, the "Witte system!' as envisaged by late development theory, 
embodies the central notion that the state consciously intervened in 
the economy in order to industrialise on a broad basis. Tariff 
protectionism was envisaged as a function of this specific economic 
requirement. Ws shall new examine this " system!', but before doing so 
we shall need to locate Witte's policies in the immediate context of 
the late nineteenth century. Central to this was the second military 
revolution, and the process of military catpetition vMch affected 
most European states, and had a particularly significant effect upon 
the Russian polity..
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SBCHCN 2
War, the fiscal Crisis of the State and the Downward Military
Multiplier
Most authors note the severe blow that the defeat dealt the Russian 
state. With this we shall concur.
"Russia's position in Europe was changed. In 1815 Russia appeared the 
strongest single power on the Continent—  after 1848 she seemed far 
to have outdistanced the other land powers: Russian primacy had
turned into Russian danination. Ihe Crimean War reduced Russia to one 
among several Great Powers" (Seton-Watson 1988: 331).
Even this appraisal underestimates the blow. Far fran Russia as 
" primus inter pares" in the European state system, it was clear to 
everybody that the military power of Russia was new inferior to her 
conpetitors. Indeed, the autocracy that had been founded and had even 
predicated its very existence and being on its military and great 
power status in the European system, had come undone. Ihe clue to the 
post-1861 period in terms of economic development lies not only in 
the loss of great power status (as most theories contend) but more 
importantly, in the actual nature of this defeat.
One of the major reasons for the Crimean defeat was the financial 
weakness of the Russian state. As so often had been the case in the 
past, the state had insufficient resources to pay for the war. 
Military expenditures A^iich even in peace time could swallow up as 
much as 80% of revenue, rose from 190m roubles in 1853 to about 300m 
in 1854 and 380m in 1855 (Kennedy 1988: 176 - figures from
"Correlates of War" print out data, I. U. CP. S. R, Ifeiversity of 
Michigan. Ihese figures however are presented in sterling, and have 
been converted into roubles using ELdwell's pre-war parity conversion 
figures. As a result the figures presented above are only 
approximate. ). Ihe state was forced to resort to foreign borrowing, 
mainly in Berlin and, Amsterdam. However, even this measure was
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insufficient to cover these vast military e3q)enditures. As a result, 
the state turned to the printing press (RLntner 1959: 85; RLntner 
1967: 184; Miller 1926: 117). This in turn created a downward spiral 
of economic decline (Dev. Path 4).
The monetary problems that the war had induced were not new - they 
had become a precedent especially since 1815. In the nineteenth 
century paper money was relatively new to Russia. It was first issued 
in 1769 by Catherine the Great but was not used much until the reigns 
of Paul and Alexander I, at the turn of the century. Crisp explains 
the monetary problem in a nutshell: "ever since Russia had attained 
the status of a great power in the sixteenth century the military 
requirements for the maintenance of that position inposed on the 
Russian Treasury a task of magnitude disproportionate to the largely 
natural economy of the country and the poverty of its people" (1953: 
156).
With the onset of budget deficits despite increases in taxation, 
recourse to the printing press and foreign loans became a common 
course of financial policy (foreign borrowing was not always possible 
nor sufficient, and thus increasing recourse to the printing press 
occurred). Since the first issue of the rouble- assignat in 1768, in 
connection with the first Turkish War, the volume of assignats had 
swollen. After the wars with Sweden, Poland, and Persia under 
Catherine II, the Italian campaign under Paul I and the Napoleonic 
Wars under Alexander I, the rouble had effectively been devalued hy 
80% (Crisp 1953: 156. Eintner 1959: 85-87. 1967: 188. Miller 1926: 
112-117). The restoration of the paper rouble, or assigned, to its 
face value was one of SperanskL's major goals in his financial plan 
of 1810. Thou^ he managed to promote the value of the rouble in 
1811, it came to no avail, for in 1812, Napoleoh s invasion forced 
the government to stop the programme and issue additional paper 
roubles (Pintner 1967: 188) As Russia became involved in the European 
wars that followed the French Revolution, more and more paper money 
was issued to meet the military expenses and its face value declined 
further. Count Kankrin (the finance minister to Alexander I) managed 
to peg the rouble to silver, thus according a momentary semblance of
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monetary stability. However, this was scon disrupted by war, this 
time the Crimean.
Like many of its predecessors the Crimean War created a downward 
spiral of economic decline. In 1854 Russia was forced to abolish the 
prevailing silver standard, adopted a decade earlier, in order to 
print more paper money (Pintner 1967; 184). Immediately the paper
rouble was worth between 91 and 93 kopecks by the late 185CK s. In 
addition to this devaluation the rouble had becone de-stabilised and 
the climate to attract foreign loans was adversely affected - this 
happening at a time ^ e n  such loans were needed more than ever (i. e. 
during the war). Hiis meant that the state had to resort on a renewed 
scale to the printing press, vAiich in turn led to the further 
decrease in the value of the rouble, in turn rendering it more 
difficult to secure the desperately needed foreign loans. Ihe result, 
therefore, was the dominance of the "downward military multiplier" 
creating a vicious circle of economic decline. For it meant an 
increasing insolvency of the state, recurring bouts of inflation, but 
most inportantly of all, a severe lack of surplus to invest in the 
economy and a hi^ily volatile and weak currency vhich prevented the 
influx of foreign capital needed to shore up the impoverished 
economy. Indeed it significantly contributed to Russia's intractable 
backwardness. Ihis downward military multiplier is represented by 
Development Path 4 vhere the state, in follad.ng its own military 
imperatives creates an unintended block to economic development.
"Ihe earlier brave attempts of the Finance Ministry to create a 
silver-based rouble to ban all promissory notes - vMch had been the 
ruination of ' sound finance' during the Napoleonic Wars and campaigns 
against Persia, Turkey and the Polish rebels - were ncw^  completely 
wrecked the Crimean War. If Russia persisted in its fruitless 
struggle the Crown Council was warned on January 15, 1856, the state 
would go banknpjt" (Kennedy 1988: 176. See also Seton-Watson 1988: 
248. Pintner 1959: 85-87).
Between 1851-1853 there were approximately 311m rouble notes in 
circulation. Ihis had increased to 599 in 1856, and stood at 713m in 
1857 (Pintner 1959: 85). Ihus in the space of just four years, the 
volume of notes in circulation had risen by as much as 130%. Ihe 
message was clear; "the extension of Tsarist international 
commitments thus seemed to emphasise the vulnerable and unstable
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financial health of the country" (Gatrell 1986: 215. See also Crisp 
1953: 156-157, 1976: 155; Kipp 1975: 442-444). Faced with a potential 
bankruptcy, the "fiscal crisis" of the Russian state - brought on by 
its own military over-extension, gave Alexander no choice, but to 
call off the war.
The loans and paper currency that the state resorted to during the 
Crimean war, thou^ granting short term benefits to the government 
had, as a consequence, adversely affected the econony.
"The mounting deposits in the state banks were the very proof of 
this: capital instead of seeking private investments had, thanks to 
the government's guarantee of these deposits with specie, accumulated 
in these institutions vAere it covered the state deficit. While the 
government new recognised the advantages of private enterprise, it 
continued a banking system v^ch deliberately stifled the very 
initiative that in the long run mi^t have increased productivity as 
well as state revenues. " (Kipp 1975: 444).
Irdeed, like many of his successors, Peutem conplained that,
"the dimensions of state loans which are repeated every year on such 
a large scale divert all the free capital away fran private 
enterprise and industry, and give rise to entrepreneurial conplaints 
about shortage of credit" (quoted in Gatrell 1986: 209).
In addi tion to loans funding the military budget (and thus diverting 
resources away from capital), the problem was exacerbated by the 
allocation of the ordinary budget vMch also went largely to the 
military. During the 1850's, about 40% of central government 
expenditure went on defence vAiilst the other main outlays were debt 
charges (incurred through loans for war) and politico^administrative 
costs. Ordinary revenue alone was not enou^ to cover these 
e2q)enditures. In short, there was not enough for the military let 
alone for economic development.
Thus the state was faced with a dual problem. Firstly, the 
devaluation of the ruble through wars jeopardised the potential of 
the state to maintain itself in future conflicts. Secondly,, warfare 
had negative linkages with the economy, by undermining the currency 
and reducing the pool (potential and actual) of credit available for 
economic development. The problems of monetary devaluation and the
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lack of an available surplus to fui^ d possible investments - two 
inportant legacies of the war - provided the policy agendas for post 
1860 finance ministers. Thus Reutem called for a reduction in 
military expenditures, so as to release funds for private investment. 
Indeed from 1874 onwards, he theoretically managed to cap the growth 
of the army budget, throu^ the inposition of absolute, maximum 
appropriations.. He also managed to arrest the violent fluctuations 
of the currency initiated by the Crimean War. budget. However just as 
the economy was beginning to pick up, the Turkish War of 1877 broke 
out.
"In 1876 the choice between Alexander II and his ministers was to 
either let Slav peasants in the Balkans be butchered by the infidel 
Turk and preserve the modicum of economic stability vMch Reutem had 
acconplished or, to go to war... and accept the financial chaos. 
Inevitably, power politics took precedence over financial (economic) 
soundness; the government moved towards war" (von Laue 1963: 17, ity 
addition).
The Turkish War, furthermore, in addition to ruining Reutemf s 
hitherto monetary policies caused a breakdown in the application of 
maximum appropriations inposed on the anty budgets by the finance 
ministry, and in December 1878 the War Ministry secured the ri^t to 
appeal for additional credits (above any such inposed maximum). 
Reutem had violently opposed hostilities with Turkey. As he had 
correctly foreseen the war vMch had begun in April in 1877 had 
severely damaged both Russia's financial and monetary position. The 
value of the credit rouble in relation to gold declined by 7. 8% from 
September to November 1876 alone. The ruble fell to about 92 kcpecks 
following the Crimean war; to about 80-85 kopecks in the following 
decade; and to a mere 67 gold kopecks after the Turkish war (Gatrell 
1986: 215). Ebg)enditure both on war preparation and war itself from 
1876-1877 totalled a massive 888m roubles (Fuller 1985: 60).
The resulting military-induced inflation and indebtedness undid all 
Reutem^ s monetary achievements vMch had formed the basis of his 
long-term development project. The circulation of notes had increased 
by over 400m and about 1. 5 billion roubles were borrowed during the 
war (Crisp 1953: 156. Von Laue 1963: 80). Both Kankrin and Reutemf s 
work at the finance ministry had been undone by the war ministry in 
alliance with the militaristic autocracy. That is Development Path 4
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(military Mock) had taken precedence over Development Path 1 (long­
term "enaMing" economic rationality - " neo-Listian" ). In 1877 
Reutem decreed that all payments of customs duties be collected in 
gold. This would have several benefits. Firstly, it would increase 
the revenue collected at the ports of entry (to be discussed in 
section 4). Secondly, it allowed the treasury to increase its gold 
reserve, vMch would be enhanced further by the construction of a 
positive balance of payments. This was the lyncl^n of successive 
Finance Ministers' policy of tariff protectionism. Uie 1877 tariff 
enacted in effect between a 30-50% increase in rates.
Reutem was followed another liberal, N. Kh. Bunge. Like most 
finance ministers before and indeed after him, Bunge sought to impose 
a long-term development programme, initially based upcm the 
stabilisation of the rouMe \Æiich had been undermined by the Turkish 
War. Having failed to withdraw paper-currency fron circulation he 
sought to permit transactions in gold. Like his predecessor and 
indeed successor, this was vetoed by the state council. The rouMe 
could only therefore be stabilised by the attainment of the gold 
standard to vMch Bunge set his sights. In order to build \jp the gold 
reserve he required a favouraMe balance of payments. This was in 
part vAiy he turned to increasing the tariff.
His monetary policy, as Reutem had found, ultimately rested on a 
general curtailment of e:q)enditures. Certainly it could not withstand 
any escalation of expenditures which would occur should Russia go to 
war. Like his predecessor he too argued that the cause of the 
country's budgetary difficulties lay in the cost of the war and naval 
ministries, (over 32% of annual e3q)enditure on the ordinary account 
alone and the service of the puMic debt \^ch had increased by 50% 
since the Turkish War in 1877). According to Migulin, the puMic debt 
had risen to over 6,000 million ruMes between 1877 and 1881 (quoted 
in Gatrell 1986: 223). The debt was also increased, though not to a 
significant extent by Reutem, in an attenpt to maintain the bullion 
reserve. Thus he borrowed bullion frcan foreign markets to augment the 
gold reserve (Von Laue 1963: 16). It was a painful way to progress; 
for every three steps forward, he took in effect two steps back. In a 
memorandum of March 1884, Bunge addressed to Alexander II this very
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problem stating that he had resisted the sijpplemental appropriations 
that the War, Naval and Transport Ministries had asked for, 
justifying it by citing the need for bringing public expenditure and 
income into balance. He argued that the monarchy would be served best 
by making the peasants better producers of crops and wealth as well 
as better consumers (see Rogger 1983: 101). His central econcmc
weapon \tas the tariff, \Mch would help both create a positive 
balance of payments and would sijpply the additional funds urgently 
required to overccane the deficit on the government's current account.
Bunge's attenpts were to be unsuccessful, with his last year ending 
in little short of disaster.. The government's financial condition, 
already strained by annual deficits was further weakened by tension 
over Af^ianistan, thereby endangering Russian bonds in the London 
stockmarket, and then exacerbated by the formidable Bulgarian Crisis. 
In addition, the danger of war with Austria-Hungary called for an 
increase in Russian armaments vdiich Bungs' s budgets sinply could not 
sustain. With the subsequent military canpaigns in central Asia 
(1882-1884) and the Bulgarian crisis of 1886, the paper rouble sank 
to an all-time low. "... his broader policies of economic development 
could not be satisfied in the face of rampant military costs and 
inadequate revenues" (Trebi Icock 1981: 226). In short. Bungs' s hands 
were tied by the autocracy's geo-political ambition to maintain both 
an a m y  and to compete in the international military arena in the 
manner worthy of a great power. As von Laue noted, the tragedy of 
Russian welfare was that the military ambitions of the autocracy 
vitiated all efforts to build ip the country's economic strength for 
the future. "No straining at the bootstraps could raise Russia above 
her backwardness, particularly if her government became involved in 
costly military expenditures" (von Laue 1963: 23). Once again
therefore Development Path 4 was adopted by the autocracy, flying in 
the face of the finance ministry. Such economic development that had 
occurred was undone by the autocracy's resort to its favoured 
preference of short-run military preoccipation vMch in turn led to 
an intractable backwardness.
Bungs' s successor Vÿshnegradsky also aimed to set Russia on the gold 
standard. Having had his request to admit transactions in metallic
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currency vetoed by the state council, he also chose to create a 
favourable balance of payments. To this end all was directed. An 
important part of his policy was the tariff vAiich would allow him to 
increase e]q)orts and decrease imports thereby attracting gold into 
the country (P. Lyaschenko 1970: 561). In this vein he instigated the 
Mendeleyev Tariff of 1891 which secured a general level of protection 
of 32% ad valorem. In addition T^hnegradsl^ set about the collection 
of tax arrears from peasants, vhich had the effect of forcing them to 
market their grain (Crisp 1953: 160). The tariff was successful in 
achieving surpluses on the balance of trade, which averaged 311.2 
million gold rubles annually between 1887-1891, compared to a mere 
68m, 1882-1886 (Crisp 1953: 161). Vyshnegradsky managed to
considerably increase revenues mainly from indirect taxation, state 
owned railways, Crcwn lands and forests (Crisp 1953: 161; Trebilcock 
1981: 228; Lyaschenko 1970: 561; see chart 3.8 below), which also 
inproved his ability to purchase gold bills from abroad.
In addition he managed to reduce external expenditure on foreign 
debt by replacing the 5% Mendelsohn bonds of 1897 ly a 4% loans of 
500m francs issued on the Paris stock market at the end of 1888. This 
marked the beginning of a vast conversion operation onto the French 
market which opened up a new era in the history of both the Russian 
state and her foreign credit, (though the debt in sum wvas a little 
higher, annual repayments represented a saving of some 12.5m gold 
roubles). It should be noted however that events had somewhat played 
into Vyshnegradsky s hands. For when the German credit market wfas 
closed to Russia in the late 188Cy s, France who was at the time 
looking for a new military ally, found this in Russia. She thereby 
extended the golden handshake and France became Russia's main lender 
on the basis of this military alliance (see Feis 1930: 212-229).
However, he did little for the econony in other spheres. Hardly any 
state funds wvere ploughed back into the national econony for a future 
increased yield. In general, "it was a policy concerned wdth 
budgetary indicators rather than productive power, maximising the 
extraction of current resources rather than the creation of new ones" 
(Trebilcock 1981: 228. See also, von Laue 1963: 25).
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Summary of Economic Development 1861>1892;A Case of Centralised
Bureaucratic Struggle
The main successive finance ministries of Reutem (1862 -1878), 
Bunge (1881-1886), Vÿshnegrads)^ (1887-1892) all aimed at developing 
the economy and to establish Russia's foreign credit position 
(particularly for geopolitical reasons), mainly by attenpting to 
achieve monetary stability. One of the most fundamental paradoxes of 
Russian policy was that this project was defeated time and again by 
the military requisites of the autocracy. Echoing previous complaints 
finance minister Abaza cautioned Alexander II in 1881,
"Hie natural increase of state revenues has certain limits. In the 
course of the last twenty years total revenue has more than doubled 
yet it has invariably been swallcwed up by expenses. Even though our 
foreign policy has resumed its peaceable direction, about a third of 
the budget is still put at the disposal of the Minister of War. In 
these conditioi^ the Minister of Finance believes himself to express 
his conviction that it is urgent to take measures to reduce the 
sacrifices of the country for her armed forces" (quoted in Fuller 
1985: 61).
Hiis belief was shared widely within the Financial Chancellery as 
witnessed by the official historian of the Finance Ministry in the 
reigns of Nicholas II and Alexander III.
"A special danger to the successful application of measures to reduce 
deficits threatened from size of expenses generated by the demands of 
state defence. Expenses of this kind attained huge sums that even a 
comparatively insignificant increase in them occasioned by an 
increase in a number of troops, the perfection of armaments or higher 
food prices (the a m y  was the single largest purchaser of grain in 
Russia), mi^it immediately render nugatory all efforts directed to 
the attainment of parity between revenues and expenses" (Cbzor 
MLnisterstva Finansov, quoted in Fuller 1985: 61, my addition].
Thus the Russian economy was constantly undermined by warfare and 
the downward military multiplier (Dev. Path 4). Hie nineteenth 
century presents a picture of constant fiscal crises of the state, 
brouc^t on by geo-political over-extension. Hiese constant fiscal 
crises wreaked havoc with the economy leading to an institutionalised 
backwardness. In addition, the skimming off of fiscal surpluses and 
the undermining of the currency prevented the formation of a stable
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government credit (so vital for the development of military capacity 
as well as industrialisation). This makes clear not only that the 
military (Dev. Path 4) was continually preferred to the neo-Listian 
path but is reflective of an inportant rift/struggle between the 
Finance Ministry on the one hand and the Autocracy and War Ministry 
on the other. This was one part of a multitude of political conflicts 
between different ministries. These conflicts were vital to the 
generation of economic development throughout the period and will be 
examined later.
Geopolitics, Industrialisation and the Acquisition of the Gold
Standard
As with his predecessors at the Finance Ministry, most of Witte's 
industrialisation programme was subject to fiscal-military 
constraints and inperatives. The move to convert the currency onto 
gold was no different. Von Laue has argued that Witte adopted the 
gold standard to stabilise the currency in order to attract foreign 
capital. However, this was only a part of Witte's intention. As we 
have seen, the principal problem for Finance Ministries throu^iout 
the nineteenth century was the acquisition of foreign loans. They 
were essential in times of war as 1855, 1877 and 1888 had all
testified. Indeed loans for military expenditure had been soumit ever 
since the sixteenth century and had become a time honoured constancy 
in Russia's fiscal policy. Witte was only too aware of the 
destructive effects that war had placed upon the economy, having 
witnessed the demise of Reutem and Bunge before him. In his memoirs, 
Witte wrote,
"As we had lived under the regime of paper currency since the Crimean 
War the very notion of metallic currency had become obscured in the 
press and in the minds of educated people generally. We had grown 
accustomed to paper currency as one gets used to chronic disease in 
spite of the fact that gradually it ruins the economy*' (1921: 59).
Witte showed a fundamental understanding of the historical role that 
war had played ipon the economy.
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"The economic wealth and consequently the political strength of a 
country depends \jpon three factors, natural resources, capital and 
labour, physical and intellectual. In capital... she is poor for the 
reason that the history of the country is a continuous chain of wars" 
(1921: 72)
So clear were the deleterious effects of war upon the econony to 
Witte, that he was led to put aside approximately 400m roubles in 
case of just such a happening. As he himself stated, this was 
prompted
"... by the feeling that never left me after the ascension of Ertperor 
Nicholas to the throne that sooner or later a bloody drama would be 
staged in this or that part of the country. " (1921: 78).
If the state was to remain solvent and the economy in some sort of 
equilibrium, it was clearly essential to be able to secure loans 
particularly in times of war. To this end it was crucial to stabilise 
the rouble since its violent fluctuations naturally frightened off 
potential lenders.
There was also a further military factor involved leading to the 
need for foreign loans. Witte had carefully manipulated the budget so 
that he could ostensibly present a fiscal surplus. This was done by 
simply switching major expenditures from the ordinary to the extra­
ordinary account. The latter constituted not only railway expenditure 
but huge military and debt repayments, accrued from both railway and 
military charges (See Trebilcock 1981: 238). The extra-ordinary
account was funded mainly by foreign loans. Thus Witte, more than 
any other finance minister had relied ipon the extra-ordinary budget, 
was forced to increasingly resort to the foreign loan system. As 
Drage put it,
"the major advantage of the possession of a gold reserve is an 
element of power within a country. It is a guarantee of solvency in 
arranging for loans and affords the possibility of reverting to a 
paper currency during a time of financial pressure, for example in 
war" (quoted in Miller 1926: 107).
For the most part loans were sought after by Witte for both peace 
and war-time military expenditures. To be able to attract such 
foreign loans it was essential to have not only a stable currency but
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in addition an adequate supply of gold. The gold standard therefore 
was the perfect solution. This military cause to the adoption of the 
gold standard hy WLtte complemented the additional need to attract 
foreign capital, as indeed von Laue argued. The fluctuations in the 
rouble prior to conversion in 1897, had indeed hindered commercial 
transactions with foreign companies.
On the attainment of the gold standard and with the arrest of 
monetary fluctuations 226 foreign companies immediately set up in 
Russia. However, it should be pointed out that this influx of capital 
was premised also upon a number of other factors. There was firstly 
the lure of hard profits on government contracts especially for 
railway equipment at inflated prices. Secondly, there was the lure of 
h i ^  tariffs mainly for heavy industries. Thirdly, the lew level of 
world interest rates, (at least until 1900). Finally, the favourable 
publicity abroad intensified by the formation of the political
alliance with France prior to any such conversion (Falkus 1972: 
61,72; Kahan 1967: 71-73; Crisp 1988: 13).
In sum, the gold standard was adopted for a variety of reasons; of
commercial viability, the desire for foreign capital and perhaps most 
importantly of all, for the politico-military reason of securing 
loans for both peace and wartime military expenditures. That military 
requisites also played an important role in Witte's move to gold is 
reflected in his memoirs in vhich he stated that,
" the establishment of the gold standard definitely established 
Russia's credit and put her financially on an equal footing vdth the 
other European pcwsrs. CKd.ng to it we weathered the Japanese war and 
the subsequent revolutionary movement. Without it, economic and
financial collapse would have occurred at the beginning of the war 
and all the economic achievements of recent decades would have been 
annihilated" (1921: 59).
Tb this end tariff protectionist policies were aimed. From Bungs' s 
term in office throu^ to Witte, exports were increased and imports 
curtailed. Indeed tariff policy v/as successful in achieving a 
positive balance of trade. As the chart belcw shows, in the crucial 
years leading ipto gold conversion (1897), Russia enjoyed a positive 
balance of trade.
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Tabla 3. 3 Russian Balance of Trade. 1885-1897
Year Exports Imports Balance of 
Trade
1885 541 439 +102
1886 486 432 + 54
1887 620 4 04 +216
1888 792 397 +395
1889 754 441 +313
1890 696 414 +282
1891 712 383 +329
1892 480 409 + 71
1893 606 468 +138
1894 676 576 +100
1895 690 540 +150
1896 691 619 + 72
1897 732 607 +152
Source P. R. Gregory 1982: 314;
Thus the first objective of tariff policy was to enhance the fiscal- 
military position of the state, as well as to provide the future 
groundwork for long-term economic growth. The causal chain of 
economics and politics is therefore extremely conplex. The military 
requisites (Development paths 2 and 3) had positive benefits for 
economic development. In addition, the aim of long term econcmc 
growth (development path 1) was also strongly premised on developing 
the future military capacity of the state. This will now be explored 
further.
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SECnCN 3
Protectionism and the Militarisation of Industry
Hie desire to stimulate industrialisation, vMch late developnent 
theory assumes to be determined by the intended, long term economic 
actions of the finance minister, Sergei Witte, was to a large extent 
premised on narrow state-military requisites. The shift to 
industrialisation policies occurred mainly after the Crimean war. For 
in 1815 Russia had emerged as the greayest land power on the 
continent. Her army was by far the largest, and her navy was third in 
the European "league table". Even as late as 1853 it was believed 
that the naval differential was not large, as the dramatic 
destruction of the Turkish at Sinope attested (McNeill 1982; 230). 
But then came the Crimea, vMch tested Russia^ s military capacity to 
the full. Once again, it was the specific nature of this defeat vdiich 
stimulated state leaders to develop their military infrastructure in 
the post 1860 period.
The biggest problem Russia faced was a severe logistical weakness. 
In the event, this proved crucial, as the war was ultimately decided 
by the outcome of a siege on Sevastopol vdiose maintenance was 
premised upon Russia^ s siç^y capability. Since there were no 
railways south of Moscow, the horse-drawn supply wagons had to cross 
hundreds of miles of Steppes, which were a sea of mud during the 
spring thaw and the autumn rains (Kennedy 1988: 174). Though about
125,000 peasant carts were requisitioned, deliveries of sijpply proved 
hopelessly inadequate. Ihe means of transport (the animals) needed to 
eat. However to sustain the animals meant that the payloads dropped 
to almost nothing (McNeill 1982: 230; Kennedy 1988: 174). An enormous 
logistical effort therefore produced disproportionately small 
results. It took a mere three weeks for supplies and reinforcements 
to be sent from France and England by sea to the Crimea \diereas 
Russian troops from Moscow sometimes took three months to reach the
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front. In addition, the stocks of guns, powder and shot were also 
reduced due to the poor supply capability (Kennedy 1988: 174; Seton- 
Watson 1988: 319; Blackwell 1968: 183; McNeill 1982: 230).At the
beginning of the war, approximately 1 million guns had been 
stoclgxLled. But ty 1855 a mere 90,000 remained. Of the 1, 656 original 
field guns, only 235 remained (Baumgart 1981: 68-80
In addition to chronic problems of SL^ p^ly, the Russian navy also 
proved hopelessly inadequate. Not only did the allies have many more 
steam driven ships with s\ç)erior armaments technology, but they also 
had the industrial capacity to continue the building of new vessels 
as the war progressed (se^ Pushkarev 1963). Furthermore, the 
inadequacy of her navy was matched by the inferior arms technology of 
the land army. As McNeill put it,
"... the three initial battles of Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman v^ch 
cooped the Russians in Sevastopol were rehearsals for the Prussian 
victory over Austria at Kbnnigratz (1866) in the sense that superior 
rifled hand guns, newly issued to French and British infantry gave
them a decisive edge over the Russians still carried old-
fashioned muskets. The difference boiled down to this: the new rifles 
had an effective range of about 1000 yards as against the 200 yards
within vMch smooth-bore muskets could fire effectively*' (1982: 231.
See also Gerschenkron 1965: 708; Skocpol 1979: 84;
Kennedy 1988: 173).
Ihis meant that the allies could effectively avoid Russian fire 
vMlst keeping the enemy within range. As a result the allies were 
able to inflict terrible damage.
The State, War and Industrialisation
Ihe defeat was thus caused by a multiplicity of factors; inadequate 
supply modes, poor armaments, a backward navy, and above all the 
state* s hopelessly insufficient fiscal base. Ihese military problems 
became central to Russia* s developmental policies eifter 1861. Indeed 
a,
"... substantial connection grew \jp between the experience of defeat 
and the delineation of new objectives. For it was precisely the 
superior armaments and transportation of the western allies vAiich
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demonstrated to the Tsar that Russia's deficiencies in railways^ 
steam-engines, iron foundries and machine shops could impose costs in 
a currency v^ch the enpire respected" (MLliutin 1959, quoted in 
Trebilcock 1981: 220).
Typical of most theories and central to Gerschenkronf s is the way in 
vMch the period following the Crimean war is conceptualised in 
economically teleological terms. Viewing the 1890-1900 period as one 
embodying a "Great Spurt", and the subsequent "take-off" into 
autonomous industrial development, the previous period (1861-1890) is 
accordingly viewed as " necessary" for the setting up of the required 
preconditions for such a leap. In such a way Gerschenkron explains 
the growth of the railways ".. Before industrialisation could really 
take off an inprovement in canmunications was crucial", and 
furthermore, " railroads were indispensable to sustain a level of 
ejqjorts, consonant with the needs of an industrialising economy" 
(1962: 124). All this may have been true. But it cannot sinply be
used to explain the reasons for railway development in the first 
place.
As the Crimean war demonstrated (to be reinforced by the onset of 
the Second Military Revolution), the needs of railways for military 
strategic requirements had become imperative if the state was to 
remain corrpetitive in the international military system (Kipp 1975: 
446; Ellison 1965: 535; Miller 1926: 183).. Indeed during the great 
debate within the government over sponsorship of railway building, 
the supporters of state action were motivated by either military 
considerations or by fiscal concerns (state revenue implications). 
"While neither grovp ignored the long-term econonic effects, neither 
considered them primary" (Rieber 1966: 38). Accordingly the
government wasted no time in setting about this project. In 1855 
there were only 850 miles of railways, but by 1875 there were some
17,000 miles ^Aich had been built since 1860 (see Gatrell 1986: 150- 
154; Miller 1926: 182-201; Setcxi-Watson 1988: 405-406). Crisp has
correctly pointed out that modem scholarship has neglected the 
significant economic growth derived in particular from the rapid 
first spurt of the railway construction (1988: 13).
However it is true that successive Finance Ministers beginning with 
M  Kh. Reutem (1862-1878), determined to create an economic
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regeneration (Dev. Path 2). This conplemented the Tsar's desire for 
military railways. Thus vhilst helping to provide a military 
infrastructure, they also aided the economy throu^ the various 
forward and backward linkages. They extended backwards by creating a 
strong demand for iron and steel production and extended forwards by 
allowing the much needed transportation of goods (especially in the 
form of Siberian grain) both internally and externally. However, the 
economic benefits of this programme were only in part derived from 
the neo-Listian path iirplemented by the Finance Ministry. To a 
degree, economic benefits were derived from the unintended 
consequences of the state following its own military inperatives, 
mainly throu^ the building of strategic railways, (vMch also had 
inportant backward and in some cases vital forward linkages; for 
exanple, the Trans -Siberian) .
This path has been referred to by‘ Michael Mann as a form of 
"Military Keynesianism". This refers to a military development 
embodying growth-inducing qualities for the economy. More 
specifically the military multiplier may be defined as; the state, in 
following its own military inperatives provides unintended 
consequences for positive economic development (similarly, the 
"Downward Military Multiplier" refers to the situation ^Aereby the 
state follows its own military inperatives and in doing so provides 
unintended consequences for negative economic development). The 
positive multiplier is represented by Development Path 2 and 3, and 
its negative version by Development Path 4.
The Second Military Revolution
In addition to the effects of the Crimean defeat, the desire not only 
for railways, but also a military- industrial infrastructure were 
greatly reinforced by the inpact of the Second Military Revolution.
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The immediate origins of this phenomenon were found with the Prussian 
military revolution of the 186CK s vdiich soon produced \tot Disraeli 
termed "the German revolution in European affairs" (see Kennedy 1988: 
184). Part of this revolution was founded upon the level of 
industrial attainment from which accrued certain military advantages. 
Her strong iron and steel industries enabled her to siçply an 
increasingly important set of armaments industries, naval shipyards 
and in addition a vital network of strategic railways.
The problems of supplying and deploying large forces via the 
strategic railway network was new made part of an increasingly 
rational calculative method adopted hy the General Staff. Indeed the 
viiole system was increasingly made a matter of precise scientific 
calculation, administrative planning and professional esqpertise. This 
" administrative revolution" was accompanied by a technological 
revolution with the creation and adoption of new guns and artillery. 
The Prussian needle-gun proved far superior to the muzzle-loader, 
v^ch allowed the soldiers to lie down vMlst firing hence providing 
less of a target to the eneny (Howard 1976: 101; McNeill 1982: 236; 
Stone 1984: 72).
All this was put to the test in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian war. The 
result was defeat of the French much to the latter's humiliation. 
This humiliation would soon ferment into a national bittemess \hich 
would play a vital part in future Franco-Russian relations. The 
Prussian way of war turned into the "German" method and with it, a 
new age was bom. The epicentre of Europe from 1871-1914 was now 
fixed firmly upon a geographical area that lay between the great 
powers of France and Russia. If European diplomacy centred upon this 
area known as Germany, so too did European military methods. It was 
in this dual sense that the phrase "all roads now led to Berlin" must 
be understood.
In addition to the effects that German unification, as well as the 
German way of war had upon the military policies of the Great Powers, 
there is also the inpact of the rapid progress of military technogies 
to be taken into account. %to the I860's, military power received a 
revolutionary technological boost. Hitherto, technological advances
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had progressed slowly. But by 1880, this was disrupted by the 
advancement of the Parsons turbine, vMch gave navies greater scope 
ann range. Improvements in metal shell casing, as well as the 
invention of smokeless powier [cordite], as well as the development 
of the revolutionary method ôf steel-making throu^ the Hiomas- 
Bessemer converter [itself developed under the pressures of war - see 
Gautam Sen 1984] significantly shifted forward the military 
production possibility frontier of war-waging. Ihese revolutionary 
military developments had two specific effects upon the various 
national-economic policies of the Great Powers. Firstly, they led to 
a rapid increase in the military budgets of the great powers (dealt 
with here, in section 4). Secondly, they had specific consequences 
for the industrial policies of these states.
Thus states sought to inprove their industrial bases; for the 1871 
Franco-Prussian war showed the necessity for a military- industrial 
infrastructure to provide siperLor arms, navies and strategic 
railroads, if these states were to remain in existence within the 
European system. This combined with the already acute problem of 
supply-logistics in Russia, to provide a vital impetus for a certain 
amount of railway and industrial development, in order to satisfy the 
military exigencies of the Russian autocracy. It is in this context 
that we need to relate Russia's industrial policy of the 189CK s under 
Witte. Indeed the impact of this revolution was exacerbated in 
Russia, owing to the already-existing profound Crimean war 
legacy. Ihus the need for a military infrastructure in Russia had by 
1880 become overvdielmrLng.
The Witte System as politico-military and politico-economic
Not surprisingly, the selection of Witte as finance minister in 1892 
by Alexander III was premised on the desire for an increased 
strategic railway network. Ihe immediate task at hand was the 
building of the Trans-Siberian Railway \Mch would allow Alexander to 
fulfil his long held dream of geo-political conquest in the Far East.
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Who better to appoint therefore than the brilliant transport 
minister, Sergei Witte?
Indeed Witte's record prior to 1892 was inpressive, and was only- 
surpassed by his activities during his time as finance minister. 
Whilst most of the early railway lines built after 1855 were done on 
a private basis, by the early 1880's this pattern began to change. 
The 44 private rail companies in existence in 1871 were reduced to a 
mere 6 by 1900. More specifically, in 1889 only 23. 5% of the network 
was publicly owned- By 1900 this figure had increased to 60.5% 
(Miller 1926: 184; also Ellison 1965: 535). In addition, \Aereas
between 1876-1880, 767 km. of track were laid per annum, and 914 km. 
per annum were laid between 1886-1890 (thou^ certainly not 
insignificant) were dwarfed ly the construction of 2820 km per annum 
between 1896-1900 (Gatrell 1986: 150). In aggregate terms, between
1890-1901 the track increased from 30, 600 to 56, 500 km (Gatrell 1986: 
151; Crisp 1988: 13; Miller 1926: 188,208, Falkus 1972: 54).
As von Laue has made clear, Witte soumit the construction of 
railways as part of a wide industrialisation programme. Witte was 
particularly adamant to build railways specifically of " economic 
value" (i. e. non-strategic). However, such a requirement ran counter 
to the desires of the War Ministry and ultimately the autocracy. 
There also came into play additional factions, d^io sou^t the 
construction of strategic railways, namely, the Russian General Staff 
in collusion with both the French Foreign Office and General Staff.
Due to the allocation of railway expenditure to the extra- ordinary 
budget, they were to be funded primarily therefore throu^ foreign 
loans. Russia's main lender became France ^Ao had entered into the 
alliance through fear of the newly formed (Serman nation state. This 
financial alliance was explicitly premised on France's desire for a 
military counterwei^t to Germany and to this end, Russia was the 
obvious candidate (Feis 1930: 140-141; Rostow 1978: 173). This
catplemented Russia's situation. For, since Bismarck had alienated 
Russia in the 188(y s she was new forced to seek financial aid outside 
of Berlin, hitherto her chief source of funds. France immediately 
extended the golden handshake and an alliance was drawn rp officially
138
in December 1893, on the basis that she vrould lend money to Russia in 
exchange for military and political support.
"The experience of the Franco-Prussian War had demonstrated that 
railways, in facilitating the rapid transportation and provisioning 
of large numbers of men had initiated a catplete transformation in 
the conduct of war. The French General Staff having suffered once 
frcan railway-bome German attacks were especially keen to ensure a 
swift mobilisation of troops in case of war with Germany. This was 
foreshadowed in the 1891 Franco- Russian agreement according to vdiich 
any move against Germany must be ' general and as swift as possible' 
and though the alliance was seen by politicians as essentially 
defensive in nature, French military circles envisaged any 
hostilities as leading to the total destruction of Germany" 
(D. N. Collins 1973: 778, quoting fron French state archives).
This could only be accorrplished if Russia and France had railway 
resources rou^ily equal to those of Germany. The French were only too 
aware of Russian deficiencies in mobilisation due to the lack of a 
sufficient network of strategic railways. As a result, the much 
needed French loans came at a price: that money lent to Russia for
railways should be spent on strategic purposes. This of course
conflicted with Witte's desires to inplement a pure economic 
rationale through railway construction.
The French determined to overcome this obstacle presented by Witte, 
and in doing so soumit the use of the Russian military lobby. The 
latter were in favour of a strategic network and more often than not 
held favour with the Ttear. As a result, the French managed through 
the help of the Russian General Staff and the War Ministry to secure 
the construction of several major military railways - for example, 
the Orenburg-Tashkent, the Trans-Caspian and the Bologoe-Siedlce, 
"v^ch were understood to be without economic value for the moment" 
(D. N. Collins 1973: 781; Feis 1930: 217-219). Witte provided testimony 
to this in his memoirs.
"After the Turkish War of the 1870's, railroad construction was 
suspended, and it fell to my lot to resume the building of railroads. 
In this respect, I have succeeded in achieving a good deal for during 
my administration I doubled the railroad mileage. It is noteworthy
that the Ministry of War was constantly thwarting my efforts. This
ministry supported me only ^ e n  I proposed to build railroads of 
strategic inportance. Often strategic railroads were built counter to 
my recommendation. Besides the direction of non-strategic railroads 
was often distorted to suit the purposes of the War Ministry. In this 
respect. General KuropatkLn, and especially the former Chief of Staff
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Obruchev, did a great deal of harm. Ihe latter was a gifted and well- 
educated man, but strategic railroads were his monomania... Ihus I 
strained every effort to develop a railroad network. Military 
considerations with vÆiich his majesty often naturally sided, 
prevented me from building the lines most productive economically" 
(1921: 75).
Furthermore, he goes on to state that,
"the country will be best off if in building railroads it is guided 
by purely economic considerations. On the vhole such railroads would 
also meet the strategic needs. It is my opinion that this should 
becane a basic principle of railroad construction. For 30 years we 
were building railroads with a view to a war in the Wèst and we have 
wasted no end of energy in that section. In the end the war broke out 
in the Far East" (1921: 75-76).
It is perhaps of greater irony however that the war in the East 
was enabled by Witte's very own construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway, built si:çp06edly for "narrcw economic" reasons (as von Laue 
had claimed). Alexander had commissioned its building with precisely 
such geo-political considerations in mind and it is of further irony 
that it was the need for the construction of this railway line that 
had led to the choosing of Witte as finance minister in the first 
place! However it was also true that there were pure economic 
benefits engendered by the railways. Undeniably, they linked for the 
most part forward into the econcny, not least by opening the vast 
grain resources of Siberia. Ihe thrust of Witte's complaint was that 
there were no economic benefits from the military-strategic railway 
lines. Such a complaint was entirely unfounded.
We return to the military multiplier ( Dev. Path 2). It was noted 
above the strong linkages to the economy that the railways produced 
particularly ly the demand that they created for coal, iron, and 
steel production. Between 1895-1899 (the hei^t of the second railway 
boom), the percentages of domestically produced iron and steel 
supplied to the railways were as follows; 57% in 1895; 59% in 1896; 
58% in 1897; 53% in 1898; and 64% in 1899 (see Gatrell 1986: 153). 
Investment in rails and rolling stock generated sufficient demand to 
sustain the new iron and steel industries in South Russia. Thus 
railways had strong backward linkages to industry. If approximately 
30% of railway construction was undertaken for strategic purposes 
(see section 4), it is’ clear that military impulses were responsible
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for considerable heavy industrial development. Thus economic 
development was being generated by a mixture of political-military 
and political- economic rationalities (Dev. Paths 1 and 2). What was 
becoming obvious was that Witte's " industrial programme" was being 
subtly informed by a politico-military agenda aided and abetted by 
the rival factions of the General Staff and War Ministry in collusion 
with the Tsar. This agenda however extended beyond railway building 
and into the very heart of Witte's programme - namely the sphere of 
heavy industry.
Late development theory conceptualises Witte's eitphasis on heavy 
industry within a broad econanic, neo-Listian framework. Gerschenkron 
for example argues that as a result of the "substitutive process" (of 
the state substituting for the lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie), 
the state must concentrate its primary attention on the group of 
heavy industries - coal, iron, steel, machinery, transport and 
general engineering (1962: 20,126,360-361). These industries it is 
argued are attained because they are "strategic" in an economic 
sense. That is they have strong forward and backward linkages 
inducing both econanies of scale and a high growth performance. 
However, as Gautam Sen points out, this set of industries are also 
"strategic" in a military sense (1984: 7). The importance of military 
railways to the development of the econony has already been 
emphasised above. The arms industries and naval shipyards 
simultaneously provided an essential input to the capital goods 
industries as well as providing a strong boost to the iron and steel 
industries, and stimulating a vital demand for coal (1984: 106-'9). 
Not only did specific military policies have a direct inpact in the 
Witte period, but they continued to do so in the 1907-1914 period. 
Peter Gatrell has disaggregated various industrial output data in 
order to establish the specific linkages between the state's 
armaments/military policies and economic growth. He shews that the 
state's military policies underlay the substantial industrial growth 
rates witnessed in the years ipto the Great War (1982: 99-110; see 
also Falkus 1968: 52; Kemp 1983: 146; Trebilcock 1981: 281-284).
The second military revolution set a precedent for states to acquire 
an autonomous industrial system for national defence. That is.
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dependence on foreign industries had to be avoided since otherwise it 
could prove fatal in the event of war. Therefore the Russian state 
sought these industries for reasons of national defence. " Only the 
perception of external threat from the prior presence of already 
industrialised countries pronpted considerably enhanced involvement 
with industrialisation and explain the rapidity of progress" (Sen 
1984: 79). Furthermore in Russia this external threat not only acted 
as a " catalyst" to increased involvement in industrialisation - 
rather it constituted a fundamental reason for the actual acquisition 
of these industries in the first place.
Tariff policy was aimed to a significant degree at securing a 
military strategic base of heavy industries. Thus in 1877, the state 
imposed higher tariffs on locomotives and wagons, as well as 
restricting the iirportation of rails. Prior to then, rails were 
supplied to the tune of 50% by foreign supplies of iron. In 1870 only 
two factories in the Ural produced rails (thou^ not without 
difficulty). Belcw are presented those articles ^hich incurred such 
prdiibitive tariff duties.
Table 3. 4 Tariffs rates as thev affected Heavy Industry. 1868-1891
(Duties in kopecks per pood)
Product 1868 1891
Pig Iron 5 25-53
Iron 20-50 90-150
Rails 20 90
Machines 30 250
Locomotive 75 300
Engines
Source: Hoffding 1912: 78; see also Lyaschenko 1970: 558
These industries were in fact the core of Russia's heavy industrial 
base, and constituted the vital iiputs to her military production, 
namely railway, armaments factories and ship-building industries. In 
addition to these highly protectionist tariffs, the government 
guaranteed the sale of their products by the direct placing of supply 
contracts. The state injected nearly 70m rubles between 1868-1878
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into rolling stock factories (representing orders for 900 locomotives 
and 32,000 wagons). This was an essential part of the government's 
programme vMch soumit to achieve a self-sufficient military- 
industrial base (Gatrell 1986; 151). As Feis points out, in
particular,
"the metallurgical works were dependent upon the Russian government 
for armament and railroad equipment orders... " (1930: 222).
The siçply contracts themselves embodied a hidden subsidy. ^)art from 
guaranteeing sales, government contracts were also favourable to 
industries, in that domestic prices were often fixed well above those 
of foreign products. Thus in-1897, the price for rails was fixed at 
1. 1-1. 25 roubles, vdiereas the cost of production at the best five 
Russian plants was 77-89 kopecks. On the free market these rails sold 
at 85-89 kopecks and foreign rails cost a mere 60-65 kopecks. For the 
construction of the massive Trans-Siberian railway, the state was 
offered a price of 75 kopecks for the rail, by various British firms. 
In the end the contract went to Russian producers at the staggering 
cost of 2 roubles. In other words it is clear that the treasury was 
subsidising domestic producers through orders at vastly inflated 
prices. As an approximate estimate, this subsidy amounted to some 15m 
roubles per year, vMch was distributed to a dozen " favourite" plants 
(Lyaschenko 1970: 560). Thus with a combination of h i ^  (and
genuinely) protective tariffs, and favourable supply contracts the 
Russian state created an autonomous "state-led" military-industrial 
base, the achievement of which was soumit after by many European 
states in the late nineteenth century, as they responded to the 
second military revolution.
These military-required industries could played a dual purpose since 
they had strong economic growth inducing qualities (the military 
multiplier). Crisp and Gatrell have argued that the railways provided 
the basis for Russian industrialisation (Crisp 1976; Crisp 1988: 13 
). According to Gatrell between 1895-1900, railway investments 
represented 25% of total net investment, thou^ he goes onto state 
that if investment in transport equipment was included, the figure 
would be nearer 30% (Gatrell 1986: 152-153). This clearly exceeded
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Fremâling's (1977) 25% estimate necessary for German
industrialisation
Once again it was becoming clear that WLtte^ s " economic" agenda of 
industrialisation and tariff policy was being set to an appreciable 
(though not exclusive) extent by the military impulses of the 
autocracy. Although Witte disliked the military foundation and 
direction of many of his policies. Military Keynesianism allowed 
considerable amounts of economic growth. Thus these benefits 
ultimately conplemented Witte's desire for higher rates of such 
growth.
S S m C N  4
The Fiscal Origins of Tariff Protection
Von Laue has argued that tariff policy was essentially determined by 
the needs of industry, Wiich was in turn a vital factor to Witte's 
industrialisation programme. Thus he stated that, "it is doubtful 
vAiether Witte... ever clearly understood the fiscal character of the 
tariff. To him it appeared as the government's chief instrument for 
the promotion of a rapid industrial advance" (1963), However,
we have seen how Russian "industrialisation" was conditioned iy the 
stats' s response to both the defeat in the Crimea and, in particular, 
the second military revolution (section 3). In section 2 it .was 
argued that the state's military requirements played an inportant 
role in the shaping of tariff protectionism, necessary to create a 
positive balance of payments. The fiscal base of the tariff had a 
further dimension; to provide revenues for the state.
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With the military revolution there was a concomitant escalation of 
military costs and thus a need for vast increases in state revenues. 
Russian government expenditure doubled between 1860 and 1885, doubled 
again between 1885 and 1900, and doubled again between 1900 and 1913 
(see Table 3. 10). The major expenditures were derived mainly for 
military purposes, thou^ the state budget also contained a 
signiricant amount of economically productive expenditures (see 
T a b l e s  3JO - 3.1 5 ). The problem of finding new
sources of revenue became acute and the quest for the necessary 
increases became a central preocci;T)ation not only for the Tsarist but 
for many other states in Europe. This quest became inextricably 
entwined with the rise of tariffs in the late nineteenth century.
From the late 1850's to the 1870's Europe had undergone an era of 
free trade. Upon this principle both liberal and authoritarian states 
harmonised and the Gdbdenite dream it seemed was becoming a reality. 
But then in the late 1870's the dream began to slip with the onset of 
tariff protection and was finally turned into a nightmare by a wave 
of sustained and aggressive tariff wars. The principal wars were 
conducted between France and Italy, 1887-98 (see Ashley 1920: 323- 
327; Pollard 1981: 261), Germany and Russia, 1880-1894 (see Ashley 
1920: 69-74; Henderson 1967: 49; Pollard 1981: 261-262), France and 
Switzerland 1893-95, (see Ashley 1920: 334-336). The immediate
occasion of this shift to protection was the flooding of industrial 
goods, raw materials and particularly grain into the European markets 
from both America and with reference to the latter from Russia. This 
occurred at a time \Æien European governments were feeling the effects 
of their increased military spending and were searching desperately 
for an accompanying boost in revenues. Kith the massive increase in 
imports secured in the late 187(y s the answer to their problem lay 
right under the statesmen^ s noses. Tariffs secured on this tidal wave 
of imports would prove to be most lucrative. As did Germany, Russia 
similarly turned to protectionism, the major tariffs being secured in 
the years 1878, 1880, 1885, 1887, 1891 and 1903. The table below
shews the breakdown of tariff duties for the three main branches of 
production.
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Triblp, 1, 5 Customs Duties and their Incidence 1855-1912 (in
percentages)
Year Foodstuffs Raw Materials & 
Semi -Manufactured
Manufacture
Goods
All
Items
1855 33. 1 7.0 24. 3 23. 7
1860 38. 9 8. 5 22. 5 19.0
1865 35. 1 9. 0 13. 8 16. 3
1870 31. 8 7. 7 11. 8 12. 9
1875 25. 6 7. 9 12. 6 11. 7
1880 33. 1 11. 7 16. 6 17. 2
1885 41. 1 13. 8 24. 9 23. 7
1890 59. 6 18. 3 26.0 28. 7
1895 63. 9 24.5 24. 1 31.9
1896 65.0 25.8 24.7 32. 1
1897 67.8 29. 5 26.5 35.2
1898 69.4 31. 8 25.8 36. 2
1899 68. 8 28.8 25. 6 34. 1
1900 81.0 25.0 25.0 33.0
1901 92.0 32.0 27.0 -
1902 96.0 31.0 28.0 40.0
1903 89.0 30.0 26.0 38.0
1904 91.0 28.0 26.0 37.0
1905 95.0 27.0 26.0 38.0
1906 91.0 25.0 29.0 38.0
1907 76.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
1908 69. 0 27.0 29. 0 35.0
1909 75.0 24.0 26.0 33.0
1910 77.0 22.0 26.0 30.0
1911 69.0 23.0 26.0 30.0
1912 67.0 22.0 27.0 30.0
Source: 1855-1899: P.A.Khromov (1950: 484-485).
1900-1909: E  Hoffding (1912: 86). See also V. P. Litvinov-Falinsky
(1908: 75).
1909-1912: Miller (1926: 71; figures taken from Messenger of Finance 
No. 10, 1914
The most striking feature of these rates is the high incidence of 
duties applied to raw materials and semi-manufactures in relation to 
finished manufactured goods. In addition, from 1898 onwards there 
were many occasions vdiere raw materials and send- manufactured goods 
actually incurred a higher duty than the finished product. This had 
an adverse effect for Russian manufacturers. Tariffs levied on raw- 
materials and semi-manufactured goods (as well as on foodstuffs) had 
very little protectionist function. For the main part they were 
purely revenue producing since in the vast majority of cases ^ere 
such tariffs were levied, there were no indigenous producers. As with 
Germany, Russia required increased sources of revenue to fund her
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expanding expenditures, particularly for the military budget. As 
Russia turned to industrialisation, she imported large amounts of 
raw-materials and semi-manufactured goods (see Table 3. 6). Upon this 
increase, tariffs levied proved to be a lucrative source of revenue 
(see Table 3. 7).
Tahlp. X 6 The proportions of the values of the manor categories of 
imports (as a percentage of the 1
Years Foodstuffs Raw materials 
&
Semi -manufactures
Manufactures
1905 16.5 54. 9 28. 3
1906 16. 9 54. 1 28. 8
1907 17.0 53. 6 29. 3
1908 16. 6 54.0 29. 2
1909 14. 9 52.3 32. 6
1910 12. 7 54.0 32.8
1911 13. 1 50.6 36.0
1912 13.5 49. 9 36. 3
1913 13. 3 49.0 37.4
Source Figures derived from Miller (1926: 76, Table K, originally 
taken from Foreign Trade on the European Frontier for 1905-1910, and 
from Messenger of Finance, Nb. 8, 1914: 342; see also Khramov 1950: 
476-479)
Tabi p, 3. 7 Ihe Siqnd fi ff revenue vielding items
Item %age
total
of Yield
in roubles 
(millions)
Tea of every kind 15.0 44. 4
Raw cotton 12.0 35.4
Machines and parts 10.6 31.5
Herrings 3.9 11.4
Unworked metals 3.7 11.0
VKool and down 2.2 6.3
unworked
Woollen manufactures 2.0 5.9
Coal and coke 2.0 5.8
Chemicals 2.0 5.8
Oranges and Lemons 1.9 5.6
Iron and steel 1.8 5. 3
manufactures
Ccxnbed wool 1. 8 5. 3
Source; Miller (1926: 71, from Messenger of Finance. Na 10,1914).
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Furthenrore, if we examine the state revenue accounts more closely 
we may note a specific relationship between customs revenue and 
excise tax. For if we aggregate the two (in order to derive total 
indirect tax), we note that in most years there is a constant 30; 70 
ratio in favour of excise taxes, lhat this ratio should remain 
constant particularly in the years of the major tari ff increases 
suggests that these two taxes were being calculated by the finance 
ministry in a highly rational way. Ihis would give further evidence 
to the view that tariff policy had an inportant fiscal function.
It may be objected however* that surely it is a well established 
principle of public finance that the way of extracting the largest 
possible proceeds from tariff duties is to tax at a moderate rate a 
few articles of general consumption. Why Russia did not follow this 
prescription is shown by the following characteristic quotation from 
a memorandum presented in 1882 to the Imperial Council by the then 
Minister of Finance, N. Kh. Bunge;
"the revision of certain clauses of the tariff arises from the need 
of strengthening the resources of the Imperial treasury. A hi^er 
customs revenue can in some cases be secured by a lowering of the 
tariff rates, if an increase in consunption can be expected; vtereas 
in other cases it may be secured by a moderate rise in the duties if 
an increase in consunption is not to be expected, but it can yet be 
assumed that the trade can beeu: the hic^ier duty" (quoted in Hoffding 
1912: 83).
Clearly Bunge preferred the second method since, as he went on to 
argue;
"a lowering of the tariff rate premises an increase of the customs 
revenue only in the more or less distant future and on the condition 
of a sufficiently h i ^  standard of material well- being in the 
population. But the present condition of the Treasury cannot be 
inproved by an increase of revenue vMch is only to be expected sane 
years hence, and the great mass of our people are not so well off 
that the increase of consunption could make up for the lowering of 
duties. It appears therefore, necessary to have recourse to the 
increase of duties only providing that this increase should not make 
the duty of all articles inaccessible to the people and diminish the 
consunption" (Bunge, quoted in Hoffding 1912: 84).
This reasoning was to be found amongst most European powers. It was 
so because states operate fiscally with regard to short or very short
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run calculations. Since Europe had undergone a period of free trade 
it was fiscally profitable for these states to raise tariffs even to 
a considerable degree (since the tariff rates began froti a very lew 
base). With the onset of inports on a vast scale into Europe any 
increase of tariffs tended to bring in more revenue particularly on 
grain, ^Mch Bismarck had found to his delight!
The Establishment of a Non-Tax and Indirect Tax Regime
Tablp. 8 Government Revenue 1860-1913 (millions of rmiblps^
Year
(1)
Direct
(2)
Indirect
(3)
State
Property
(4)
Total
1860 53 170 0 330
1865 69 165 0 356
1870 98 230 0 460
1875 119 287 29 558
1880 112 352 29 628
1885 151 361 68 759
1890 115 474 110 940
1895 133 587 157 1256
1900 229 662 365 1704
1905 182 850 397 2024
1910 216 1172 673 2781
1913 274 1372 938 3417
Source: P. A  Khromov 1950: 494,495,498-513
(1) Direct tax includes; redenption payments, land taxes, taxes on 
industry and tax from money capital. (2) Indirect tax includes 
excises on spirits, tobacco, cigarettes, sugar, petrol, salt (rpto 
1886) and matches, as well as tariffs on foodstuffs and on industrial 
materials. (3) State property includes stamp duties, property 
transfer, goods and ships in ports, railway duties, fire insurance of 
properties, mining, mint, post, telegraph and telephone, licenses, 
forests, state railways, state factories and treasury income
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Table 3. 9 The Major Categories of Tsarist Revenues. 1860-1913 (in
percentages)
Year
(1)
Direct
(2)
Indirect
(3)
State
Property
1860 16 52 -
1865 19 46 -
1870 21 50 -
1875 21 51 5
1880 18 56 5
1885 20 48 9
1890 12 50 12
1895 11 47 13
1900 13 39 21
1905 9 42 20
1910 8 42 24
1913 8 40 27
After 1860 and particularly after the 1880's, the government moved 
over to an indirect tax and state property tax base (as did Germany). 
Between 1860 and 1880 receipts from customs revenue rose threefold, 
vAiilst total indirect taxes more than doubled (in nominal terms. Note 
that all tax grcMth rates have been calculated here in nominal 
terms). By 1913, customs revenue had almost quadrupled, and had 
increased by over 1000% since 1860. If we take national income growth 
into account, the growth rate is still striking (4. 7% in 1885 and 
7. 2% in 1913). Conversely direct taxes, ^^ch represented over 20% of 
tax revenues in the 187Œ s, contributed a mere 8% in 1913. In 
addition, revenue from government property and in particular from 
state-owned railways increased more rapidly than revenues from other 
sources such, that by 1913 they accounted for almost 30% of total 
ordinary revenue (See also Gatrell 1986: 218 and A. Babkov 1912: 175). 
Thus from 1875-1913, nominal state property revenues had increased by 
over 3200%. When these growth rates are calculated against national 
income, there was a five fold increase between 1885 and 1913.
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Table 3. 9A The Major Categories of Government Expenditure, in Percentages
□  Direct 
M Indirect 
M State Property
O L n o L n ' O L n ' o ' i n ' O L nc D C D r ^ r ^ c o o o o ^ o î o o
C O O O O O O O C O O O C O O O O O O ^
Many authors have observed this shift, (see for exaitple Crisp 1976: 
27; Crisp 1988: 9; Gerschenkron 1965: 781; Gatrell 1986: 218; Yaney 
1973: 288-290; Robinson 1973), though few explanations have been
forthcoming. It will be argued here that there was a network of 
overlapping multiple power logics involved in the shift ro an 
indirect and non-tax regime. These will now be traced.
After 1861, part of the fiscal obligation that the peasants incurred 
in the Obschina was the payment of the state for the land. The 
peasantry had to pay a fixed sum of money over a 49 year period in 
order to redeem the land. This was know as redenption payment. This 
was levied in order to conpensate the state for the money it had in 
turn given to the landlords in conpensation for their lost land. In 
the late 1870's these were required in cash and as this commodity was 
still rare, large arrears began to appear. In addition to problems of
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liquidity the peasants bitterly resented such payments for the land, 
which they believed was and had always been rightfully their own. As 
a result arrears began to appear. The accumulation of such arrears 
went unchecked and became a constant fiscal thorn in the side of the 
state.
From 1876-1880 tax arrears for the country as a vAiole amounted to 
22% of the budgeted revenue from direct taxes (Gerschenkron 1967: 
768; Rogger 1983: 77). However, this figure hides extreme disparities 
in terms of regional indebtedness. Ihus by 1881 arrears stood at 5m 
roubles in Yaroslavl and Tula, but as much as 158m in Moscow, 249m in 
Smolensk and 146 in Orenburg (P. W. Gatrell 1986: 197; cited originally 
in N. M. Druzhinin 1978: 76-77; Table 5). In 1880 the arrears amounted 
to an average of 27% (Pdbinson 1973: 95). As a result the government 
began to decrease the direct tax burden of the peasantry, partly for 
fear of civil unrest and partly also from the plain realisation that 
this form of taxation was in no way lucrative. Accordingly in 1881 on 
his accession to the throne, Alexander reduced the redemption debt by 
about 10% of the arrears (27% of average annual payments) as a sign 
of good gesture (Gatrell 1986: 196). Again this conceailed massive
regional variations; thus it represented a mere 16% in Kherson, but a 
staggering 90% in Olonets (Gatrell 1986: 267; Robinson 1973: 95-96). 
Furthermore in 1886 the hated salt and poll taxes were abolished. A 
further reduction in the redenption payments was made in 1884. 
However, the aggregate reduction amounted only to a modest 9. 2% of 
the total outstanding debt (Gerschenkron 1967: 769). Despite the
decrease in the sum of state and zemstvo (provincial) dues from an 
annual average of one rouble and 44 kopecks per desiatin (1871-1875) 
to an annual average of one rouble and twelve kopecks (1896-1900), 
the accumulation of arrears in the payments assessed by the state 
amounting in 1875 to 22% had increased by 1900 to a massive 119% of 
the average annual assessment of the period 1896-1900. Thus, the 
total accumulation of arrears (119m roubles) in payment due to the 
state had finally come to exceed by a substantial margin the average 
amount of the current assessments - being 99.3m roubles per year 
1896-1900 (Robinson 1973: 96). By 1903 the amount in arrears stood at 
130 million roubles, vÆiich represented 138% of the budgeted revenue 
for that year (Robinson 1973: 96). Throu^iout the 1890^  s the
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government had been concerned with the redenption payments especially 
after 1891, v^en the famine in conjunction with ^^hnegradsky s 
forced export drive, had led to a doubling of tax arrears, raising 
them from 51. Im in 1890 to 102. 8m in 1892 (Gerschenkron 1967: 779). 
Although Nicholas II forgave a certain amount of the arrears their 
escalation to new heights went unabated. In the 189Cy s redenption 
debt was reduced by approximately 25% (Rogger 1983: 77). It had
become clear by the 189CX s that this tax was more of a liability than 
an asset. As a result, much of the redenption debt was written off
1904. In addition, Stolypinf s land reform of 1907 was probably little 
more than an official realisation of the unpopularity of redenption 
payments; it is also probably the case that the land reform was 
merely formal confirmation of the informal pratice of frequent 
peasant movement away from (and usually back to) the obs china.
The capacity of this tax to produce arrears was greater than that of 
any other. On tcp of this the striking fact, that the cost of 
administering this tax was about five times hi^ier than that of all 
others. Furthermore, it provided only 6.4% of the total net tax 
revenue. As direct taxation was proving to be ineffective, the 
finance ministry* s first prerogative was to find a more lucrative 
source of revenue. As we noted above, the vast increase of imports, 
derived from both American exports and as a concomitant to 
industrialisation in Russia, meant that tariffs could provide an 
efficient and effective source of revenue. It was also far less 
eigensive to administer, since tariff revenue could be collected at 
fixed customs houses throu^ vMch imports passed on their way to the 
Russian market place The first reason then for the move to indirect 
taxation was its superior fiscal yield to current sources of 
taxation.
The question arises, that if the prevailing form of direct taxation 
proved a hindrance rather than a help, vdiy then was it not abolished? 
The reasons turned out to be political, revolving around the factors 
of centralised bureaucratic struggle and the patrimonial impulses of 
the autocracy. Firstly, if this tax was abolished it would 
effectively lead to the removal of the legal ties, holding the 
Obs china together. As we noted above, the commune was created in
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order to freeze the vast bulk of the population to the land to ensure 
tax and military requirements and in addition, for the patrimonial 
inperative of preventing the formation of a landless proletariat. The 
Obs china therefore, as far as the authorities had intended, was set 
up to block peasant emancipation.
In addition, the Cbschina was also created to a large degree under 
the ioperatives of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) which managed 
to acquire an increased measure of power vis-a-vis its rival 
ministries within the bureaucracy. Thus the autocracy and the MVD 
both had a vested interest in the Qbschina^ s maintenance, and 
consequently therefore, the maintenance of redenption payments at 
v^tever the fiscal cost. For these payments were the essential 
mechanism by which the peasantry were frozen to the Obs china. (As 
will be explained later, there was a gap betvæen theory and practice 
in this respect. That is, in practice the peasants were able to mover 
around relatively freely, as it was not feasible logistically to 
constantly police such movements). It was clear therefore that if the 
Finance Ministry wished to increase its power over its main rival the 
MVD, it would need to undermine the latter's source of pc^^ er - that 
is, its tax collection function and the Obs china. This could be done 
by reducing the redenption payments to such a level that the MVD s 
fiscal role would be reduced. What better way to ensure this than by 
replacing direct with indirect taxes? What is central to this shift 
in tax regime is then a powerful conflict between the two main 
ministries, the finance ministry (FM) and the MVD, and represents an 
inportant way in ^hich centralised bureaucratic struggle had direct 
repercussions for the determination of economic and fiscal policy.
The History of the "Centralised Bureaucratic Struggle" between the EM
and the IWD
In 1802 the system of Ministerial government was set ip, with the 
creation of eight ministries followed by an additional four more in
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1811. This remained the basic structure of the Russian government for 
over a century. After 1905, there were in all, fourteen ministries. 
The FM and MVD were the only ministries universally involved in 
government and society. All ministries were vitally dependent upon 
them and thus from the beginning their potential for bureaucratic 
aggrandisement vis-a-vis the other ministries was secured. The 
conflict between the FM and the MVD did not explicitly emerge until 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and manifested itself over 
a broad area of policies. Until the 1880's, the MVD was highly 
favoured by the Tfear and held enormous power within the bureaucracy, 
especially with its much expanded role in the interior after the 
emancipation.
In the very early years however, the MVD had remained weak. In 1810 
its preserve was extended to the caring of the interior to the "care 
of the spreading and stimulation of agriculture and industry" 
(Orlovsky 1981: 24). So as to preserve his freedom of manoeuvre the 
Tsar's tactics of divide and rule ensured that no workable division 
of labour should be installed between the various ministries. This 
was in strong contrast to Prussia and France, vhich had separate 
ministries for agriculture and industry from the early nineteenth 
century. In Russia as the century developed, ministerial 
jurisdictions came to increasingly overlap, with the result that as 
there was little cooperation or communication between ministries, a 
unified policy became increasingly difficult to obtain. Consequently, 
there emerged from the mid-century onwards an increasing paralysis in 
government intensifying as the twentieth century began.
In the second phase of MVD history (1819-1837) there were changes, 
but an overall political læakness still remained. In 1819 the 
Ministry of Police was abolished and its departments went back to .the 
MVD, thus considerably increasing the latter* s administrative- power 
base. In addition the MVD relinquished its economic sphere with its 
Manufacturing and Internal trade section being transferred to the FM, 
(vAiere it stayed). Nevertheless it was not to be cut off from trade 
matters entirely. The specific section of the Department of Trade and 
Manufacturing v^ch administered Russia's trade fairs was however 
regained from the FM in 1820. The MVD new had a vital role to play in
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a series of econanic areas, for instance; credit institutions, 
railways, taxation, joint stock cortpanies and factories (in addition 
to its considerable role in the interior). In all these areas the MVD 
would have to be consulted for. future legislation. [As we shall see, 
tension would mount as the FM in the late nineteenth century 
attenpted to appropriate control over many of these economic areas].
Then in 1837 with a reform of provincial administration, the MVD^  s 
hold was extended further into the provinces. The Govemor-Generals 
viio had been created by Catherine II in 1775 and had jealously 
guarded their power against encroachments from the bureaucracy were 
now abolished and replaced with a governor was directly
responsible to the MVD, thus greatly enhancing the latter's power. As 
the MVD extended its hold over the interior, it simultaneously 
increased its power within the bureaucracy. (The expansion of a 
ministry's pcwer/administratlve base enabled it to gain more 
influence with the tsar, over other ministries). From the 183(y s and 
especially after 1857, it played a central role in preparing for the 
emancipation of the peasantry from the landlords (see Emmons 1968: 
209-318; Orlovsky 1981: 61-62; Field 1976: 173-232; Rieber 1966;
Yaney 1973). Its sole aim was to replace the landed gentry as owners 
of the serfs with its cwn institutions. Pushing the Tfears Nicholas I 
and Alexander II towards emancipation, it could clear) y envisage a 
quantum leap in its power, ^hich it would accumulate at the direct 
expense of the landowners.
Sure enou^ after 1861 there was indeed such a quantum leap. Rural 
society was now split into two provincial spheres. Firstly, there was 
the creation of the Cbschina, vMch was liable for tax and military 
conscription (to be administered ly the ÎOT). In addition the MVD 
played a vital policing role in the Cbschina. Secondly, there was the 
creation of the zemstvo, vMch was monopolised by the landed gentry 
(see banning 1982, for the breakdown of constituents within the 
obs china). Nevertheless this body remained more or less iiipotent vis- 
a-vis the autocracy and central state, gaining at best a foothold in 
localised social and cultural activities; for exairple, the setting \jp 
of food stores, charity work and public health. They could not 
conpete for political resources vital to the autocracy, as the
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landlords had done prior to 1861. This institution could not 
therefore challenge the state.
As Skocpol put it, the zemstvos
"... grew up alongside not within the hierarchy of societal political 
power. For the inperial authorities retained a monopoly of 
administration and coercion... and the zemstvos were tolerated by the 
inperial bureaucracy only to the extent that they did not challenge 
central controls and policy-making prerogatives" (1979: 89-90).
In practice, autocracy did not surrender any of its functions since 
it sinply authorised these bodies to perform politically 
uncontentious tasks with vMch the state was not traditionally 
concerned (Vucinich 1960: 197; Orlovsky 1981; Skocpol 1979: 90;. Yaney 
1973: 237-239).
Furthermore, since the peasants were new dominated by the MVD, there 
was no possibility of a resurgence of the "party power" of the landed 
gentry on the Prussian model (see Robinson 1973: 79-80). Hiis class, 
had been broken economically, and had been left unprotected frcm the 
harsh winds of the economy. Iheir role as agents of the peasantry had 
been terminated in 1861. Ihe MVD under P. A. Valuev (1861-1868) began 
a trend vMch increasingly restricted zemstvo activities by depriving 
them of vAiat little executive and financial means they had necessary 
to fulfil their already meagre functions (Orlovsky 1981: 76). Even 
the judicial reforms of the 186Œ s were attacked ty the MVD, and the 
judiciary that came into existence was subordinated by the MVD s 
jurisconsult section. This allowed it to increase its political 
powers by dispensing "political justice" for "state crimes", without 
interference from the prosecutors or regular courts. The MVD s role 
in the police state that came to dominate Russia in the late 
nineteenth century grew to be immense.
So by the late 188D s the MVD had grown to an extremely powerful 
position within the bureaucracy due to its vastly expanded 
administrative base - so much so that it had come to constitute the 
Tsar's right hand ministry. Alexander II's most inportant criterion 
to be fulfilled by his ministers particularly within the MVD, was 
personal loyalty and submission to his desires. This was typical of
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patrimonial relations of domination within the bureaucracy (see 
section 5). Indeed, in three of his five appointments he ignored 
their political skills and was quick to eliminate or isolate those 
v^o infringed upon his personal power. Hence in 1868, Valuev was seen 
to be overstepping his mark, and was accordingly dismissed. Similarly 
when Shuvalov had grown too powerful he was sent off as Ambassador to 
London (see Orlovsky 1981: 101-102). For the most part however, the 
MVD's leaders enjoyed a distinguished position of prestige within the 
bureaucracy. By the 188Œ s this was at an all-time high.
But with the onset of industrialisation from the 1880^  s onwards, the 
FM began to increase in power, with an expanding administrative role 
to play in the direction of economic matters. From a logistical 
viewpoint it was perhaps inevitable that the FM would attempt to 
takeover many of the economic functions of the MVD. As the 
industrialisation process advanced so the FTf s challenge intensified 
Finally, conflict became overt between these two ministries occurring 
in a number of areas, most notably labour policy (see T. McDaniel 1988 
for an account of this particular conflict), and also in the area of 
taxation. Vfe have noted above, that the MVD s tax collection function 
was an essential ingredient to its administrative base and hence its 
power position within the bureaucracy. Consequently, if the FM could 
undermine this role it could therefore simultaneously undermine the 
power of the MVD. And this it sou^t to do, by initially muscling in 
on the MVD s role in these matters of tax collection in the 
countryside. Ihe MVD could be further weakened by vastly reducing the 
amounts of redenption payments to be collected The FM sought this by 
engendering a shift away from direct to indirect taxation. As 
Gerschenkron pointed out "the shift to indirect taxes that was taking 
place inevitably reduced the role of the police (MVD) in matters of 
tax collection". (1965: 781). Thus by increasing indirect taxes at
the expense of direct taxes, the MVD was not only undermined but had 
to concede to the FM s desire of muscling in on the actual process of 
rural tax collection. Ihus the FM used specific increases in excise 
taxes and tariffs as a power tool with \diich to force concessions 
from the MVD. Ihis political strategy was begun by H  Kh. Bunge.
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In 1885 he increased the tariff in addition to increases in excise 
duties, at a time when redenption arrears were beginning to spiral 
upwards and simultaneously legislated a further reduction in direct 
taxes. Having forced the MVD s hand, the FM was able to create an 
institution of tax inspectors in that very year. From 1885 onwards, 
there was a tax inspector from the FM in each uezd (region) to check 
up on financial operations, much to the disgust of the MVD 
(Gerschenkron 1965: 781; Yaney 1973: 364). Then in 1891,
Vyshnegradsky's New Mendeleyev tariff increased further the indirect 
tax base, the reduction in direct taxes was extended because of the 
sudden quantum leap in redenption tax arrears. Once again the MVD was 
forced to admit some cooperation with the FM s tax inspectors over 
the process of tax collection. Again in 1903, a further increase in 
the tariff coupled with an increase in indirect taxes, and with the 
subsequent decreased in direct taxes (at a time vAien arrears on 
redenption payments had reached an all time high), allowed the FM s 
inspectors to assume additional responsibilities in tax collection. 
Finally by 1905 the elected village tax-collector, formerly 
subordinated to the MVD came under the effective jurisdiction of the 
FM (von Laue 1963: 176; Yaney 1973: 364).
In sum, successive FM s invoked a shift to an indirect tax regime to 
undermine the hegemonic power of the MVD within the central 
bureaucracy. This centralised bureaucratic struggle between the two 
ministries therefore had direct repercussions on tariff policy. For 
as tariffs were increased, and additional revenue obtained, so the 
power of the FM was increased at the direct expense of the MVD, 
within the bureaucracy.
The Inpact of Ruling Class Strategies on the Relations of Extraction
A further reason for this shift away from direct to indirect taxes 
was premised on a set of autonomous political preferences. Ihe 
autocratic state chose to repress the lower orders as part of its 
strategy to maintain its despotic autonomy over society. This 
strategy was reflected in the stats' s tax policies. The 1861
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Emancipation Act relocated the peasantry into state- dominated 
locales, \<here an increased rate of fiscal extraction could be 
achieved- That is, the state could new freely tax the peasantry, 
since the landlords could no longer mediatise this relationship 
(between state and peasantry). Successive finance ministries 
increased the rate of fiscal extraction from the lower classes. Witte 
had intensified the extraction of taxation from the lower orders, 
increasing it by over 40% above the already high 1885 level (cf. 6. 41 
roubles per capita in 1885 to 8. 83 roubles per capita in 1900 - Kahan 
1967: 462-464).
As will be shown in the final chapter, in relation to Britain, 
Germany and America, the Russian tax system was by far the most 
regressive. Indirect taxes (vMch were for the most part extremely 
regressive owing to the high incidence applied to essential, price- 
inelastic goods) represented over 7% of national income. This was 
over double the rate of its authoritarian and liberal counterparts. 
Direct taxes constituted approximately 8% of total tax revenues and 
only 1% of national inccane. (In addition, these direct taxes were not 
progressive). Not only was the nature of the tax base highly 
regressive, but it was also hi^ily oppressive. That is, total 
taxation represented approximately 20% of national income (50% hi^ier 
than in Britain and over 100% hi^ier than in America).
In terms of the incidence of taxation, it is likely that the 
peasantry were to some extent able to substitute non-taxed goods for 
those vMch were subject to hiÿi tariffs and excises. As Crisp puts 
it,
"The very size of the rural population would suggest that it must 
have contributed substantially to the total revenue raised by 
indirect taxation, thou^ evidence suggests that peasants consumed a 
lower proportion of the items taxed relative to their share in' the 
total population" (1988: 9).
Given that the relative rate of extraction (taxes as a proportion of 
national income) had increased throughout the post- Crimean war 
period, and given that the peasantry had managed to increase their 
incomes net of taxes, it was likely that they vrere able to avoid some 
of the increased taxation In the towns it was much harder to
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sutetitute for taxed goods than it was in the countryside. Those 
towns vhich were in close proximity to the countryside may have 
enabled urban workers to accumulate to some extent substitutable 
goods. However, in the urban-industrial areas it would have been very 
difficult to engage in such activities. It was therefore likely that 
urban workers paid considerably higher taxes than their rural peasant 
counterparts. It is also likely that urban rates were very high; 
considerably higher than the average figure would suggest (20% of 
national income). Undoubtedly this would have been a source of strong 
urban discontent, and would certainly have contributed to the 
development of proletarian revolutionary consciousness.
By 1913 the average Russian had 50% more of his income appropriated 
by the state for current defence than did the average Englishman even 
though the Russian^ s income was only 27% that of his British
contenporary (Rogger 1983; 77; P. M. Kennedy 1988: 236; Miller 1926:
137). This oppressive level of taxation ipon the lower orders proved 
increasingly unacceptable. Tension rose until it finally exploded in
1905. The state ultimately came to feel the repercussions of its 
fiscal policies. Though it managed to weather the storm, the seeds of 
its eventual downfall had been sown. Thus in 1917, vAien a revolution
took of, the state finally paid the price for its oppressive
policies.
Thus just as the state had enacted repressive labour policies, so it 
similarly levied highly regressive taxes. These hit the peasantry and 
in particular, the urban proletariat. No progressive income tax was 
forthcoming in such a political climate. Nevertheless, it would be 
incorrect to explain the regressive indirect mode of taxation through 
exclusively enphasising the nature of the state regime (mode of 
domination). Equally as inportant was the fact that average incomes 
were too low to support a progressive income tax. That is, revenue 
yields would have been be insignificant. Furthermore, there was 
simply not available the sort of infrastructural capacity necessary 
to inplement such a system. However, the fact remains that taxes in 
Russia were perhaps the most regressive in Western Europe. 
Furthermore, the levying of such high levels of regressive taxes was 
sinply not possible in liberal Britain and America, or even in
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authoritarian Germany. In sum therefore^ the mode of domination 
played an inportant, though certainly not exclusive part in the 
formation of Russia's regressive relations of extraction (and hence 
its resort to indirect taxes and tariffs).
Patrimonial and Military Inpulses in the Creation of a " Partial" 
Industrialisation of Russia
At this point it is worth briefly examining the linkage between 
government fiscal policies and economic development, before going 
onto appraise the nature of the tax base in terms of its regressive 
quality. Late development theory argues that Russian fiscal policy 
had a strong economic bias. As von Laue put it;
"How much the government spent for its various economic activities in 
these years may come as a surprise. Rou^ily totalled the 
appropriations for all economic ministries (finance, agriculture, 
communications) and the service of the government débt (contracted 
largely for railroad. construction) amounted to over 52% of the
combined ordinary and extraordinary budgets in 1894 and 55% in the
following year. The a m y  and navy combined claimed about half as 
much, nearly 29% in 1894 but only 22. 5% in 1895. What was left went 
to the administrative agencies, the Ministry of Interior with its 
extensive organisation and its police, diplomatic service, schools 
and universities, the church, the courts of law, the Ministry of 
Justice and the Inperial household. Obviously the economy rather than 
defence was the beneficiary of Witte's financial management" (1963: 
100-101; see also Gerschenkron 1970: 102).
The subsequent revisionist swing has countered this by arguing that 
charges for administrative costs and debt repayments cannot be sinply 
labelled as "economically productive expenditure". Furthermore debt 
charges were to a large extent accrued from pure military
expenditures. Althou^ railways contributed to the growth of 
government debt ( approximately 30%), much of this was military- 
inspired. Thus Peter Gatrell has claimed that the outlays on 
government administration, defence and state debt suggests that it 
"would be idle to maintain that Ifearist expenditure had a productive 
purpose" (Gatrell 1986: 221. See also Kahan 1967: 461-466; Seton-
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Watson 1952; 122; Falkus 1979: 10; Feis 1930: 210; Crisp 1976: 97). 
Or, as Hans Rogger put it, industrial development,
"was not its (the state's) first priority - the claims of army and 
navy, of administration and internal security still took precedence 
as Witte's pleadings testified" (1983: 119).
To test these various claims will involve a detailed examination of 
Tsarist expenditure policy. It must be remembered that the state 
financed much of its peacetime expenditures through recourse to 
loans. Thus a conplete examination can only be made if we include 
exctra-ordinary with ordinary expenditures.
Tab! A 3. 10 The Maior Oltlavs of Orfl-inary and Extra-nrdi narv 
Expenditurps nf ibarist Russia 1860-1913, (in millions of RnuhTPfil
Year
(1)
AIMCN
(2)
EDÜC
(3)
CHÜ
(4)
MVD
(5)
FM
(6)
CCM
(7)
def
(8)
DEBT TOTAL
1860 28 4 5 14 94 12 140 51 414
1865 37 7 6 26 68 32 163 72 428
1870 45 10 9 42 91 78 165 86 564
1875 63 14 10 52 80 79 201 108 605
1880 68 17 10 63 113 57 293 174 793
1885 64 20 11 71 108 80 246 314 913
1890 70 23 12 76 109 170 282 315 1057
1895 84 24 14 86 141 428 342 409 1521
1900 118 34 24 88 280 504 485 317 1843
1905 136 43 29 114 380 528 1635 322 3205
1910 207 80 34 160 409 601 651 414 2597
1913 276 143 46 185 482 776 961 424 3383
Source: P. A.Khromov 1950:
(1) Administration
(2) Education
(3) Church/clergy
(4) Ministry of the Interior
(5) Ministry of Finance
(6) Ministry of Communications
(7) Army and Navy
(8) Debt repayment
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Table 3. 11 The Maior Categories of Government ExpATviitn-rA. fin
millions of Roubles)
Year
(1)
CIVIL
(2)
Eocrocc
SERVICES
(3)
MILITARY
1860 51 106 140
1870 106 169 165
1880 158 170 293
1890 181 279 282
1900 264 671(a) 485
1910 481 822 651
1913 650 1023 961
CIVIL = Administration, Education, Church, Interior 
ECCNCMIC SERVICES = Trade and Industry, Communications, Finance 
MILITARY = Amy, Navy
(a) After 1900, the Finance Ministry spent approximately 50% of its 
total expenditures on the spirit monopoly. These expenditures have 
therefore been deducted from the total ''economic services".
Certainly on this set of figures, economic expenditures constituted 
the mainstay of Russian tudgetary policy. However, this chart does 
not take into account hidden military expenditures. The first 
amendment involves the allocation of debt repayment. Von Laue has 
argued that most of the debt incurred was a function of railway 
expenditures. Thus he included debt repayment within his "economic" 
category. However, only approximately 33% of debt undertaten by the 
government was incurred for railway expenditure (Feis 1930: 211). The 
remaining 66% went on the military. Taking this into account provides 
us with the following estimation of the major categories of Tsarist 
expenditures.
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Table 3, 12 The Maior Categories of Ifearist Experviituresfin millions
nf RnnblPgl
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Military
1860 51 173 174
1870 106 197 222
1880 158 227 408
1890 181 383 490
1900 264 776 694
1910 481 959 924
1913 650 1163 1241
TahlP. 1. 13 The Manor Categories of Expenditures (expressed in
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Military
1860 9 42 42
1870 13 35 39
1880 20 29 51
1890 17 36 46
1900 14 42 38
1910 19 37 36
1913 19 34 37
Once again we find that substantial amounts went on both military 
and economic categories. Hcwsver one final calculation can be made. 
This involves the allocation of railway expenditures. Witte 
corrplained in his memoirs that as much as 37% of railway expenditure 
was "diverted" into the construction of (uiç>roductive) military- 
strategic lines. (Although there were few forward linkages, such 
lines nevertheless had considerable backward linkages, and were thus 
not unproductive). It should be noted that this figure of 37% is 
probably subject to some exaggeration. By conplaining that much of 
his reforms were diverted from their intended "economic" destination, 
he hoped to inply that industrial growth rates could have been higher
had he gotten his way, at the time. Nevertheless, assuming the figure 
to be approximately 30%, the above chart would need to be accordingly 
amended. The result of such an amendment is eagressed below (Charts 
3. 14, 3. 15).
Table 3. 14 The Maior Categories of Government E x p e n d itn rp g  
(in millions of ro n b ln m l
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Military
1860 51 86 211
1870 106 138 281
1880 158 159 476
1890 181 268 604
1900 264 543 926
1910 481 671 1212
1913 650 814 1590
Tqhl A 3. 15 The Maior Categories of Tgarimt 
(expressed in Percentages)
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Military
1860 12 21 51
1870 19 25 50
1880 20 20 60
1890 17 25 57
1900 14 29 50
1910 19 26 47
1913 19 24 47
Only if by using this set of figures can vre s\;çport the claims of 
Kahan, Gatrell and Gregory. These figures do indeed recast von Laue^ s 
claims. However even this set of figures shew the "economic services" 
category to be well funded. This final chart gives us perhaps the 
best overall picture of the real intentions of Tsarist budgetary 
policy. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for referring to the 
previous method of calculation in order to finally appraise Tfearist 
budgetary policy, (expressed in Tables 3.12, 3.13), because it is
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difficult to differentiate military fran economic motives in railway 
construction. However, on either reading it is the case that the 
state spent large amounts on economic services. These were almost 
equal to that spent on military purposes, (not to mention the 
economically productive aspect of the latter category). It would be 
fair to say that the revisionist swing has gone too far. Ihus Kahaif s 
calculations have underestimated the growth inducing quality of the 
state's e:jq5enditure policies. In addition, a certain amount of the 
state's military policies had growth inducing qualities. The amount 
spent on economic services (on any reading) was vastly superior to 
that of any other state; particularly in relation to Germany, Britain 
or America (all with vastly siçerior levels of per capita national 
income). If Kahah s figure of 16.4% for 1903 is too low, von Laue's 
estimate of 52% is certainly too high.
Perhaps ironically, despite the ijçjward revision of Kahanf s " economic 
category" figure, the substantial dcwnward revision of von Laue's 
figure leads onto a reappraisal of the late development model itself, 
(which propagates the idea that the state budget had to a large 
extent been responsible for the development of a broad based 
industrialisation). Ihat there is some truth in this is not disputed 
here. However, von Laue has certainly exaggerated his claim that 
state spending on economic services was so large as to provide the 
foundation of Russian industrialisation. Overall, it is the case that 
Ifearist expenditures marginally favoured the military, and that the 
stimulation of a broad industrialisation programme was not intended 
within the ambit of the government's fiscal policy. Nevertheless a 
limited industrialisation was helped by the stats' s fiscal policies. 
In further contrast to Kahanf s position, it was also the case that 
the state unwittingly laid the foundations for the rise of a limited 
consumer-based demand. In this connection, the point of departure 
must be the recognition of the existence and development of a 
consumer-based set of industries (Crisp 1976: Ch. 1; Gregory 1974).
Inportant recent resesuxh by Olga Crisp, Paul Gregory and Peter 
Gatrell has sham Gerschenkron^ s thesis of agricultural stagnation to 
be incorrect. In particular, it is argued that the " rigid" 
emancipation laws preventing peasant movement were in practice
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frequently flouted. Crisp has analysed internal passport data and 
Gregory has examined data on industrial labour. Both argue that the 
peasant moved quite frequently between agriculture and industry 
(Crisp 1976: Ch. 3; Crisp 1978: 323-333; Crisp 1988: 11-12; Crisp
1989: 57; Gregory 1974; Gatrell 1986: Ch. 3). There is the additional 
fact of relatively rapid per capita growth of Russian agriculture 
from 1885-1913 (Goldsmith 1961; Gregory 1982: Ch. 6; Gregory 1984: 
Ch. 2; Gatrell 1986: Ch. 4; Crisp 1988: 4-7). Gregory concludes that 
the volume of retained cereal crops rose both in absolute terms as a 
proportion of net output between 1885-1889 and 1897-1901 (1982: 72- 
79). In contrast to late development theory, rural consunption 
actually increased- Tb an extent the reasons for this growth of 
peasant incane were premised upon the unintended consequences of the 
stats' s fiscal policies.
After peasant emancipation, peasants found that they were able to 
retain the surplus that previously would have been handed over to the 
landowner. At the same time, the economy became increasingly 
monetised. In particular the state raised the rate of fiscal 
extraction. Since these dues were required in hard currency, peasants 
needed to either sell their crops at market for hard cash, and/or 
they could seek industrial employment (Falkus 1972: 56). Throu^ such 
heightened economic activity, the peasants and even more so, the 
growing proletariat could meet these increasing fiscal payments. 
Furthermore according to Crisp, the peasant managed to retain a 
surplus cifter payment of taxes (1988: 4-10). This contrasts with the 
Gerschenkron position, \^ch states that the peasantry were exhausted 
by high taxes (1962: 125-127,130; see also This surplus played an 
important part in the stimulation of the consumer industries, vAiich 
incidentally, formed a larger proportion of total industry than the 
heavy sector. That is, far from stifling peasant purchasing power as
Gerschenkron had argued, state taxes had a positive economic
multiplier effect (Development path 3). It is important to note that 
the development of consumer demand was stimulated in part by the 
unintended consequences of the state following its own fiscal- 
military impulses (development path 3), as opposed to any long term 
intended strategy (development path 1). The principal question to
emerge from this discussion however is, did the creation of a
168
consumer demand combine with the growth of heavy industry to enable a 
full industrialisation (as argued by Gerschenkron (1962; 119-142,
1970: 122-124) and Walt Fostow (1971a: 87-88, 117, 1971b: 65-66,93-94, 
1978: 427-428; see also Lyaschenko 1970: 563-565; Pollard 1981: 242).
The Russian Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Economy
The question posed above can be rephrased to read, vàiat evidence is 
there that the economy had failed to "take-off" after 1907 into a 
modem form of sustained and autonomous development? In 1914 the 
economy suffered from a chronic dualism with a relatively modem 
industrial sector and a large (and relatively) backward agrarian 
sector, even though the latter had developed quitted considerably 
(Gregory 1972: 432). Indeed it is widely accepted, even by the 
revisionist historians, that Russia^ s worst-best sector - agriculture 
- remained huge and acted as a deadwei^t holding down the economy 
(Gregory 1972: 427; Rogger 1983: 127; Keiip 1983: 147). Furthermore, 
the country was predominantly agricultural. Estimates of the size of 
the industrial workforce vary from 3 million (P.M. Kennedy 1988: 233) 
to about 9 million (Rashin, quoted in Gatrell 1986: 85; also, Ellison 
1965: 539), and finally to 14 million (P. R. Gregory 1972: 433). This 
dualism existed not only between sectors, but perhaps more 
inportantly, within the industrial sphere itself. Businesses were 
divided between cartel and Rustar. Entrepreneurship was split between 
a modem sector of trained technologists opposed to a traditional 
sector of corrup tion and incompétence; markets were split between an 
urban demand and one of rural tastes; and finance was divided between 
a new set of industrial banks and the older Russian state banks 
(Trebilcock 1981: 275; Rogger 1983: 127). Furthermore, the horse
power used in industry stood at 14. 7 per 1000, vhich matched the 
British figure of the 183Œ s and the German, for the 186(X s (Bairoch 
1976c)
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According to Paul Gregory and Mark Falkus, by 1914 the autoncanous 
preconditions for modem forms of growth had not emerged.
"One can say that Russia was obviously backward relative to its major 
European conpetitors both at the beginning of the ' modem period' 
(1861) and at the end of the tsarist era. This conclusion emerges 
unambiguously from the per capita figures and from social indicators" 
(Gregory 1982: 159; Gregory 1972: 422-423, 432).
Indeed per capita income remained abysmally lew vAien compared to 
other European countries (see figures presented in chapter 4). 
According to Gregory actual Russian per capita income was 20% that of 
the British and a mere 11% that of the American levels (1982: 155- 
157). According to the calculations made in this thesis, per capita 
Russian national income was 24% that of the British, 31% that of the 
French, and 36% that of the German (see table 4.5).
"It did not take a passion for progress to feel that the vicinity of 
the 1914 level which stanped Tfearist Russia as the most backward of 
the great powers of the world was not an ideal resting place (Erlich, 
quoted in Falkus 1968: 62).
Tb add to these problems, Russia was severely in debt, to the tune 
of 8. 8 billion roubles in 1914 (Crisp 1976: 202; Feis 1930: 210).
However this is not to preclude the fact that there was strong 
economic grcwth after 1870, and accelerating after 1885. As Gatrell 
argues,
"... any characterisation of the Russian econony \^ch inplies that 
the population in general was cau^it in a poverty trap fails to do 
justice to the record of economic growth, particularly in the period 
after 1885" (1986: 46).
Indeed this chapter has argued that there was indeed such strong 
growth. However the revisionist swing can only go so far. Tb 
reiterate Gregory, the fact remains that in 1913 per capita incomes 
were at the bottom of the European league.
Thus Gerschenkronf s view of 1906 as constituting the first year of 
an industrial take-off into autonomous growth is wide of the mark. 
Logically, this also means that the "Great Spurt" of the 1890's was 
not as large or significant, as the concept would inply. Furthermore,
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the high growth rates of the WLtte period appeared large, given that 
growth rates upto that time had been generally fairly low. In 
addition the Russian econaty was starting fran a very low base after 
1860, and thus almost any development would give rise to high growth 
rates. Using the figures presented in this thesis (Table 4.5 and 
Appendix 1) we can quantify the Great Spurt from a comparative 
perspective. On the basis of these figures, it is significant to note 
that the differential between Britain and Russia per capita incone 
had by 1913 narrowed by no more than one half of one per cent. Vfe 
need therefore to revise downwards Gerschenkron^ s central claim, that 
the great spurt "was truly a great one" (1962: 129).
A further problem is that the growth rates witnessed after 1906 were 
not derived fran an autonomous societal based development. Far from 
dropping out of the development process, the state actually played a 
vital role in stimulating the econony from 1906-1914, mainly throuÿi 
the unintended consequences of its rearmament programme after the 
traumatic military defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905 (See 
especially Gatrell 1982: 99-110; Trebilcock 1981: 281-284; Kenp 1983: 
146). As well as indirectly stimulating the econcoy throu^ its 
substantial rearmaments programme, the state also intervened directly 
in a \tele variety of ways. For example government guarantees against 
share capital were necessary so as to induce investment. Ihe state 
budget maintained its not insignificant growth-inducing features 
(particularly throu^ railways and communications). As Crisp points 
out,
"Ihe need for the State Bank to undertake a programme of building 
grain elevators in 1911 is a measure of the weakness of the 
autonomous forces and a significant pointer to the still vital role 
of the public sector" (1976: 34; see also Falkus 1972: 81).
In sum, to answer the question posed above as to vAiether Russia 
fully industrialised, thou^ it would be wrong to conclude as does 
Raymond Goldsmith, that Russia had fallen further behind its European 
competitors, we can agree with him \jhen. he states that Russia was 
still underdeveloped on the eve of Tsarist autocracy* s demise in 1917 
(Goldsmith 1961: 441,443; see also W. Nutter 1962; MJ.ard 1981: 243).
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Most inportantly^ this conclusion stands even v^ hen we resort to 
Gregory s higher estimates of national income and net national 
product growth rates (1982: Ch. 3; see appendix 1). Indeed in the 
words of Paul Gregory,
"One can say that Russia was obviously backward relative to its major 
conpetitors both at the beginning of the ' modem period^ (1861) and at 
the end of the tsarist era. This conclusion emerges unambiguously 
from the per capita figures and from social indicators" (1982: 159; 
1972: 422-423,432, itty enphases).
In short, not only did Russia fail to enjoy either a "Great" Spurt 
(1890's), or a "take-off in consumer demand (1906-1914), but managed 
only to inaugurate a partial industrialisation
SBCrrCN 5
Capitalist versus Autocratic Rationality! Patrimonial Iitpulses in the 
formulation of Industrial and Tariff Policies
Patrimonialisnv Industrialisation and the Downward Political
Multiplier
In the previous section it was argued that tariffs had an inportant 
revenue function. This meant predominantly the taxation of industrial 
raw materials and semi-manufactured goods (inputs to production). Hie 
chart (Table 3. 5) shews that from the 1890's onwards, raw materials 
and semi-manufactures were taxed as hi^ily as the finished product. 
Furthermore, in some years inputs were taxed at a higher rate than 
the finished au±icle. Ihis had an adverse effect Wiereby Russian 
manufacturers had to pay higher input prices (ceteris paribus) as a 
result of the tariff, than their foreign conpetitors (Hoffding 1912: 
86; Crisp 1976: 29-30; Kahan 1967: 470-471; Gatrell 1986: 167). Ihe 
net effect of this tariff system was to make domestic industry less 
competitive than its foreign rivals within the Russian market. In 
other words, IfearLst protectionist policy subsidised foreign
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conpetitors with an export bounty at the expense of in±Lgenous 
Russian producers.
It is widely argued that a tariff is applied for the rational 
economic reason of boosting domestic industry over foreign 
conpetition. Here is a clear exaitple where domestic industry was to a 
certain extent sacrificed on the stats' s fiscal altar. Ihat is, as 
was argued in the previous section, tariffs had been constantly 
increased on these inputs to production so as to provide the state 
with urgently required revenues. Ihe taxation of these inputs to the 
levels witnessed in Russia provides a striking contrast with the 
British situation. Whilst the British state almost resorted to 
tariffs in the Edwardian era so as to provide revenues (to fund 
pensions and dreadnoughts), taxes on inputs to production were 
strictly ruled out on the grounds of economic rationality. Ihis 
policy was itself the result of the liberal stats' s desire to 
maintain a conpetitive econony. Such a rationality contrasted with 
autocratic policy. (See the final chapter)
However it was not sinply the desire for revenue that had produced 
such an economic irrationality; for, \tot this fails to explain is 
the stats' s willingness to accept such a position in the first place. 
The reason lies at a more fundamental level, and takes us to the 
heart of the industrialisation process itself. Ihe policy was 
premised rather on a pcwerful set of political rationality 
preferences.
By the end of his term in office Witte began to pressurise the Itear 
to remove some of the existing barriers to his proposed plan of full- 
scale industrialisation. As Max Weber has made clear, capitalism 
requires a system of law vMch facilitates the formation of private 
corrpanies. Furthermore, capitalism requires a rule of law and a legal 
system conducive to the exchange of goods; "Predictability, 
continuity, trustworthiness and objectivity of legal order are all 
essential for industrial capitalism on a large scale" (Weber 
1922/1978: 1095). Witte conplained to Nicholas over the lack of such 
a legal system in an 1899 memorandum, ccnibining it with a plea for a
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greater influx of foreign capital (also inportant to his 
industrialisation programme).
"It must also be stated that the influx of foreign capital does not 
proceed as easily and freely as is necessary to assure its 
continuation until the demands of the country acquire the help of 
foreign savings. On the contrary there are in our country such 
obstacles to its influx as exist in no other civilised country. We do 
not have the corporation laws vÉiich are in effect in the majority of 
civilised countries. Under such laws, everyone who wishes can form a 
joint stock conpany by fulfilling certain conditions stipulated by 
law. In Russia a foreign conpany can be opened only by a specicil 
decree of the conmittee of ministers d^iich requires the confirmation 
of Your Irrperial Hi^mess... In permitting the activities of foreign 
conpanies in Russia, the government retains the ri^t to revoke at 
any time that permission and to demand the liquidation of any 
conpany. Obviously every detail of the influx of foreign capital into 
Russia is kept under the strictest control by the central and local 
authorities... Under these circumstances one should rather speak of 
an excess of government control of foreign capital which takes its 
chances from going to Russia, and of unnecessary limitations inposed 
upon its freedom of investment. Furthermore, because of the 
difficulties and tribulations v^ch a foreign entrepreneur has to go 
through in Russia, because of all kinds of petitions and applications 
vdiich he has to submit to provincial and central authorities and 
because of constant interference not only by the law but also by 
administrative regulations the influx of foreign capital into Russia 
is not yet copious enou^" (quoted in von Laue 1963: 180-' 1).
Witte's industrialisation programme • thus required more foreign 
capital and a more conducive legal system, in particular the 
establishment of property and contract law so that social grovps 
would be able to act on the basis of expectations grounded in legal 
guarantees Raeff 1966; Pipes 1974: 183; Szamuely 1988: 50-51; Bendix 
1978: 106-123,504-508). The lack of such a rational-legal framework 
was a result of the patrimonial elements ^Aiich remained strong 
throu^iout the nineteenth century. Predictability and property rights 
were consistently rejected in favour of Usarist arbitrariness. 
Similarly the "distinction between law and administration so crucial 
in a liberal political system remained vague in practice and the 
autocracy refused to recognise the judicial norms that it had enacted 
itself" (McDaniel 1988: 20). The establishment of private property 
has historically been poorly developed in Russia. Property rLc^ts had 
been granted by the state and were linked to political status. Indded 
the process by civil society is forced into state service is 
according to Max Weber. the essential regime strategy of 
patrimonialism (1922/1978: 1006-1069; se also Pipes 1974: Ch. 4; Blum
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1968: Ch. 11). Hiere were many ruling class strategies enployed in the 
creation of a subordinate nobility. For example, landowners that held 
political office were constantly prevented from holding-office in 
their localities (Raeff 1966: 47; Pipes 1974: 173). The weakness of 
property rights was intensified by the peculiar Russian law of 
inheritance, vhich prevented primogeniture. Thus through time there 
was a perpetual splitting up of estates (Szamuely 1988: 55; Raeff
1966: 16-17). As aresult no rival power to autocracy could arise
within civil society. This logic was inputed not only to " feudalism", 
but also the rise of "capitalist property relations in the late 
nineteenth century
Ruling class strategies were also an important factor in the 
prevention of the emergence of a rule of law, as well as conducive 
conpany law. The problem was that such a legal reform would involve 
a conpromise of the autocracy's pcwer. During the nineteenth century, 
autocratic power became decentralised within the central bureaucracy. 
For as this bureaucracy expanded so too did the number and complexity 
of the tasks to be performed. As a result, the Tsar lost his monopoly 
of policy making power in part, because he siitply could not read each 
piece of legislation and in part because bureaucratic elements sought 
to inplement their own political desires. To prevent the dilution of 
their power, successive Tsars in the nineteenth century turned to 
specific monarchical strategies, \Mch would maintain their power 
preserve. These were numerous.
The first weapon was to prevent the formation of a rational-legal 
mode of calculation within the state bureaucracy. Historically, 
patrimonialism works " arbitrarily*' and is not limited by abstract 
rules. The Enperors of the nineteenth century managed to maintain 
this very element of arbitrariness within the bureaucracy. As part of 
this process h i ^  ranking officials in the nineteenth century lacked 
the separation of the all important private and public spheres. For 
political administration was treated as a purely personal affair of 
the ruler. Personal discretion and favour or disfavour of the ruler 
remained central to the bureaucracy right into the early twentieth 
century. Decisions were made on an ad hoc basis and in strict 
contrast to "ideal type" bureaucracy, the position of an official in
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late Iirperial Russia derived from his personal submission to the 
ruler (on the general phenomenon of the patrimonial official, see 
Weber 1922/1978: 1028-1031, 1088-1090. In the Russian context see
especially, M. Raeff 1957].
In contrast, in the states of Western Europe, as bureaucracies grew, 
they challenged the monopoly of political power held by the rulers. 
One important method of doing so was through the establishment of the 
rule of law. Ihe "autonomous" legal order consisted of a theoretical 
separation of administration from adjudication and legislation and 
the growth of a method of legal reasoning independent of the mode of 
reasoning prevailing in the political sphere. But in Russia, however, 
throughout the nineteenth century, the Enperors ensured that the rule 
of law was prevented from emerging. As we noted above, since a 
rational- legal order was also prevented, the Tsar was able to 
maintain a sphere of political autoncmy within the bureaucracy. 
Indeed the dynamics of royal defence constituted a political 
constancy Lp to 1917. Ihus "althou^ in sane measure limited by the 
high bureaucracy, Alexander II successfully played factions off and 
never permitted individual ministers or groups of officials to 
institutionalise and therefore possibly perpetuate their fleeting 
victories" (Orlovsky 1981: 18). As the nineteenth century progressed 
and the ministries took on more roles, so the Tsars increasingly 
resorted to an ever stricter policy of "divide and rule", favouring 
one ministry and then another. In particular, the Tsar constantly 
played off the Finance ministry with the Ministry of Interior. As 
Yaney put it,
"The Tsar would support one of them against the other, so as to 
prevent their unification in to one massive political organisation, 
and it was this fact that led to the Tsar's personal favour 
continuing to play such a vital role in government 1880-1905" (Yaney 
1973: 307)
In addition, as in the German Kaiserreich there was no ministry or 
person beyond the Enperor himself in whom decision-making was 
formally concentrated. Divide and rule had prevented it. The Russian 
Enperor had in common with his German counterpart the right of 
"immediatstellen" vMch enabled persons outside the government a 
private audience with the Tsar. Uiis occurred frequently and was an
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inportant factor in the undermining of a strict chain of authority 
both in the bureaucracy and in the army (see Mann 1989a: 13 for a
similar presentation in the German context).
Indeed most of the Ibar" s ministers readily sought the s\jpport of 
the enperor against their colleagues if they felt they had any hcpe 
of getting it. Given the highly unpredictable nature of the Tsar's 
vhims, the high ranking officials became very insecure both in their 
tenure of office and in the support they could expect for their 
policies. To follow through a consistent line the official had not 
only to forestall opposition from his own colleagues in the 
administration but also had to contend with the highly influential 
counsel of the personal friends of the monarch, men without official 
status in the governments.
As Taranovsky put it,
"the Tëar was cauÿit in a bind. No longer fully master of his house 
because of the growth of complexity of governments and the degree of 
institutional] sation that it entailed, the Tbar could stubbornly 
obstruct the development of those institutions vaille making certain 
that the personal power principle embedded in them was never 
extinguished" (quoted in Orlovsky 1981: 12).
As with the German state, policy making was the outcome of the 
interplay of numerous power actors v^ iose relations had been left 
deliberately informal and factionalised so as to preserve monarchical 
freedom of action.
As a result, the government fluctuated from one direction to another 
and failed to achieve a unified and coherent policy. As the central 
bureaucracy split \jp into numerous competing ministries and factions 
each vying for the Tbar's favour, this " centralised bureaucratic 
struggle" became institutionalised into the policy making arena 
leading on to \tet shall be termed the "institutionalised paralysis 
of government".
Nc^Aere was this to have a more disastrous consequence than in the 
field of economic development and ultimately in the international
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military arena. Speaking of the patrimonial state in general Weber 
argued that,
"as a rule the negative aspect of this arhitrariness is dominant 
because - and this is the major point - the patrimonial state lacks 
the political and procedural predictability indispensable for 
capitalist development vMch is provided by the rational rules of 
modem bureaucratic administration. Instead we find unpredictability 
and inconsistency on the part of court and local officials, and 
variously benevolence and disfavour on the part of the ruler and his 
servants" (1922/1978: 1094-' 95).
Itearismf s refusal to renege on its power principle ultimately 
undermined Witte's long-term industrialisation project. Witts' s 
insistence on expanding the process of industrialisation clashed with 
autocracy's desire to remain autonomous of indigenous economic 
groupings. Autocracy was only interested in bourgeois elements in so 
far as they could satisfy its a m  military inpulses. Beyond this 
sphere autocracy was not prepared to go, and capitalism remained 
blocked. With its historical disdain for rival sources of power, 
Ibarism did much to inhibit the organisation of the industrialists as 
an interest group fearing that they may overstep their state- 
designated mark ty becoming independent of government control. They 
had the further disadvantage of tending to bring in their wake a 
proletariat \^ch the autocracy believed had revolutionary potential. 
In inhibiting the growth of a bourgeoisie the autocracy was 
successful;
"Indeed if Western experience had given rise to the assumption that 
the capitalist bourgeoisie would fight for representative government 
and political liberty, then the conduct of Russia's business class 
bellied that assumption!' (Rogger 1983: 122).
It was not just that this class remained extremely small ri^it up 
until 1914, but even PleMianov, the great Russian revisionist, was 
forced to note the bourgeoisie's political inertness even thou^ he 
continued to believe in its progressive role. Such "pragmatism!' vAiich 
had grown up as a coumter-wei^t to Bolshevik "idealism!' seemed in 
the li^t of the bourgeoisie's political ambitions to be as equally 
idealistically founded.
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Indeed the bourgeoisie's essential conservatism and narrow social 
base kept them small and ineffective. Members of this class who 
actually sat in the Duma never made up more than 9% of its total 
membership. Furthermore^ they often collaborated with the 
conservatives and rightists now wished to strengthen the state 
and resist the démocratisation of political institutions. Thus in 
agreement with Mann, constitutionalism reinforced the developments of 
an autonomous organic capitalist class, whereas autocracy tended to 
block it or cross cut it with other political divisions (1986: 479). 
Pipes estimates that the bourgeoisie comprised a mere 5. 8% of Duma 
members. He goes onto state that such an amount is ”... surely a 
pitiful share for the bourgeoisie in an insitution supposed to have 
embodied ' bourgeois' rule in Russa'” (1974: 219-220).
The state throughout the nineteenth century made it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to set ip in business (Pipes 1974: 193-197; CX^ en 1982: 
77). In addition to the almost prohibitive reams of bureaucratic red 
tape, entrepreneurs had to face a hostile climate in terms of 
business trust and confidence. Indeed according to Norman Stone,
' trust' simply did not exist (1984: 210; see also McDaniel 1988: 21- 
23). More importantly, the bureaucracy had inposed strict limitations 
on small businesses. Where there were partnerships (full or trust), 
the 1807 Imperial Manifesto decreed that such partnerships could only 
hold for one conpany and could not extend beyond this bare minimum. 
Most importantly, company liability was "unlimited”. Mostinportantly, 
company liability was "unlimited". Consequently only a small amount 
of entrepreneus dared to set ip in business. Moreover, Russian 
bussinesses often remained small. There was as a result a dearth of 
middle-sized conpanies. Even the large industries operated under the 
terms of the restrictive law of 6 December 1836, ^Aich gave the 
bureaucracy immense authority over the establishment of such 
corporations, ri^t down to 1917 (T. C. CXæn 1982: 64-70).
In attempting to create favourable conditions for the rise of 
capitalism and a bourgeoisie, Witte was frustrated by the patrimonial 
impulses of the autocracy. This then was the nature of the fifth 
development path hereby the patrimonial element of the state was 
responsible for blocking full industrialisation in a manner
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representative of capstone government, (the downward political 
multiplier).
Through a combination of geopolitics, adverse personal intrigues, 
centralised bureaucratic struggle with several other inportant 
ministries and the Tsar's total loss of confidence in his finance 
minister for a host of reasons, not least his desire to go beyond 
autocracy s desire for a partial industrialisation, Witte was 
dismissed in 1903.
S B C n W  6 
Conclusion
According to Gerschenkron and von Laue, the state consciously 
intended to industrialise throu^ a wide-ranging economic programme. 
In this chapter it has been argued that industrialisation was 
determined to a large extent by the unintended consequences of the 
state fdlcwing its cwn autonomous fiscal, political, economic and 
military interests. Some of these inperatives conplemented and 
stimulated industrial development (Development Paths 1,2 and 3), 
vMlst others blocked development (paths 4 and 5). Sometimes this was 
intended (Path 5). At other times the economy was retarded as an 
unintended consequence of the fiscal-military policies of the state 
(Path 4). However, there were significant moments, as (3erschenkron 
argued, vhen the state intervened to set i;p a broad-based industrial 
programme (Path 1). These formed only a part of the story, and were 
criss - crossed by the multiple actions of the state as it followed 
its own goals. As a result, the economy had only partially 
industrialised before the onset of the First World War.
Tsarist tariff policy reflected this complicated industrial process. 
Thus tariffs were used, particularly rpto 1897 to provide a positive 
balance of payments, in order to set \jp the conditions for gold 
conversion, in turn necessary to attract foreign investors. This was
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certainly part of a long term# intended industrial programme (Path 
1 ). However, overlapping this logic was the stats' s programme of 
attaining a stable currency in order to attract war-time loans (Path 
2). In addition, as the state soumit to promote heavy industry in 
order to shore up its military capacity, so high tariffs were granted 
(to a small group of producers) in order to stimulate their 
development (Path 2). However, as the state increased its expenditure 
on defence requisites, so it looked for new sources of revenues. To 
this end the state increased tariffs on industrial inputs, vhich had 
the unintended result of reducing the conpetitiveness of the final 
Russian product in the home market (Path 4). However, this was only 
in part the unintended consequence of Tsarist budgetary policy. In 
addition this was enabled by the patrimonial inpulse of autocracy, 
vMch sought to prevent the emergence of a strong capitalist and 
proletarian class, in order that it may maintain its despotic 
autonomy (Path 5).
In addition, both industrial and tariff policy were stimulated in 
part by the process of "centralised bureaucratic struggle". These 
areas of policy were pushed in different directions by various 
political struggles that occurred at the heart of the state itself. 
Such major struggles occurred between the ministries of Finance and 
Interior, Finance and War and lastly. Finance and Autocracy. This 
means that we must refine the monolithic conceptions of the state as 
presented by the major theories; notably. Late Development, Realist, 
neo-MarxLst and neo- Classical.
We may conclude that there is a clear sense in vhich there is no 
state, since that body is little more than an agglomeration of 
numerous agencies or satrapies, each vying for favours and power. 
Accordingly, there is little sign of an overall coherent industrial 
or tariff policy since these were not subject to the rational designs 
of one ministry (notably the Fft as Late Development theory claims), 
but were determined by the multiple interactions of different 
agencies v^ch inplemented their own various fiscal, military, 
political and economic inperatives.
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CHAPTER 4
The Politics of Free Trade and Protectionism in Liberal (Unitary)
Britain 1870-1910
SEŒTCN 1;THE BOCNCMIC POUNDATTCNS 
OF TARIFF PRCTBCTrCNLSM AND IMPERIAL PREFERENCE
Tracing the Export (Economic) Origins
Fran 1880-1910 the Conservative party moved from a belief in free 
trade to an embrace of the protectionist ideal. This occurred in 
approximately three phases, the periods spanning 1880-1897, 1897-
1906, 1907-1910. These have been separated out for analytical
purposes. This allc^ us to analytically locate two essential
criteria which informed the shift to protection. Firstly, the
Unionist embrace of protectionism intensified with the passing of 
each phase. And secondly, over time the fiscal aspect became more 
dominant. That is, whilst the initial calls for tariffs had an
economic foundation, subsequently they enphasised the fiscal aspect 
until by 1908, the Unionist Party supported protectionism
overwhelmingly for fiscal reasons. We shall begin therefore with the 
first historical phase of tariff reform \^ch explicitly based its 
arguments upon an economic foundation. This will lead onto a
discussion of the second phase and an analysis of the economic 
inperatives accorded to preference by the Chamber! ainite movement.
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After 1880, vrorries were eagressed concerning Britain^ s ei^rt 
capacity. Hiese were articulated for the most part by two 
institutional organisations - the National Fair Trade League and the 
InperLal Federation League, an offshoot of vMch was the United 
Enpire Trade League. In 1881, the National Fair Trade League was 
created. It explicitly blamed the distressed conditions in British 
industry on the revived protectionism of various continental 
countries vMch were coipled with the British government's 
intransigence to fight for reciprocal trade opportunities via 
retaliatory duties (See R H. Brown 1943; S. H. Zebel 1940: 161-168). (In 
fact these criticisms were very weak - European tariff levels were 
still very low in 1880. Furthermore, vMlst the British state did not 
pursue retaliatory tariffs, it would not have been economically 
rational to have done so - see next section).
Ihe League's proposed solution was for tariffs on manufactured goods 
and agricultural produce, with the latter being waived for those 
colonies prepared to accept British manufactured inports "in 
reasonably free exchange" (see Zebel 1940:169), Specifically, they 
wanted a 10-15% duty ipon manufactures. In addition, tariffs on 
foodstuffs should be acconpanied ly a conpensatory reduction of 
duties on tea, coffee and sugar. (IVro decades later, Jose^ 
Chamberlain would call for a very similar strategy). Iheir calls for 
a parliamentary investigation into the causes of the Depression were 
unheeded by the Gladstone government. However the following 
Conservative government was more responsive, granting a royal 
commission to examine Britain^ s difficulties. Ihe Northcote 
Commission reported that vMlst there were difficulties, the remedy 
would be for trade to be maintained on a free basis. Ihe Fair Trade 
League collapsed partly for the reason that the "official mind" was 
still committed to free trade and partly for party political reasons.
As noted already, in 1886 the Home Rule crisis had led to a major 
defection of members from the Liberal party. It was inportant that 
these new members were kept within the Conservative party. It was the 
need to appease the " Liberal-Unionist" faction that led Salisbury to 
reject any calls for protectionism (Senmel I960: 84-85. B. H. Brown 
1943: 63. Sykes 1978: 7. N. McCOrd 1970: 127). Ihis was coipled with
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the highly effective Liberal attack made at the time upon protection 
- the raising of the "dear food" cry. Such an attack rendered tariff 
reform - at that time - an electoral liability. Thus Salisbury's 
dismissal of tariff reform, coupled with an upswing in the business 
cycle led to the eclipse of the Fair Trade League.
In 1884 the Irrperial Federation League was founded (see J. E. Tyler 
1938: 107-115,176-209). In response to its pressure, Salisbury called 
the first colonial conference in 1887. Ihe League was initially 
founded "to combine on an equitable basis the resources of the eirpire 
for the maintenance of conmon interests and adequately provide for an 
organised defence of common rights" (quoted in Zebel 1967: 137).
However the discussions were not fruitful. The colonies were clearly 
reluctant to share in Britaih s military and financial burdens (see 
especially Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback 1988: ). It was however 
suggested by one conferencee - Jan Hofineyr of the Cape Colony - that 
a 2% InperLal Customs tariff be inplemented to meet the growing costs 
of the enpLre's defence (cf. D. Gordon 1965: 91-92). However this was 
contrary to the existing free trade principles of the mother country 
and was in any case prohibited by existing commercial treaties. 
Although the Fair Trade League brou^t considerable pressure to bear 
on the Federation League it was to no avail. Ihe latter's directors 
rejected a uniform customs code on the grounds that it was 
inpractible due to the fundamental differences in local conditions. 
This led to fierce internal wrangling vAiich vhen coupled with 
government intransigence caused the demise of the InperLal Federation 
League. Nevertheless the sentiment for closer links with the colonies 
had been b o m  and would live on to reemerge throuÿi the 
ChamberLainite movement. (In the meantime this colonial sentiment was 
institutionalised throu^ organisations such as the British Enpire 
League).
The first phase of tariff reform was based fundamentally on the need 
to replenish the lost market opportunities of the late nineteenth 
century, as well as to provide the foundations for protecting 
domestic industry in an increasingly less open world econany. (Note 
that both these requisites were not necessarily mutually compatible, 
mainly because large elements of the InperLal Federation League were
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hostile to the raising of British tariffs). To this end an expansion 
of colonial markets (through preference) was called for. Although 
there was a continuation of this " eagort-capacity" argument in the 
second phase, it became increasingly less significant. As we shall 
see in the next section the basic premise of a loss of export markets 
upto 1900 was enpirically accurate (though it will be argued that 
this represented neither a structural reduction in Britain^ s ability 
to e:gort, nor did it signify the "decline" of the econcmy).
The standard explanation of the rise of inperial preference argues 
that Chamberlain sought a closer link with the colonies so as to 
allow Britain to preserve its position as the pre-eminent world 
industrial power given the fact of her economic decline (See 
A. L. FrLedberg 1989: 21. D. A. Lake 1988: 149-151). There is a very
strong prima facie case for making this argument since Chamberlain 
himself explicitly articulated it on many occasions. The colonies, 
Chamberlain argued, could take an increased supply of inports from 
Britain in return for a preferential tariff on foodstuffs and raw 
materials to be levied by the mother country. However this "solution" 
to Britainf s " export problems" was riddled with contradictions vMch 
rendered the vhole project - in terms of this economic frame of 
reference - a self-defeating own goal.
The Economic Contradictions of Iirperial Preference 1
Perhaps one of the most serious problems that closer iitperial co­
operation would pose was the loss of export markets in the "first 
world". This would be particularly damaging given the British 
dependence upon non-inperial markets. Significantly this was 
recognised at the time. Charles Ritchie pointed out to Chamberlain 
that " foreign countries... new take more than twice as much of our
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exports as are sent to the colonies" (quoted in Sykes 1978: 34).
Indeed the fact was that approxiinately 66% of Britain^ s trade was 
conducted within the first world (P. J. Cain 1979: 50; J. A. Hobson 1902: 
34; S. B. Saul 1965: 6; F. Crouzet 1975: 223; T. J. McKeown 1983: 80). It 
should be pointed out that according to the Fiscal Blue Book (1903) 
this was true for 1890, but that in 1902 the colonies were absorbing 
42. 1% of British exports (Semmel 1960: 149). However the 1902 figure 
(quoted as 39% by QBrien), represented a peak and that in general 
the share of British exports despatched to the colonies fluctuated 
between 25%-33% (P. K. O  Brien 1990: 16; see also Davis and Huttenback 
1988: 161). Indeed most of Britaih s exports were destined for the 
First World markets. Davis and Huttenback reckon that in I860-' 2, 75% 
of British exports went to the First World, 65% in 1885-' 7 and 68% in 
1910-' 12 (1988: 160; see also the figures in J. A. Hobson 1902: Ch. 2, 
and Saul 1960: 219). Saul points out that esqports to the enpire after 
1900 actually declined and that furthermore, "but for the 
extraordinary rush of exports of cottons to India in 1912 and 1913, 
the statistics would have shewn a marked decline in the enpire's 
share of BrLtainf s trade over this period (1960: 215). In addition, 
the extent of the colonies as sources of sipply of foodstuffs and raw 
materials for the mother country was not especially significant. In 
1860, 20% of inports to Britain came from the enpire rising only to 
25% before the First World War (C7 Brien 1990: 15. See also J. A. Hobson 
1902: 30-39; F. Crouzet 1975: 215,219; W. Schlote 1952: 99). As a  Brien 
goes onto argue, those enpire commodities could be obtained elsev^ere 
and "British consumers paid conpetitive prices for inported primary 
produce regardless of its origins” (1990: 16). In addition, if we 
take British trade in its entirety with the colonies, (sum of 
exports, re-e:ports and inports), the 1909/' 13 figure of 27.5% was 
only marginally greater than the figure of 25.4% for the period 
1854/' 7 (Crouzet 1979: 223).
Preference would have jeopardised Britainf s export capacity vis- a- 
vis the all inportant " First-Wbrld" markets, since tariffs levied 
against these foreign countries would have led to retaliation. At the 
very least, Britain would have risked foregoing the benefits she 
acquired from her most favoured nation (MFN) status. Ihe withdrawal 
of foreign MFU treaties would have seriously jeopardised her trading
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capacity in these markets. This could only be remedied by the 
granting of extra markets with her colonies (as Chamberlain 
prescribed). However the extent to vhich the ençire could absorb an 
increasing share of the mother country s exports was very limited 
(P. J. Cain 1979: 49). Indeed by 1900 British exports to the colonies 
were rapidly reaching saturation point. And even if the colonies 
could have absorbed a larger share of Britain^ s exports, they 
certainly could not have taken a 200% increase on the 1900 level 
(necessary to rid Britain of her reduced foreign markets in the first 
world). Admittedly Britain would still have been able to maintain 
exports within the first world after her swing to preferential 
tariffs. It was however very unlikely if not iitpossibLe, that the 
colonies could have absorbed even the trade that Britain would have 
lost in the first world throu^ tariffs, let alone take any 
additional increments vMch was the essential basis of inperial 
preference in the first place. As Charles Ritchie pointed out to 
Chamberlain "... a sli^t differentiation of duties might easily 
diminish the trade of the U. K  with foreign countries by a much 
larger amount than could be counter-balanced by any possible increase 
of trade with the colonies whose markets this country already to a 
large extent commands" (quoted in Sykes 1978: 34). Even more
problematic was the fact that Britain was the great entrepot for 
world trade. Accordingly, tariffs on foreign inports would have 
certainly involved a heavy sacrifice particularly on food and raw 
materials A^icse cheapness had been vital to Britainf s conpetitive 
edge (Fraser 1966: 229). Thus Marshall correctly pointed out that,
"England is not in a strong position for reprisals against hostile 
tariffs, because there are no inportant exports of hers, vAiich other 
countries need so urgently as to be willing to take them from her at 
a considerably increased cost; and because none of her rivals would 
suffer serious injury throu^ the partial exclusion of any products 
of theirs with \diich England can afford to dispense" (quoted in Saul 
1960: 135)
InperLal preference would have created further problems for the 
mother country. Through 1880-1914 althou^ British exports to the 
colonies remained more or less constant, (see S. B. Saul 1965: 6) the 
enpire however received larger proportions of textile, pig iron and 
iron manufactures from the mother country (see W. Scholte 1952: 166- 
167). The colonies werè merely providing an outlet for Britain^ s most
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old and backward industries (Caimcroes 1975: 103-208,222-246). Thus 
preference would almost certainly have served to shield inefficiency, 
the opportunity cost of vMch could have been the creation of new 
higher growth rate industries (see Platt 1972: 103-135). In addition, 
the enpire allowed Britain to concentrate on the textile sector, 
v^ere demand grew slowest. As a result, Britain paid less attention 
to the all inportant capital goods sector (Crouzet 1975: 224-^  5, 227; 
Lewis 1957: 583; Lewis 1978; Kindleberger 1978a; De Cecco 1975; for a 
general discussion of the nature of Britainf s exports see Aldcroft 
and Richardson 1969: 72-74, vAiere they argue that Britain s share of 
exports to the colonies merely added to the home economy's problems). 
Preference therefore, would'.have blunted incentives for Britain to 
adapt and remain conpetitive (Friedberg 1989: 84).
Ihis backs up Hdbsbawmf s argument that in the decades \jp to 1914 
inperial markets had led British firms to postpone adjustments
necessary to meet the increased German and American competition
(1969: 116-126). Patrick (7 Brien has posed this argument in the form
of a counterfactual where he states that an early "delinking of the 
economy from commerce with the enpire, may have promoted faster 
productivity growth and the structural changes required by the 
British econony to meet the challenges of the twentieth century" 
(1990: 18, 1988: 184). Aldcroft and Richardson have disputed this
line of argument, pointing out that Britainf s exports to the enpire 
were no greater in 1914 than in the nid nineteenth century. Rather, 
faster productivity growth could have been achieved through more 
innovative entrepreneurial ism (1969: 154-156). However, this merely
reinforces the Hdbsbawm/C Brien point; namely that the existence of 
fewer inperial markets open to Britainf s outmoded older industries 
would have forced more innovative practices to have emerged. 
Furthermore, there would have been less opportunity to retreat behind 
imperial preference. Ihus in sum, an extension of trading links with 
the enpire would merely have undermined economic growth further
Perhaps most damaging of all was the foreign retaliation that 
Britain would incur if preference and tariffs were levied. America 
and Europe earned throu^ their exports to Britain the vital 
surpluses necessary to pay for the inports from the primary producing
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countries (Kirby 1981: 19; Aldcroft and Richardson 1969: 82). Since 
British protectionism would have led to a subsequent fall in these 
surpluses, Europe and America would have been forced to turn 
elsewhere. If Britain had granted inperial preference, it was likely 
that American and European conpetition would have extended to other 
markets inportant to Britain such as those in Latin America or the 
Far East (Cain 1979: 50. Also, Saul 1960: 45,63-64,228; F. Crouzet
1979: 226). An alternative scenario is presented by David Lake v*io 
argues that British preference could lead to an American strategy of 
freer trade, premised by her unwillingness to lose her substantial 
export markets of Britain and her colonies (Lake 1988: 48-56; 1989: 
152-163. For a critique of this argument see Chapter 5).
The economic problems that inperial preference would give rise, 
would also be felt within the colonies themselves. Firstly many 
colonies had an " infant-industrial" base. Most would have been 
unwilling to have them exposed to the full force of British 
conpetition (v^ch would have had to have happened if Britain was 
even to maintain her export capacity, let alone increase it). (Zebel 
1967: 140. R.A.Reirpel 1972: 17. P. J. Cain 1979; lyier 1938: 167, 170) 
As Merriman pointed out at the time,
"... to colonists, the idea of union for the purpose of securing the 
manufacture monopoly of Great Britain hy preserving the colonial 
markets does not in any respect strike a popular key note and is in
fact more likely to make for discord than for union" (quoted in lyier
1938: 171)
. Furthermore Green has argued that it was this fact that had led to 
the lukewarm reception that was granted preference by the colonies 
(E. H. H. Green 1985: 667). Nor would they have been willing to accept 
indefinitely the role of primary goods producers \^ch this policy 
would iitply (Freidberg 1989: 84-85). However, perhaps the most
damaging effect that preference would have upon the colonies would be 
to suffocate her of government revenues.
As with Germany, Russia and America, tariff duties levied by the 
colonies on foreign inports were a vital source of government 
revenue, (the reasons for this to be examined later on). The
contenporary, Merriman, argued that Pereas customs as a proportion
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of total tax revenue was 27%, in the colonies the figure was between 
60%-90%. Furthermore, he argued that if Britain granted preference 
(mainly under zollverein conditions of inperial free trade), the 
colonies would be forced to turn [unwillingly] to increasing direct 
taxes (see J.E. Tyler 1938: 167-168). Granting zero tariffs on British 
inports would have meant foregoing large amounts of government 
revenue. If there was an increase of British inports - as was 
intended - the colonial governments would have lost even more 
revenue. In this respect it is interesting to note the position of 
Canada since it was this country vMch had spurred Chamberlain to up 
his canpaign in 1902. Was Canada as Chamberlain believed, in favour 
of inperial preference?
On 12 May 1902, Robert Borden (Leader of the Canadian opposition) 
had stated to the British Prime Minister that if preference was 
granted on c o m  then "we are in a position to make offers to the 
inperial government which we could not make in 1897” (quoted in 
Renpel 1972: 18). The nature of this offer however was not compatible 
with Chamberlain^ s notion of an inperial zollverein. What it meant 
was that Canada would exenpt Britain from further tariff increases. 
Indeed Canadian tariffs were not lowered in the period ipto 1914. 
More damaging was the fact that many Canadian Conservatives had 
opposed the earlier preference and advocated making their country 
industrially self-sufficient. Furthermore, it was clear that the so- 
called “preference" already granted by Canada to the mother country 
were not done for inperial reasons. Rather it was given for domestic 
reasons; that is, the Liberal government had lowered tariffs in order 
to appease their own domestic supporters (Renpel 1972: 17-19).
In addition Britainf s stance of unilateral free trade tended to 
invite protection abroad. Such a stance made it difficult for Britain 
to force tariff concessions. Reciprocity in tariff negotiations - was 
required . Whilst Britain continued to adhere to unilateralism vis-a- 
vis the enpire, it was unlikely that significant reciprocity between 
the mother country and her colonies could be achieved. In other 
words, under Inperial Preference there would have continued the 
condition of unequal exchange between Britain and her Enpire, to the 
detriment of the former.
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Even if the British public could have been persuaded to accept 
inport duties and higher food costs (vMch it would not), "there is 
good reason to believe that plans for an " Inperial Zollverein" would 
have foundered on colonial rissistance. Hence it was nonsensical" 
(Friedberg 1989: 84; R  Jebb 1911: 342; Saul 1960: 228). Or as Balfour 
put it,
"I question vAiether the people of this country will be sufficiently 
tolerant of the protective side of the schema, or the people of the 
colonies sufficiently tolerant of its free trade side" (Balfour to 
Devonshire, 4 June 1903, quoted in Friedberg 1988: 63).
As Sir Wilfrid Laurier explained at the Inperial Conference of 1907, 
free trade within the enpire is ruled out for revenue reasons (see 
T. R  L. 1910: xv). However, this was clearly recognised by both
Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League (from vdiose handbook 
Laurier's comment was taken). As the League argued, there was a way 
of circumventing some of these problems Wiilst at the same time 
retaining inperial preference. Ihis was for the colonies to continue 
to levy the same rates of tariff ipon British inports, vAilst at the 
same time increasing the duties on all other foreign inports. This 
would allow them to maintain their revenues vÆiilst enabling 
preference to the mother country (see TRL 1910: xv-xvi, 3).
Whether this would have solved the revenue deficiency that the 
inperial zollverein concept entailed was not clear. Certainly it 
would have been an inprovement. But it would have meant that tariffs 
levied on non-British inports would have been raised to very high 
levels. It is possible that in many cases such rates might have been 
prohibitive and thus not productive of revenue. Even if they were not 
quite that h i ^  they would still have led to a reduction in non- 
British goods entering the country regardless as to vAiether Britain 
had gained preference, which would have entailed a reduction in 
government revenues. Ihis could only have been avoided if the 
shortfall in inports on foreign goods was made good by an increase in 
British products. Ihis was possible and would certainly have met the 
criterion of inperial preference. Hcwever, in achieving this 
conplicated fiscal balance, necessary to k e ^  the colonial states in 
pocket, there would have been further adverse economic consequences.
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An increase in tariffs on non-British inports, especially under 
conditions of preferential treatment to the mother country, vrould 
certainly have led to high, if not massive levels of foreign 
retaliation. Germany had already waged a tariff war with Canada Thus 
the non-British markets open to the colonies would be substantially 
reduced, if not closed altogether. In addition there would be further 
retaliation because Britain's own system of tariffs would harm the 
export capacity of foreign nations (as noted above). Ihus the 
problems that inperial preference gave rise to sinply within the 
colonies were such that it rendered the whole concept dubious. 
However, the problems did not sinply stop here. Ihere was a further 
way in ^ ^ch the colonies made the notion of preference problematic. 
Ihis was incurred throu^ the problem of Britainf s capacity • to tax 
raw materials - in turn an essential aspect of preference.
Within Britain the taxation of raw materials was an extremely 
sensitive issue. Che of the major reasons free trade had been so 
dominant in British thinking was that the levying of tariffs on 
either raw materials or semi-manufactured goods was seen as 
economically self-defeating - especially given the export- orientated 
nature of the economy). Tariffs levied on inputs to production merely 
served to raise the price of the finished good, thus reducing its 
conpetitiveness. For an export orientated economy such an 
irrationality would clearly have adverse economic consequences. Ihe 
problem that Chamberlain faced was that preference necessarily 
inplied the taxation of raw materials since they constituted a major 
element of colonial exports. Ihis was something \^ch Chamberlain 
tried to downplay. It was an area full of lucrative political points 
to be gained ly the liberal opposition.
Herbert Asquith (in a speech at Doncaster 21 May, 1903), was one of 
the first to suggest that preference inplied the taxation of inported 
raw materieils. Ihis point was reiterated by Sir Charles Dilke in a 
House of Commons debate, adding semi-manufactures to the list. 
Naturally Chamberlain was reluctant to concede this since the 
advocacy of taxing inputs to production was effectively to commit 
political suicide. Indeed so damaging was this, that Chamberlain
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initially replied, "if you are going to give a preference to the 
colonies... you must put a tax on food" (quoted in Marris on 1977). 
This was a revealing reply. Admitting the taxation of food was
politically very dangerous since it would raise the "dear locif" cry - 
something vMch had put paid to the earlier calls for preference upto 
1900. In terms of weighting, Chamberlain - perhaps correctly - saw 
the admittance of taxation of food rather than raw materials as 
politically the lesser evil. When pushed further, he produced the
very weak reply - "I must ask the right honourable gentleman not to
quote me as committed to this, that, or any other proposition" 
(quoted in Marris on 1977: 217). Even as late as August 1903
Chamberlain still had not openly admitted to taxing raw materials 
(see J. Amery 1969a: 235).
Armed with a powerful weaponry, the free traders taunted Chamberlain 
with the resulting contradictions that this would create for inperial 
federation. Ihe arguments of John Charlton (a member of the Canadian 
House of Commons) were published in Ihe Standard. He pointed out that 
a preferential tariff on ^eat alone would benefit only the North 
Western Province of Canada. In addition, in order to fully appease 
all Canadian producers, preference would have to be given on all 
grains tuffs, flour, butter, cheese, meats and timber, the latter 
being one of the industrial raw materials that Chamberlain had 
declined to openly include in his scheme. Asquith rhetorically asked, 
how would the Canadian lumber producer feel (already in bitter 
rivalry with Norway for the British market) vtoi he found out that he 
was to be denied the preference accorded to his fellow vheat farmer 
(Marrison ).
More problematic still the differential inpact ipon the various 
colonies that the exclusion of preferential tariffs on raw materials 
would have. South African food exports were negligible. Her main 
export to Britain was raw wool. As the Free Trader further pointed 
out, the only other eoports of any significance to Britain were a 
host of other raw materials - skins, copper and hides. "Ihe lesson 
was siirple: either raw materials would have to be taxed or the result 
would be a scheme with huge inequalities of treatment between 
colonies and within colonies" (Marrison 1977). Chamberlain was on the
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scissors. If he was to tax raw materials he would seriously damage 
the conpetitiveness of British exports - a suicidal political move. 
If he dropped this tax he would not only undermine the vhole concept 
of preference, but most damaging of all, he would set up major 
conflicts not only between producers within each colony, but between 
the colonies themselves. In this scheme preference would serve to 
alienate rather than unify the colonies with the mother country. As
if this was not bad enough, the issue of raw material taxation opened
up a can of worms on the revenue side of the preferential scheme (as
will be discussed in section 2).
Finally there was one further area of possible colonial discontent
should preference and/or federation go ahead. It was of considerable
colonial fear that such a scheme threatened a return "to the bad old 
days of centralisation" (lyier 1938: 173). At stake was not just the 
colonial capacity to determine its own trade regime. More 
importantly, it was felt that colonial sovereignty in general was at 
stake. As lyier concluded, " With the colonies already complaining 
that their interests were, as things stood, too much at the mercy of 
Downing Street, this essential feature of federation was probably
itself a fatal obstacle" (1938: 173-174). It was also a colonial
suspicion that federation was really j'yst a British system, designed 
to extract fiscal and military marpcwer from the colonies to help 
fi^t any prospective European wars (vdiether true or not).
It was clear therefore, that there were many economic obstacles to 
the cause of inperial preference. At best it was a very clumsy scheme 
to rectify the loss of British export capacity. More likely it would 
have reduced export capacity by severely iitpeding Britainf s access to 
the vital first world markets. In sum inperial preference was a 
system riddled with contradictions vMch, to all real intents and 
purposes rendered it, in terms of providing economic benefits 
(particularly for Britain) at best problematic, and at worst, sinply 
inpractical
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The issue of the " Decline" of the British Econony and its relation 
to Inperial Preference. The Economic Contradictions of Tariff Reform
2
It is commonly argued that the Unionist shift to tariff reform after 
1900 was a response to the "decline of the British economy" 
(Friedberg 1989. Lake 1989). This seemingly innocuous phrase however 
contains several inter-related aspects on the condition of the 
British economy in 1914^  all of v^ch need to be separated out and 
examined in turn. Firstly there is the problematic issue of v^ether 
the economy suffered any internal/absolute decline, to be termed here 
retardation. Most theorists have argued that there was a decline, 
though they have differed on its date and timing. On this point 
however, it will be argued that " Britain's decline" has been at best 
exaggerated, and at worst unfounded.
Most theorists have only differed on the starting date of 
retardation. One reason for this is that the choice of indicator will 
lead to different conclusions. For example, those vAio have emphasised 
the use of industrial production data such as D. J. Ccppock (1956, 
1961, 1964), as well as W. A. Lewis (1949, 1954,1957, 1978) have argued 
that the starting date was in the early 1870s, ^Aiilst Aldcroft and 
Richardson (1969) have argued that the econany turned downward in the 
1880s. [Such empirical analyses sipport major social theories, most 
notably those offered by P.M. Kennedy (1988) and R.Gilpin (1975, 
1981, 1987)]. (joppock in particular cirgues that there was not simply a 
downturn but more emphatically, a " climacteric". This conclusion was 
derived from the use of an index of industrial output, [notably 
Hofônan (1955)]. However Coppock emphasised the problem that there 
was a divergence bettæen national income and industrial output; 
"...between 1875 and 1900 the two series are quite contradictory" 
(1956: 4; see also Aldcroft and Richardson 1969: 101-106). A
different scenario appears with the use of the national income data 
as r^iresenting the indicator of decline.
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A second school of thought, vMch has used the national income data, 
argues that the decline in the economy began in the 1890s (Phelps- 
Brown and Handfield-Jones 1952. C. H. Wilson 1965). Ihe use of the 
industrial production index has a known dcKvnward bias (Wilson 1965: 
187-189; Saul 1985: 37). Jefferys and Walters argued that in a
developing economy [as Britain was in the period 1870-1913] the ratio 
of input to net output will tend to fall. Thus Hoffman^ s raw material 
[input] " industrial production" index therefore tends to 
underestimate final output (1955: 11. But see Phelps-Brown and
Handfield-Jones 1952: 276). Wilson returns us to the dilemma pointed 
out by Ccppock, claiming that " the gap between the apparent 
slackening of growth and the better substantiated estimates of rising 
aggregate national income (is) a conundrum to which no really 
satisfactory answer has been given" (1965: 193. But see McCLoskey
1970: 450-451). The differential growth rates betwæn the two sets of 
data can be at least partially resolved. Whilst industrial production 
may have been slewing down, invisible earnings may have been 
increasing, thus leading to a hi^er national income growth rate. 
Indeed this was actually the case, as was in fact origianlly pointed 
out by Hoffman (1955: 216).
Returning to Ccppock, we may cite several problems with his 
analysis. In addition to the fact of HOfânan;s statistics having a 
known downward bias, his use of these tatistics has been done in such 
a way as to exaggerate the deceleration during the years of the so- 
called "Great Depression". This is achieved by cccparing the period 
between 1850-4 and 1870-4 (3.0% growth rate), with the period 1870-4 
and 1893-7 (growth rate of 1. 5%). However the years 1870-4 cover the 
era of a large boom vMlst 1893-7 represent those of a sluitp period 
(Musson 1963: 530). In addition Coppock relies too heavily ipon the 
notion of the Great Depression. The presence of a cyclical slunp, 
however serious, is not necessarily equivalent to the notion of a 
permanent national decline. In general terms by that reckoning, the 
American economy was all but finished in the 1930s! Musson has quoted 
Lomax to the effect that between 1914 and 1950 British industrial 
growth increased at a rate hi^ier than those witnessed before the 
Great War, [ a point also made by Aldcroft and Richardson (1969: 
105). For a further critique see W. A. Cole (1958: 309-315)].
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Yet more significant is the fact that many inportant indicators 
remained strong - certainly upto 1900. ffcCIoskey (1970) argues that 
real national product growth is as striking upto 1900 as its 
deceleration is thereafter. In addition he argues that there was a 
well sustained growth rate of productivity upto 1900 though again 
falling back rapidly thereafter (1970: 458; see also A. Maddison 1964: 
232; Phelps-Brown and Handf ield-Jones 1952: 270-279, 294; Aldcroft and 
Richardson 1969: 126; Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee 1982: 174- 
183). McCLoskey argues that the case for Victorian failure is weak. 
Rather he sees the post 1900 Edwardian era as the point at which 
decline set in. This is also supported ly S. B. Saul (1985), vho argues 
that the notion of the "Great Depression?' spanning the years 1873- 
1896 is a myth. Saul presents the Feinstein et al (1982: 175) data of 
gross domestic product growth rates (per annum) vhich are as fcUcws; 
1856-1873 - 2.2%; 1873-1899 - 2. 1%; 1899-1913 - 1.4%. He argues that 
from 1882-1899 growth was well \xp to the longer run trend and that 
for the years 1873-1899 it was only marginally below the rates 
established for the previous 17 years. "Such results strongly 
reinforce the argument that the concept of the Great Depression is a 
myth" (1985: 57). But as these figures would indicate, he goes onto 
argue that there is a decline in the growth rate after 1899. Saul's 
analysis has the advantage over the two other "schools of decline" in 
that it does not rely solely on one indicator \diether it be national 
product/income or industrial data alone.
Indeed with the exception of Saul and McCIcskey most theorists focus 
either on industrial output or yearly growth rates of national 
income. The latter indicator is perhaps the most general standard hy 
vhich decline has been analysed and measured. Certainly it forms the 
basis upon which most debates on decline are conducted. However, 
vMlst the "post 1900 school of decline"" has the advantage of using 
multiple indicators, thus preventing spurious indications of decline, 
it also juirps to premature conclusions. One of the most serious 
errors is revealed by a brief analysis of the post 1900 period.
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Tahl A 4. 1 Annual Pates of Growth of G. D. P in % 
(By cycles)
Lewis
1856-1865 2.0
1865-1874 2. 1
1874-1883 1. 7
1883-1890 1. 8
1890-1901 1.8
1901-1907 1.4
1907-1913 2.2
Source: Lewis 1978: 260-264
Saul rejects those analyses v^ch point to a slow-down after 1873, 
or after 1890 (see also H. L. Beales 1934). And yet, certainly as 
regards the growth of national income, Saul (and indeed McCLoskey) 
have merely replaced one analysis resting on a cyclical dcwntum 
(1873-1896), with another (1901-1907). Ihe striking fact to emerge is 
that the growth of British national income cifter 1907 was as large if 
not sij^rior to the rates established in the boom years of the 1850s 
and 1860s. Furthermore the same is true for manufacturing production 
and mining (see Hilgerdt 1945: 132-134; Lewis 1978: 148-150) as well 
as industrial production (see Feinstein 1972: 24-25).
Ihe problem steins from the fact that most theorists have treated the 
years 1900-1914 as a monolithic bloc, vdiereas in fact the slunp of 
the eau2ly years of this period was r ^ a c e d  ly high growth rates 
thereafter in many of the economic indicators. However it is true 
that some indicators had taken a dcwntum without recovering after 
1907; for exanple, productivity. In agreement with the recent 
prognosis of Sidney Pollard it was clear that "too many factors 
intermingled and mostly worked to different rhythms. Ihus it would be 
quite wrong to focus on any one in particular in order to shew the 
decline of the British economy. In sum, even given the range of 
techniques available to us nowadays, it cannot be proved that the 
British economy was declining in any absolute way" (1990a: 17).
Ihe second area of the "decline" debate focuses on cross- national 
comparisons. Ihis area focuses on the notion of " relative decline. "
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It is worth at this point to broaden the debate by considering 
decline in terms of two separate ideal types. Hitherto we have 
analysed the process of internal decline or retardation. There is 
also to be considered the process of relative decline.Heaver this is 
an altogether separate analysis to the one posed above, particularly 
\dien analysed in terms of ideal-typical categories.
The arguments for relative as opposed to retardation are more 
conpelling. Once again the debate focuses on annual growth rates 
(particularly for national income). There is little doubt that
BrLtainf s lead was cut frati its very hic^ levels of the 1850s and 
1860s. Indeed the world shares of Britain^ s e:^rts, of output and 
other inportant indicators (measured in terms of absolute growth 
rates) show that she was being caught up. (For percentage shares of 
world pig iron and steel output see P. L. Payne 1968: 72. For
percentage shares of world exports see the tables belw. For
percentages of world trade see lyszynski 1951: 286. For industrial 
production grwth rates see; Lewis 1978: 248-250,269,271,273; and
Hilgerdt 1945: 56, 132, for manufacturing grcwth rates. A major
overview of these figures is presented in Pollard 1990a).
Table 4. 2 Shares of World Manufactured Exports 
(IN PERCENT)
Years Britain Germany U.S France
1881-5 43.0 16.0 6.0 15.0
1899 34.5 16.6 12. 1 14.9
1913 31. 8 19. 9 13. 7 12. 8
SOURCE Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982: 435, using data 
from Hilgerdt 1945)
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TART.E 4. 3 Shares of World Manufactured Exports. 1913
Country (1) (2) (3)
Britain 31. 8 27. 3 29. 9
Germany 19. 9 24. 2 26. 5
U. S. 13. 7 11. 6 12. 6
France 12. 8 - 12. 9
Col (1) Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982: 435). 
Col (2) W. A. Lewis (1954: 3)
Col. (3) S. a  Saul (1960), amending Tÿszynski (1951: 286)
However it comes as something of an irony to leam that the 
eitçirical evidence presented to SLgport the " relative decline" of the 
econoity provides us perhaps with the most conpelling reason as to vhy 
Britain should have maintained free trade. For it is clear from the 
evidence that vMlst Britain was losing the lead it was also true 
that she managed to maintain her European dominance right vp to 1914. 
Certainly a focus on absolute grcwth rates would present a picture of 
relative decline especially given the vast increases in population 
witnessed on the continent. Thus vMlst Russia's national product was 
rapidly nearing that of Britain, if we take population growth into 
account, Russia was no richer relative to Britain in 1914 than she 
had been in 1860! (see Table 4. 5) Germany too witnessed a population 
explosion after 1890. In terms of per capita national income the fact 
remains that Britain was well ahead of her Great Fewer rivals in 
Europe.
4. 4 National Income compared on a Comparative National Basis, 
1885-1913 (in £in sterling)
Year Russia Germany France UK
1885 813 710 760 1115
1890 877 918 839 1385
1895 1096 971 823 1447
1900 1370 1287 994 1750
1905 1495 1530 1051 1776
1910 1826 1867 1253 1984
1913 2022 2176 1506 2265
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Source: see i^jperdix lA
(1) Note that these figures have been converted into £ sterling by 
using Bidwell's pre-war parity conversion rates. Since therefore 
these figures were not converted into £ on a year to year basis, the 
final figures presented above are only approxiinate. Hie currency that 
was subject to particularly large swings was the ruble. Nevertheless, 
with gold conversion in 1897, the ruble was henceforth relatively 
stable.
These figures illustrate well the relative decline of Britain. 
However, they also point to the fact that in 1913 Britain was still 
in the lead (in Europe). Furthermore, it is the case that much of the 
increase witnessed for BrLtainf s main rival (Germany) was derived 
from the fact of her large population, coupled with the larger 
demographic growth rates (rather than simply the function of greater 
productivity). Indeed in 1913 the German empire contained a 
population of 66. 978m, compared to 45. 6m in Britain (Flora 1987b). 
Furthermore, Germany's population grcwth rate was significantly 
higher. From 1885 to 1913, Germany witnessed a grcwth rate of 43% 
compared to that of 27% for Britain. Similarly Russia's large 
national income was to a large extent derived from her huge 
population [171m in 1913] (Khromov 1950: 452,454). Population grcwth 
rates were also large. Indeed Russia's population increased by 57% 
between 1885 and 1913. Thus to obtain a clearer picture we need to 
present per capita national incomes across the period.
TablP, à. 5 Per Capita National Income on a Cross National Basis.
1flftS-1Q13 M n  £ fitPrliTxrl
Year Russia Germany France UK
1885 7. 5 15.2 19.9 31.0
1890 7.4 18.6 21.9 36.9
1895 8.8 18.7 21.4 36.9
1900 10.3 23.0 25.5 42.5
1905 10.4 25.4 26.8 41.4
1910 11.4 28.9 31.7 44.2
1913 11.8 32. 5 37. 9 49.7
Source: see ^ pendix lA, IB
In particular Æ^iilst many point to Britainf s declining world share 
of exports and production of capital goods, the fact is that with the
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exception of Germany' s overtaking of Britain in percentage share of 
world manufacturing production (see Hilgerdt 1945: 13), by 1913 her 
share had been surpassed by no one. David Lake calculates that in 
terms of world trade (exports plus inports) the U.K. secured 14. 1%; 
United States 11.1%; Germany 12.2%; France 7.5% (1989: 31; figures 
based on League of Nations data). In terms of aggregate shares in 
world manufacturing exports, in 1913 Britain remained the leader 
(Lewis 1957: 579; Kuznets: 53- 55; Saul 1965: 12; Hilgerdt 1945: 158- 
159; see also Kirby 1981: 139). Especially in view of her tiny
population, conpared to the likes of Russia, Anterica and Germany, the 
fact that she continued " to hold the largest share of the world's 
manufacturing exports was a not inconsiderable achievement. Moreover 
because of the h i ^  levels of British exports, even her lower rate of 
increase yielded a hi^ier absolute increase in manufactured*.exports 
ri^it up to the outbreak of the first world war, ^Aen Britain was 
indeed still much the largest export economy among the leading three" 
(Pollard 1990a: 14). Britainf s position has been well summarised by
Saul who argues that the new industries in \Aich Germany had a much
publicised lead (iron and steel production) were still only very 
small by 1913, whilst in addition she had large Icw-productivity 
sectors. "In no way had the last forty years reduced Britain to a 
backwater - but the gap was closing" (Saul 1985: 72).
Ihus overall Britain^ s absolute decline has at best been
exaggerated. Interestingly, W. A, Lewis has argued that Britain^ s 
"decline" vpto 1914 was premised not on endogenous factors, but
rather the inpact of exogenous continental (rapid) industrialisation, 
vAich led to less demand for British goods (1978: 117). Upto a point, 
this would reinforce the conclusion of this section; namely that 
there was little or no internal factors of decline undermining the 
British economy . In agreement with Pdlard, vAilst there had been 
set backs, in most areas Britain remained internally strong. The 
"relative" as opposed to the absolute decline issue hcwever has more 
credence. Nevertheless it remains the case that in 1914 Britain was 
the most powerful econony in Europe ( and indeed in the world, bar 
America).
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It is therefore not the case - even given the sophistication of 
techniques utilised in these modem debates - that the conteirporary 
political and economic elites in the country, (in the period upto 
1914) would have been aware of any structural or permanent problems 
to the economy. There is an additional reason vhy this would have 
been so. That is, even as late as the early twentieth century, 
techniques for calculating national income had not emerged. It is 
true that there had been individual attenpts conducted in order to 
establish national incane, but they were sporadic, unsustained for 
any reasonable time period and most of all, inaccurate. Even today it 
is a hi^ily complicated area, subject to various operational and 
methodological differences (particularly \dien dealing with cross­
national comparisons). Indeed as Amery put it,
"it is difficult in this over-documented age to realise how little 
statistical information was available even to government departments 
at the turn of the century. Esqport and Inport figures were known from 
the Custcnf s returns. There was no statistical information at all, 
however, about production, investment, Ccpital movements or even 
enployment" (Amery Book 5:1969a: 284).
Thus contenporary assessments of the condition of the British 
economy were based on a wholly different set of figures. 
Contenporaries focussed instead on the Custcnf s Department records of 
inports and exports. "These were used to assess the natiorf s 
condition as the indicator of Britain^ s economic performance" 
(FrLedberg 1989: 44; See also Pollard 1990a: 3). And it was these 
figures that Joseph Chamberlain used in order to prove that the 
economy was declining.
Chamberlain correctly pointed out that from the 1870s orwards 
British exports were declining and in particular, from 1890-1900 they 
were stagnant In 1905 he had stated "We have in the last twenty or 
thirty years lost our comparative position in the world s trade. We 
have found our proportion of it has become less \diile the proportion 
of our competitors has greatly increased" (Speech at Albert Hall 7 
July 1905, in T. R.L 1910: 267). More significantly he pointed to the 
possibility of absolute decline ^Aen he stated that, "... it is not 
well today with British industry**. He claimed that our export trade 
had been practically stagnant for thirty years (Speech at Glasgow 
6/10/1903, quoted in FrLedberg 1989: 70). This was supported by a
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certain Customs Department memo in v^ch it was argued that whilst 
British inports had grown in value by 50% in the preceding thirty 
years y exports had increased by a mere 10% (see Friedberg 1989: 79). 
Modem sources show this general assessment to be correct.
Table 4. 6 Annual Growth Rates of U. K Exports in Percentages
(By Cycles)
Domestic
Exports
Export
volume
1865-1874 3. 12 4. 5
1874-1883 0. 56 3. 3
1883-1890 0. 89 2. 1
1890-1901 1. 08 1. 3
1901-1907 5. 50 4. 8
1907-1913 4. 96 3. 8
Source: Pollard 1990a: 4. Domestic export increases calculated from 
current prices. Export Volume taken from A. H. Imlah and B. R. Mitchell.
It is clear that escport increases v^re well dcwn on the pre-1873 
years. Furthermore Chamberlainf s claim that exports had stagnated 
between 1890 and 1900 was reasonable. This then could support the 
claims that were made for protectionism and preference. As Pollard 
puts it, " Ebgort grwth rates, even \iien corrected for prices, shew a 
clear dip in the 1880s and 1890s, calling forth the understandable 
concern for protectionism... of those periods" (1990a: 4). However we 
need to differentiate the two issues, of on the one hand declining 
exports and on the other, the decline of the economy. Bearing in mind 
that contenporaries had little clue as to the position of most 
indicators, it was only natural that they would therefore lean on the 
trade figures in order to assess the economy's condition. However 
this would give rise to several significant problems.
Firstly, the condition of the economy could not be derived simply 
from an exclusive use of the trade figures, particularly given the 
cyclical nature of capitalism. Secondly as an inter- related point, 
if the trade figures were to show an inprovement, the ^Aole case for 
the decline of the econony wDuld be undermined. Furthermore, this 
would undermine the " economic" arguments for protectionism, \diether
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these vjere based on the decline of the economy or sinply a reduced 
export capacity. If we extend the export growth figures through to 
1913, we find a very different scenario to the one depicted by 
Chamberlain (see table 4. 7 above)
Whilst concerns about Britaih s escport capacity were understandably 
giving rise to certain protectionist sentiment at the turn of the 
century, the position after 1901 rapidly changed. In addition to the 
figures shewn above, ALdcroft and Richardson estimate the increase of 
exports to be at the staggering rate of 4. 2% for the period 1900- 
1913, conpared to 0.4% from 1890-1900 (1969: 4; see also A. H. Imlah 
1958; MW. RLrby 1981: 140). Furthermore, these increases were
striking even on an international basis. Bollard puts the growth rate 
of exports at 6. 1% for 1900-1913, conpared to 4.1% for the U. S., 4. 0% 
for France, 6.2% for Germany, 5.2% for Belgium, and 3.9% for 
Switzerland (1990a: 7). In addition, in constant prices the export of 
manufactures according to Hilgerdt from 1901/' 5-1911/' 13 increased at 
a rate that was double the 1891/' 5 - 1901/' 5 period, nine times the 
1881/' 5 - 1891/' 5 period and almost double the 1871/' 5 - 1881/' 5 
period. Lewis puts the increase for 1899-1913 as almost twice that of 
the 1873-1899 period. More significant still were the export figures 
conpared to inports. Lewis shews a 2.92% increase of manufactures 
less manufactured inports (in constant prices), conpared to a figure 
of a mere 0.38% for 1873-1899 (that is, an almost 800% increase). 
Semmel states that by 1913 exports had almost doubled on the 1900 
figure (I960: 88).
Such strong export grcwth, particularly ^Aen conpared to the weak 
inport grcwth of manufactures was "a truly remarkable result for a 
country in the process of being cauc^ up by other industrialising 
nations” (Pollard 1990a: 9; 1990b: 58). Hius if the case for decline 
was based on trade returns (as was the case), it was clear that if 
Britain had " declined” ip to 1900, it was positively booming 
therecifter. On this reading therefore, Chamberlain had mistaken a 
cyclical downturn for retardation. Even Aaron Friedberg, who details 
a more pessimistic picture of the overall position of the economy 
ipto 1914 than that presented here, is forced to admit that enphasis
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on the trade returns would have lulled people into complacency (1989; 
80).
The use of the trade figures by Chamberlain to base his arguments 
for protectionism had, certainly after 1906 - vAien the Conservative 
party really shifted to tariff reform - backfired. Indeed Winston 
Churchill was not wrong when he claimed as early as 1903 that from 
the point of view of the trade returns there was no case for tariff 
reform (see Churchill to Balfour, 25 May 1903, quoted in McCord 1970: 
136-137). Thus Chamberlaih s 1903 tactic had boomeranged,
particularly in the eyes of the electorate.. Ihe ball was new in the 
Free Traders' court. If the economic arguments for protectionism were 
problematic in 1906, by 1910 they would be weaker than ever. 
Churchill's comment would be vindicated in the 1910 elections. As he 
put it in 1908,
" It is one of Nature's revenges upon those ^Ao seek to violate 
economic harmonies, that the very period which had been predicted for 
our downfall and disaster should have witnessed the most surprising 
manifestation of our industrial productivity" (quoted in Kennedy 
1980; 301).
Thus in 1909 the Research Office of the Conservative party stated 
that in the 1910 elections,
"It was difficult to respond to the argument 'vote for vAiat the 
foreign "dunper" dreads... vAien exports (and indeed total trade), had 
just reached a new record" (quoted in P.M. Kennedy 1989: 301)
Indeed, this was reflected at the time by the position of British 
industry.
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ihe Position of the Grass-Hoots Interests on the Frontline of the
Economy
With the exception of elements within the iron and steel industries, 
the vast majority of econcsnic interest groups favoured free trade 
right up to 1913. The laissez faire attitude of the cotton industry 
in Lancashire was well known (see P. F. Clarke 1971). As Clarke points 
out, Lancashire provided the "pivotal inportance to the outcome of 
elections - as both parties recognised" (1971; 7). Lancashire was not 
only significant in terms of electoral strategies, but was also 
strategic in terms of the contribution that cotton made to Britainf s 
exports. Cotton accounted for approximately 30% of all exports and 
enployed 600,000 workers. Ramsay MacDonald argued that in 1903, that 
if Britain shifted to protection, "■hine-tenths of the people of 
Lancashire would then live on American sufferance" (quoted in Renpel 
1972: 97). Clearly this electorally significant county was not to be 
won over to tariff reform.
The coal industry was equally strong in its commitment to free trade 
as was the vast shipping industry vdiich employed 1 million men in 
shipbuilding and a further 200,000 as seamen (Rempel 1972: 98). Ihe 
shipping industry (as well as coal) was, like cotton, vital to 
Britainf s economy, since the profits of the carrying trade 
contributed significantly to the maintenance of the balance of 
payments (P. M. Kennedy 1981: 24). Bcwley stated that shipping services 
accounted for £ 90m (1903: 120 - a figure also provided at the time 
by Asquith 1903: 21 Trade and the Empire London, Methuen). In
addition many manufacturers benefited from (3erman dumping vMch 
sipplied them with a glut of cheap steel. In particular shipbuilders 
reaped this benefit throu^ free trade (Semmel I960: 146; Ingham
1984: 161). With the 1.25m workers in transport industries also
favouring free trade, the barriers to protection were clearly 
substantial (see Semmel 1960: 150).
At the level of the Labour movement tariff reform (as an economic 
strategy) had even less appeal. Not only was the Trade Union Tariff
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Reform Association a rank failure, "it never won the si:çport of any 
major labour leader or any major union" (K. D. Brown 1970; 153). Hie
"organised" working class remained loyal to free trade. The Labour 
Representation Conmittee published a policy statement in 1906 vMch 
unequivocally endorsed free trade (quoted in N. McCord 1970: 139-142). 
Furthermore, the industries committed to free trade contained the 
vast bulk of the working class (Semmel 1960: 146). Indeed as Neal
Blewett has shown, one major reason for the defeat of tariff reform
in 1910 was the free trade identity of the working class. Ihe demise
of the Trade Union Tariff Reform Association was testimony to this 
fact. According to Robert Gilpin, under conditions of declining
hegemony, labour becomes hiÿily protectionist (1987: 115). However, 
apart from the fact that there is little evidence of such a decline, 
and that labour was actually in abundance [as a factor of 
production] (RogcwskL 1989: 8-10, 34-36), it remains the case that this 
particular factor of production favoured free trade for the 
beneficial tax provisions that this entailed, namely, the
introduction of a progressive income tax, as well as the enployment 
opportunities that free trade created. Indeed the vast majority of 
workingmen were hostile to any modification of free trade (McKibbin 
1984: 322)
Ihe upturn in trading activities after 1900 merely consolidated this 
free trade tendency. Whilst the Chamberlainites had reckoned (even 
hoped) for a period of depression after 1903, the years 1904 and 1905 
had been very prosperous. Ihe follcwLng year was even better, with a 
7. 6% increase in exports conpared to a massive 13% in eaports (Halevy 
1952: 14). Indeed "the conplaints of the tariff reformers found no 
echo in the world of industry*' (Halevy 1952: 14). At the official 
level it was recognised that the vast majority of industrialists 
favoured free trade (Report of the Tariff Commission, Vols. 1 and 2, 
London 1904). It is however true that some industries favoured a 
measure of protection, notably iron and steel, thou^ even here we 
must tread carefully. Ihe 100,000 workers employed here were sinply 
dwarfed ly other those in other industries, and even within the iron 
industry there was no overall solidarity for Chamberlain (see Rempel 
1972: 97).
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To reiterate the conclusion of Halevy, it was only too apparent that 
the Unionist calls for protection had little or no grounding in the 
sphere v^ch they claimed to represent, namely the econony, and that 
the "major reason for the failure of Chamberlaih s campaign was that 
apart from iron and steel, the major industries... still prospered 
under free trade" (Rempel 1972; 97). This had been anticipated by
Lord Lansdowne as early as 1903. In a letter to Devonshire, Lansdowne 
pointed out the dilemma that the tariff reformers faced. He pointed 
out that the possibility of tariff reform would depend on three 
factors; (a) the attitude of people connected with commerce in this 
country; (b) the attitude of the colonies; and, (c) the readiness of 
the working class. His impression was that "even if Chamberlain 
succeeds in • educating' the working classes as to (c) we are unlikely 
to come to terms with those most concerned as to (a) and (b)" 
(Lansdwne to Devonshire, 1 June 1903, in Fraser 1966: 237).
According to Landsdcwne's logic, the 1910 election revealed that in 
terms of favouring tariff reform, the working class would remain 
"uneducated".
Furthermore, many "Whole Hoggers" had focussed their ideological 
campaign for tariff reform on its supposed "enployment function". But 
in the Edwardian era, unenplpyment though a problem, was not 
understood by the electorate as something which could be abolished or 
even reduced by tariff reform. Nor was tariff reform seen in public 
in terms of its employment opportunities, given the high levels of 
unenployment in Germany and America (J. Harris 1972: 366). And as was 
recognised by the electorate in 1910, protection would probably only 
have led to increased unemployment Not surprisingly there was a 
great deal of unease at the higfiest levels within the Conservative 
party over the link betvreen protection and enployment
Balfour in 1909 argued that "neither new nor on any other occasion, 
in private or in public, tell any of my countrymen that the vÆiole 
difficulty in unenployment is going to be solved by tariff reform!' 
(The Times 31 December 1909, quoted in Murray 1980: 251). Hewlns had 
noticed this as early as 1903, reporting that Balfour had been 
irritated by the Tariff Reform League slogan "Tariff Reform means 
work for all" on the grounds that he had felt that there was no real
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basis for this claim (see W. A.S. Hewins I: 187). This was a major blow 
for those vdio had premised their arguments for tariff reform on the 
unenployment issue. It was the case that Garvin^ s passionate calls 
that protectionism must more than ever be linked to unenployment as 
the main weapon with vMch to fi^t the Budget were to go unheeded 
(see Garvin, The Observer 3 October 1909, reprinted in Tariff or 
Budget). Indeed as Jose Harris points out, in the 1910 elections. 
Unionist leaders had to restrain their party members from making rash 
promises about the abolition of unenployment under a system of 
protection (1972: 319; see also Balfour's comments in Parliament, in 
Hansard 5th Series, Vol. 14, Col. 417,1910). So adamant was Balfour on 
this point that he deliberately toned dcwn the Conservative Manifesto 
to read that tariff reform would only "lessen unenployment". This 
however represented a major climb-down, for it was the enployment 
issue that had formed the carrot in the Ikdonist attenpt to attract 
the working classes, and was the last remaining economic argument, 
behind vMch the Conservative party wculd hide its real intentions.
Summary of the "Economic Inperatives" for Tariff Peform
The general " econondstic" argument stipulates that the choice of 
free trade or protection can be determined by a country s phase or 
level of development. A country in the. initial phases of 
industrialisation can benefit from tariffs which. can protect her 
" infant-industries" (eg. German industry 1840 onwards; Russian 
industry 1880 onwards, American industry 1815 onwards). However in 
the intermediate phase of development, when the economy is developed 
and stable, free trade is beneficial, allowing the country to 
maximise its strength (eg. British industry post 1846, America .post 
1945). The final stage involves the decline of the economy, vhere 
protection is once again the rational course of action (German 
agriculture post 1879). The general econondstic argument states that 
Britain maximised her trading opportunities through free trade after 
1846. Then with the "onset of decline" in the late nineteenth 
century, tariffs were prescribed as "rational".
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However many authors within this broad school have confused two 
separate axes around vMch "decline" revolves. That is they have 
failed to adequately differentiate retardation and relative decline. 
There is in some cases good reason for this, in the works of some 
authors. The classic analysis of W. A. Lewis stipulates that a major 
reason for British decline/retardation was the inpact of the 
exogenous factor of rapid foreign industrialisation (see page 202 
above). Meyer and Cqppock have both argued that the decline in 
industrial production was due not so much to internal economic 
problems, but rather due to a slow^'dc^ in export grcwth, in turn a 
function of the various rapid industrialisations occurring on the 
continent (Ccppock 1956; Meyer 1955: 17-18). From this angle, it
could be argued that Lewis and others have argued for the case of 
"relative decline" rather than retardation. This would also allow a 
relaxation of the hitherto ideal-typical analysis of decline 
conducted here. The interesting point to emerge from this, is that in 
the works of several analyses of retardation, British decline is 
conceptualised not in absolute but only relative terms, which is the 
central conclusion of the analysis presented here.
i^cifying the exact nature of British decline is essential, since 
the different forms of decline entail differing trade regime 
prescriptions, which are as foUcws.
(1) If a country suffers endogenous absolute decline, (retardation), 
then tariff protectionism can be effective in order to prop up the 
weakening economic structure.
(2) If a country suffers absolute and hence (inevitably) relative 
decline and vice-versa, protectionism is once again rational.
(3) If a country suffers "relative" but not "absolute" decline, then 
according to its own premises the theory will prescribe the trading 
regime equivalent to that vMch was adopted vdien the economy was at 
its zenith - notably free trade.
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Ihe third position matches the 1873-1914 period for Britain. That 
is, Britain suffered little or no absolute decline/retardation, 
(though it did suffer to a significant extent from relative decline). 
Thus, with her dominant position within Europe still very much in 
place, even by 1914, within the bounds of the economistic theory 
itself, free trade would be prescribed in order to create maximum 
economic returns, vMlst protection would only deny such gains. 
Whilst the economistic theory could therefore argue that Britain 
remained free trading upto 1914 for rational economic reasons, it 
could not however adequately explain vhy the Conservative Party chose 
to adopt protectionism, which would make little or no sense 
economically - the real problem at hand!
One thing was certain; economic causes did not supply the real 
motives for the Conservative party's shift to protection after 1906, 
thou^ they may have had some pertinence in the 1902-1906 period. One 
by one the economic arguments - the " employment" carrot, the issues 
of the decline of Britain and/or her export c^aacity, had fallen by 
the wayside and the real motive for the Unionist adoption of tariff 
reform, as the Liberals had effectively demonstrated to the public, 
was open for all to see. Tariff refom was embraced so that the 
Conservatives could maintain and even extend the fiscal privileges to 
the upper income groups (which formed a strong constituency within 
the party). Ihus the A^iole debate over protection versus free trade 
was exposed for the real issue that it was; a conflict over 
autonomous electoral-fiscal strategies. In addition, trade strategies 
were for the Conservatives (though not so much for the Liberals) 
almost entirely subordinated to tax strategies. Philip Snowden gave 
testimony to this in 1910, \^ ien he stated that "the real inwardness 
of the Tariff Reform programme was not a question of protecting 
British industries, but was the alternative to a democratic budget" 
(Snowden, Northern Daily Telegraph. 30 November, 1910, quoted in 
P. F. Clarke 1969: 327). For the most part therefore, particularly after 
1906, the economic reasons given in terms of protecting British 
industries provided a smoke-screen behind vMch lay the Conservative 
tax strategy of maintaining fiscal privileges to the upper income 
groups.
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In sum, there were two choices of tax regimes after 1907; the
Conservative avenue of indirect taxes (and hence protectionism), or,
the Liberal avenue of direct taxes (and hence free trade). The choice 
was clarified by Asquith in 1908, "if it could not be proved that 
social reform (not socialism) can be financed on free trade lines, a 
return to protection is a moral certainty" (Asquith to Strachey, 4 
May 1908, quoted in Clarke 1971: 358). Or, as Ihe Economist put it,
"If Free Trade were to be preserved... the onus was upon the
government to prove that the financial burdens of the modem state 
could be carried without recourse to Tariff Fefonrf* (23 January 1909, 
ppl50-151, quoted in Murray 1973: 556).
Section 2.
Ihe Emergence of the Fiscal Origine of Tariff Beformtihe Second Phase.
Imperial Preference
Chamberlain^ s Revenue Equation
Ihe second phase covered the initial Chamber! ainite thrust of 1897- 
1903. Ihis movement spanned several moments of the late Victorian and 
early Edwardian eras. Firstly, it built on the first phase of the 
tariff reform cairpaign which was developed between 1880-1897 by the 
Iiiperial Federation League and the Fair Trade League. As we have seen 
these movements set the groundwork for Chamberlain, even though they
petted out, mainly for party political reasons (see pages in
this chapter) though also because of various internal problems that 
divided these organisations
Secondly and more inportantly, the Edwardian era was dominated by 
the political effects of the extension of the franchise in 1884. 
Within the domestic Liberal-Parliamentary electoral system, the 
parties fou^it to attract this large mass of nswiy emergent voters. 
Joseph Chamberlain, a " radical" had left the Liberal party over
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the question of Home Rule for Ireland, joined the Conservative
(Unionist) Party. It was essential he believed, to attract the 
working classes into the party so as to prevent them from joining 
either the Liberal or the " socialist" Labour party.
The rise of the political face of labour led to extreme responses 
within the Consevative party. "Vfe are in a state of bloodless civil
war... To loot sonebody or something is the common object under a
thick varnish of pious phrases" (Salisbury to Smith, 5 February 1889, 
quoted in Sykes 1978: 12). The sentiment was expressed aptly by
W. H. Smith;
"It has made the extreme radicals masters of the Liberal Party, and 
men siçport a policy now from vMch they would have shrunk with 
horror ten years ago... Men are strictly honest in their
transactions with their neighbours have come to regard Parliament as 
an instrument by vAiich a transfer of ri^ts and property may 
equitably be made from the few to the many" (Smith to Salisbury, 3 
February 1889, quoted in Sykes 1978: 12).
By 1888 Salisbury had realised that something over and above a bare 
minimum of concessions was necesseuy not only to appease the working 
classes, but also to maintain the existence of the pgu±y. Ihis was 
due to the constituency of the party. Ihe Heme Rule crisis had led to 
a large defection of members from the liberal party to the Unionist 
Party. Ihese " Liberal-Unionists" as they were kncwn had a more 
radical nature than the traditional Conservative hierarchy. 
Chamberlain, the main defector, soon began to upset not only the 
hierarchical nature of the party, but also its actual political 
agenda. If these Unionists were to be appeased, the leadership wculd 
need to move towards a more radical programme than hitherto.
Joseph Chamberlain hcwever, forced the issue of social reform i:pion 
the party. He claimed that the party had a natural claim to social 
reform due to its tradition of state intervention Ihis was 
contrasted with the Liberal tradition of Ccibdenite laissez- faire. 
Ihrough social reform he argued, the working classes could be brought 
into the party. At the same time, "predatory socialism^ could be 
defeated vMlst property rights could be defended. It was this 
"radical" brand of Conservativism \^ch Chamberlain stood for, and 
was to a large extent the subject of the split within the party.
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The second moment \^ch informed the Chamberlainite caijse was linked 
to the third - the position of taxation in the late Victorian era. As 
will be developed later, since 1842 there had been a very gradual 
shift by the state to raise revenues from direct rather than indirect 
taxes. Linked to this was the fact that the current sources of 
revenue were becoming insufficient to meet the needs of fiscal 
accumulation. As early as 1887, Goschen had emphasised that the basis 
of taxation was too narrow. The Unionist party saw direct taxes as a 
redistributive evil vhich would need to be redressed. Whilst there 
was an overvdielming consensus within the party for a shift back to 
indirect taxes, there was a growing split over the issue of 
government expenditure. A small minority led by Joseph Chamberlain 
wanted expenditures to grew A^iilst the majority preferred the time 
honoured expedient of " retrenchment". In the short term the majority 
would predominate thouÿi after 1906 heaver, the Chamberlainite view 
of expenditures would rapidly gain the ascendancy. From its inception 
Chamberlain^ s tariff reform package was inextricably linked to the 
creation of government revenue.
The Fiscal Odglns of Industrial Protectionism
Thus fcu: WB have dealt only with the concept of imperial preference. 
It is important to differentiate Iitperial Preference from " industrial 
protectionism^. That is, preference implies tariffs only on 
agricultural goods, as well as on raw materials. Preference does not 
require tariffs on foreign manufactured goods. Whilst the two areas 
were quite separate, they could however be linked in an explanation. 
As will be argued, industrial protectionism was derived indirectly 
from preference throu^ the need for tax revenues.
When Chaihberlain announced his programme of Imperial Prefezence on 
15 May 1903 in the House of Ccmnans, the opposition^ s r ^ y  revolved 
principally auxfund the old notion of the "dear loaf". In the 
contemporary setting a sharp controversy rapidly developed over how
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Chamberlain could overcome this problem. "A Revenue Official" in Ihe 
Times brou(ÿTt the problem into the open. The official found that a 5% 
tax on imports on foreign foodstuffs (as was prescribed by 
Chamberlain) would yield £ 7. 5m to the Exchequer. As the Free Trader 
immediately pointed out, this would yield some £5. 8m in revenue, but 
calculated that the real cost to the consumer would be between £ 14- 
£15m, (owing to the increased cost of the bread). Thus if the family 
food budget was to remain the same after the tariff was applied, the 
existing food taxes (some £13. 6m in 1902) would have to be taken off 
in their entirety, leaving a residual amount of £ .0. 4 - £ 1. 4m vhich 
could be taken off the tobacco duty ("The Proposed Gamble in Food" 
The Free Trader. 7 August, 1903: 10-11, quoted in Marri,son 1977: 219- 
220. ). Whether the “Revenue Official” agreed with the consumer cost 
of £ 14-15m quoted by The Free Trader was not stated. However it was 
effectively iitplied (bar approximately £ Im) by the fact that the 
official advocated the . removal of the easting £ 13. 6m revenue duties 
on food imports.
As pointed out by the free trade opposition, the implication of this 
scheme was thus far to leave an Exchequer shortfall of between £ 6. Im 
-(ie. 13. 6 minus 7. 5) under a revenue official's calculations and 
£8 .7m  (14.5 minus 5.8) under the free traders' calculations. The 
solution to the deficit incurred through preferential tariffs on food 
lay with the taxing of foreign manufactures. He proposed a 7% ad 
valorem tariff duty on imports of foreign manufactures \diich would he 
thought produce a slightly larger amount than that necessary to cover 
the shortfall (Marrison 1977: 220). Thus industrial protection was 
envisaged purely as a revenue earner.
Originally Chaihberlain wanted to acquire revenues not only from 
industrial goods but also from food. In the first instance there were 
to be no compensatory duties (that is, no relief to the consumer 
would be made as a response to the tariff on bread). He reckoned on 
providing throu^ tariffs between £ 9-16m. This would then be added 
to the anticipated £6m derived from the wheat tariffs, which would 
constitute a considerable revenue pool from vMch pensions could be 
adequately financed. This was essential to fund Chaihberlain's desire 
for old age pensions. Indeed it was this that has led many historians
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to argue that social reform was central to ChamberLaiif s prefect (See
E. H. H. Green 1985). It is true that Chamberlain was keen to make 
inroads toward social reform. Indeed this was an essential part of 
his liberal "radicalism!'. Hcwever it became rapidly apparent that the 
whole reform scheme was jeopardised both by the problem of revenue 
production, and in particular by the need for coirpensatory duties to 
be made in order to appease the working classes. Firstly, there was 
the problem of the revenue calculations, \^ch Chamberlain had 
incorrectly exaggerated. Since the revenue calculations which 
Chamberlain made were similar to those of the "revenue official", an 
examination of this latter set of estimates will allow us to 
scrutinise the overall Chamberlainite social-fiscal project.
Firstly, The Times criticised the revenue official for failing to 
mention that of the E 37. 8m of Britainf s food inports already subject 
to revenue duties approximately 30% came from the empire. Ihese would 
throu^ preference therefore, not be subject to duties. Ihus the 
official had considerably over-estimated the revenue to be gained to 
make good the damage inflicted by the c o m  tariffs. In other words, 
the abolition of so-called " compensatory" duties on other non­
colonial food inports would be insufficient to redress the fiscal 
deficit incurred fron tariffs on colonial produce.
Secondly, almost half the existing revenues on food goods were 
derived from sugar. Ihis measure had been only tenporary, having been 
inposed under the emergency conditions of the Boer War. Indeed the 
Conservative government had already pledged the sugar duty for 
immediate repeal after the war. Ihis then reduced further the leeway 
for " conpensatory" tariffs to make good the deficit.
However one fiscal advantage accrued to Chamberlain that had not been 
available to the revenue official. Ihat is, the revenue official had 
calculated the revenue to be remitted as a function of conpensation 
on the basis of conplete abolition of the revenue tariffs. 
Chamberlain however as part of his conpensatory package, had called 
for only 75% of the tea duty and 50% of the sugar duty, with 
corresponding reductions on cocoa and coffee. Ihis meant that 
Chamberlain^ s projected deficit at the Exchequer would have been
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considerably less than that of the official^ s, thus giving him more 
leeway.
Thirdly, Chamberlain s proposal of an average duty of 10% on 
manufactured goods in order to raise between £9-15m was also subject 
to over-estimation. It was pointed out at the time that this 
calculation was based on the Bocurd of Trade estimates of manufactured 
inports. Indeed Robert Gif fen pointed out that Chamberlain s use of 
Table 1 of the Fiscal Blue Book was misleading since it included 
semi-manufactures with the finished articles in one total. As a 
result, he reckoned on an approximate 70% error! (Giffen in The 
Times. 24 October and 29 October 1903, quoted in Marrison 1977: 226) 
- something which Chamberlain had acknowledged in his Glasgow speech 
in 1903. Whilst the free traders argued that semi-manufactured goods 
were in fact raw materials - a somevAat exaggerated claim - the 
principle was correct Certainly semi-manufactures, like raw 
materials, constituted an input to the production of the finished 
article. Indeed the minimisation of the costs of production argument 
was too powerful for Chamberlain either to run rough shod over, or 
even to ignore. In any case, Chamberlain indirectly admitted defeat on 
this point by conceding that semi-manufactures should be subject to a 
lower rate of duty.
Furthermore, it was pointed out that Chamberlainf s assessment of a 
10% tariff yielding £9-15m assumed that there wsuld be no reduction 
in the volume of manufactures inported. Thus Chamberlain, according 
to his calculations had significantly overestimated the revenue to be 
obtained from a 10% tariff on (finished) manufactures (For a further 
critique, see The Free Trader. 7 August 1903, quoted in Marrison 1977: 
226). Finally, one of Chamberlainf s stated objects of tariff reform 
was to put a step to the dumping of cheep, over-produced continental 
manufactures. W. J. Ashley had pointed out that duties of between 50- 
75% were necessary to stop dumping. Similarly, the other stated 
desire for tariff reform was to effect " retaliation" against foreign 
protected markets. As Balfour was only too aware, retaliatory tariffs 
needed to start h i ^  and would then come down as foreign states 
reduced their tariffs on British exports. To start lew could probably
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lead to costly tariff wars, vMch as it was correctly recognised at 
the time, tended to hurt the instigator more than the recipient.
For these economic reasons, but especially for the fiscal reasons 
pointed out above, it was cleeur that a 10% tariff would not be 
sufficient to provide enou<ÿi revenue to fund welfare reforms - in 
particular old age pensions, and that Chamberlain^ s estimate of £ 9- 
15m was almost certainly too h i ^  Chamberlain once again found 
himself on a knife edge. Either duties on manufactures would have to 
be h i ^  or taxation would have to include raw materials and semi­
manufactured goods. Both these options would have produced ijproar 
within the industrial and financial circles within the economy. 
However, there was another way of providing the revenues for social 
reforms. Chamberlain could simply drcp the conpensatory tariff 
reductions. As Sir William Harcourt informed Chamberlain in the 
press, the funding of pensions W3uld require tariffs on wheat as well 
as on manufactured goods, assuming the remaining food taxes to remain 
in tact" (Marrison 1977; 218-219, my emphases). The above analysis
demonstrates two points as regards the revenue options of 
protectionism, vMch can be reduced to two simple equations. Tariffs 
on:
(1) Wheat + Manufactures + Existing food duties - Maximum Revenue 
(Hence, Social Reforms).
(2) Wheat - Conpensatory duties + Manufactures = Minimum Revenue 
(Hence NO Social Reforms)
In May 1903 Chamberlain put social reform h i ^  on the preferential 
agenda. On 22 May in the House of (commons, he linked tariff reform to 
old age pensions emphasising that "in tariff reform lay the solution 
to the revenue problem vMch has hitherto held up social reform?' (see 
Sykes 1978: 37). Initially therefore, Chamberlain adhered to the
maximum tariff revenue scenario (equation 1). However the "dear loaf" 
cry caused Chamberlain to tactically retreat. He then adopted the 
position ^bereby the working class could choose between old age 
pensions or, conpensation of dearer food with similar reductions on 
other duties such as tea, coffee and sugar (a prevarication betv^en
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equations 1 and 2). Heaver, it became rapidly apparent which choice 
the working class would make.
As a result Chamberlain wrote Devonshire;
"If as I originally hoped, the proposal that I made for discussion 
had been accepted on both sides and had not been made a party 
question, we mi^t have stood to vhat was my original idea and have 
treated the small taxation that will be necessary to give a 
preference to the colonies as a revenue tax and have used the profits 
for the promotion of those social reforms which are certain to come 
in the future, and vhich ou^t in my opinion to be provided for by 
indirect and not by an increase in direct taxation” (J. Amery, Book 5, 
1969a: 265; ).
However, the opposition^ s cry of “ free food” was politically so 
powerful that he went onto argue;
"... They (the opposition) have raised the free food cry and we must 
meet them on their own ground. I am therefore prepared to accept the 
responsibility of treating the change so far as preferential rates 
are concerned as a redistribution of taxation and not as an 
imposition of increased burdens” (Chamberlain to Devonshire, 25 
August, 1903, in Sykes 1978: 41-42, my emphases).
Ihus by late August, Chaihberlain had decided to circumvent the "dear 
loaf" cry in the only way he knew hew. He therefore favoured the 
"compensatory” duties so as to relieve the tax burden of the consumer 
which would increased as a result of the preferential vheat tariff. 
Ihus he stated,
"I am not asking you to impose further burdens tpon the people of 
this country. I am not asking you to raise the amount of taxation in 
this country. I am asking you to transfer taxation from one article 
to another” (Speech at Newcastle, 20 October 1903, quoted in T. R. L. 
1910: 266).
Accordingly, having decided to reduce existing food duties in order 
to effect ” compensation” to the average family food budget, 
Chamberlain took a sli^tly different course to the one anticipated 
both by the Frpft Trader and the Revenue Official. Ihese two 
alternative estimates of the Exchequer shortfall ranged frorni £ 8. 7m 
and £ 6. Im respectively, and were derived on the basis of 100% 
abolition of existing food duties. As pointed out above, Chamberlain 
had advocated only a 75% reduction on tea, and 50% on sugar, coffee
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and cocoa. This would have reduced the revenue to be accrued at the 
Exchequer by some £8m rather than the £14m anticipated by the Free 
Trader and the official However, perhaps ironically this meant that 
the average family food budget would not be fully conpenated for the 
increase in the prefemtisü. food tariffs; thus the term 
"conpensation" was something of a misnomer. However the up-side for 
Chamberlain was that the eventual Exchequer deficit would be only 
£2. 8m, rather than the £ 8.7m oi £j6. Im (Marrison 1977: 225). Thus
industrial tariffs were inportant for Chamberlain so that he could 
make good the Exchequer deficit, in order to provide funds for 
pensions.
However, as was shewn above, the estimate of £9- 15m on a 10% tariff 
on industrial (finished) goods, was subject to exaggeration. A 10% 
tariff on industrial manufactures would have done well to have 
produce! £.8- ,9m. Having made good the £ 2. 8m exchequer shortfall, the 
actual surplus to be received by the government would have been 
approximately £5-6m. With the general increases in expenditures 
(especially on defence), such a surplus would have been quickly 
absorbed. It was therefore hi^üy unlikely that the revenue acquired 
from industrial tariffs would have been sufficient to finance social 
reforms. In fact, the only means by \^ch pensions could be financed 
was by retaining current food taxes (rather than partially or even 
catpletely abolishing them), and simultaneously levying tariffs on 
industrial goods, as well as instigating iitperial preference (vAieat 
tariffs) [the "maximunf revenue formula; equation 1 above]. This 
maximum revenue scenario would only come into play in Unionist party 
strategy after 1906.
Thus with this decision, Chamberlain effectively dropped the 
potential surplus revenue of the original scheme. He had therefore 
moved to the "minimum revenue" scenario (expressed in equation 2, 
above). From now on, pensions would be dropped from the preference 
agenda. They would however wait in the wings ready to reemerge after 
1906. Far from dead, social reforms became the "reserve engine" of 
tariff reform, vhich would dominate the third phase of the 
protectionist movement, vhen the "maximum revenue" scenario would be 
adopted
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The Chamberlcdnite project as it appeared in late 1903 therefore did 
not embrace social reform, though this is not to downplay its future 
potential, nor to diminish the iitportance that taxation played in the 
overall project. Rather, the position from 1903-1906 adopted a 
"minimum revenue" scenario, where, revenue would be derived only from 
the tariff on industrial manufactures, (and of course as an unintended 
consequence of the tariff on colonial produce). Indeed industrial 
tariffs played no part in the iitperial preferential schema, other 
than to overcome the exchequer's deficit, acquired from the 
difference between the revenue produced from the vÆieat tariff and the 
additional cost to the consumer that it entailed, aifter Chambericd.nf s 
partial compensatory reductions had been made.
The minimum revenue scenario was hcMjsver an inportant aspect of the 
project, for it allowed a commutation of indirect for direct taxes. 
Ihis constituted the backbone of the Conservative party* s long term 
fiscal project, ^Aiich had begun to emerge at the end of the last 
century. On many occasions Chamberlain had stated his desire to 
reduce direct taxes, (see the above quotation). Ihis could only be 
done effectively by increasing indirect taxes. To this end he levied 
a tariff on industrial goods.
In sum, the second phase of inperial preference introduced the notion 
of tariffs (on industrial tariffs) as a revenue producer. Hcwever, 
vheat tariffs could not be seen in this fiscal li^it, for the sinple 
reason that any revenues gained from preference were nullified by the 
conpensatory reductions in existing food duties. Chamberlainf s desire 
for preference (1902-1906, thouÿi not thereafter) lay in cueas other 
than social reform Establishing the exact reasons for preference as 
construed by Chamberlain are hi^ily problematic. Various theories 
have been proposed. R.J. Scally (1975) has argued that imperial 
preference was the means by \Mch Chamberlain attempted to woo the 
masses by ^ Aiipping ip nationalist sentiment. Others have argued that 
the empire would act as an extension of "little" England into a big 
state, or what Friedberg refers to as the desire for "gigantismf' 
(1988: 30-33). A big state had an economic and a geopolitical input. 
In the nineteenth century Darwinian conception of the world, it was
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perceived (correctly) that big states tended to swallow up their 
smaller neighbours. This geopolitical rationality was, according to 
Friedberg, later si;ççlemented by the economic notion that big states 
tended to be strongest in industrial terms (though hew Russia fitted 
into this schema is not explained). To vÆiat extent the enpire was to 
act as a kriegsverein (military union) rather than a zollverein 
(tariff union) is an important question to be answered when 
evaluating the causes of preference. Furthermore as Tÿler points out 
there were clear political benefits from the enpire. The question of 
food and raw material supply in time of war was causing unease within 
the mother country. Firm inperial connections could allow these 
supplies to reach Britain after military activities had begun.
As was argued in Section 1, the economic arguments for preference had 
been considerably exaggerated by Chamberlain. As lyier stated it was 
"not difficult to draw ip a wei^ty case against preference, or any 
other form of commercial union, on purely commercial grounds" (1938: 
171, ny enphases). It seems more likely that Chamberlain wished to 
create an ideological climate that was favourable to the election 
chances of the Conservative pazty. CXdng to the problem of 
conpensation, the fiscal origins of preference shelved, and
would only fully emerge after 1906, thou^ industrial protection had 
a clear fiscal core. In sum, establishing the exact reasons for 
Chamberlaiif s schema of inperial preference is not of primary 
significance here. In the context of this chapter, of more 
significance is the revealing of the fiscal seed that was planted by 
Chamberlain, and would develop in the third phase.
Conservatives Divided Ihe Enigmatic Balfour and Protectionist
Stagnation, 1903-1906
Although the question of free trade versus protection became a 
central issue within the Conservative party, a decision as to vhich 
policy would be chosen was not forthcoming; Ihe party was divided 
into three struggling factions. At one end of the continuum were the
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" Free Fooders" embracing the free trade position. This was the 
smallest faction, doninated by Cecilian Conservatives and Liberal 
Unionists. Iheir position was summarised by H u ^  Cecil in a letter to 
Balfour, "We are passionately afraid of protection, we think that it 
will lead to corruption and class division, to a general Americanism 
of our politics... Protection seems to us an evil of the same class as 
Home Rule" (4 May, 1907, quoted in Blewett 1968: 95). At the other 
extreme were the "Whole Hoggers" led ly Joseph Chamberlain, vAiose 
fight for imperial preference and tariff reform was relentless. (For 
an analysis of the cairpaign fou^t by these " confederates" see 
A  Sykes 1975; K  Blewett 1968, 1972; R. A  Renpel 1972). As Blewett
aptly put it, "they became as doctrinaire as those defended the 
faith of free trade" (1968: 96).
In the middle were the Balfourites. Hiis was a janus-faced faction 
facing both ways and capable of joining either group depending on the 
politicauL situation. It was the direction of the prevailing political 
wind that was as important (if not more so) than the saliency of the 
issues at stake. Only after 1906 would this important group become 
concerned with the issues at stake. In the meantime, the three groups 
reached only stalemate revealing an extraordinary incapacity to 
resolve the mounting confusion.
The irony to emerge from this confusion was that much of it was 
caused by Balfour's overriding concern for party unity, dearly 
unable to come firmly to a decision, he not only prevaricated but at 
times jumped from one camp to the other. For example; in ^ iril 1905, 
Balfour called a small conference consisting of Chamberlain, Herbert 
Maxwell and himself and Landsdcwne. To Chamberlain^ s amazement and 
delight, Balfour informed them that he accepted not only a general 
tariff but also preference as the first au±icle of the party 
programme. But astonishingly, within ten days Balfour reneged on this 
informal agreement, having given way to the pressure exerted by the 
Free Fooders (see P. Fraser 1966: 263). This merely added to the 
confusion and resentment that each side felt for the other.
In fairness to Balfour, in this instance he was put in a no win 
situation. Ihis was achieved by the fact that whilst the Free Fooders
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could not put him in a minority in the House of Commons merely by 
abstention, they could however have done so by siding with the 
opposition. Not surprisingly, Balfour caved in. Perhaps he should 
have sounded out the free traders before imposing his decision ipon 
them. However, given his overvdielming desire for unity, there was 
little he could do in the face of a party divided between two 
bitterly opposed factions, well dug in, and wedded perhaps more to 
fighting over dogma than real issues. Nevertheless, Balfour's 
inability to choose between the two options merely intensified the 
conflict and the confusion. It was not until 1907, vAien he took a 
firm stand (in favour of protection) that the party finally came into 
line.
Overlapping this "protection versus free trade" split was a conflict 
between two broad notions of Conservativism held within the party. 
Ihe free fooders favoured a laissez-faire approach, of \diich 
resistance to social reformism and the maintenance of free trade and 
retrenchment were central. Ihe Whole Hbggers however preferred a more 
"progressive" Conservativism giving a pride of place to state 
intervention and hence favoured increased government expenditures, 
social reform and protectionism. Neal Blewett has even gone so far as 
to argue that it was these differing notions of party and 
Conservativism that informed the split, rather than simply tariff 
reform (1968: 100-102). Whilst this is overstating this aspect, it 
did nevertheless constitute a significant aspect to the party split.
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SBCnCN 3 THE ORIGINS OF TOE FISCAL REVCLUHCN 1906-1909
The Inpact of Increasizig Government Expenditures on Revenue
Production
Much of the period's expenditure was covered by the natural rise of 
national income. Heaver, this was only really true of the period 
\jpto 1885, given the remarkably stable nature of government 
expenditures. Even so from the late 1850s throu^ to 1895 the rate of 
income tax rose gradually from 5d to 8d. Heaver from the late 1880s 
and in particular throo^ the 1890s expenditures began to rise 
rapidly. Althouÿi rises in national income offset some of this 
increase, economic growth was no longer sufficient as a fiscal 
weapon.
As the charts below show, from 1860-1875 expenditures remained 
remarkably stable. This was all the more remarkable given the fact 
that the continental Great Powers were increasing their expenditures, 
particularly on war preparation. From 1875-1895, expenditures 
increased at a fairly steady, rather than a pronounced rate. By 1900 
however, expenditures rocketed with the onset of the Boer War. The 
war had in fact only a catalytic inpact upon the worsening condition 
of the state's coffers. For if we project further beyond 1902, we 
find that military expenditures remained hic^ relative to the amounts 
spent in the nineteenth century. In addition civil expenditures were 
on the increase as of the late nineteenth century, particularly those 
on education. Indeed in nominal terms, civil expenditures increased 
over fivefold between 1860 and 1913. Furthermore, such expenditures 
absorbed as much as 30% of total expenditures in 1913, compared to a 
mere 14% in 1860.
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However, the cost-push effect of expenditures was only one aspect of 
the irtpending fiscal crisis. In addition there was the demand-pull 
effect; namely the popular will for the raising of certain taxes 
vhich were required to meet these costs. Ihe fiscal crisis of the 
Edwardian era was as much about the nature of taxation and its linked 
political aspects, as it was about the need to s\.pply the increased 
costs of government. Ihese were connected to the relations of 
extraction (see final chapter) and the nature of the tax base.
T a b l e  4. 7 Covemment Expenditures 1860-1913 fin £ .million)
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Defence
(4)
Debt
(5)
Total
1860 10 5 25 29 70
1865 10 6 26 26 67
1870 11 6 22 27 67
1875 14 8 25 27 73
1880 17 8 25 28 82
1885 19 10 30 29 89
1890 17 11 33 25 91
1895 20 13 35 23 101
190.0 24 16 70 23 144
1905 29 19 66 25 150
1910 41 22 63 21 157
1913 55 27 73 20 184
Source: B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane 1962: 397,398. Public Finance
tables. (1) CIVIL represents expenditures on Vtorks and Buildings,
Salaries of Public Departments, Law and Justice, Education, Art and
Science, Colonial and Foreign Office. (2) BOCNCMIC SERVICES
represents expenditures on Post, Telegra^^ and Tele^^ne (3) DEFENCE 
represents expenditures on the A m y  and Navy (4) DEBT represents 
expenditures on debt repayment.
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Tabla 4. ft Shares of the Mai or Categories of Central Government
Expenditure (expressed in percentages)
Year
(1)
Civil
(2)
Economic
Services
(3)
Defence
(4)
Debt
1860 14 7 36 41
1865 15 9 39 39
1870 16 9 33 40
1875 19 11 34 37
1880 21 10 30 34
1885 21 11 34 33
1890 19 12 36 27
1895 20 13 35 23
1900 17 11 49 16
1905 19 13 44 17
1910 26 14 40 13
1913 30 15 40 11
Reaching the Limits of the Old Mode of Taxation
By 1895 serious concerns were expressed concerning Britainf s fiscal 
position. Indeed within only a month of the installation of the 
Salisbury government in 1895, the ever-nearing crisis was being 
anticipated within government circles. On 24 July Edward Hamilton of 
the Treasury Department circulated a memorandum in the cabinet 
stating that,
"A little more than twenty years ago we were in the days of 
' leaps and bounds' of revenue, ^Aen Mr. L c ^  declared that the chief 
difficulty of the chancellor of the exchequer was to knew hew to get 
rid of the money \Aich persisted in pouring in xjpcBO. him. We are new 
in days of ' leaps and bounds' of expenditure, \Aen the chief 
difficulty of the Finance Minister of this country is, or soon wiJLl 
be, hew to raise money sufficient to cover the demands \Aich ' persist 
in pouring in upon himf " (Hamilton " Some Renarks on Public Finance" 
quoted in Friedberg 1989: 100).
He went onto warn that \Ailst national expenditure had increased to 
over ElOOm per annum by 1895, "... large as that sum is, there is 
every prospect of a still further increase and a very formidable
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increase in the not very distant future". The reasons for this 
situation were summarised as follows.
"Some of the services vMch the state has undertaken are in their 
nature services of automatic growth, notably educational services; 
vMle the tendency of responsible as well as irresponsible persons is 
to saddle the state with further undertakings vdiich must be 
accoirpanied with heavy cost to the tax-payer. Agriculturalists are 
pressing to be further relieved fron the burden of local rates the 
working classes are claiming some provisions for old age - a claim 
\Æiich, if it be freely satisfied, may mean a boundless subsidy from 
the state... there is little hope that the War office and the 
Admiralty will be satisfied with smaller provisions... In view of 
these considerations the question of inperial finance may very 
possibly before long become a serious problem!' (quoted in Friedberg 
1989; 101).
Hamilton! s claims reveal the seriousness that the government was 
viewing the financial situation in 1895. That it was more widely 
perceived was reflected by the memorable phrase of William Harcourt, 
that "... in the growth of the expenditure of the country you have 
very nearly reached the limits of tolerable taxation" (Harcourt in 
the Liberal ^^oazine. June 1895, quoted in H.V. Eny 1972: 109). As
Hamilton put it the government was faced with a stark choice. Either 
it would have to cut spending, or new methods of finance would have 
to be found if the nation! s accounts were to be balanced.
What were the options available for such a balancing act to take 
place? On the revenue side of the equation, there were several 
avenues to be explored. Firstly, the government could consider the 
avenue of suspending the sinking fund. Here, new funds could be 
accrued by the diversion of revenue for debt repayment to current 
expenditure. However, there was a clear consensus between both major 
parties on the treatment of loans to fund government expenditure. 
That is, loans were regarded as a vital reserve to fund wartime 
expenditures. Cross-party consensus was revealed by Austen 
Chamberlain ;Ao readily quoted Harcourt to the extent that the 
sinking fund " is... not to be tanpered with in ordinary times and 
normal deficiency, but reserved for great emergency" (quoted in Emy 
1972: 123). In peacetime, it was held both in theory and practice 
that all loans should be repaid throuÿi interest payments as well as 
reducing the dead wei^it debt itself.
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There were essentially three reasons vAiy peacetime loans v^re to be 
avoided- First and foremost, by not taking out peacetime loans and by- 
repaying interest and dead weight debt, the state was able to raise 
new loans in wartime (vhat Emy has called the " first financial 
reserve). More inportantly still, such loans could be raised at lew 
rates of interest. Both these factors played a vital part in 
strengthening the military capacity of the state in wartime. Thus 
Selbome stated to the cabinet that " its Credit and its Navy seem to 
me to be the two main pillars on v^ch the strength of this country 
rests and each is essential to the other*' (quoted in Kennedy 1980: 
325).
Secondly, constant recourse to loans, particularly in peacetime led 
to an increase of the rate of interest. Not only did this undermine 
the military capacity of the state in wartime, but it was widely held 
that it also weakened the economy. An influential contemporary
F. W. Hirst put it to Caiipbell-Bannennan that h i ^  interest rates vMch 
had occurred as a result of the Boer War loans the prime cause 
of reduced business confidence. He went further by arguing that the 
increase in dead wei^it debt from È640m to ESOOm had resulted in 
borrowed credit, less enterprise in business and manufacturing, 
reduced home demand and therefore reduced output to meet it, and 
reductions in wages, increases in unenplpyment and pauperism in 
general. Here Hirst was echoing the classical liberal view, that 
borrowing merely crowded out private investment, and thus undermined 
economic growth. In addition Hirst also pointed to a third reason 
the state should not resort to the use of loans in peacetime. Loans 
enabled a government to avoid its formal financial and political 
constraint of going before parliament to explain its expenditure 
plans. Thus parliamentary accountability was an important reason as 
to vhy peacetime loans were seen as unfeasible. This was echoed by 
thirty four leading banking and financiers from the City ;Ao, in 
criticising the 1909 Budget proposal to invoke an annual 
appropriation for the reduction of fixed debt by £3m stated that this 
was;
"A dangerous innovation, and we are convinced that the established 
principle under vhich the surplus revenue of each year is 
automatically applied to the reduction of the debt is the only sound 
one. Any departure from the principle in the direction proposed would
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inevitably tenpt a government to underestimate expenditure for it 
would be conparatively easy to obtain the consent of parliament to 
the allocation of realised surpluses to purposes for vMch it would 
not have been prepared to raise fresh tax" (printed in The Economist 
15 May 1909, quoted in Emy 1972: 123-124).
Hence to all intents and purposes this avenue was closed to the 
Conservative government. As will be discussed later, this attitude 
towards loans was very different to Continental practices, in 
particular Germany and Russia. Indeed the notion of "credit" was far 
more inportant to British statesmen than it was to German or Russian.
The second major avenue to be explored was the possibility of 
colonial burden sharing. As Chamberiain put it to the Colonial 
Conference in 1902, "The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb 
of its fate... We have borne the burden long enough We think it is 
time our children should assist us- to sipport it" (quoted in 
Friedberg 1989: 116). Thus various attenpts were made by the British 
government to secure contributions from the colonies. However, such 
efforts came to little or nothing (See O  Brien 1990: 35-39,43.
O  Brien 1989. Davis and Huttenback 1988: 112-129; Friedberg 1989: 116- 
117) [Note that India was a possible exception to this rule, but see 
B. R. Tomlinson (1979: 104-118)].
The third major avenue ^ Aich was to be examined was the boosting of 
existing taxes. It was felt within government circles that indirect 
sources of taxation had for the most part reached the limits both of 
fiscal productivity and of political acceptability. Increases on 
already h i ^  rates of existing indirect taxes it was felt, would lead 
to a net reduction in revenue owing to the subsequent decrease in 
consumption. Even more problematic was the fact that increases in 
such taxes, vhich were levied predominantly on basic food items, 
would only serve to alienate the working classes ipon vhom such taxes 
were overwhelmingly borne. As H.W. Primrose at the Board of Customs 
wrote,
"Reviving the tax on sugar, possibly a tax on com, are as much as 
can perhaps be conteirplated in the present day. And even they... would 
bring into acute prominence the controversy... in regard to the 
relative rate of taxation of rich and poor" (quoted in Friedberg 
1989: 103).
231
Increasing existing direct taxes was politically even more 
problematic for the government. Conservative voters were already 
alarmed at the " creeping*' rates of direct tax rates. As Hamilton put 
it, "An income tax at 8d in the pound seemed already to be too high a 
rate for times of peace" (quoted in Friedberg 1989: 102). The
argument was also made that direct taxes adversely affected the 
supply side of the economy. Although this had been a staple of the 
budgetary practices of the nineteenth century tax regime, the 
Conservatives invoked it largely as a means of masking the real 
reason for their hostility to direct taxes. Ihis was to protect the 
hitherto fiscal privileges that the upper income groups had held 
under the old indirect tax regime. Thus for the most part, the 
" supply-side" arguments were a red herring. Furthermore, and equally 
as weak, was the argument that direct taxation should be reserved for 
wartime expenditure only (the "second" financial reserve).
Only the creation of a new indirect tax would be acceptable to the 
Conservatives. As the crisis unfolded, this option became 
increasingly popular within the party. Indeed it was this need for a 
new indirect tax, A^iich would be reasonably undetectable by the 
electorate (or so the Conservatives believed) that led the party 
after 1900 increasingly towards the advocation of tariff 
protectionism.
There was a final avenue open to the Conservatives in their attenpts 
to find a solution to the rapidly approaching fiscal crisis of the 
state. Ihis was to maintain the old practice of "retrenchment" - the 
time honoured expedient. However, it turned out that like most of the 
avenues "open" to the Conservatives, this one would lead to a cul-de- 
sac, thus leading them to favour - after 1906 - tariff duties in 
order to overcome the fiscal crisis.
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The Onset of Fiscal Crisis, 1899-1905. The Fetters to the Development
of Fiscal Accumulation
From 1896-1899 the government had a teirporary reprieve from the 
mounting fiscal crisis owing to a large increase in the national 
income. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, the three years of 
budget surpluses proved merely to be a peaceful interlude between 
latent and realised fiscal crisis. The mounting crisis was boosted by 
the catalytic impulse of the Boer War after 1900. Though contrihuting 
to the fiscal problem throu^ the vast amounts of expenditure that it 
entcdled, it was however merely a catalyst rather than a cause of the 
crisis.
In this connection it is worth briefly examining the recent claim 
made by Davis and Huttenback (1988) and P. K  (7 Brien (1988, 1990), 
that the enpire was a costly burden içon the British tax-payer and 
the economy. As a prelude to the final chapter of this thesis, the 
fact is that British military expenditures ^^ oen ccnpared to the 
capacity of the economy to bear them, were very low. Indeed with the 
exception of America (vMch had only really become a military Great 
Power after 1898), British military expenditures as a proportion of 
national income were the lowest of the world's Great Powers. 
Furthermore, military expenditures on the colonies, as Davis and 
Huttenback indeed admit, only constituted approximately 50% of the 
total spent on the military. This then reduced further the tax 
revenues necessary to fund the "unproductive" colonial expenditures. 
Perhaps most damning of all was the fact that past military 
expenditures on the colonies actually allowed Britain to maintain the 
lowest rates of taxation from 1903 to 1914 of all the Furcpean Great 
Powers..
However, although British military expenditures (as a proportion of 
national income) were of the lowest levels of the Great Powers (with 
the exception of American), the increases that occurred particularly
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cifter 1895 through to 1913 were of sufficient inport to radically 
effect Edwardian politics. Thus despite the catalytic nature of the 
Boer War (and indeed the enpire as a whole) vpon the mounting fiscal 
crisis of the British state, the fact remains that government 
spending during this conflict. rocketed from £143.7m in 1899 to 
£205. 2m in 1901-'2 (Mitchell and Deane 1962: 398; Mallet 1913: 477). 
To meet these expenditures, increases in tea and tobacco duties were 
made whilst the sinking fund was suspended and new loans were 
resorted to. Significantly, new customs duties were brought in - 
particular a tariff on com. At this stage however, the cause of free 
trade was still dominant over protectionism within the Conservative 
Party. As a result (and sipplemented with a threat to Balfour of his 
resignation) Ritchie was able to revoke the 1902 c o m  tariff a year 
later, vAien Chamberlain departed for South Africa. As noted above, 
the government's attenpt to develop a scheme of colonial burden- 
sharing failed in the fcice of colonial resistance.
The situation was increasingly leading the government towards the 
policy of protectionism as a means to solving the crisis. Edward 
Hamilton^ s statement of 1901 was even more impelling two years later 
"... The conclusion to vdiich I have with great reluctance come, is 
that it is necessary seriously to consider the question of enlarging 
our sources of revenue and of broadening the basis of our taxation 
systemf' (quoted in Friedberg 1989: 108, my enphases). Indeed in 1903 
the fiscal "seed" of the broadening of the basis of taxation (throu^ 
new indirect taxes) had been planted within the Conservative party. 
From 1903 throuc^ to late 1906 this fiscal "seed" grew - thou^ very 
much in the background. From 1907 onp^ Lcds the seed would grow openly 
and rapidly into a mighty oak, to form the backbone of the Ohionist 
electoral campaign in 1910.
For the immediate period of 1903-1905 however, the seed would meet 
certain teirporary obstacles. With a distinct lack of will to raise 
direct taxes, most Conservatives agreed with Hamilton^ s sentiment. 
Thus they favoured an increase of new indirect taxes. To this end an 
inport duty on sugar and an export duty on coal had been levied in 
1901-2. The following year a tariff on c o m  iirports was adopted (this 
by a free trade chancellor - Michael Hicks-Beach! ). But it was agreed
234
that further levies on wine and beer would yield little, and any 
additional increases on tea and tobacco were deemed politically 
unwise. A general tariff on all iitpo2±s had been discounted in part, 
because free trade forces were still dominant within the party but 
also, because this would involve a tax on raw materials (vMch 
of course would have had the adverse effect of raising the price of 
the finished British good). Chamberlain^ s alternative formulation - 
that of a moderate tariff to be levied on finished manufactured 
inçorts - would emerge only after 1906 as the preferred option.
The dilemma for the free trading faction within the party was 
presented as early as 1901 by Hicks-Beach;
"I cannot anticipate that the revenue of 1902-^  3 including the war 
taxes, will do much more than meet the expenditure of the year... I 
see no hope at any rate of a sufficient surplus to take off even a 
penny of the income tax... This seems to me of the gravest inportance 
if we examine the history of our expenditure during the past six 
years... There has been a total increase (in normal expenditure) of 
40%... I cannot conceive it possible that such a rate of increase in 
time of peace can long continue. It has been met, so far, by the 
great increase in our general revenue due to prosperity, by death 
duties and ly taxation inposed for war purposes. The first two are 
new beginning to fail us. The third, even if vdiolly continued, cannot 
in my judgement, be increased in peacetime. Heavier direct tax would 
not be borne; aiy attenpt to increase the exdsting indirect taxes 
would be useless on a falling revenue, and the only possible new 
indirect taxes A^iich would produce aiy inportant amount, without a 
complete return to protectionist policy would be small duties on 
com, or meat or petroleum, on the political objections to vMch I 
need not dwell... For th^e reasons it seems to me absolutely 
essential that a real check should be inposed on the continued 
increase of ordinary expenditure for which we have been responsible 
since 1895-^  6" (Beach to Salisbury, May 1901, quoted in Sykes 1978: 
26)
The fiscal logic of taxation was beginning to weaken the case for 
free trade within the Conservative Party. For the moment however, 
with free trade forces still powerful within the party, (despite 
Austen Ghamberlainf s promotion to Chancellor of the Exchequer), .the 
protectionist solution was not adopted. Hemmed in on all sides, the 
new chancellor had little choice but to fall back on the old policy 
of retrenchment. Attenpts therefore at securing increased revenues 
had backfired. The withdrawal of the c o m  duty in 1903 had stimulated 
a full blown row over the issue of protectionism within the 
Conservative government. In the wake of this political crisis several
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leading members of the cabinet - both free traders and protectionists 
resigned in protest, including Joseph Chamberlain. Austen 
Chamberlain was made chancellor, and was faced with the daunting task 
of sorting out the growing political and financial problems that the 
government faced. Although Austen Chamberlain initially countenanced 
a programme of increased taxes, it was only too clear that cill 
political avenues leading to this proposal were closed. Ihus he 
informed his colleagues;
"However reluctant we may be to face the fact, the time has 
come v^en we must frankly admit that the financial resources of the 
United Kingdom are inadequate to do all that we should desire in the 
matter of imperial defence" (28 April 1904, quoted in Friedberg 1989: 
89-90).
Thus with his hands effectively tied, he set about inpleiftenting 
reductions in government expenditures. He was especially keen to 
maintain the country's naval strength, vAiilst he accepted that 
military expenditures would have to be reduced. In October 1904, 
Selbome appointed Admiral Sir John Fisher to the post of First Sea 
Lord. Fisher set about to undertake a mini-revolution within the 
Admiralty. Under Fisher, the whole naval system was rationalised. In 
particular, old and inneficient suoned vessels (of vAoich there were 
plenty), were deccmmisiOned, thus dispensing with much waste and 
inneficiency. (For a fuller discussion see P. M. Kennedy 1983: Ch. 8; 
A.Marder 1956: 22-38; A. Harder 1961: 23-46; A. Harder 1964: 483-514; 
A. L. Friedberg 1989: Ch. 4; R  F. HacKay 1973: 273-350). In 1905 rewards 
were reaped at the Exchequer. Naval expenditures went from £41m in 
1904 to £37.2m in 1905. This was a striking development to occur 
given the escalation of foreign naval developments, (thou^ the 
reduction was based on a more rationalised system mther than any 
real leduction in military power).
However, this so-called "sdutionf* - that of reducing expenditures - 
vMch had dominated government fiscal policy from 1903-1905, 
r^resented nothing more than the death throes of a by new obsolete 
mode of taxation. Or put another way, the problem of rising 
expenditures had sounded the death-knell for retrenchment and old 
regime budgetary practices. Indeed the growing desire for a 
broadening of indirect taxes within the party came increasingly into
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contradiction with the policy of retrenchment. By 1906 the strain 
could hold no more, and the contradiction enabled the fetters to the 
development of the mode of taxation to burst asunder.
By 1906 it was clear that the government had failed to fully resolve 
the fiscal question. Ihe choice of retrenchment over taxation would
very soon become impossible to maintain. As a result the
Conservatives would be forced to choose their fiscal weapon with 
which they would fight the Liberals. The factor vhich would lead to 
this confrontation, and would simultaneously destroy old regime
budgetary practices, lay partly on the military and partly on the
social side of the expenditure equation. The overwhelming feature of 
Edwardian politics was the realisation of the Victorian development 
of the 1884 franchise extension to much of the working class. Armed 
with the vote, the working class began to push for major welfare 
reforms. It became iiqperative that if the two major parties were to 
remain electorally popular, inroads towards appeasing the working 
classes would have to be made. However it is worth pointing out that 
it would be quite incorrect to assume that such attempts as were made 
by the two parties were a simple response to the onslau^t of 
"proletarian class struggle". Bather, the attempt by both parties to 
attract the working class masses was a function of ruling class 
strategies, in turn a function of the parliamentary democratic [as 
opposed to authoritarian or autocratic] nature of the British state 
[see chapter6j. Thus as a response to the political rise of the 
working class, civil expenditures began to grew quite rapidly in the 
late nineteenth century. By 1906 both parties soumit to increase 
further social reforms in order to attract the working class vote. 
Fiscal pressures were also mounting on the military side, 
particularly with the new Dreadnouÿit programme vMch was soon to be 
initiated.
After 1906, the policy of retrenchment came more and more into 
contradiction with the requisites of fiscal accumulation. More 
specifically, the relations of extraction were coming increasingly 
into contradiction with the mode of taxation. The electoral rise of 
the working class masses in the context of parliamentary democracy 
meant that the hitherto regressive mode of taxation was increasingly
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untenable. It was realised by the Liberal government that urgently 
required sources of revenue could not be extracted from the working 
class. The Unionist party had failed to foresee this, and as a 
result, went down in the Liberal wave of 1910. Thus current relations 
of extraction had to be overthrcwn before fiscal accumulation could 
take off from its stagnant position in 1905. This meant that the tax 
burden would have to shift away from the masses, and at the very 
least bring the onus of fiscal responsibility to the hitherto 
privileged upper income groups. This meant that a fiscal revolution 
had to be waged from above. In turn, this required a frontal attack 
upon the various "dominant" class groups by the state Such an attack 
was left to the Liberal government, since the Conservatives had 
allied themselves to maintaining the old regime relations of 
extraction. Thus in the Edwardian era a major political rift 
developed between the two parties, growing rapidly after 1906. The 
specific nature of this rift lay not so much over welfare reforms but 
in the sphere of taxation.
Theoretical and Practical Develcpnent of liberal Policies of 
"Radical" Taxation, 1890-1907
The Edwardian era witnessed a shift from an old fiscal regime to a 
new mode of taxation. In the Victorian era, the accumulation of 
government revenue and in particuleur the growth of expenditure had 
been strictly limited. This was the essence of the budgetary 
practices of the old fiscal regime. John Stuart Mill's Princioles of 
Political Economy had provided a theoretical guide-line to fiscal 
practice rL^t up to the last decades of the nineteenth century.
Government intervention in the economy was seen as harmful; capital 
accumulation could be checked and "excess" taxation could be "carried 
so far as to discourage industry by insufficiency of reward" 
(J. S. Mill 1891: 533). Direct taxation presented a particular problem 
for capital accumulation, especially in its effect on profits
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(J. s. Mill 1891: Ch. 3, pp. 496-498). This was also due to the adverse 
consequences that it created for the "supply- side" of the economy 
through the fact that the taxation of savings could only reduce 
capital accumulation ( 1891 Book 5, Ch. 2 pp. 490-491, 499-501, 522-523; 
see also David Ricardo The Principles of Political Economv and 
Taxation 1817/1971, Ch. 8, pp. 168-172). David Ricardo summarised the 
classical position aptly; "There are no taxes vMch have not a 
tendency to lessen the pcwer to accumulate" (1817/1971: 169). It was 
also central to the classical position, that taxation should wei^ 
equally on all income groups. In this vein, progressive taxation was 
unjust. Thus revenue extraction would not be "progressive" tut 
"proportionate" to the numbers of the population (see especially 
James Mill Elements of Political Economy 1891: Ch. 4, pp. 271-275). 
Thus indirect taxes would predominate as the major source of revenue, 
(even though they weighed disproportionately upon the Icwsr income 
orders).. Indeed the indirect nature of the nineteenth century mode 
of taxation formed a major strand of old regime budgetary practices.
The view that the two major classes should contribute in proportion 
to their numbers (rather than in proportion to their income) was 
maintained by the Conservatives throu^iout the Edwardian era. The 
ostensible reason for this was stated by Lecky;
" Highly graduated taxation realises most completely the supreme 
danger of democracy, creating a state of things in vMch one class 
iitposes on another burdens ^Aich it is not asked to share, and inpels 
the state into schemes of extravagance under the belief that the 
v^ide costs will be thrown ipon others" (quoted in Emy 1972: 109).
However if this had been a genuine principle of Conservative 
financial principle then the old tax regime would never have come 
into existence in the first place, owing to the fact that it 
penalised one class (the lowest income earners) over another (the 
higher income earners). The real reason for the Conservative distrust 
of progressive direct taxes was that they would hurt the party s 
supporters hardest owing to the h i ^  income nature of their 
constituents. Thus the system of taxation of the nineteenth century 
disproportionately benefited the hi^iest income groups . Not 
surprisingly the Conservative party, d^rLch had come to represent such 
groups by the late nineteenth century, souc^ to maintain this strand
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of old regime tax strategies v^en it came imder threat, particularly 
after 1906.
The second major strand was the policy of "retrenchment", ^Aich 
stated that government expenditures (and hence revenues) should be 
kept to an absolute minimum. This had several strands, all of vMch 
were connected with old Liberalism. Mill's individualist philosophy 
had immediate inplications for taxation; since the business of life 
is best performed by the individual (vAo knows best his interests), 
taxes (if excessive) only infringe upon this "sovereign" sphere. 
Excessive taxation therefore is anathema to the individualism of 
classical liberal political economy (see Mill 1891 Book 5, Ch. 11, 
pp. 567-591). Excessive taxation also effected the individual in terms 
of enployment opportunities. As Gladstone put it,
"All taxation operated in the restraint of trade, and, therefore, in 
order to reduce prices, in order to secure full employment, it was 
necessary to k e ^  taxation and public e^qienditure at a ndnimunf 
(quoted in Davis and Huttenback 1988: 276).
This implied two normative principles. Firstly that tax levels 
remain lew and secondly, that governments should not intervene in the 
economy in order to effect a redistribution of incomes through 
taxation for welfare purposes. Petrenphment also linked \;pto the 
problem of direct taxation. As Gladstone put it, the income tax was 
particularly pernicious since, "it tenpted statesmen to expansion", 
and "tempted tax-payers to fraudulent evasions" (quoted in Davis and 
Huttenback 1988: 276).
In addition, the liberal Cdbdenite view in particular held military 
expenditures to be necessary but unproductive. As will be discussed 
shortly, it was this view - rather than enpirical reality - that led 
to the liberal belief that the enpire was too costly, in turn giving 
rise to the somsvhat disingenuous notion of the "^Mte manf s burden". 
Or put another way, it was the existence of liberal views emphasising 
the necessity of low taxation, that led to the belief that both 
military ejpenditures and inperialism were excessive in the context 
of British inperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Thus successive British governments managed to either 
reduce peacetime military expenditures, or at least keep such
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spending increases to a minimum. Thus frcm 1830-1850 military 
expenditures increased frcm £13. 9m to £15. Im. From 1850-1890 military 
expenditures rose frcm £15. Im to only £32. 7m. This increase would be 
much less if the latter figure was deflated for price increases. In 
addition total government expenditures were remarkably stable. In 
1850 they stood at £ 55. 5m; 1860, £ 69. 6m; 1870, £ 67. Im; 1880, £81. 5m 
(See Table 4. 8). This was all the more striking for the fact that 
Great Power rivals were rapidly increasing their total levels of 
military expenditure througjiout this period. The escalation of the 
relations of violence in the late nineteenth century, partly as a 
function of the second military revolution, impacted profoundly upon 
Britain, particularly in the naval and fiscal spheres.
The old fiscal regime of the nineteenth century vAiich was founded 
upon the old Gladstonian liberal budgetary practices of retrenchment 
and low direct taxes - was increasingly rejected ty the new brand of 
liberalism that was emerging in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. Interestingly, it was the relationship between taxation and 
economic development \^ch constituted the initial concem of the New 
Liberal attack ipon old regime tax principles.
The first major breach with the old orthodoxy came with Harcourt's 
1894 budget. The economic justification was given by Sidney Buxton 
argued that the proposed death duties were not a tax on personal 
capital (pace the "sipply-side" arguments), since personal wsalth 
accumulation only indirectly impacted on productive investment. Most 
inportantly the creation of the death duties had a double inpact for 
the progressive tax cause. Not only did it raise the significance of 
progressive taxes in the pool of total revenue, but it also led to an 
absolute reduction in regressive taxes, namely indirect. Harcourt 
argued that the state had a perfect ric^t to claim property of an 
individual "beyond the term of his life". This was yet another 
striking reversal of Liberal politics, vMch had hitherto held that 
the state must be prevented from imposing or intervening in the 
private sphere of the individual. Thus the sanctity of the private 
domain of the individual at least after his death was under attack. 
It would only be a matter of time before Liberalism would turn upon 
that individual during his lifetime. It is interesting to note that
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J. s. Mill had favoured such a tax. Indeed it was "largely owing to 
Mill's support (that) the progressive inheritance tax became law in 
1894" (U.K. Hicks 1967: 128).
The linkage between taxation and income redistribution, though not 
yet e:^icitly made, was being carefully prepared beneath the party 
level. A vital area of attack against any notion of progressive 
taxation would cane mainly in the economic sphere. Principally it 
would be argued - as it had been for the majority of the nineteenth 
century - that any reduction in the supply side of taxation to the 
economy would have adverse consequences. Ihat is, any reduction in 
the pool of savings - vdiich direct taxation would imply - would 
reduce investment, and hence economic growth. However, this orthodoxy 
was radically challenged by John Atkinson Hobson.
Hobson argued that the high income (capitalist classes) appropriated 
an " unproductive" surplus due to their favourable monopolistic 
societal position. This "unproductive" surplus consisted industrial 
super profits and economic land rents. It was deemed unproductive 
owing to the fact that it was either relocated to stimulate over­
production via the savings-investment linkage or it was sinply 
"squandered" on unproductive "luxury" expenditures. Thus the basis of 
the supply-side conditions for direct taxation - namely the savings- 
investment linkage - was depicted by Hobson as the cause of certain 
economic failings. This curgument was kncwn as the 
"underconsumptionist theory".
In this theory, it was argued that a small oligarchy had effectively 
hijacked from the majority of society, the propensity to save, 
through its exclusive extraction of surplus income. This meant that 
there was a constant stream of savings vhich was directed to 
investment in industry. However vhilst the supply side was well taken 
care of, the demand side to the economy was severely lagging behind. 
This was due to the fact that this minority had reduced the 
majority s income throunÿi its extraction of super profits. Thus the 
situation arises ^dierely industry produces too many goods, whilst 
society is starved of the necessary capacity to absorb them. Thus 
over-production is a function of under-consumption. The effective
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solution to the problem - according to Hobson - ■was not the export of 
capital abroad (inperialism), which merely d^ressed money wages and 
led to a further restriction in demand (Imperialism 1902: 81-99). The 
solution lay rather with a boost to donestic purchasing power.
The principal weapon to smooth out this damaging cyclical nature of 
capitalism, was the introduction of progressive taxation. This would 
have the double effect of firstly reducing the pool of savings vAiich 
would alleviate the problem of over-production in the first place, 
and secondly, a redistribution of income throu^ such taxation would 
allow an effective absorption of all commodities. Whilst this would 
allow industry to maintain a steady rate of profit, it would have 
many other benefits, not least of all a widening of eirployment. (See 
J. A  Hobson 1900, 1902, 1909)
More specifically Hobson argued that unproductive surpluses accrued 
from land vAiich had been "granted by society", should therefore be 
returned through vrelfare reforms.
"Then will devolve on (the state) the duty of taking as much of the 
public income as it can secure and of expending it most economically 
for the public v^fare. Such a state... will no longer say ' vAiat is 
the least revenue vMch is needed to fulfil the functions inposed 
upon me?' but ' \tot is the largest amount of useful work vAiich I can 
do with the income that belongs to me? (Hobson 1908, "The Taxation of 
Unearned Income," Transactions of the Political and Economic Circle 
of the NAt-l mnal Liberal dub. Vd. 3, quoted in Emy 1972: 112; also 
Hobson 1902: Ch. 4).
Hobson not only favoured a shift towards progressive forms of 
taxation thrcuÿi income and land taxes, but dearly heralded the 
death-knell for retrenchment. Increased government expendi tures would 
amongst other things allow for a stimulation of the economy.
This provided a radical departure from d d  regime principles. ' As 
Peacock and Wiseman argue, upto the 1880s the notion that 
"Expenditure determines Pdicy" predominated. In other words, as 
William Gladstone put it, "the cost of any pdicy would generally be 
about the s d e  element in deciding its desirability" (quoted in 
Peacock and Wiseman 1961: 64). This formula of retrenchment began to 
give way as of the late 1880s to the notion that "Expenditure depends 
ipon policy". Thus if policies, especially of a social nature were
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desired, then the necessary taxation would be extracted. Policies 
would be judged more on their electoral merits rather than solely on 
their costs. However this was not a carte blanche to spend limitless 
amounts of tax-payers^ money. "While policy was beccxning more 
generally regarded as the significant matter and expenditure its 
passive consequence, governments still had to take into account of 
v ^ t  citizens would tolerate by way of taxation" (Peacock and Wiseman 
1961: 66). Furthermore, certainly up until about 1906, the Liberal
rather than the Conservative Party would favour increased 
expenditures, particularly for welfare purposes. Ihe Conservatives 
would later come to grudgingly adopt this formula, but even then only 
up to a limited extent.
This new fiscal departure differentiated Conservative from Liberal 
thinking, not only in terms of taxation but also expenditure. As 
already, discussed, the Conservatives responded to the fiscal crisis 
with a policy of retrenchment from 1903 to 1905. Ihis enabled the 
party to k e ^  direct taxes to a minimum; an inperative, given the 
increasing confrontation to direct taxes of Conservative party 
constituents. Indeed in 1903, vhen the government was forced to raise 
the income tax to Is 3d in the pound for one year during the Boer 
War, many Conservative supporters openly withdrew support. As a 
result the government lowered the rate by 4d to lid the following 
yeatr. As Ritchie made clear in an address to the City on 17 July 
1903, he remembered " years ago that the principle of taxation in 
this country was that direct taxation should only be half of indirect 
taxation, but as years had gone on that proportion had been reversed" 
(quoted in Emy 1972: 113). Clearly both he and his audience were 
displeased at the violation of this "principle".
The Liberals felt that direct and progressive taxes would benefit 
the "social" as well as the economic sphere. A cleeu: foundation to 
the progressive principle had been developed by the Marginalist 
revolution of the 1870s. This established the principle that when 
"ability to pay" is defined, adequate account should be made of the 
declining marginal utility function of increased income levels. Thus 
an "equal sacrifice" could only be defined on a progressive rather 
than prcportional basis (Hicks 1972: 130). The notion of "social
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justice" had entered the political vocabulary. It was this aspect 
that dominated the Liberal aim of achieving progressive taxation. 
After the 1884 franchise extension, the party sought to attract the 
new working class vote. To this end welfare and progressive tax 
reforms would be aimed (to be realised in 1910). Thus the radical 
shift in the Liberal programme suited their new electoral strategy. 
Friedrich Engels had understood this vAien he wrote Bebel " The 
Liberals know full well that for them it is a question of catching 
the Labour vote if they intend to continue their existence as a 
party" (Engels to Bebel 5 July 1892, Marx and Engels On Britain. 
quoted in P. F. Clarke 1971).
By 1900 it was evident that there was a grcwlng rift between 
Conservative and " new" Liberal viev® of taxation. The rift developed 
rapidly thereafter such that by 1906, the Liberal party^ s adoption of 
collectivism stood in strong contrast to the Conservative's continued 
attachment to more old style notions of individualism. Ihe Liberals 
had by new reinterpreted MLir s vievs of taxation based on equality 
of sacrifice to justify progressive fiscal measures rather than the 
Conservative held view of proportional taxation (^ i^rray 1980: 34). 
Thus vAîat differentiated both parties - aifter 1906 - was not their 
commitment to social reform but rather the methods v^ch each would 
enploy to fund these initiatives.
SBCHCN 4.
THE FISCAL BASIS CF lAKIFF REFORM 1906-1909. HŒ! THIRD PHASE 
"Socialist" Finance and the Emergence of Labour
Going into the 1906 election hopelessly divided, the Conservatives 
suffered a catastrophic defeat, securing a mere 25% of the seats in 
the House of Commons. Divisions however were not the sole cause of 
the defeat. In fact perhaps the most vital single issue in this
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collapse was the organisation of the Labour vote. Indeed the Labour 
vote contributed heavily to the overall "radical" victory. Although 
the Conservatives actually managed to increase their vote to 2. 46m in 
1906 (over 1. 67m in 1900), the radical (Liberal and Labour) vote went 
from 1. 52m in 1900 to 3. 11m in 1906. No one had been so wrong in 
their predictions as Joseph Chamberlain. On 13 January 1906 (forty 
days and forty nic^ts after the fateful dissolution of the 
government), Chamberlain stated that
"... before the dissolution I reckoned the majority would be 140 with 
the Irish. After the dissolution, \^ch irrproved our position and 
upto new, I put the majority against us at 80. I am curious to see 
how far these guesses prove correct" (quoted in Fraser 1966: 273).
The majority turned out to be a staggering 356. The election* was the 
turning point for the Conservatives. And with it the third phase of 
tariff reform was rapidly entered into.
The 1906 election results were a shock to the Conservatives. Leo 
Maxse claimed that, "we may remain in opposition for half a 
generation" (Maxse to Bonar Law, 29 January 1906, quoted in 
E. H. H. Green 1985: 669). Indeed the election defeat produced a
scmevtot exaggerated reaction throuc^iout the Conservative Party. 
"What is going on is a faint echo of the same movement vMch has 
produced massacres in St. Petersburg, riots in Vienna and Socialist 
processions in Berlin" (A. J. Balfour quoted in Sykes 1978: 115). The 
election was perceived iy the Conservatives not so much as a great 
Liberal victory but the expression of the " solidarity of labour... the 
conviction for the first time b o m  in the working classes, that their 
social salvation is in their own hands... " (Balfour to Joseph 
Chamberlain, 24 January 1906, quoted in J. Amery 1969 Vol. 6, pp. 791). 
It was not so much the Liberals but the socialist threat that worried 
the party. This was fuelled by the fact that the two opposition 
parties - Labour and Liberal - had formed a cohesive electoral pact 
in 1906 to defeat the (Conservatives. As Chamberlain put it to Bonar 
Law on his election defeat, "You have gone down in the Labour wave" 
(Chamberlain to Law, 19 January, 1906, quoted in Green 1985: 682). As 
the (Conservatives saw it, the political atmosphere was becoming 
increasingly saturated with "socialist" ideology.
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However thus far, the Conservative programme had little or nothing 
with vÆiich to fi<ÿit the "socialist menace". Indeed with the rise of 
labour and the shift of the Liberal party leftward, current 
Conservatism suddenly appeared redundant. Its poverty was summarised 
by Salisbury;
"The Labour Party have cone forward in the consciousness of 
strength, and have formulated enormous demands. Ihe radicals will 
attenpt to meet them - so will Joe, I suppose. But we wretched 
Conservatives, if we are honest, can offer them very little. Into 
this is mixed Tariff Reform, and our position as a party and in the 
Lords trying to stem the current is to be this - We cannot give you 
old age pensions, land nationalisation, compulsory minimum wages etc, 
but this is what we will do, we will c^ve you a tax on your bread. It 
is an inpossible situation.' The food tax was always a very heavy 
wei^t to carry tut with a suspicious and importunate proletariat, it 
is a prohibi-tive handicap - for Conservatives" (Salisbury to 
Selbome, 12 February 1906, quoted in Sykes 1978: 107).
It was only too clear that the lind'ts of the hitherto dominant 
policy programme of the Conservative party had been reached. Ihis was 
recognised by Lord Malmesbury lAo stated that;
Ihe necessity for new institutions and new movements in harmony with 
the changing spirit of the times has never been more inperative "than 
at present; and just in proportion as the Unionist Party proves 
itself capable of this adjustment will be its owner of continued 
usefulness to 'the country" quoted in Green 1985: 690).
Ihe rise of labour and the shift in the Liberal party had by 1906 
rendered (kanservativism to a large extent inoperative. Ihe 
Conservative Party was in electoral crisis, holding no effecti've 
programme with v^ch to regain executive power. As Garvin starkly put
it;
Ihe Spectator is right when it declares that hew to combat Socialism 
is the practical question before all moderate men It is sight v^en 
it says that there is no prospect for the Unionist Party upon the 
present programme" Garvin in Ihe Na-tinnal RAvi mw. September 1907, 
reprinted in Garvin 1910: 106).
It would therefore take a minor political revolution within the 
party to remove the fetters ^Anch stifled its development and 
electoral chances. Ihus the party would revert to the "reserve 
engine" of Chamberlaih s tariff reform project. Ihat is the party 
would embrace social reforms - in particular old age pensions - in
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order to capture the working class vote. Furthermore, the adoption of 
social reform by the Conservative party meant that the "maximum 
revenue" scenario would cone into play (see equation 2 above). As 
Parker Smith vAio lamented the less of the working class vote to 
Labour in Scotland put it, tariff reform was now vital not for 
inperialist or preferentialist reasons, but as the
"only effective argument against the spoliatory schemes of taxation 
v^ch will be put forward. Fresh sources of revenue are required by 
men of all parties for social schemes. In opposing confiscatory 
proposals, we must have an alternative policy of taxation" (Smith to 
Balfour 28 January 1907, quoted in Sykes 1978: 119).
The alternative method of revenue extraction therefore was an all­
round moderate tariff. Vfould the Conservative party be willing to 
forego economic benefits to trade that free trade would bring, by 
levying protectionist tariffs in order to secure revenue? Such a 
sacrifice would be necessary in order to prevent the "socialist" 
policies of redistributive, punitive and anti- property tax measures 
proposed by the Liberal and Labour opposition.
Indeed pace Hobson, the constant diction of the Liberal programme 
as "socialist" by the Conservatives was not an ideological smear 
cairpaign (see Hobson 1909 133). Ihe grcwlng "socialist menace" must
have been quite terrifying for much of the Conservative party. Ihe 
rise of egalitarianism coupled with vAiat must have looked 
increasingly like the arrival of Robin Hood in the guise not as 
outlaw but state could in their eyes only have led to serfdom. Indeed 
to paraphrase Marx, picture to yourself the En^sh."bourgeois", how 
in the throes of "socialist" panic his "trade-crazy" brain is 
tortured and confused, set in a vMrl and stunned by rumours of 
socialist fiscal coup d' etat, by the seeming " communist" conspiracies 
of the radicals. Ihink of all this and you will comprehend vAiy in 
this unspeakable, deafening chaos of confusion, conspiration, 
usurpation and fiscal revolution, the bourgeois madly snorts at his 
parliamentary constituency, "Rather an end with Protectionism than 
socialist taxation without end". Arthur James Balfour understood this 
cry.
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Balfour^ s Switch to Protection
In the pre-1906 period, Balfour had managed to avoid coming to a 
decision over free trade or protectionism. He had never been 
convinced of the economic case for tariffs. He had ventured only so 
far as appearing in favour of a moderate tariff in order to provide 
retaliation against foreign protectionism - ultimately to achieve 
free trade. Acconpanying the first draft of his Economic Notes on 
Insular Free Trade was a letter which he sent to Devonshire in vMch 
was stated,
"I do not think that... we ou^t to attempt to carry out a 
retaliatory policy by the continental method of starting with heavy 
duties against the world and relaxing them in favour of those 
countries vMch give us privileges" (Balfour to Devonshire 30 July, 
1903, quoted in Sykes 1978: 45).
Hcwever as has been argued above, moderate tariff rates and 
retaliation had a certain inconpatibility. Lew or moderate rates were 
likely to lead to foreign retaliation, possibly spiralling ipwards 
into a tariff war - the latter being a long term historical fear 
within the "official mind". Ihe obvious trajectory for tariff rates 
to meet the goal of retaliation would be to start h i ^  and work 
downwards. Balfour's reluctance to sipport h i ^  tariff rates was 
synptomatic of the fact that he never really believed that 
protectionism had any economic benefits. Indeed Balfour had only 
favoured (low) tariffs for retaliation as it would allow him (or so 
he believed) to keep the peace between the free fooders and the v^ iole 
hoggers. Beyond this half heartedness Balfour did not tread, much to 
the anger and frustration of the Chairiberl ainite faction.
Yet the striking fact to emerge was that by 1907 Balfour had been 
converted to Tariff Reform. In addition, he had originally stated 
that retaliatory tariffs would have to be levied on a selective 
basis. But after 1907 it was clear that he had shunned the 
"selective" criterion in favour of an all round general tariff. What 
then had led him to change his mind? Ihe year 1907 marked a vital 
turning point in the tariff reform campaign. Indeed events in that
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year strengthened the Unionist shift towards adopting tariff reform. 
Not least was the appearance of Philip Snowdeh s 
The Socialist Budget, in vMch he wrote,
"The existence of a rich class vAiose riches are the cause of the 
poverty of the masses, is the justification for the socialist demand 
that the cost of bettering the conditions of the people must be met 
by the taxation of the rich" (quoted in Fraser 1966: 287).
He went onto argue that the poor should pay no taxes; all indirect 
taxes should be abolished. To make good the lost revenue (and to 
provide surplus funds), he proposed to add £ 72m to the income tax, 
most of vMch would be borne by the top thirtieth of the population 
(who he argued, owned 33% of national income). As the Conservatives 
saw it, socialist insurrection would come not at the barricades but 
throu^ the insidious use of taxation ("in instalments"). "For the 
purposes of our time, vAiat we shall have to grapple with is not the 
utopian creed but the budgetary method. Practical Socialism. ..is a 
system of finance" (Maxse, quoted in Fraser 1966: 287). Conpared to 
Sncwden s fiscal prescriptions, tariff reform appeared - even to the 
staunchest of free traders - to be infinitely preferable. This was 
expanded into popular form by the Observer editor, J. L. Garvin in his 
article "Free trade as a Socialist Policy" (in the Nat-innai Review. 
September 1907, reprinted in Garvin 1910: 105-112).
In addition the Qiamberlainites had alreac^ put the revenue 
arguments at the very forefront of their case. This case was built 
upon a three-fold political infrastructure. Firstly, it was argued 
that if the (Conservatives were to attract the working class, they 
would need to offer significant social reforms. With their defeat at 
the 1906 election and the simultaneous rise of Labour, reformism it 
was argued was essential if the Conservatives were to regain 
electoral support.
Secondly, tariff reform would provide a more palliative alternative 
to income taxation for most, if not all Unionists. As Chamberlain had 
put it in the House of Commons in May 1906, the only alternative to 
revenue from tariffs was " confiscation^. Only tariff reform could 
provide "without robbery or jobbery" the necessary financial basis 
for further social reform, (Chamberlain in Oitlook. January 1907,
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quoted in Murray 1980: 88). Hiirdly, tariffs iitpcsed for revenue 
purposes offered a backdoor to inperial preference (see Murray 1980: 
87-88).
The rise of " socialist" taxation onto the political agenda meant 
that the Conservatives would new turn tcwards tariff reform as the 
alternative. This was accompanied by the resurrection of the original 
reserve engine of the tariff reform campaign - old age pensions. This 
had been assigned to the back-room of the tariff policy programme in 
1903 owing to the fact that Chamberlain had been politically forced 
into adopting the "minimum-revenue scenario*'. However, in the eyes of 
the Conservatives, by 1906, creeping socialism had been jolted into a 
stampede, and with it, tariffs on food and manufactured goods became 
the only acceptable alternative.
All this impacted ipon the Tory leadership. In the early months of 
1907, Balfour entered into discussions with W. A. S. Hewins. Hewins 
pointed out that the system of taxation was rapidly resuAing crisis 
point. With the increasing levels of government expenditure incurred 
after 1890 and (especially after 1900), revenues would need to 
similarly rise. A large war or an economic crisis Hewins argued would 
"smash the present systenf (quoted in Fraser 1966: 284). In
particular, he shewed that since 1840 British governments had come to 
increasingly rely on direct taxes - a trend vMch had accelerated 
under the Unionist governments after 1895 (see tables 4. 9 and 4. 10 
below).
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Table 4. 9 The Changing Proportions of the Main Categories of Central
Government Revenues. 1860-1913
(in Percentages)
Year
(1)
Direct
(2)
Indirect
(3)
State
Property
1860 18 64 9
1865 16 61 12
1870 26 59 4
1875 17 63 4
1880 25 61 5
1885 26 53 5
1890 26 50 6
1895 28 50 6
1900 31 47 7
1905 33 47 6
1910 27 47 7
1911 44 36 5
1912 38 39 6
1913 37 38 6
Source: B. R. Mitchell ai)d P. Deane 1962: 393,394. Public Finance
Tables, see Appendix 5
(1) DIRECT represents. Land and Assessed taxes. Property and Income 
taxes, and Death Duties. (2) INDIRECT represents. Customs and Excises 
(3) SIATE FRQPERIY represents net revenues from Post, Telephone and 
Telegraph. That is, the figures above have had state property 
expenditures deducted.
With the " socialistic" plans to raise direct taxes further, it had 
become inperative for the Conservatives to find an alternate revenue 
base. Almost inevitably this meant an increase in indirect taxes (and 
hence tariff reform). Indeed, the issues of Britainf s relative 
decline, the problem of dunping and unenplpyment v^ere for Hewins of 
secondary inportance. His primary objective, as it was to become 
Balfour s was the necessity of extracting revenues from npn-direct 
sources (see especially. A  Sykes 1978: 130). In particular, Balfour 
favoured indirect taxes to meet the increased costs of the Edwardian 
era. A memo on food taxes was sent to Balfour on 11 February in which
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Hewins proposed food tariffs, not because they were essential for 
preference and imperial unity, but rather because they provided 
increased revenues vAiich would allow a reduction in the income tax 
(this reason also being a major part of Chamberlaih s project, 
encapsulated within both the "minimum!' and "maximum!' revenue 
scenarios).
Tariff reform as an alternative to socialist taxation was Balfour's 
primary concern. Thus there had been a change in ertphasis over the 
original protectionist project of Joseph Chamberlain. Althou^ 
Chamberlain had favoured a shift towards indirect taxes away from 
direct sources, this objective had been if ai^thing secondary to his 
ultimate aim of unifying the enpire. In his Savoy hotel speech in 
1907 Balfour focussed primarily rpcn the revenue aspect of tariff 
reform, vMlst the preferential aspects were at best only secondary. 
As he stated, "Seme revision of our fiscal system and some broadening 
of the basis of taxation would be absolutely inevitable if vre were 
the only commercial nation in the world, and if we had not got a 
single colony" (speech at a Central Conservative Association Meeting, 
Hull, 1 February 1907, quoted in T. R. L. 1910: v; my emphases).
The Savoy speech marked a turning point both for the Conservative 
party and the tariff reform campaign. Indeed after this "realigning" 
speech, Balfour - like Bismarck almost thirty years before him - 
emerged as a tariff reform leader. With Balfour at the helm, the
Conservative party could - and would - unite upon the cause of
protectionism. What had caused this fundamental change in Balfour was 
not Britainf s e:q)ort capacity, nor Rrltainf s "decline", nor problems 
of unenplpyment, but rather the need to defeat the opposition 
policies of "socialist" taxation. The events of 1907 in particular 
had helped consolidate Balfour* s switch to protection, crescendoing 
with the classic speech to the annual conference of the National 
Union in Birmingham on the 14 November. Here he reiterated his Savoy 
Hotel speech (vdiich strangely had made only a limited inpact upon his
contenporaries). He boldly stated that broadening the basis of
taxation throuÿi a general tariff would finance social reform. After 
all, he argued, "social reform has long been the work of the Itoionist 
Party" (Balfour; The Times. 15 November, 1907). It should be pointed
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out however, that there vas a certain irreconcilabi lity with this 
fiscal stance and his earlier stated "retaliatory*' formula.
A tariff to provide revenue would have a certain permanency 
particularly vithin the framework of Edvardian politics. However, 
retaliation implies that tariffs are to be levied in order to effect 
a lowering of rates invoked by foreign countries. Such a trading 
strategy seeks explicitly to ultimately achieve a situation of more 
or less free trade between Britain and her trading partners. 
Retaliation therefore had very much a temporary, short term nature 
vMch contrasted markedly with the more permanent, longer term aspect 
of the tariff invoked by Balfour after 1907 as a revenue producer. In 
Balfour^ s mind, the tax strategy of protectionism occupied the prime 
position.
Hie Unionist Switch to Protection
It was by new clear that the conflict of " free trade versus 
protection" had been siperseded by the fiscal issue of "direct versus 
indirect" taxation. This was neatly summarised by Cromer
... the more I see of the political situation, the more I am inclined 
to think that free trade versus protection is falling into the 
background and that the real fi^it before long will be socialist 
versus anti-socialist" (Cromer to Lord Robert Cecil, 28 May 1909).
Around this fiscal issue, and under the decisive leadership of 
Balfour, the party came to unite rspidly. Ihis was most clearly 
reflected in the radical development of the unionist Free Traders. 
After 1906 they had found themselves to be in a dilemma. Maintaining 
free trade meant accepting "socialist" income taxation. The 
alternative meant a conplete reversal of their economic aspirations 
and going with protectionism. As Cromer classically put it,
"We are between the Devil and the Deqp Sea. Shall we go to the Devil 
of protection with our friends or the d e ^  sea of socialism with our 
political adverscud.es? (Cromer to Elliot, 19 July 1909, quoted in 
Sykes 1978; 183).
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Whilst both options were problematic for the free trading Unionist 
faction, the choice as to vAiether to favour the "good" of the 
national economy as they and maiy others saw it, or the fiscal 
privileges of the upper income groups was quickly reconciled. 
According to Craner it was,
"... almost certain that a very large number of shaky even perhaps 
some rather strong free traders will practically conbine with the 
tariff reformers rather than bear any very heavy fresh burthens in 
the shape of direct taxation" (Cromer 1908, quoted in Murray 1980: 
88).
Cromer was not wrong. In 1908 Lord Lansdcwne announced to the annual 
meeting of the Liberal Unionist Council that,
"We shall be driven to it (tariff reform) ly the exigencies of the 
financial situation!' (Lansdowne, 20 November 1908, quoted in Marray 
1973: 557).
Ihe Duke of Northumberland lAo had hitherto resisted Chairiberlainf s 
protectionist campaign new turned to support Balfour. Hius he wrote 
Strachey, the
"only chance we have of success is to find a different way of raising 
the money to that proposed ty the government, and as far as I knew 
Tariff Reform is the only alternative".
And again,
"Protection cannot be worse than Socialism... And as... Tariff Reform 
or Socialism are the only possible alternatives at the moment, I am 
quite prepared to swallow the former" (Northumberland to Strachey, 
7,13,21 September 1909, quoted in Blewett 1968: 121).
Perhaps more striking still was the conversion of Lord H u ^  Cecil 
vtio wrote the Earl of Bessborough,
"Mr Lloyd George and Mr Winston Churchill seem to me to desire to 
plunge the country into Socialism, and if I have to choose between 
socialism and tariff reform I unhesitatingly choose the latter" 
(Cecil to Earl of Bessborou^ 29 September 1909, quoted in 
P.P.Clarke 1969: 327).
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Hie Unionist Free traders made it clear that the days when they
would support the opposition in order to satisfy their trade
strategies were over. From 1907 onwards, they would unite with the 
party to avoid the d e ^  sea of socialism. When the 1909 Budget was 
announced the remaining Unionist free traders turned to 
protectionism. St. Aldwyn wrote Robert Cecil;
" This budget seems to me to have given the final shove to the
movement of the Unionist party to tariff reform. A man may be a free 
trader by (economic) conviction and reason... but if he has anything 
to lose... he will certainly prefer an indefinite tariff reform policy 
to the fiscal policy which is initiated by the present budget" 
(St. Aldwyn to Cecil, 28 May 1909, quoted in Reitpel 1972: 193).
The real issue by late 1907 around which the two parties would 
conflict was the raising of revenue. Certainly on the Conservative 
side, it was not trade but tax strategies which informed the
conflict, to vMch the issue of free trade versus protection was to a 
very large degree epijhenonenal.
Indirect Versus Direct Taxation Escalation of the Conflict
Thus far the conflict between the alternative political approaches 
to the fiscal problem had to a large extent occurred on an intra 
rather than inter-party basis. However by 1908 this latent conflict 
reached the surface. In the Spectator, Strachey taunted the 
government that free trade finance would be unable to raise some 
È13m, necessary to fund next year's pensions. Asquith confidently 
replied that "I have secured an anple fund to meet them (pensions) 
without any extra taxation!' (Asquith to Strachey, 9 May 1908, quoted 
in Murray 1980: 92). However by the year end it was clear that
Asquith had been wrong. He had under-estimated pensions e:g)enâiture 
by over £2m. Thus in February 1909 a supplementary vote of Ê 910,000 
had to be provided just to make good the pensions deficit incurred in 
the last quarter of 1908 (Rowland 1968: 216). It was commonly 
recognised that Lloyd George would have to raise new and large sums
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in taxation. The Conservatives goaded the Liberals arguing that free 
trade finance was virtually exhausted and tariff reform was therefore 
only a matter of time (Murray 1973: 556-557; 1980: 92).
Indeed in addition to formulating the budget so as to attract the 
working classes, Lloyd George also fully intended to prove the 
strength of free trade finance. The Liberal shift to income taxation 
was neither accidental nor unea^cted. As Haldane put it;
"We have not stumbled into the introduction of an old age pension 
system, nor into the increase of the proportion vAiich direct bears to 
indirect taxation. These two changes are reforms vMch the true 
spirit has called us for as definitely as it called for electoral 
reform in 1832" (Haldane to Asquith, 9 August 1908, quoted in Murray 
1980: 93).
On a more specific basis, Lloyd George had to deal with a large 
fiscal deficit of 1908-1909. This issue was the subject of 
controversy, particularly within the Liberal cabinet. Walter Runciman 
claimed that Lloyd George had deliberately over- estimated the size 
of the deficit so that he wuld be allcwed to keep all his proposed 
taxes in the Budget. Indeed several other Liberals suspected this 
motivation Lloyd George's projected deficit (see the Diarv of John 
Bums). Such suspicions \^re not merely confined to the Liberal side 
of the House Cromer wrote Strachey that whilst he himself had on 
occasion purposefully underestimated the prospective revenue for a 
certain year, he had however,
"never under-estimated the revenue with a view to making out a case 
for very burdensome taxation. That is \Hnat he appears to me to have 
done in this case" (Cromer to Strachey 14 May 1909, quoted in Murray 
1973: 566).
Thus expenditures were liberally rounded up and revenue estimates 
consistently conservative. Simultaneously he determined to contain 
the real deficit, by resisting as far as possible the Admiralty's 
demands for an escalation of ship-building for fiscal 1909-1910. Thus 
vMlst he sought to make generous allowances for old age pensions he 
attempted to resist the demands for six or even eic^t new 
dreadnoughts in the same yeeu:. As with the pensions, Asquith's
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original estimate of £6m was at least £2m out. Ihe final figure was 
revised from approximately £ 6m to £ 8, 496, 395, (vÆiich actually went 
out). The Admiralty had originally asked for only four new 
dreadnoughts. But hy December it was clear that even this was not 
sufficient given Germany's escalating naval programme. Accordingly 
McKenna revised his request to six new ships, calling for an extra 
ESm. Then in January the Sea Lords urged that eight new ships be 
built, in order to keep ahead of Germany.
On 24 February, Asquith cleverly resolved the problem by agreeing to 
provide for the building of four new ships in fiscal 1909- 1910 and 
the remainder to be provided for in the following year.
" ' And so' Austen Chamberlain snorted in disgust, ' Lloyd Georgs' s 
Budget was to be saved, the little Navy men were to be told of a 
programme of only four ships and the Big Navy men ware to be assured 
that it was really eight' " (Murray 1980: 128).
In the event navy expenditures for the year 1909/1910 stood at 
£ 35. 8m - an increase of £ 3. 6m on the previous year (Mitchell and 
Deane 1962: 398. Mallet 1913: 476), of vMch new construction would 
cost £8,885,194 as against £ 7,545,202 for 1908/1909 (Murray 1980: 
128). Despite the subtle fiscal manoeuvre enacted by the government, 
the fact was that free trade finance was on trial. In April 1909, the 
budget's trial would begin in earnest,
SBCTTCN 5 The Uhgentleznanly State Versus "Capital". The Realisation 
of Fiscal Revolution
The Budget Attack presented
On 29 ^)ril Lloyd George presented his budget to the House of 
Commons, stating that,
" This, Mr Emmott is a war budget It is for raising money to wage 
inplacable warfare against poverty and squalidness. I cannot help 
believing that before this generation has passed away, we shall have 
advanced a great step towards that good time vAien poverty, 
wretchedness and the human degradation vMch always followed in its
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canp will be as remote to the people of this country as the wolves 
v^ch once infested its forests" (quoted in Cross 1966: 102-103).
For the Conservatives, their nightmare scenario had been realised. 
The budget sought a sharp increase in the death duties by a third 
bringing the top rate on estates worth over Elm to 15%; the 
introduction of new land taxes vMch went J^pto a 20% tax on the 
unearned increment in value vAien the land was sold; the introduction 
of a super tax of 2d in the pound on incomes over £5000; an increase 
in the income tax from Is to Is. 2d in the pound. In addition the 
Budget aimed to sweeten the middle classes by inaugurating child tax 
allowances, as well as introducing a lower rate of tax for earned 
than unearned income. Finally various excise taxes were increased 
(Cross 1966: 103. Also R. A. Penpel 1972; 192; Rowland 1968: 217).
But most intimidating of all for the Conservatives was the fact that 
the provisions for the income tax were designed to meet the future 
needs of "inevitable fiscal expansion for national defence and social 
reform!' (Murray 1980: 172). Indeed Lloyd George told the House of 
Commons that the Budget was not a mere "temporary shift". Rather 
these new taxes were of "such an eaqpansive character" that they would 
grow as the country* s demands increased (Hansard» quoted in Murray 
1973: 566). More than anything else, this aspect conjured up for the 
Conservatives a scenario ;Aere they could see themselves descending 
into the quagmire of a socialist hell. As Ihe Hmes mildly put it,
"It (the Budget speech) struck almost exclusively at the fairly well- 
to-do; it raised and attenpted to prejudice several controversial 
issues; and the Budget speech had opened up a number of questions 
vMch went beyond the proposals in the Budget and seemed * rather to 
invite controversy* " (The Times. 30 April 1909, quoted in Murray 
1980: 174).
In fact this proved to be a gross underestimation of the Unionist 
response. The Budget grew into "the most prolonged struggle over a 
single measure in the history of the House of Commons" involving no 
less than seventy days of parliamentary debate and 554 divisions 
(Cross 1966: 104). Ihe Times summarised the Conservative sentiment; 
the doctrine of social ransom has never been carried quite so far" 
and, "the fundamental rl^t of ownership was at stake" (30 April
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1909, quoted in Eny 1972; 122). During the second reading on 10 June, 
they made three points absolutely clear.
Firstly, Austen Chamberlain stated that,
"We are told that it is the final triuitph of free trade and the death 
blow to fiscal (tariff) reform. Sir, in the spirit in which it is 
offered I accept the challenge and I am ready to go to the country at 
any moment upon it" quoted in Murray 1973: 567 my addition).
The Conservatives saw the budget as oppressive, confiscatory and 
totally unacceptable. The sooner this budget could be put to the 
country, they felt, the better. Thou^ a long time in the offing, the 
overt war against "socialism?' was final)y about to begin. One 
strategy that the Conservatives would use would be the recourse to 
constitutional law. Just as in the United States, the PepubLicans had 
on various occasions since 1895 attenpted to block income tax 
legislation throu^ recourse to an extra- legislative body - the 
Supreme Court - so the Conservatives in Britain sought to mobilise 
the oppositional pc^^ of the House of Lords in order to challenge 
the constitutionality of the budget, (Wiich hoover was an 
unconstitutional position, in contrast to the American scenario).
The war spread rapidly at the grass roots level. Maiy organisations 
such as the Tariff Reform League, the Anti Socialist Union, the 
Liberty and Property Defence League, and the National Trade Defence 
Association were all mobilised. Attacking the license duties were the 
Brewers' Society, the Licensed Victuallers' Central Protection 
Society, the Licensed Victuallers' National Defence League. 
Mobilising against the land taxes were the Land Taxes Protest 
Committee and the Budget Protest League. Perhaps the most powerful 
group to mobilise against the Budget was the "City of London?'.
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The Ungentlemanly State Versus the City; The City Versus Free Trade
It was the financial interests in the "City" that were most 
vociferous in their opposition to the "Free Trade" Budget. On 24 
June, Lord Rothschild chaired a meeting of one thousand City traders 
and merchants. Whilst the spokesmen accepted that they should bear a 
fair share of tax, they argued that the Budget would damage the 
nation's commerce and industry. Their strong resistance to the " Free 
Trade" budget seems strange given the prevailing consensus amongst 
theorists of all persuasions, that free trade was maintained at the 
policy level in order to appease* the City. This argument is 
propagated in its most concentrated form amongst r^uocLst historians, 
as well as the recent works on "gentlemanly capitalismf.
Thus dynn and Sutcliffe argue that;
"At times finance has preferred free trade (because it co-existed 
with the free movement of capital) vhen protection would have been 
beneficial for industry. This was particularly true in the years 
between 1880 aixl 1913" (1972: 41).
More explicit still is M. Barratt-Brcwn \ho states that;
"What defeated Chamberlain in the last analysis was the City of 
London, vhich still dominated the British econony and vhose wealth 
did not derive any longer from manufacturing at the time of the first 
decade of the twentieth century" (1963: 106)
Or as Sidney Pollard has recently put it,
" Manufacturing lost its bid for protection... commercial policy, in 
so far as it existed was meant to safeguard ' trade' and the City 
investor and banker" (1990a: 244)
This is echoed by a host of modem writers, vto argue that the 
hegemony of the City predominated over the power of industry in the
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setting of govemnent policy. As E. R  H. Green characteristically put 
it,
"No matter the political colour of the government of the day, the 
British state demonstrated a consistent bias towards City opinion" 
(1988: 611; see also Cain and Hopkins 1986: 501-525; 1987: 1-26;
P. A. Anderson 1964, 1987; Naim 1981. Ihe most sophisticated analysis 
of the relations between the City and the state has been provided by 
ain^iam 1984, 1990).
Finally a softer version that has saturated the general literature is 
sinply that free trade was antithetical to the "cosmopolitan" trading 
interests of the City (See for example, M  W. Kirty 1981: 21; B. Semmel 
1960: 142; A. Ihomton 1959: 99-100; K. Fielden 1969: 98; S. Newton and 
D. Porter 1988: Ch. 1). Ihis position is summarised well by Frank
Longstreth who stated that,
" Ihe City... looked on protection as anathema, seeing the system of 
free trade based on the gold standard as the business of their world 
position and hence British prosperity" (1983:47; 1979: 163).
Ihe problem with this general formulation is that the City was 
overwhelmingly srpportive of the Conservative Party. W. D. Rubinstein 
has pointed out that one of the "most important features of the 1886- 
1922 period, was the movement of commercial capital/wealth into the 
Conservative party" (1977a: 123). According to J.A. Ihcmas, by 1895 
" finance capital" had replaced the landed class as the most inportant 
interest group in the party (1939: 25), Ihis is perhaps overstating 
the case since the landed interest was at least numerically dominant. 
Alan Sykes is more accurate when he states that, "in the late 
nineteenth century, the Conservative party was becoming less and less 
exclusively the party of land and increasingly the party of property 
in general - in parliamentary and electoral terms" (1978: 8-9).
Indeed the shift was striking, especially when compared to the 
caiposition of the Liberal party, where the industrialists and 
manufacturers w^ ere the major representatives of the "dominant 
economic classes".
Ihis fact poses a problem for the orthodox explanation of free 
trade, in that after 1900, the City favoured the party of protection. 
Ihis wfas recognised by Ferry Anderson, who having argued that the 
City remained " naturally... and... resolutely loyal to free trade"
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went onto wDnàer "v^y... the City nevertheless remain(ed) politically 
Conservative?" Part of his answer was that once the Conservatives had 
been voted in, the City could then perhaps have neutralised 
protection (1987; 43). However there were in fact vAiolly rational 
reasons as to why the City not only favoured the Conservatives but 
also protection over free trade. For the most part, it was clear that 
sooner or later, the Liberals would raise progressive income taxes. 
Indeed in 1909 the Liberal government brou^t in the "Red” Budget, 
(as Garvin (1909) named it. Significantly, the increase in direct 
taxes that it called for was the only available means at the time, to 
maintain Britain^ s policy of free trade. Ihis was widely understood 
at the time. And yet the City was vehemently ranged against it. In 
1910 City interests, throuÿi voting for the Conservative party 
declared their preference for protection and hence indirect taxes, 
over free trade and direct taxes. Why then, it must be asked, did 
"finance capital" favour a policy vdiich would hinder its business 
activities? Ihe first answer to this question is that the City and 
protection were not irreconcilable. According to a memorandum written 
by H.A.Gwynne for Joseph Chamberlain in December 1903, there were 
four broad categories that cocprised the "city interests", all with 
varying trade preferences.
Ihe first of these was the money dealers (bankers, finance houses and 
stock brokers). Of these, Ayynne reckoned that the stock brokers were 
"almost to a man in favour of protection (1903/1982: 393). Ihe
bankers favoured free trade he argued, did so more out of "city" 
deference to the instincts of people such as Lord Goschen, Gif fen and 
Harvey (of Barclays) rather than to a clearly defined set of 
preferences formulated from their own business experience. Other 
bankers such as Hambro and Gibbs (governors of the Bank of England), 
and several colonial bankers clearly favoured protection. 
Furthermore, the majority of those involved in banking and finance 
houses vto favoured free trade did so more because they felt that 
Chamberlain^ s tariff reform campaign came at a singularly inopportune 
moment In 1903 the money market in London was depleted due to the 
recent Boer W&r as well as the limited financial methods employed by 
the government
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CXd.ng to the fact that much investment ( approximately £50-60m) vras 
held on the continent, there was a fear that should Britain adopt 
protection, Germany may retaliate hy using these investments as a 
weapon. That is, if this money was to be called in, it could have 
severe financial repercussions given the tenporary vulnerability of 
the London market. It was therefore the poor timing of the Tariff 
Reform canpaign that had led many bankers to favour free trade. Ihus 
by 1910, v^en conditions had iitproved it may well have been the case 
that such bankers would have favoured protection. In addition there 
were some bankers vdio had from the beginning been interested in 
protection, but had felt that Chamberlain^ s proposal was too vague to 
be convincing. Ihus they very much supported the establishment of a 
judicial and expert commission to inquire into the question more 
fully. Finally there were many vAio would have supported Chamberlain 
had he added to his programme a scheme for securing for the people a 
sound commercial and technical education,
Ihe second faction in the City comprised the shipping interests. Ihe 
majority of these representatives favoured protection. Nevertheless 
there was a vocal minority vMch favoured free trade. The main motive 
for this free trade sentiment was based on the fact that preference 
taxed food and raw materials, vMch would make it harder for these 
interests to conpete internationally as vrell as nationally. However 
there was a minority vho favoured protection., conprising those vho 
dealt with raw materials and colonial goods, in neutral markets (such 
as China and Japan). Ihe third faction conprised "middlemen" and 
"large iirporters". Ihis faction objected to tariff reform as it would 
increase the cost of raw materials, and hence undermine the 
conpetitiveness of the British product.
Finally the fourth category conprised colonial houses. Ihey greatly 
favoured preference but felt that it would be inpractical , owing, to 
the fact that the colonies relied predominantly on tariffs for their 
source of government revenue. But practical realities aside, this 
group favoured preference (Gvyrme 1903/1982: 393-397).
Ihus it is clear that City interests were largely divided over free 
trade and protection in terms of their own day-to-day business
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activities. A further major tenet of the "economistic consensus" is 
that "the City" favoured free trade v^iilst "industry" favoured 
protection. A strict line of demarcation has been drawn between these 
two capitalist interest groups firstly, along lines of policy 
preference and secondly, along lines of power and influence over the 
state. In this latter formulation the interests of the City 
predominated over those of industry at state policy level.
However, as the above analysis shews, "City interests" were not 
monolithic and unified. As well as the fact of conflict between 
"fractions of capital", ["Industry" versus "Finance"] (inter­
capitalist conflict), there were also inportant divisions within 
these "blocs" (intra-capitalist conflict). Equally as inportant is 
the fact that there were also certain elements within these two blocs 
vdiich overlapped in terms of their interests and policy desires. 
Indeed this was hardly surprising since there was considerable 
functional and business overlap between various City and Industrial 
groips (see especially M. J. Daunton 1989: 134-142).
Anthony Hcwe has recently argued that the select calls for protection 
from the 187(y s onwards were echoed by various interests within the 
City. Ihe Fair Trade movement, thou^ spearheaded ly various 
provincial industrialists, nevertheless attracted considerable City 
support. In addition, various free trading elements within industry 
and the City allied themselves in favour of a bimetallic standard in 
the 188(y s and 189CX s. Furthermore, the protectionist elements of 
heavy industry vhich supported Chamberlain, were supported by 
elements within the City. Interestingly, Howe argues further that if 
the "free trading" nature of the City cannot be assumed as a given in 
Edwardian era, nor can it be sinply assumed for the period of the 
184(y s, vhen the original transition to free trade occurred. Howe 
shows that at the time of the transition, the City was far more 
interested in maintaining "ancien regime" monopolistic trading 
practices, rather than those of the free maidoet (Howe 1991: 1-31).
It would therefore be incorrect to contrast these two groups in terms 
of unified monolithic alternatives. Hie rigid demarcation betv^en 
finance and industry tends not only to obscure more than it reveals.
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but also leads to a conpletely incorrect analysis of the "social- 
class" identity of the cause of free trade and protection (see 
M. J. Daunton 1989: 150-151; A. Howe 1990: 377-391). Thus it would be
wrong to characterise these two groiçs in terms of "protectionist 
industry" versus the "free trading city". In reality , there were 
strong elements within both these groups vMch favoured either free 
trade or protection. Thus it was the case that various protectionist 
City elements had more in common with their heavy industrial 
"counterparts" than with fellw members \dio worked alongside them 
within the "square mile", as indeed those free trading City interests 
had more in common with much of Industry. Whilst it would be wrong to 
turn the economistic consensus on its head by arguing that industry 
favoured free trade vMlst the City favoured protection, it is 
nevertheless the case, that much of industry supported free trade, 
and crucially it was the industrial groiqps (as opposed to the City) 
supported the Liberal government's decision to maintain free 
trade.
As mentioned above, the City interests voted almost unanimously in
favour of the protectionist Conservative party. Why was this so if
there were various financial groups favoured free trade? The 
answer revolved around the politics of taxation In short, such free 
trading ” finance capital" favoured a protectionist policy which would 
hinder their business interests, in the interests of securing for 
themselves lower personal taxation (see P. J. Cain 1979: 57-58). Thus 
it was said of the meeting of 24 June, chaired by Lord Rothschild in 
vMch "finance capital" had expressed their opposition to the free 
trade budget, that it was " really a meeting of the rich men who wonf t 
pay for the Dreadnoughts they were clamouring for" (Lord Lansdcwne, 
25 June 1909, quoted in Murray 1980: 129).
Surely it may be argued, there was much free trade sentiment vMch
came from the City. Whilst this was only in part true, it does not 
change the fact that the fiscal predicament around ^diich the 
political debates raged, did not allow the free trading interests any 
room for manoeuvre, because the only practical alternative to income 
taxation was tariff reform - as principled by the party to ^ Aiich they 
gave their clear sipporL Indeed in 1906 Sir Edward darke, the free
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trade MP vAio represented the City was driven out of Parliament by 
London tariff reformers. In the subsequent by-election Sir Frederick 
Banbury - one of the most doctrinaire ri^t wing tariff reformers in 
British politics, won the constituency (RA.Reitpel 1972: 173-174). In 
addition, Garvin gleefully reported that "City" people such as "Sir 
Walter Gilbey who spent thousands of pounds to put [the Liberals] in, 
says he would spend six times as much to put them out" (Garvin to 
Northcliffe, 10 May 1909, quoted in P. M. Kennedy 1980: 333).
The dilemma that the free trade City factions faced was only too 
clear; vote Liberal to maintain free trade and "die" with the budget; 
or vote Conservative to inaugurate tariff reform and "die" with 
protection. In the 1910 general elections the City made its choice 
and gave its overvdielming support to the party of protection. As Cain 
put it, "The Unionist heartland was that part of England dominated by 
commercial and financial power - much of it centred on overseas trade 
and foreign investment..." (1979: 57). Indeed, City businessmen,
together with country landowners and tariff crusaders, "had common 
cause to oppose a budget ^Mch not only hit their pockets but also 
seemed to prove that money could be raised for social reform without 
-tariffs" (Cross 1966: 105, my emphases). In the end the free trade 
interests of the City madly snorted at their parliamentary 
constituency, "Father an end with Protection than 'Socialist' 
(direct) taxation without end". Thus vMlst they chose protection, in 
the last instance they "died" with the budget. Ihus it is to be 
concluded that had the City got its way, Britain would have 
relinquished its hold on free trade and turned to protectionism.
It may however be argued that even if this is true, could it not be 
the case that the budget itself was "designed" to maintain the 
"business" interests of the City. Ihere are several problems even 
with this softer formulation. Firstly, protectionism was favoured by 
much of the city interests in relation to its pure business
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activities. Secondly, as Rubinstein points out, it was not the City 
that defeated tariff reform but rather "It was its rejection by the 
liberals and non-conformists - based in industrial areas or reliant 
upon heavy industry - which did so" (1977a: 123). In particular it
was the Northern industrial areas vMch si;çported free trade and
voted with the government. At a general level, free trade was
favoured by the majority of industrialists (as described in section 1 
above). Thirdly, the real issue at stake in 1909/1910 was not trade 
but tax strategies. Ihus the extent to vMch the budget enabled the 
maintenance of free trade was to an extent, the unintended
consequence of the Liberals' desire to increase direct taxation, in 
order to attract the working classes.
Hence the view that the City dictated or had a monopolistic influence 
on government policy formulation, is not only wrong, but also assumes 
an incorrect causal relationship between economics and politics. The 
British state and the various groups that comprised it, particularly 
those holding office, were never sinply a function of the "dominant 
economic class" (however defined). Rather, there were autonomous
political interests, non-reducible to "capital", that had an 
important influence on the determination of national policy. Finally 
we may conclude that City interests constituted neither the social 
foundation of the British liberal state, nor did they conprise an 
essential or "institutional" core in alliance with the Treasury and 
the Bank of England (as Geoffrey Inÿiamf s hi^ily influential thesis 
states).
The Uhgentlemanly Stats' s Attack on the Tandmd Upper Classes
In addition to the CLty's stated apposition, various groups 
mentioned above, attacked the land tax aspect of the budget. The 
subject of the land tax was a vital strand of the Liberal budget 
package. George and Hobson had argued that economic rents accruing to 
the landed interest were "unearned", since it was society that had
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endowed the land its value. Ihus they argued it was only right to 
return that increment from vhence it came. This sentiment grew to 
form a mainstay of Liberal politics. By 1906 J. H. Whitley^ s Land 
Values Group had acquired 280 Liberal and Labour MF s (Murray 1980: 
46). Upon the central inportance of land taxation all Liberals 
united, (see M. Freeden 1978; H. Erty 1972).
In the King's Speech of 1908 the land tax issue had finally reached 
the policy agenda. This speech produced much excitement amongst 
Liberal MF s with Trevelyan stating that the backbench wanted " to 
have the Valuation Bill... promised in the King's Speech introduced at 
the earliest possible moment" (Trevelyan to Canpbell-Bannerman, 4 
February 1908, quoted in Murray 1980: 48). Throuÿîout 1908, Liberal 
(and Labour) agitation for land taxation intensified. Then on 27 
November the House of Lords rejected Lloyd George's Licensing Bill. 
In terms of its practical revenue consequences this rejection was 
insignificant. The ideological and political repercussions were 
heaver, enormous.
It was said that Lloyd George had organised a "thanksgiving service" 
at the Treasury. Churchill's reply was as belligerent. "We shall send 
them up such a budget in June as shall terrify them, they have 
started the class war, they had better be careful" (quoted in R^irray 
1980: 108). Indeed in private, Lloyd George even alarmed Churchill 
with his talk about setting \jp a guillotine in Trafalgar Square; 
thou^ as Masterman points out, such a discussion was conducted by 
Lloyd George in jest vMch Churchill had failed to pick ip 
(L Masterman 1968: 139). Ironically it was the liberal government
that dragged the Lords into the conflict. This raises the traditional 
question as to v^ther the Budget was framed solely in order to nail 
the Lords.
Roy Jenkins was correct to argue that the Budget was not framed 
solely to break the Lords, as indeed Peter Rowland also argued (1969: 
215-216).. However this was so for a very different reason to that 
supplied by Jenkins. Jenkins had argued that Lloyd George could not 
have anticipated a rejection of the Budget by the Lords, as such a 
move would only undermine the Second Chamber due to the fact that it
269
was not constitutionally allowed to tançer with House of Commons 
finance bills. Hence he argued that the budget could not have been 
framed sinply to damage the Lords (1954: 40-42; 1978: 196). However 
the Lords had in 1908 already rejected the Licensing Duties, thus 
revealing their will to intervene in House of Commons finance bills. 
Jenkins was correct by default rather than design, owing to the fact 
that the budget would have been constructed even if there had never 
been a House of Lords. Ihis was due to the fact that the budget was 
essentially an electoral strategy constructed by the Liberals in 
order to attract the working class vote, as well as a necessary means 
to pay for social reforms and Dreadnoughts. To this end, Lloyd George 
sought to smear the Lords with tariff reform
Jenkins was wrong to argue that there was no connection between the 
budget and the Lords. In fact the issue of the Lords formed a vital 
strand to the A^iole Liberal pditico^^fiscal strategy of securing 
their electoral hegemony. Thus Lloyd George's acclaimed joy on 
finding the Lords to be ranged against his finance bills, especially 
in 1908 and 1909, was not surprising. For it enabled him to 
rhetorically reduce the vhole fiscal controversy to a simple conflict 
of "Landlords versus The People". That is, ware old age pensions to 
be funded by the taxation of the "parasitic" landlords (throu^ land 
taxes) or through the taxation of the stomachs of "the People"? 
Furthermore, in terms of revenue production the land taxes were 
insignificant. Ihe real issue of the budget was the boosting of 
income taxation, vMch naturally would affect a far broader range of 
groups than sinply the Lords. But by smearing the Income Tax 
proposals with the issue of the Lords, Lloyd George was able to 
considerably boost the popularity of the Budget, given the rife 
hostility that was felt ip and down the country against this class of 
"unearned" privilege. HCwever it is also the case that in order to 
effectively smear the Lords with the income tax, he would need to 
arouse their hostility to the budget. In doing so he could achieve a 
further political aim - to break the power of the House of Lords. 
Ihis could only be done if the House of Lords were to reject his 
budget. Ihis would lead to a constitutional crisis since the second 
chamber was not allc^^ to interfere with House of Commons sipply
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bills. These two aims - to smear the Lords with the budget, and to 
challenge their constitutional power became effectively one strategy.
Thus in 1908 Lloyd George began his attack on the Lords, almost 
willing them to reject his tax proposals, vMch he intended to place 
before Parliament the following year.
"They (the Conservatives) are going to tax your bread, they are going 
to tax meat (and) timber... and other foreign commodities... and if the 
Lords want to stake their privileges upon it by all means let them do 
it" (The Times. 22 December 1908, quoted in ^ ticray 1973: 559-560).
This weapon was used most powerfully by Lloyd George in the war 
against the Unionists vhich developed rapidly after the 1910 
election. In the July campaign, three months after the original 
budget speech, Lloyd George delivered his most damning attack. In his 
Limehouse speech he declared that thç. landlord was a gentleman \ho 
did not earn his own wsalth. His income was produced by others, but 
squandered by him. Reiterating Hobsonf s argument, he stated that the 
value of their land was determined by the growth of the community. In 
addition he argued that even their mining royalties were derived on 
the backs of capitalists vdio had risked not only their own money, but 
more inportantly, the lives of miners. Furthermore Lloyd George 
stated that,
"... When the Prime Minister and I knock at the door of these great 
landlords and say to them ‘ Here, you knew these poor fellows have 
been digging \jp royalties at the risk of their lives, some of them 
are old, they have survived the perils of their trade, they are 
broken, they can earn no more... " we ask, "Woh t you give them 
something towards keeping them out of the workhouse?" However they 
simply "... scowl at you and we say, ' You thieves! ' And then they turn 
their dogs onto us and every day you can hear their bark... If this 
is an indication of the view taken by these great landlords of their 
responsibility to the people vto, at the risk of their life, create 
their wealth, then I say their day of reckoning is at hand" (The 
Times. 31 July 1909, quoted in Murray 1980: 191).
This speech marked a watershed in the campaign. Ilqyd George's 
attacks on the Lords continued unabated. He followed up the Limehouse 
speech - or " Slimehouse" speech as F. E. Smith called it - with an 
equally vicious attack made in Newcastle.
"The Peers may decree a revolution but the people will direct it. If 
they begin, issues will be raised they little dream of... It will be
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asked why five hundred ordinary men, chosen accidentally fran among 
the unemployed, should override the judgement - the deliberate 
judgement - of millions of people" (quoted in Cross 1966: 106).
The Government and Lloyd George in particular were new "deliberately 
challenging the Lords to do their worst" (Cross 1966: 106). The
situation was developing hereby the Lords would have to defend 
themselves. Not surprisingly therefore the Lords rejected the Budget 
by 350: 75 votes - the largest rejection of a House of Commons bill 
ever. On Friday, 3 December 1909, Parliament was prorogued. Lloyd 
George was delighted, for the Lords had fallen into his trap. Just as 
Bismarck had cornered the National Liberals in 1878 and had 
jubilantly proclaimed that he had new "got those fellcws", so Lloyd 
George exclaimed of the Lords, "Vfe have got them at last and we do 
not mean to let them go until all the accounts in the ledger have 
been settled" (The Times. 4 December 1909, quoted in Murray 1980: 
235).
Lloyd George's Budget enabl ed the Liberals a double election victory 
in 1910. The smearing of tariff reform and the "dear loaf" witb the 
lords was particularly effective. Indeed the cry of "Peers versus 
People" was institutionalised at the popular level throu^ the 
labelling of Llpyd (Seorge's fiscal papkage "The People's Budget". 
However, the debate as to whether the Budget was framed so as to 
undermine the House of Lords is somewhat misplaced. Whether this was 
the case or not, is not significant in the context of this thesis. Of 
more salience, is the fact that the budget represented a fundamental 
attack upon the hitherto fiscal privilege of the landed upper class. 
To this end direct taxes were levied on earned and particularly on 
unearned income, (not to be confused with the land taxes, vMch 
proved to yield only very small amounts of revenue).
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Defending the Dominant Class. The Conservative " Trading" Strategy
revealed
Hie Liberals v^re able to maintain free trade vMlst at the same 
time produce a tax package that had a positive affinity with the 
interests of the working classes. Hiis stood in stark contrast to the 
alternative as proposed by the Unionists. Hieir adoption of tariff 
reform was essentially a means to defend the fiscal privileges of the 
high income groups. Ihe adoption of indirect taxation meant that the 
Conservatives had no natural claim to the working classes. Given this 
disadvantage, the Conservatives needed to look elsewhere for measures 
that could attract the lower classes, if they were to ultimately 
maintain the fiscal privileges to the içper income groups.. As a 
result the Conservatives latched onto the issue of unenplpyment. Thus 
tariff reform would be sold to the working classes throu^ the 
enployment that it would produce (see Acland Hood The Times li 
December 1909). Ihe Conservative argument for enployment was cleverly 
- thou^ incorrectly - linked to the tax problem. In this 
formulation, tariff reform would shift a large portion of the tax 
burden off the working class and onto the foreigner, (an incorrect - 
not to mention - absurd argument, deliberately designed to confuse 
those groups vAxxn they sought to win over). The argument continued, 
that this would have the double bonus of giving fiscal relief to the 
working classes vMlst also boosting domestic jobs and industry. 
Significantly this did not inpress the working class electorate, 
v^ch remained firmly wedded to free trade, for amongst other 
reasons, to maintain enployment. Furthermore the Conservatives 
(incorrectly) argued that this tendency would be considerably 
strengthened by virtue of the "opportunity costs" to enployment that 
the Budget would entail. That is they claimed that the budget would 
serve merely to add to unenployment by fri^±ening capital away, (an 
equally dubious proposition, often cited by those groups have the 
most to lose from the inposition of direct taxation - of. the
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Republicans in the United States post-1900). Finally tariff reform 
would provide of course# the funds needed to supply the old age 
pensions programme (though this was not strictly an economic 
factor).
The problem with the Conservative propaganda canpaign for tariff 
reform was that most of the economic arguments upon vMch it was 
based# were fatally flawed; so much so that it brings into question 
their real motives in adopting tariff reform (as discussed in Section 
1 above). The poignancy of the tax issue vMch informed the conflict 
was reflected by the capitulation of the Unionist Free Traders. Ihey 
had openly argued ever since the Ihriff Reform campaign had begun 
back in 1903# that protectionism would undermine the economy. ïheir 
case had rested on the need for lew production costs. Ihus they had 
(correctly) argued that tariffs would only lead to a more 
unconpetitive finished British good - commercial suicide for such an 
export dependent country. ïhe sentiment was aptly summarised ly Ripon 
in a letter to Canpibell-Bannerman;
"If I were an Inperialist, I would denounce Chamberlain as the worst 
eneny of Inperial unity... But that is not really the most inportant 
part of the matter. The abandonment of free trade# the taxation of 
food# if not of raw materials to vMch# whatever Chamberlain may say# 
his policy directly leads# the disorganisation of industry and the 
war of tariffs which are the inevitable features of this policy# 
render the present crisis ty far the gravest in the last fifty years. 
It is the greatest political struggle even of my long 
life... Everything else sinks into insignificance. Ihis battle must be 
fought to the end. We must be prepared to unite with anyone will 
help and part company with anyone who will not" (30 May 1903# quoted 
in Sykes 1978: 64).
And yet by 1909 such sentiments had sunk into insignificance. By 
1910 such free traders were denouncing free trade as evil and had to 
be defeated at all costs. What had changed their minds? Certainly 
econanic conditions played no part whatsoever in this revolutionary 
U-tum. If anything# economic conditions in 1910 were even more 
conducive to free trade than they had been in 1903.
A new battle had surpassed that of "free trade versus protection". 
Ihe new battle# that of "socialism versus anti- socialisms and 
"direct versus indirect taxation" would now be fouÿit to the end.
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Thus the Unionist free traders united with the "Wiole hoggers". In 
sum the Conservative free traders openly sacrificed what they saw to 
be the correct conditions to maintain the econony in favour of 
retaining the fiscal privileges to the upper income groups in the 
country. Thus all the outspoken words of the Free-Fooders against 
protection were quietly dropped. Hence in 1910 they willingly 
heralded the cause of tariff protectionism against the evil of 
"socialist" free trade taxation.
SECnON 6 THE FISCAL REVOLUTICIN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Liberal Fiscal Hammer
Chart 4. 10
The Proportion of the Major Revenue Categories, 1860-1913
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Table 4. 11 Incidence of Tax Rates of Total Income, between all Income 
Groups in relation to the lowest incane group (£50 = Base 100) before
and after the Budget
Income in £ 1903/1904
Earned Unearned
1913/1914
Earned Unearned
50 100 100 100 100
100 68 68 69 69
150 55 55 56 56
200 62 86 55 80
500 73 97 67 114
1000 81 113 76 140
2000 73 108 67 138
5000 62 106 78 143
10000 56 104 93 174
20000 54 110 95 184
50000 53 112 97 208
Source Samuel in Statistical Society of London Journal Lxxxii [ 1920: 
176-177] (quoted in Murray 1980: 294; see also Colwyn Camdttee on 
National Debt and Taxation)
Tahift 4.12 A C n m n a r i R o n  f i n  nercentaoe) of the tax rates paid on all 
incomes in 1913/1914 over the period 1903/1904 in relation to those
. on £50 in 1903/1904
Income
£
1913/1914
Earned
50 96
100 97
150 98
200 86
500 88
1000 89
2000 88
5000 121
10000 159
20000 169
50000 175
Source: See Table 4.11
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It can be seen fran Tables 4. 9 and 4. 10 above, that the gradual shift 
from indirect to direct taxes in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century greatly accelerated as a result of the Liberal budget of 
1909. Table 4.11 shows the breakdown of the actual tax regime across 
all income bands before and after the budget. These figures show that 
the budget led to those on incomes over £ 5000 paying considerably 
more tax in 1913 than they had ten years previously. Table4. 12 shows 
the relative tax liability of all income groiçs in 1913/1914 conpared 
to the pre-budget 1903/1904 position. This shews that those on 
incomes from £ 50- £150 received a very slight amount of tax relief. 
Those on incomes of between £ 200-£ 2,000 received a substantial amount 
of tax relief. However those on incomes of between £ 5,000-£50,000 
paid considerably more tax as a result of the budget. As Table 4.11 
also shows, the relative tax rates on unearned incomes of £ 500 and 
above, paid tax according to a clear progressive scale
Seen ofcourse from the vantage point of the late twentieth century, 
the lowest income groups paid far more than current notions of social 
justice would lead an observer to conclude. Indeed even within the 
contenporary setting (as Samuel originally argued), the lowest income 
groups paid too much in relation to all other groups. However, vdien 
we conpare the 1913 with the 1903 position, it is clear that the 
budget had initiated a substantial shift away from regression, 
particularly throu^ equalising the burden between the lowest and 
highest income groups. In agreement with Davis and Huttenback, 
"overall there is clear evidence of declining regressivity, if not of 
increasing progressivity** (1988: 211, and this for the period prior 
to the 1909 Budget! ) Furthermore, this was probably one of the most 
progressive (or least regressive) national tax regimes in the world 
at that time. In addition, the principle was established that higher 
incomes should not only pay at least as much as the lowest income 
groups, but should also pay for social reforms vMch would 
exclusively benefit the working classes. The Budget therefore laid 
the foundations for the modem concept of social redistribution, to 
be developed after 1945.
277
The Budget represented an historically unique attack by the state 
upon the "dominant economic classes". Ihus the so-called "favoured" 
groups - the rich industrialists and perhaps to a greater extent, 
those "gentlemanly" capitalists in the City, as well as their "landed 
relatives" on their estates - came under the Liberal state's fiscal 
hammer. This was an exanple of clear and genuine autonorry on the part 
of the state as it responded not to the needs of capital, but to its 
own electoral and fiscal interests. Indeed capitalism was not under 
threat in the late Edwardian period, thus quashing the Marxist chairge 
of "relative autonomy". In aiy case if there was any truth in this 
relatively autonanous approach, then we would surely expect the 
Conservative party to act in a similar manner to that of the Liberal 
government. However, given the party's choice of protection and 
regressive taxes, nothing could really be further from such a claim. 
In conclusion, the granting of progressive taxes had nothing to do 
with the long run maintenance of capitalism, but was rather premised 
upon the autonomous requisites of party government in the context of 
liberal parliamentarism. As a. result, free trade was maintained and 
tariff protection avoided
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CHAPTER 5.
THE STATE, TAXATION AND TARIFF PROTECTIONISM IN LIBERAL 
(FEDERAL) AMERICA 1789-1913
Ihe Emergence of Tariff Protection
Tariff protectionism formed a mainstay of American economic policy 
from the end of the ei^teenth to the first few decades of the 
twentieth century. Tariff policy was as much about taxation as it was 
about protection. Prior to the twentieth century the central 
government relied predominantly ijçon the tariff for its revenue. Ihe 
tariff owed its predominance to the specific nature of the American 
state. In the first instance, the "state" was not unitauy but rather, 
federal. Vfe have already noted the link between federalism and 
tariffs as revenue instruments in the case of Inperial Germany. 
Alongside Germany stood Australia, Canada and Switzerland. America 
was no exception. Whilst the federalism of the Ü. S. played a vital 
part in the formation of tariff policy, the decentralised nature of 
the central state itself led to the maintenance of h i ^  protectionism 
right into the twentieth century. Finally, party government also 
inpacted ipon the formation of tariff policy. As with Britain, the 
politics of the tariff and the income tax became intertwined 
particulcu±y after 1887. Furthermore, this chapter will allow us to 
envisage a multilayered conception of the state as it autonomously 
impacts upon the process of economic development, to be analysed 
further in the final chapter.
The problem of central provision in America has plagued the 
government ever since its inception. The early years of the 
continental Congress were marked by a profound political and fiscal 
struggle with the local states. Establishing the tax premise proved 
to be very difficult. The Articles of Confederation (1781) included 
no financial pixvisions. Thus the Congress was at the mercy of the 
thirteen independent legislatures (See StudenskL and Kroos 1952: 25; 
Ratner 1967). Congress made various attempts at securing revenue
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including the levying of tariffs. It took the occurrence of a war 
(for independence) before the resistance of the thirteen colonial 
governments could be broken down. Ihe war left the Congress prostrate 
in the face of massive indebtedness. A convention was set up in 1787 
to solve the fiscal crisis. Ihe result was the granting of the 
Congress with an independent source of revenue (as well as 
expenditure).
Article 1, Section 8, No. 1 states that;
"The Congress shall have power to collect taxes, duties, inposts and 
excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and 
general welfare of the U. S. ; but all duties, inposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the Ü. S  to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian 
tribes... to make all laws vhich shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers".
More specifically with regards to tariff policy. Article 1, Section 
10, No. 2 states that;
"No state shall without the consent of Congress lay aiy inposts or 
exports, except vhat may be absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection laws and the next produce of all duties and inposts and 
exports shall be for the use of the Treasury of the U. S. ; and all 
such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the 
Congress. No state shall without the consent of Congress lay any duty 
of tonnage".
Ihe Constitution ensured that central and local government would be 
allowed their cwn unique and independent sources of taxation. Ihat is 
the fiscal "instrumentalities of each were constitutionally immune 
from taxation ty the other" (Studenski and Krocs 1952: 39-40). %  
until 1787 the states had presided over the use of direct and 
indirect taxes. It was decided that the preserve of indirect taxes 
would be granted the central state, v^le the localities would 
maintain their moncpolistic hold over direct taxes.
On 6 April 1789, the new Congress met with the initial purpose of 
providing a national revenue. Madison stated that;
"Ihe deficiencies in our Treasury has been too notorious to make it 
necessary for me to animadvert ipon that subject... a national 
revenue must be obtained, but the system must be such a one that, 
vAiile it secures the object of revenue it shall not be oppressive to
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our constituents. Happy it is for us that such a system is within our 
power; for I apprehend that both these objects may be obtained from 
an inpost on articles inported into the United States" (quoted in 
Young 1872).
Thus the tariff Act of 4 July 1789 was adopted since "direct taxes 
could not be thought of; and even the excise would be unpopular" 
(House statement 15 June 1789, quoted in Young 1872: 13-14). At the 
same time, the preamble to the Act made clear its intentions; 
"Whereas it is necessary for the sipport of the government for the 
discharge of the debts of the U. S., and the encouragement and 
protection of manufactures, that duties be laid... " (quoted in Young 
1872: 15).
Protectionism and Taxation 1790-1860
In 1789 Alexander Hamilton was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. 
The popular image of Hamilton, expressed in much of the literature, 
has been of a man propagated an early version of Friedrich 
List's, Na-fi oral, svtem of Protection. However, as Secretary of the 
Treasury, Hamilton's first prerogative was the securing of a 
" national system of revenue", in the face of severe financial crisis. 
Indeed his first report on the finances in January 1790 was devoted 
in large part to precisely this problem. To meet these fiscal 
requisites he favoured tariffs on luxury goods as well as raw 
materials and manufactured.
From 1789-1815 there were approximately 25 tariff acts. It is 
difficult to agree with Hill and Bcwies argue that these initial 
acts were made solely with protectionism in mind. The main object of 
these acts was to secure revenue (Taussig 1931: 14-16; Dewey 1968: 
135). This is partly evidenced by the fact that purely revenue items 
such as tea, coffee, molasses, spirits, were predominantly favoured. 
In addition Hamilton^ s classic "Report on Manufactures" (1791), vMch 
called for a "hi^ system of protection!' was not borne out Average 
tariff duties never rose above 10%. His protectionist views therefore 
had far less inpact in this period than the popular literature has
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portrayed (Keohane 1983: 53; Gilpin 1987: 181). So lew was this
actual " system of protection" that Keohane has termed it 
"associative" (1983: 52). Furthermore America was still predominantly 
agricultural, with industry barely having reached even the infant 
stage.
In 1816 a h i ^  protectionist tariff was brought in to enable a 
retirement of the war debt (J. F. Witte 1985: 67; Keohane 1983: 77). 
However, by 1816 revenue needs were matched by industry s desire to 
block the flood of foreign imports. %Lth the rise of fiscal deficits 
in 1820, 1821 and 1824 the government increased tari ffs, whilst at the 
same time enabling intended protectionist benefits to industry, 
(particularly the woollen interests). Ihe average level of protection 
was increased further in 1828. Ihis was one of the few acts vMch had 
no fiscal rationale, though there was a specific paity logic involved 
(See Taussig 1931: 88-89,98; Ashley 1920: 151; Kechane 1983: 78;
Dewey 1968: 181). Ihe 1828 Act was known as the "Tariff of
Abominations” owing to its very high rates of duty (which were over 
40% - Dewey 1968: 181; Studenski and Krocs 1952: 98).
In 1832 these abominable rates were lowered. Ihis was a result of 
the over-accumulation of revenue derived from the 1828 Act. Ihe 
surplus revenue problem was resolved by the 1832 and 1833 Tariff Acts 
vhereby rates were reduced to average 33% ad valorem. Ihe latter act 
was known as the "Conpromise Tariff” as it appeased the Southern 
states by stipulating that rates would be reduced to 20% by 1842 
(Studenski and Kroos 1952: 98-99). There than followed a series of 
annual surpluses thou^ after 1836 (with the exception of 1839) these 
were transformed into deficits. Thus in 1840 President Harrison 
proposed to amend the tariff so as to meet the Treasury deficits. His 
death led to the election of President lyier who continued this 
movement. With the maintenance of deficits "the only remedy vMch 
occurred to the statesmen of the United States was a revision of the 
tariff” (Ashley 1920: 167). As a result the 1842 Tariff Act was
passed, significantly increasing the duties from approximately 20% to 
30%. Ihis ensured a series of healthy annual surpluses. Ihese 
pronpted the government to lower the rates once again in 1846. 
However this led not to a reduced but rather to a vastly increased
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revenue, premised upon the booming economy vMch sucked in a large 
amount of inports, (in turn enabled by the lower tariff). Oving to 
the simultaneous increase in state expenditure, the need for a 
further revision of the tariff was not forthcoming.
However by 1857 the vast annual surpluses led to the desire for a 
reduced government revenue (and thus a revision of the tariff). Thus 
the government brought in a tariff in 1857 vMch lowered the average 
duty to 20% and increased the free list (I. MTarbell 1911: 2). Almost 
immediately however the government was faced with large deficits. 
This pronpted Justin Morrill to argue that "... the government is 
living hand to mouth and it was obliged to go to bed without its 
supper every time the imports of the week fell short a million at the 
port of New York?' (quoted in Dewey 1968: 265). In short the financial 
needs of the government demanded a rise in tariffs. Thus in the 
winter of 1859 Morrill introduced a tariff bill ^Aich stated that "no 
prohibitory duties have been aimed at... most of the hic^iest duties 
have been so fixed more with a view to revenue than protection" 
(quoted in Dewey 1968: 265).
Tariffs, 1861-1883
Almost as soon as the Morrill tariff had come into operation, fort 
Sumter was fired ipon and the Civil ]iJar had begun in earnest. 
Hitherto government taxation levels were dwarfed by the amounts spent 
during the war. As well as securing the union, the most immediate 
concern for the government lay with extracting the necessary taxation 
to meet the vastly increased expenditures. As psu± of the 
government's fiscal strategy, tariff duties were raised in 1861, 1862 
and 1864.
On 16 July 1861, Stevens (Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee submitted a bill entitled "An Act to provide increased 
revenue from inports, to pay interest on the public debt, and for
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other purposes'' (quoted in Young 1872: cxii). With respect to the 
1864 Tariff Act of 30 June, Justin Morrill pointed out;
"Its primary objective is to increase the revenue upon importations 
from abroad, and at the same time to shelter and nurse our domestic 
products... Ihe Treasury requires a larger supply of means, and such 
sources of revenue as have not already yielded their maximum 
contributions must now be sought, so that we may fill the measure of 
our wants" (quoted in Young 1872: cxxxii-cxxxiii).
The 1864 Tariff had a particular significance in that it provided 
the basis for subsequent legislation (Taussig 1931: 174; Ashley
1920: 184; Dewey 1968: 302). In the aftermath of the war it was hoped 
by a majority of the population that the tariff rates would be 
reduced, since they had been established on a temporary emergency 
basis. However the desire to get rid of the internal taxes (excise 
and income), was so strong that it became necessary not only to 
maintain import duties, but to do so at a high rate in order to pay 
off the huge war debt (Studenski and Krocs 1952: 168-169). In
addition, the industrialists' desire for protection led to the 
maintenance of the high rates.
In response to the government suzplus of 1871, the Republicans 
enacted a 10% reduction in tariffs. However, this masked the 
protectionist intent of the Act. By abolishing or lowering the rates 
on "revenue" items (especially tea and coffee), the Republicans were 
able to maintain rates on items that afforded protection, such as 
iron and steel (Taussig 1931: 179-190; Ratner 1967: 133; Ashley 1920: 
187-188). Uiis process led to the closer linkage between tariff 
protection and government revenues. Ihe deficits that followed the 
1872 Tariff played a part in the repeal of the 10% reduction in the 
1875 Act. Taussig has argued that in this case the revenue aspect was 
merely a smoke-screen for the h i ^  protectionists to get their own 
way (1931: 190).
Ihe resulting series of treasury surpluses led to the usual pressure 
to reduce the tariff in order to balance the budget. Finally in 1883 
a proposal to reduce the duties by as much as 20% was called for. Ihe 
Secretary of the Treasury observed that times had changed since the 
law of 1789 vhich had established the Treasury Department;
284
"What now perplexes the Secretary is not where from he may get 
revenue and enough for the pressing needs of the government, but 
v^ereby he shall turn back into the flow of business the more than 
enough for those needs, that has been drawn from the people" (quoted 
in Dewey 1968: 415).
However all this would change after 1890, when the "country would 
never again be able to indulge in the luxury of regarding a surplus 
in the Treasury as an alarming matter demanding vigorous action" 
(H. U. Faulkner 1959: 109).
The Tariff, Income Taxation and Party Divisions
In 1883 the Republicans feared they ndc^t lose power unless they 
made concessions to the growing popular discontent by way of reducing 
taxes through lowering tariff rates. By the 1880s a new rationale to 
tax policies began to emerge. A growing popular feeling ^^ch 
embraced the notion of fair taxation based on the ability to pay 
entered the political scene.
The Income tax first emerged in six states between 1840 and 1850, 
(Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Alabama, Florida and North 
Carolina). During the Civil War the Central government brought the 
income tax as a tenporary war time expedient, \^ch provided $376 m 
in 1866 at its peak, (almost 25% of internal revenue collections - 
Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 418. For a discussion of the Civil War 
income tax see; J. F. Witte 1985: 67-70; Rennan 1910: 236-256). After 
the war pressure mounted for a reduction in the income tax, 
especially from bankers and manufacturers. The attack on the income 
tax was often premised (as it was in Britain) on the proclamations of 
John Stuart Mill. It was denounced as "socialistic" and more 
inportantly "a tax inposed expressly on the rich". In 1871 the tax 
was abolished at the central level. However various interests were 
developing and indeed mobilising to make the income tax a permanent 
fiscal weapon.
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In 1871 in the House vote, representatives from 14 Southern and Mid- 
Western states (vMch had contributed approximately 11% of the income 
tax during the war) cast 69 votes for its retention and only 5 
against. In contrast the Republicans from California, New York, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island (vMch had contributed approximately 70% of the income 
tax), cast 61 votes against and 14 for its retention (Ratner 1967: 
131. J. A. Hill 1894: 442-443). Rather than give way to the income tax 
demands of various states, the Republicans conceded only so far as a 
10% reduction in the tariff (1872).
In the 187(y s new parties consisting of farmers and workers emerged 
to fight the Republican party. These were small and numerous and 
variously called; the "Greenback Labour, Reform or Farmers'- Party. 
Despite the introduction of 14 different income tax bills between 
1873-1879, no such legislation was forthcoming (Baack and Ray 1985: 
608; Ratner 1967: 148).
For several years sifter 1879 widespread prosperity followed in the 
wake of the huge exports of grain into Europe. Ihis prompted large 
inports on the back of the hi^ier incomes accrued from the export 
surpluses, \^ch in turn led to a more fiscally productive tariff. 
Althou^ this delayed the urgency for a popular income tax, it did 
not diminish the revulsion at the increase in regressive indirect 
taxation. Ihus to stave off a tax revolt, the Republicans lowered the 
tariff duties in the Act of 1883. Nevertheless from 1887-1890 the 
government accrued annual surpluses of over $100m. It was at this 
point vAien the two major parties divided over the issue of tariffs 
and taxation.
Ihe Democrats wanted to decrease regressive taxation and hence move 
toward free trade and the income tax. Ihe Republicans favoured 
protection and regressive taxes and thus wished to maintain the 
tariff. Furthermore the Republicans v^re keen to maintain relatively 
high regressive taxes in order to finance (military) pensions to 
soldiers.
286
Upon these fundamental issues President Cleveland (Dem) made a stand 
in 1887. Alarmed at the huge revenue surpluses he devoted his 1887 
annual Congress message to an attack upon the hi<ÿi protectionist 
tariff vMch he described as "a vicious, unequitable and illogical 
source of unnecessary taxation," vMch "ought to be at once revised 
and amended" (quoted in Ratner 1967: 157; Studenski and Kroos 1952: 
208). Torn Terill reports that this speech not only ushered in the 
"Great Tariff Debate" of 1888 but more significantly contributed to 
the near political annihilation of the small band of protectionist 
democrats (1973: 91). Ihis speech galvanised the Democrat party to 
the immediate and future si;pport of a lew tariff as a means of 
reducing the tax burden of the masses (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 
419; Ratner 1967: 158). There is also little doubt that the Democrats 
also favoured an increase in Ü. S. exports (Terill 1973: 18; Lake
1983: 527; Lake 1989: 98).
However by the late 1880s the Republicans were back in office, and 
in 1890 had enacted the McKinley Tariff vMch extended the system of 
protection. Furthermore the huge annual surpluses of the 188(X s were 
converted to large deficits in the 189(X s. The Republicans presided 
over the depletion of the surpluses throu^ several measures, not 
least; a massive increase in military pensions; the construction of a 
steel navy; the return to the Northern states of direct taxation 
collected during the civil war (Faulkner 1959: 109). Not surprisingly 
this merely strengthened the Populist revolt, which fought for a more 
equitable tax system ( J. D. Hicks 1961: 223-229,435-439). In addition, 
the massive growth of individual fortunes was grist to the mill of 
the Populist ideological and political canpaign (Seligman 1908: 494).
The movement against the Republican system of regressive taxes also 
developed in the Democrat party. With the return of treasury deficits 
after 1892, the newly reinstated Democrats looked for ways to 
increase the revenue. To this end President Cleveland on 4 December 
1893, expressed himself in favour of tariff reform, particularly on 
the necessities of life and industrial raw materials. Furthermore he 
pointed out that lower tariffs might produce more revenue, owing to 
the very high rates of the present McKinley tariff. Of the income tax 
he said.
"The Committee after full consideration and to provide against the 
temporary deficiency vhich may exist... have widely embraced in their 
plan a few additional internal revenue taxes, including a small tax 
upon incomes derived from certain corporate investments" (quoted in 
Kennan 1910: 257).
Increased revenue would, it was hoped, be accrue from the 
introduction of an income tax. In addition, Cleveland urged its 
introduction as an electoral strategy to steal the thunder of the 
Populists.
On 8 January 1894, Wilson proposed lower tariff duties on 
manufactured goods and raw materials, and the abolition of the sugar 
duty. On 29 January, McMillin moved for an income tax amendment to be 
added to the Wilson Tariff bill (Seligman 1908: 497-499; Kennan 1910: 
257-258). As with their Conservative ^ .counterparts in Britain, the 
Republicans denounced the income tax as the "spectre of free trade"; 
that it would hamper business by reducing savings; and that it would 
be an unfair burden on the rich and thus constituted " class" 
legislation. For the h i ^  income earners, such legislation would be 
as an eastern senator put it, the first s t ^  on the road to Socialism 
(Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 419; J. F. Witte 1985: 71-73; Seligman
1908: 503- 505; Kennan 1910; 266-267).
Having been passed in the House, the bill proceeded to the Senate. 
However, it was at this point that the original bill was blocked, as 
would similar future tax legislation. In the Senate under the 
leadership of the Democrat Gorman the bill was radically altered with 
no less than 634 amendments attached. The defection by certain 
Democrats was a major factor in the defeat of the tariff bill. This 
was specifically linked to internal party wrangling and intrigue (For 
a full discussion, see Ratner 1967: 174-184; Terill 1973: Ch.4). The 
net position was that tariff revision was not granted thou^ the 
income tax provision remained in tact (Ratner 1967: 181-184).
The negation of the original Wilson Bill in the Senate was matched 
by the position adopted hy the Supreme Court. In the case of Pollock 
Versus Farmers' Loan and Trust Company the tax was deemed to be of a 
direct nature and henfce unconstitutional (Baack and Ray 1985: 610;
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Seligman 1908: 531-589; Myers 1970: 237; Kennan 1910: 262-269). Thus 
the 1894 Income Tax was revoked a year later. This ruling merely 
served to polarise the issue of the income tax along party lines. So 
while the Republicans continued to favour the tariff, the Democrats 
adopted the Populist position. The Democrat party platform henceforth 
read;
"It is the duty of Congress to secure all the constitutional power 
v^ch remains after that (inccxne tax) decision, or which may come 
from its reversal by the Court as it hereafter be constituted, so 
that the burdens of the taxation may be equally and impartially laid, 
to the end that wealth may bare its due proportion of the e^genses of 
the government: (quoted in Ratner 1967: 216).
By the end of its rein in office the Democrat party had been 
prevented from inaugurating the major fiscal measures that it had 
originally proposed. In 1897 the Republicans returned to office.
In the House, Nelson Dingley soumit to Ic^ a^r the tariff in order to 
provide revenue to make good the treasury deficit. This was due to 
the fact that the very h i ^  rates of the present tariff had reduced 
inports and had subsequently stifled the revenue. This was also 
pronpted by Republican leaders in the Senate vdio wanted an 
international bimetallic agreement with France and England, vMch 
could only be secured throu^ a lov^ U. S. tariff as a concession to 
these two countries (D. A. Lake 1989: 138-139; S. Ratner 1967: 223).
This latter initiative was stifled by the "free silver" Republican 
senators. When the bill emerged from the Senate, it had a staggering 
872 amendments attached (Lake 1989 ; Taussig 1931; Ratner 1967: 224). 
The net result was an overall increase in the tariff, \diich 
contradicted the motivation of the original Dingley hill. The Dingley 
Act raised the tariff on dutiable inports from 41. 2% (Wilson-Gorman 
Act), to 47. 6% - only 0. 8% below the rate of the McKinley Act (Lake 
1983: 534; Lake 1989: 125-126).
Thus both the Wilson-Gorman and Dingley tariff acts had been 
prevented from realising their original purposes - namely the 
movement toward freer trade (and in the case of the former act - the 
income tax). The bills had been turned around into the maintenance of 
a h i ^  system of regressive taxation and protection. This was enabled
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by the highly fragmented nature of the American central state. The 
autonomy of the legislative as well as the executive and, though to a 
lesser extent the judiciary in terms of real policy making power 
meant that tariffs and regressive taxes were maintained longer than 
if the central state had been more unitary (as in Britain, where the 
executive is to all intents and purposes the legislative).
However the problem of the deficits was not overcome. This coupled 
with the Spanish War of 1898, led to the renewal of Populist and 
Democratic pressure for a more progressive system of taxation. An 
inheritance and corporation tax bill was proposed in the House in 
1898. With the rise of progressive tax sentiment in the country the 
republicans conceded an inheritance tax and also an income tax on the 
sugar and oil refining companies.
The Move "Dward Freer Trade and the Income Tax
In 1900 President Roosevelt stated that a " graduated income tax of 
the proper type would be a desirable feature of federal taxation, and 
it is to be hoped that one may be devised ^diich the Supreme Court 
will declare constitutional” (quoted in Seligman 1908: 591; Kennan 
1910: 277). The Republican President souiÿït to conciliate popular
agitation for a more progressive tax structure. In June 1907 he told 
the people "most great countries have an income tax and an 
inheritance tax. In ny judgement both should be part of our system of 
federal taxation" (quoted in Ratner 1967: 264). Hoover he was aware 
of the difficulty of imposing an income tax owing to the Svpreme 
Court's 1895 decision. The "Great Leveller" as he was known was, like 
Presidents before him, to be prevented from inplementing his tax 
proposals.
In the election of 1908 William Jennings Bryan stood on a Democrat 
platform of an immediate revision of the tariff and the adoption of 
an inccxne tax. Unfortunately for him the final electoral decision 
favoured the Republican, Taft. As a concession to popular cpinion 
Taft also favoured a reduction of the tax burden through a lowering
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of the tariff. With the rise in uneirployment in 1907, when living 
costs were hi^, the need for a reduction in the tariff was felt more 
than ever. Thus the 1908 Republican platform declared "unequivocally 
for the revision of the tariff by a special session of Congress 
immediately following the inauguration of the next president" (quoted 
in Ratner 1967: 268). In addition Taft considered the adoption of an 
income tax stating that "it is not free from doubt how the Supreme 
Court with changed membership would view a new incone tax law' 
(Cincinnati Times Star. 21 August 1907, quoted in Ratner 1967: 269).
In 1909 Sereno Payne (chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee), introduced a bill which involved a downward revision of 
the tariff and the resorti on to the inheritance tax. This was an echo 
of Taft's inaugural speech in ^dùch he stated that should it be 
irtpossible to secure sufficient revenue "from inport duties, new 
kinds of taxation must be adopted and among these, I recommend a 
graduated inheritance tax as correct in principle and as certain and 
easy of collection" (quoted in Kennan 1910: 277). Ihe income tax was 
ignored to a large extent on the grounds of its declared 
unconstitutional ity. Once again the decentralised nature of the 
American central state led to the watering dcwn of the Payne bill. 
Althouÿi Cordell Hull had pushed for an income tax amendment in the 
House, it was blocked Ijy the Speaker, Joseph Cannon. In the Senate, 
Nelson Aldrich drafted his a m  tariff Mil \hich made far fewer 
concessions to tariff reform than the Payne Mil. Aldrich was 
challenged not just by the Populists and Democrats but perhaps more 
significantly by a group of ten "insurgent" RepuMicans (mostly from 
the Mid-West), vho wished to invoke tax reform as a means of lowering 
the cost of living for their constituencies (especially the farmers). 
Althou<ÿi they were defeated by Aldrich, they nevertheless paved the 
way for the upsurge of the Progressive movement in 1912. Ihere was 
however a progressive legacy of the 1909 Act, \diich involved.the 
introduction of a corporate income tax, enacted largely as a 
RepuMican concession to public sentiment in the face of the 
maintenance of high tariffs (Seligman 1908: 592-594).
Ihe tariff bill emerged from the Senate with 847 amendments. It then 
went to a Conference Committee vMch Aldrich and Cannon had filled
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with high protectionists. Despite fierce internal wrangling within 
the Republican party, with even the President becoming involved 
behind the scenes, the final act failed to significantly reduce the 
tariff. Nevertheless sane advances were made toward the income tax. 
The Insurgents and Democrats worked together to push for an income 
tax amendment to the Aldrich bill. However through skilful political 
manipulation Aldrich managed to defer the income tax by introducing a 
substitute in the form of the corporation tax. "I shall vote for a 
corporation tax as a means to defeat the income tax". For him, the 
latter was " a tax vAiich is sure in the end to destroy the 
protectionist system" (quoted in Ratner 1967: 288). Althou^ the
House was resentful of the 847 amendments as well as the substitution 
of the corporation for the income tax, the Payne-Alddch tariff bill 
became law on 5 August 1909. The Republicans however enacted the 
Sixteenth Amendment v^ch would effectively allcw a future government 
to introduce the personal income tax. However the concession to 
progressivity did not appease the electorate, ^Mch duly re- elected 
the Democrats (Myers 1970: 265).
In 1913, with the Democrats back in pcwer and the Sixteenth 
Amendment ratified, the scene was set for a move toward a more 
progressive tax regime. On 22 April, Oscar Ifederwocd put forward a 
House bill v^ch envisaged a sweeping downward revision of the 
tariff, the central aim of vhich was to ease the cost of living for 
the masses (Ratner 1967: 323). In addition to the lowering of 
indirect taxation, Cordell Hull drafted an income tax amendment. The 
federal income tax would levy a flat 1% rate on all incomes over 
$3000 (for a single person), ranging to 6% on very h i ^  incomes, with 
a maximum effective rate of 7%. Since average personal income was 
$621, only 2% of the population would pay the tax between 1913-1915. 
(Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 421). The Underwood tariff lowered
average rates of duty on all inports to 8. 8% and on dutiable inports 
to 26.8% (Lake 1983: 535; 1988: 51; 1989: 155). This represented a 
clear s t ^  toward free trade and a more equitable tax regime, given 
the 40. 12% average rate of the Payne-AldrLch Act (Ratner 1967: 323). 
This was described as "the heaviest blow that has been aimed at the 
protective system since the British legislation of Sir Robert Peel
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between 1842 and 1846" (The Economist 12 April 1913: 867 quoted in 
Lake 1988: 51).
Summary of Tariff and Tax Legislation# 1789-1913
This chapter has argued that tariff legislation overlapped to a very 
considerable extent with tax policies. From 1789-1860, customs 
receipts constituted over 95%% of total tax revenue (see United 
States 1949,1960). With the liberal state's desire for balanced 
budgets and low rates of taxation, it was almost inevitable that the 
existence of treasury surpluses/deficits would inpact upon tariff 
legislation. Thus vAen the government revenue account was in surplus, 
tax rates were Icwered and hence tariffs were reduced. This rationale 
affected the tariff acts of 1832,1833, 1846, 1857, 1872, 1883. When 
deficits occurred, taxes were increased and hence the tariff was 
raised. This rationale affected the tariff acts of 1791- 
1801, 1841, 1842, 1861, 1862,1864,1875. Ihe main exceptions to this were 
the tariff acts of 1828 and 1890, vAiere rates were increased in the 
face of a treasury surplus, and had an unequivocal protectionist 
rationale.
Ida Tarbell summarised U. S. tax policy as foUcws. The nation 
intends "to raise money to carry out our business by putting a duty 
on certain raw and manufactured goods brou^t from foreign countries. 
If we find we are getting too large a revenue we will cut down the 
duty, if too small we will raise it" (1911: 1). In short the iitplicit 
government revenue formula for maintaining budget equilibrium was;
(1) Fiscal deficit + higher tariff rates = increased revenue.
(2) Fiscal surplus + lower tariff rates = decreased revenue.
However even if we except the acts of 1828 and 1890, this revenue 
formula is still not perfectly applicable. For exanple in 1846 ;^ iilst 
tariffs were lowered to reduce the revenue in the face of surpluses, 
the effect was to create new increased and sustained government 
revenues. To explain, such an anomaly involves the adoption of an
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additional explanatory variable; the trade cycle. Thus vAien the 
economy was booming and imports were bountiful tariff revenues would 
(ceteris paribus) naturally increase. Under such conditions lower 
tariff rates could actually lead to higher revenues (1832, 1833, 1846- 
1856, 1883, ). When the economy is in depression and imports were
curtailed, tariff revenues decreased and thus rates were 
increased, (1842, 1860, 1875, ). However this trade variable for the most 
part worked in harmony with the "revenue formula" noted above. Thus 
vÆien depressions occurred and tariff revenues dropped, the state 
would increase tariff rates in order to provide more revenue. Under 
boom conditions and an iptum in trade lower duties were entirely 
commensurate with higher revenues (see also T. J. McKeown 1983).
The politics of the tariff and the income tax became indissolubly 
linked, particularly after 1887. In addition the choice of taxes 
became split along party lines. The Democrats came to favour 
progressive taxes and thus reduced indirect revenues (hence freer 
trade) and the income tax. The Republicans defended regressive 
indirect taxes and favoured protection for industry - hence tariffs 
and resistance to the income tax. Mark Hansen has recently argued 
that the two major parties were split in their choice of trade regime 
throuG^iout the nineteenth century. Thus he claims that tariffs went 
up under the Republicans and down under the Democrats (1990: 
539,543). He calculates that Democrat Presidents set tariff duties 
9. 51%age points lower than their Republican counterparts (1990: 544). 
Or as Gallarotti points out, four out of the five tariffs after 1880 
support this idea; "both increases occur under Republican Presidents 
and two (1894 and 1913) of three reductions under Democrat 
presidents" (1985: 179). Whilst this is to be endorsed it will be 
qualified.
Firstly, vhilst this 9.51%age point difference was ' not 
insignificant, it can hardly be claimed that it was particularly 
significant. The minimum tariff rate on dutiable goods never once 
went below 20% in the period i:pto 1913. Mostly rates were pitched 
between 30% and 50%. At this level even a 15-20% difference in rates 
between the two parties would have struggled to attain significance 
in terms of strict free trade criteria, (the 1913 Underwood Act
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excepted). Secondly, the Democrats, certainly upto 1887, were never 
free trading, as their Liberal counterparts in Britain had been. 
Father they had accepted as part of political life that tariffs were 
the essential means through vAiich the government accumulated its 
revenue. Indeed the Democrats fully endorsed the statement of the 
Free Trade Convention at Philadelphia in 1831 v^ iere it was stated 
that;
"... the people prefer in times of peace, duties raised on the 
iirportation of foreign merchandise to any internal tax, direct or 
irdirect... Duties on inports amounting to an average to about 20% of 
the value appear necessary to the support of the government" (quoted 
in Ashley 1920: 149; see also the statement by Secretary Walker in 
1846, in Young 1872: ).
Upto the 1880s, vAiilst the Republicans were the party of protection, 
the Democrats favoured freer trade. Ihis was inextricably linked to 
party notions of taxation. Hence by the late 1880s the Democrats came 
to favour the replacement of the regressive tariff with the inccme 
tax and it was this feature vMch divided the two parties.
Certainly therefore by the early 189(y s the system of party 
government played an inportant part in the setting of tariff rates. 
Ihis divide became pronounced only after 1917 when the income tax 
became fiscally predominant. Relieved of tariffs for their revenue 
function. Republican administrations (Harding and Hoover), soumit to 
boost protectionist duties \diilst the Democrats (Wilson and 
F. D. Roosevelt), soumit to lower tariffs. Ihe presence of deficits or 
surpluses no longer affected their tariff calculations. Ihus "despite 
surpluses, inter war Republicans thrice sent duties hi^ier. Despite 
deficits, inter war Democrats thrice sent duties lower" (Hansen 1990: 
547).
However this political formula is also too siirplistic and cannot 
explain why tariffs remained so hic^ ipto 1913. Ihus although the 
Democrats attempted after 1887 to lower tariffs and raise progressive 
taxes they were for the most part substantially blocked from doing 
so. Furthermore it was clear that at the presidential level the 
Republicans were also trying to implement a similar tax strategy. 
Ihese initiatives were however blocked, particularly by grass-root
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members within the Republican party, as well as the Judiciary. It was 
principally the highly decentralised nature of the central state, 
with its tripartite system of government vMch enabled the 
maintenance of protectionism upto 1913. Ihus the Presidents, 
Cleveland (Dem), Roosevelt (Rep) and Taft (Rep), all attempted to 
secure lower tariffs alongside a shift to more progressive taxation 
but were all blocked. Ihe splitting iç> of the executive from the 
legislative as well as the judiciary, meant that Presidents could be 
over-ruled at the policy level by members of the opposition or even 
those from within the government. Indeed this was an essential 
element in ensuring that the state would be responsive to the needs 
of society.
Ihus the constitution expressly stipulated that all financial and 
tariff bills would be raised in Congress (to be initiated in the 
House). Ihe close proximity of -Congress to society enabled 
particularly politically mobilised groups to pervade the policy 
making process (Lake 1989; 84). However, tariff policy was also
closely linked to taxation requirements. Ihus there was a fusion of 
top-down (state-led) as well as a bottcm-ip (society-led) aspects in 
the determination of tariff policy.
In attempting to derive Ü. S. tariff policy from the international 
economic environment, David Lake tends to downplay party differences. 
Ihus he argues that the Democrat Wilson-Gorman Tariff was no 
different to the Republican McKinley and Dingley Acts. Similarly the 
rates of the Underwood Act were half those of its Democrat 
predecessor, the Vdlson-Gorman Act (1989: 162). Ihus Lake is correct 
to point to limitations to the traditional "party" based argument. 
Howe-ver, the reason for these occurrences lies not with the position 
of the U. S. in the international arena but rather with the capacity 
of the executive to convert its intentions into policy.
Ihe movement tcward free trade could not have occurred prior to the 
establishment of the income tax, (v^ch occurred in 1913). When the 
inccHTie tax was brought in during that year, it was no short 
coincidence that tariff rates were radically lowered. However it 
should be noted that the income tax was not inaugurated as a means to
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enable industry to benefit fron free trade. All the evidence points 
to the fact that in 1913, industry was not ready for free trade, as 
the highly protectionist Fordney-McCumber (1922) and Smoot-Hawley 
(1930) tariff acts later confirmed. In addition as David Lake points 
out, in 1899/1900 approximately 57.5% of U. S. industry exported 
little more than 5% of its production and only one sector (chemicals) 
exported more than 10%. By 1909, the proportion of American 
manufacturers vAio exported 5% or more of their output had risen only 
to 63. 6% and no sector exported more than 10% of its output. This 
remained the case içto 1913 (Lake 1988: 53; Lake 1989: 75-77, 162). In 
other words, in 1913 American industry was not ready for free trade. 
Indeed this was an inportant factor in the maintenance of protection. 
In turn, industrial interests found it relatively easy to penetrate 
the state (via the Republican party) due to the pdity's embedded 
quality, (or its close proximity to civil society), vAiere their 
protectionist interest was politically articulated.
This perspective allows us a critical insi^it into a major 
alternative theory propounded ly David Lake. He argues that the 
nature of the international econcori.c structure played an important 
(thou^ not singular) role in America's shift toward freer trade in 
1913, (particularly over the hic^ protectionism of the 1909 Payne- 
Aldrich Act). Principally he refers to the growing protectionist 
sentiment emanating within the Conservative party in Britain, (in 
turn a function of the country's waning hegemonic power). He states 
that protectionist sentiment in the Conservative party was still only 
weak in 1909 and had failed to gain the "unequivocal" support of 
Arthur Balfour. This meant that America could continue to free-rLde 
on British free trade which looked certain of being maintained for at 
least another few years (1988: 49; 1989: 146-147). Hence this
explains the h i ^  rates of the Payne-Aldrich Act (1909). How then 
does he explain the substantial shift in America toward free trade in 
the 1913 Underwood tariff?
In 1912 he argues, Bonar Law replaced the "hesitant" Balfour as 
leader of the Conservative party, cccnnitting the latter to an 
unequivocal stance of protectionism (1988: 50; 1989: 151). With the 
prospect of " BrLtainf s almost century-dd coomitment to free
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trade... clearly in jeopardy... (the) United States could no longer 
free ride on Britainf s leadership" (1988: 50; 1989: 151-152). Given 
America's position as the most productive nation state, the need for 
export expansion meant that domestic protection would have to be 
reduced; hence the 1913 Underwood Tariff Act (ILake 1983; Lake 1988: 
48-56; Lake 1989: 152-163).
The problem with this formulation lies at the errpirical level. 
Arthur Balfour became fully converted to protection in 1907. His 
hesitancy over the question of protectionism began in 1903 and ended 
four years later. By 1909 the Conservative party was in favour of 
tariffs (thou^ as a means to counter the direct tax policy of the 
Liberals - as discussed here in chapter 4). In fact if anything, pre­
war protectionist sentiment within the party was at its zenith in 
1909/1910, waning thereafter (see Sykes 1978: Chapter 13; also
Chapter 4 in this thesis). Thus exactly the conditions that Lake 
e^qxDsed as underlying the Underwood Tariff existed at the time of the 
Payne-Aldrich tariff. It would not therefore be unfair to conclude 
that the international economic structure (as defined by Lake) could 
not have led to the lower U. S tariff rates of the 1913 Act over 1909. 
More significant was the popular desire for a more progressive tax 
regime, vMch entailed lew regressive taxes (freer trade) and the 
adoption of an income tax. The logic of the rise of the income tax 
(and hence ultimately of free trade) was therefore premised in 
politics as well as the condition of the country s economy. This 
perspective can be extended rpto 1945.
After 1917 vdien revenue dependence on the tariff was significantly 
diminished Governments were able to adjust tariffs in a less 
constrained manner, as noted above. With the predominance of the 
income tax, the Democrats were able to extend freer trade whilst 
simultaneously increasing progressive taxes, (as noted above). As a 
result, the Republican Smoot-Hawley tariff was significantly revised 
downward in 1934. Furthermore, the establishment of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act (R.T. A.A.), lent the executive a considerable 
boost in its capacity to enact tariff legislation (see especially 
S. Haggard 1988. Also J. Goldstein 1988: 188. But see Lake 1989: 84- 
85). This was almost inevitable given the decentralised nature of the
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central state, vArLch made it difficult for Presidents to produce free 
trade legislation. The New Deal income tax provisions paved the way 
for the American policy of virtual free trade eifter the Second Vforld 
War.
Finally however, the question of the extension of exports, 
especially after 1887, as evidenced by Cleveland^ s classic 1887 
speech has not been fully explained by recourse to the above 
described fiscal analysis. In this respect Lake argues specifically 
that whilst the state wished to maintain protection at home it also 
sought free trade (and hence expanded exports) abroad. These two 
initiatives he argues were in no way irreconcilable or problematic, 
as they could be achieved by the use of selective reciprocity deals 
with individual countries, whilst America could remain protectionist 
at home through the fact of BrLtainf s "hegemonic" commitment to free 
trade. Hence the U. S "free rode on free trade" (1983: 529; 1989: ). 
Commercial negotiations were required with foreign states as 
America's economic rise was leading to closed markets abroad. These 
negotiations gave way to the endorsement of maximum/minimum schedules 
being applied after 1909 (being replaced with a Most Favoured Nations 
Clause in the early 1920's). Certainly at the e^qslanatory level this 
aspect of American foreign economic policy would require going 
outside the ambit of taxation issues. However, Lake's assertion that 
the intemationeü. economic structure can explain tariff policy per se 
is problematic. Is it not possible that while the two main parties 
were attempting to expand exports abroad, they were hindered from 
repealing American protection owing to the h i ^  incidence of revenue 
dependence incurred by the state on the tariff in the first place?
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CHAPTER 6
THE STATIST-BCCNCMÏ CP PROTBCnCNESM AND ECCNCMIC DEVELOPMENT 1870-
1914.
Section 1 Establishing the Linkage between Trade and State Regimes
1870-1914
This thesis has presented a statist economy approach to explciining 
protectionism in Germany, Russia, America and free trade in Britain 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter 
will summarise the findings of the substantive chapters 2 through 5. 
It will also flesh out the basis of the autonomous powers of the 
state. In explcdning the inpcsition of a trading regime by a 
particular state, we shall utilise four essential variables; 
political regime structure (mode of domination), the degree of state 
centralisation/concentration (federal/unitary nature), the mode of 
taxation, and the strength of agricultural and/or industrial elites 
(related to the mode of production). A central concept in the 
e^gjlanation of protectionism is the mode of taxation, \Ædch is • 
determined by a series of overlapping autonomous power logics.
It should be noted that the mode of taxation is a multilayered 
concept, referring to a broad range of fiscal issues. Firstly the 
mode of taxation refers to the relations of extraction, as chosen by 
the central state. These refer to the income group upon vMch the tax 
burden lies heaviest. For the states dealt with in this thesis, it is 
the case that an indirect mode of taxation represents a regressive 
tax system vMch penalises the lower income groups. Consequently, a 
direct mode of taxation represents a progressive tax system, which 
penalises the upper income groups.
The mode of taxation also refers to the "forces of extraction", 
vhich are the means by vMch the "relations" are set in place. The 
forces of extraction are specific to each mode of taxation, are 
hi<ÿiLy variable and embody a mixture of political, bureaucratic, 
fiscal and economic determinants, giving these "forces" a peculiarly
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hybrid nature. It is inportant to note that this hybrid quality is 
also found to be central to the nature of the economic sphere. That 
is, economic processes such as tariff protectionism/free trade are 
determined by a mixture of political, fiscal, bureaucratic, military 
and economic inputs. Finally, the mode of taxation refers to the 
absolute and relative rates of extraction. Uiis concept is central to 
the linkage between state and trade linkages, which will now be 
theorised
Alexander Gerschenkron originally argued that the German 
protectionist regime [post-1879] was created so as to maintain 
authoritarianism, [as opposed to stimulating democratic- 
constitutionalism] (Gerschenkron 1943). However, conceptualising the 
relationship between economics and politics from this statement 
requires care. Gerschenkroh s formulation actually specified a 
linkage between state regime and class pc^r. Here, politics was 
reduced to economics, since the Kaiserreich was conceptualised only 
in so far as it enabled the maintenance of Junker power (see also 
Kehr 1977; Rosenberg 1943, 1985; Wehler 1985a, 1985b; Berghahn 
1973, 1982, 1985, ). Ihus the maintenance of Junker power was synonymous 
to the continuation of authoritarianism; and the form of state was 
derived from agrarian class power. Hiis formulation is to be firmly 
rejected . Hie form of state has its own logic, vhich cannot be 
sinply reduced to the "dominant” class, or any other mode of economic 
power for that matter. From this perspective it is important to ask 
the question that Weber asked,
"Will a certain type of... political power structure determine the
creation of characteristic forms of revenue and tax systems? (Weber
1964, quoted in Braun 1975).
In the process, we can also appraise Montesquieu^ s claim that the 
nature of the tax system is subject to the specific political sytem 
or form of government (Montesquieu 1748/1989). This question will
allow us to analyse the connections between state and trade regimes
(for the period 1870-1914).
In the literature on protectionism, it is argued that there is no 
linkage between state and trade regimes. Adapting Gerschenkronf s
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above quoted formulation# a crude hypothesis has underlain such 
denials of linkage. Hiis can be specified by presenting a two-part
hypothesis.
(1) Democracy = Free Trade
(2) Authoritarianism/Autocracy = Protectionism
From this angle# the consensus has denied a linkage. For exarple# 
Peter Gourevitch concludes that,
"... the pattern of (trade) policy outcomes in those countries 
(Britain, America, Germany and France) was the same, suggesting that 
those aspects of the political system vMch were idiosyncratic to 
each country are not crucial in e^qilaining the result" (1977: 307, my 
additions).
More commonly, Kenneth Barkin discounts the connection on the grounds 
that "the high tariff nation in the nineteenth century was the U. S" 
(1987: 230). Hcwever, not only can we explain the "exceptional" case 
of the United States, but we can draw \jp a more general theory of the 
linkage between state and trade regimes. This involves 
differentiating two aspects of state/political power;
(1) The Degree of Concentration (Federal/Unitary nature of the
state)
(2) The Mode of Domination (the proximity of the executive to the 
population - liberalism/authoritarianism/autocracy)
With regard to the first aspect, it is the case that in the 
nineteenth century (especially sifter 1870) federal states utilised 
indirect taxes to siçport central government finances. Indeed in the 
federal regimes of America and Germany (as well as Switzerland, 
Canada and Australia) over 90% (if not 100%) of central government 
revenues were derived from indirect taxes. In turn, this meant that 
tariffs on protectionist and revenue articles were levied in order to 
meet the requirements of fiscal accumulation. Thus from 1872-1914, of 
total tax revenue (TTR) extracted by the German central government, 
average indirect taxes constituted 99.4%, vMlst customs revenue 
constituted 51.5% (see table 2.16; also P. Flora 1987a: 307).
Similarly in Switzerland, between 1875-1914, average indirect taxes
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constituted 95. 8% of TTR, d^iilst customs provided 92. 5% (calculated 
from Flora 1987a: 336). In America, average indirect taxes as a
proportion of TTR fron 1791-1914 v?ere over 99. 5%. Between 1791-1861 
customs revenue constituted over 90%, vAiLlst between 1861-1913, 
tariffs constituted as much as 50%. The Australian government derived 
approximately 62% of TTR frcxn custans and excise (Davis and 
Huttenback 1988: ff. 295). For the fiscal year ending 1900, 76% of TTR 
for all states was siçjplied by indirect taxes (Levi 1988: 148;
Groenewegen 1983: 173-174). For the most part, the local states
tended to levy direct taxes and often bitterly attacked central 
governments if they attenpted to levy such taxes. Central (federal) 
states relied overvAielmingly on indirect taxes and tariffs. Thus a 
chart can be drawn up, illustrating the connection between lew 
concentrated state regimes (federal) and protectionist trade regimes
Table 6.1 The Linkage between Concentration of State and 
Trade regimes
Unitary Federal
Free Trade Britain
Protectionism Russia America
Germany
(Australia)
(Canada)
This conceptualisation of the link between state and trade regime 
ejqxLains much. In particular it overcomes the hitherto "exceptional" 
status accorded by most authors to America's trade regime. It is also 
an important element in Britainf s maintenance of free trade (of vMch 
more later). However, as is apparent from the chart, this linkage 
does not explain vdiy the Russian (unitary) state favoured protection. 
Clearly, the "concentration" state variable is inadequate on its own 
in e^glaining trade and state regime linkages. At this point we can 
introduce the second major aspect of state/political power, the mode 
of domination. As the chart above shows, the principal focus here 
must be differentiating liberal Britain from autocratic Russia.
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Table 6.2- Proportions of Tintai Revenues at central aovemment
level.
Year Britain
Direct Indirect
Russia
Indirect Direct
1860 18 64 52 16
1865 16 61 46 19
1870 26 59 50 21
1875 17 63 51 21
1880 25 61 56 18
1885 26 53 48 20
1890 26 50 50 12
1895 28 50 47 11
1900 31 47 39 13
1905 33 47 42 9
1910 27 47 42 8
1911 44 36
1912 38 39 •
1913 37 38 40 8
tource: See Table 4. 9, calculated from ^ pendix 5, and Table 3. 9
Table fi.3 The maior categories of taxation in relation to National
Income
Year Britain
indirect Direct
Russia
Indirect Direct
1885 4. 2 2.0 - 4.7 2.0
1890 3.4 1.8 5. 7 1.4
1895 3. 5 2.0 5. 1 1.3
1900 3. 5 2.3 5. 1 1. 8
1905 4. 1 2.9 6.0 1. 3
1910 3. 1 1.8 6.8 1. 3
1911 3.5 4. 3
1912 3.3 3.2
1913 3.2 3. 1 7. 2 1. 4
Sources: British figures calculated from .^:pendix 5 and lA; 
figures calculated from Table 3. 8 and .^^pendix lA
Russian
Ihese figures help to determine the conparative 
progressivity/regressivity of the two tax regimes. Table 6.2. shows 
that the British state shifted away from indirect taxes towards a 
more direct tax regime. By 1911, direct taxes constituted the major 
category of revenue, dropping back very slightly in 1912-1913. The
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Russian state however, shifted to a predominantly indirect tax regime 
1860-1913. Moreover, direct taxes (unlike in Britain) were in fact 
regressive. In addition, Russia had no income tax in this period. 
Table 6.3 charts the conparative position in regards to the relative 
rate of extraction (taxes as a proportion of national income), in 
terms of progressivity/regressivity. In 1911, direct taxes were 
approximately three times hi^er than in Russia Moreover, Russian 
regressive (indirect) taxes were over twice as high as the British 
equivalent. This meant that in Russia, the lower classes were 
fiscally penalised, v^ereas in Britain, mainly after 1910, the tax 
burden was distributed more or less evenly.
These tax regimes were linked fundamentally to the respective modes 
of domination. In Britain, political parties carpeted to g ^ n  the 
majority of the electorate, in order to acquire executive power. By 
the early twentieth century, the liberal party came round to 
attracting the recently enfranchised working class by paying for 
pensions throu^ a progressive income tax. It was this shift towards 
direct taxes which enabled the state to maintain free trade, and 
avoid the Unionist alternative of tariff protectionism. However in 
Russia, the working classes remained outside the political system, 
with no legitimate means to affect policy-making. The autocratic 
state aimed to maintain and indeed increase its despotic power over 
society. This meant repressive policies against the lower orders, 
particularly vis-a-vis the proletariat. Specifically, this led to 
regressive taxes, vMch were conparatively oppressive (see table 
6.5). In turn, this led to tariff protectionism (indirect regressive 
taxes). Thus the respective modes of domination had direct linkages 
to the different modes of taxation. In turn, the mode of taxation had 
direct linkages to the adoption of the different trade regimes.
Can this linkage between modes of domination with modes of 
taxation/trade regimes be extended to encompass the cases of liberal 
America and author! tari an Germany? If we are interested in the nature 
of the overall mode of taxation, we could draw ip a carparLson (Table 
6.4 conpares the overall nature of the British and German tax 
regimes). However, as we shall see below, this line of analysis would 
be irrelevant vhen trying to understand the relationship between
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modes of dcanination (ruling class strategies) and the nature of the 
trade regime.
Table 6.4 Compari.son of the nature of the overall German and British
tax regimes
Income £ 1 2
Under 35 100 100
35- 50 102 95
50- 90 89 75
90- 130 82 70
130- 180 82 60
180- 270 107 55
Over 270 98 <50
Income £ Britain (1904)
1 2
50 100 100
100 68 68
150 55 55
200 62 86
500 73 97
1000 81 113
2000 73 108
5000 62 106
10,000 56 104
20, 000 54 110
. 50, 000 53 112
Britain (1914)
Income £ 1 2
50 100 100
100 69 69
150 56 56
200 55 80
,500 67 114
1000 76 140
2000 67 138
,5000 78 143
10,000 93 174
20,000 95 184
50,000 97 208
Source: Germany: [Col. 1] W. Gerloff (1908: 164, quoted in P. C  Witt
1970: 52); [Col. 2] Approximate revision on the basis of widespread 
direct tax evasion [see text below]. Britain: 1903/1904 & 1913/1914; 
Samuel (1920: 176-177 Statistical Society of loTidnn Jntimal LXXXII, 
quoted in Murray (1980: 294).
(Col. 1) Earned Income. (Col. 2) Unearned Income.
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The German figures require a brief explanation. Column 1 in the above 
chart provides an estimate of regressivity on the assurtption that all 
tax-payers paid direct taxes in full. However, there is much archival 
evidence to show that this did not happen. In particular, the Junkers 
and the members of the "high" agricultural class in practice managed 
to escape much direct taxation. The principal method of tax evasion 
was the non-declaration of total personal income. This was possible 
mainly because the Junkers occupied the bureaucratic positions as the 
Landratte after 1891. In this respect, they were a law unto 
themselves (see especially P. C.WLtt 1985: 137-154). Thus column 2 has 
been presented as a very approximate guide to the actual nature of 
the tax base. Since the regressivity of the German tax regime would 
hardly have changed by 1914, it would be fair to conclude that the 
German fiscal system was far more regressive than its British 
counterpart (to be expanded \jpon in the next section).
However, the use of regressive indirect taxes (particularly at 
central level ) was more a function of the stats' s federal nature, and 
less a function of ruling class strategies to repress the working 
classes. Tariffs occupied a different role in Germany and also 
America to that of Russia and Britain. Central federal states relied 
on indirect taxes only. With extremely limited use of direct taxes 
(in this period) these central states ware therefore far less able to 
redistribute income between different social classes, by changing the 
tax base (in contrast to their unitary counterparts). Thus the only 
way to affect a redistribution of income was for the central state to 
levy indirect taxes and then redistribute these revenues to the local 
states vMch could then use these to reduce their own progressive 
(direct) taxes. Indeed as wa have see, this was central to the 
Bismarckian strategy of effecting tax relief to the upper income 
groips. Hcwever, it was not an effective instrument of issuing tax 
relief to the i;pper income groips (as discussed in the final section 
of chapter 2). As we shall see in the next section, unitary states 
had a real power (high fiscal displacement factor potential) over 
their federal counterparts (lew displacement factor potential), \dien 
it came to changing the nature of the tax system, and to redistribute 
income through tax base changes.
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The hitherto dominant notion of the linkage between states and trade 
regimes as expressed by the likes of Gerschenkron, Gourevitch and 
Barkin, concealed more than they revealed. The revised linkage for 
the period 1870-1914 can be expressed as follows;
(1) Unitary/Liberal state = Direct taxes = Free Trade
(2) Unitary/Autocratic state = Indirect taxes = Protectionism
(3) Federal states = Protectionism
Thus we can pose a linkage between trade and political regimes; but 
it can only be done by combining these two aspects of state 
institutional pc^^.
We may now present three hypotheses which theoretically locate the 
reasons for Britainf s retention of free trade after 1870, vMlst her 
German and Russian counterparts turned to protection. Firstly, a 
country remains free trading after 1870 because state expenditures do 
not significantly increase. Secondly, a country remains free trading 
after 1870 because it can acquire revenue from sources of a non- 
indirect nature. Thirdly (and linked to the second), a state remains 
free trading cmng to its unitary nature. In addition to these three 
hypotheses, a further reason for the maintenance of free trade was 
also linked to Britainf s dominant position in the European setting.
British state expenditures did not increase significantly in the 
1870s. Expenditures remained remarkably stable - revenues even more 
so. It was not until cifter 1890 and in particular cifter 1900 that the 
fiscal problem was felt, (the fiscal crunch being largely offset 
between 1890 and 1900 due to a rising gross national product). 
Germany and Russia had experienced a "fiscal spurt" in the 1870s. It 
was this factor vMch had formed the backdrop to the switch to 
protection. In Britain hcwever this spurt had come much later. If the 
hypothesis is correct, then we would expect to see a desire for 
protection emerging in Britain just cifter the turn of the century.
Indeed in 1903 Joseph Chamberlain set i:p the Tariff Reform League. 
Furthermore, tariffs on manufactured goods v^re to perform an 
inportant fiscal function - namely to provide revenue for welfare
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refonre. This was an inportant thou^ not dominant aspect to 
Chamberlain^ s project of inperial preference. However by 1907, tariff 
protection on a wide range of manufactured goods became official Tory 
party policy. And it was done precisely for the reasons expounded in 
the hypothesis - namely to provide revenue It is at this point that 
the second null hypothesis becomes relevant.
The British state had been moving away from an indirect to a more 
direct tax base throughout the nineteenth century, accelerating after 
1870. The politics of liberal Britain had led to the enfranchisement 
of a significant proportion of the working classes. The 
enfranchisement of the masses - thou^ not complete was inportant in 
that the vote (in partial contrast to Germany, and conplete contrast 
to Russia), had salience due to the liberal parliamentary nature of 
the state. In contrast to Germany, the enfranchisement of the British 
masses led to significant changes in policy, particularly in 
taxation. VîLth the pluralistic set \;p of parties and an executive 
vMch could only be captured ly the vote, it became inperative to 
address the newly enfranchised masses in some shape or form. 
Responding to such pressures, party politics in Britain polarised 
over the fiscal issue. The politics of New Liberalism led the state 
to introduce a substantial increase in progressive direct taxation, 
(the opportunity cost of v^ch was the Unionist return to 
protection). The Liberal government secured the transition from the 
old fiscal regressive regime (indirect), to a new more progressive 
direct and indirect mode of taxation, which would dominate modem 
twentieth century Britain, (as it would at a later date most other 
advanced states).
Equally as inportant in the determination of the Edwardian tax regime 
was the stats' s unitary nature. Federal regimes in the nineteenth 
century were particularly prone to raising tariffs, which tended to 
provide the mainstay of central government finances. Unitary central 
states had far easier access to direct tax and non-tariff revenue 
soumes. In addition, they had as a result a high fiscal displacement 
factor potential
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The first two hypotheses represent cin inversion of those used to 
explain the rise of tariff protectionism in Russia and Germany. Thus 
firstly, both Germany and Russia faced fiscal crisis in the late 
187Cy s; derived to a large extent from the iitpact of the second 
military revolution. This provided the initial inpetus to the rise of 
protectionism. With regards to the second and third hypothesis, both 
these countries would rely on indirect taxes, either as a function of 
autocratic ruling class strategies, or of federal fiscal-political 
exigencies.
Section 2 Adumbrating a theory of State Pcwer/Autonony
In the common literature, it is usually understood that state power 
is synonymous with the ability of the polity to usurp or, go against 
the wishes of the "dominant" class (a special legacy of Marxism). 
Michael Mann has argued that in general, Marxists have been looking 
in the "wrong place" (1988: Ch. 1). For Mann, state power can be found 
elsevhere. In the modem world, he argues, states cannot go against 
the needs or wishes of the dominant class (limited, or non-existent 
despotic power). Rather, state power resides in an entirely different 
setting. Modem states have a developed conception of infrastructural 
power (see 1986a: 477-483,521; see also the notion of "scope" in 
Giddens 1985). In this conception, states can penetrate societies and 
shape them in differential ways to those of say the dominant class, 
or the church etc. The essence of this power, is derived from the 
fact that the state operates on a different social-spatial plane to 
other power forces lodged within civil society. FollcwLng Max Weber, 
the fact of territorial-centrality means that unique roles are 
conferred i;pon the state, thus differentiating it from societal 
actors. This can be posed as a counterfactual; "Yet they (societal 
groips) could not do the state's jobs themselves unless they changed 
their own socio-spatial and organisational structure" (1988: 18).
Whilst in agreement with the inportance of infrastructural power, we 
shall develop further concepts of state power, by carefully analysing 
the state's linkage with trade regime changes for the period 1870-
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1914. It is necessary to do this since, \^le Mannf s pathhreaking 
vork takes us beyond hitherto existing reductionist theories of the 
state, his conceptual apparatus itself has certain limitations (even 
though much of his detailed enpirical work would probably go beyond 
these limitations). The limitations refer principally to his overall 
theoretical understanding of state poy^r, vhich has been 
conceptualised through a sinple dichotomy between "infrastructural" 
and "despotic" power forms. Broadly speaking he denies the existence 
of despotic power in the states examined in this thesis for this 
period. He therefore falls back on infrastructural power. One aspect 
of despotic pcwer refers to the process vhere the state undermines 
the dominant class. Since he has rejected this, he simultaneously 
ignores certain processes vhere the state goes against the dominant 
class (even if these moments are not examples of despotism). Ihese 
moments will be pointed to, and conceptualised below.
The Autonomous Powers of the State
(1) Infrastructural pot^r
(2) Ihe Mode of Domination (Insularity/independence or. Embeddedness 
of the executive vis-a-vis civil society).
(3) State concentration - h i ^  or lew (Unitary/federal nature)
(4) State Capacity - strong or weak
(5) Fiscal Displacement factor potential - h i ^  [strong], or, low 
[weak].
Ihe first aspect of state autonomy, (in this case foUcwLng Mann) is 
the notion of infrastructural power. Ihe state has certain unique 
roles, many of vÆiich have direct repercussions for tariff policy. 
Ihese include the ability to levy and extract taxes, as well as 
having a monopoly of the means of violence - vAiich means that it is 
the state that decides to spend money on military defence. Ihus in 
the 1870-1914 period, with the onset of the second military 
revolution, states aimed to increase overall tax extraction in order 
to pay for defence requisites. Ihis fact provided the background to
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the rise of protectionism in Russia and Germany, and also inpacted 
upon tax and trade policy in Britain, thou^ not until after the turn 
of the century (in the lattercase). Furthermore, the provision of 
defence also provided the background to American protectionism 
throughout the nineteenth century.
However, to gain a fuller explanatory picture of trade regime changes 
requires developing further aspects and concepts of state pcwer. Ihe 
second aspect of state power refers to the identity of the state. 
This is the mode of domination, vMch refers to the institutional set 
up of the relevant state. The executive in Russia was autocratic, 
vMch meant that it was isolated from civil society. Furthermore the 
state was in fact despotic in the Mannian sense. Its abrasive- 
despotic relations of domination over civil society meant that it 
repressed in particular the lower orders. This was directly (thou^ 
not solely) responsible for the use of an indirect tax regime, and 
hence tariff protectionism. In contrast, the Liberal-parliamentary 
British state was embedded within society. Executive power could only 
be gained by the competing political parties through co-operating 
with social actors (large or small). Thus after 1900 the Liberal 
party sou^t to incorporate the wrkLng classes in order to gain 
power. In the process, it shifted toward a more direct tax regime, 
and hence maintained free trade. The authoritarian/liberal nature of 
Germany and America respectively had less salience in the 
determination of trade regimes. Here the third aspect of state power 
was more inportant (see below).
This also refers to the specific identity of the state; the degree of 
concentration of the state. Thus federal states were diluted in their 
ability to change many policies (low concentration). Thus federal 
central states tended to rely almost solely on indirect taxes and 
tariffs. Unitary states however, had higher levels of political power 
concentrated at the centre. This meant that they had control over 
multiple fiscal resources. Thus they could choose either to rely on 
indirect taxes and tariffs (as in Russia), or they could use direct 
taxes and avoid tariff protectionism (as in Britain).
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Both these specific forms of state identity led on to different 
levels of state capacity. Each mode of domination had different 
amounts of capacity. In particular, we can differentiate autocracy 
from liberalism. This can be done for both tax and trade strategies. 
Firstly, throughout the nineteenth century, the British state levied 
tariffs, though these were applied only to revenue items (eg. coffee, 
cocoa, tea, tobacco, molasses, sugar, rubber). The inportant point, 
is that these products were did not constitute inportant raw 
materials in the production process. With the rise of tariff 
protectionism in the late eighteenth century in Britain, raw 
materials became subject to tariffs, so as to provide the state with 
revenues during the Napoleonic Wars (Davis 1966: 306-317; Deane 1965: 
186). However, by the 1820's HuskLsson reduced tariff levels, 
particularly on raw materials, as it was felt that these merely 
pushed up the cost of the finished good. Ihen in 1842, Peel set about 
instigating a system vMch applied a tariff ceiling on raw materials 
of 5%; 12% on semi-manufactures; and 20% on finished manufactures 
(Holland 1980: 102; Deane 1965: 188). Prior to even the initial phase 
of Russian industrialisation, Britain had invoked an economically 
rational trading regime. This was further extended in 1846 with the 
unilateral switch to free trade.
However, after 1870, the Russian state would travel in precisely the 
opposite direction. By the turn of the century, overall average 
tariff rates on raw materials and semi-manufactures were very often 
subject to hi^ier tariff rates than the finished articles. Ihis had a 
particularly adverse effect for Russian producers. At best, it would 
have merely negated any protection that was granted the finished 
product vhich entered the country. At worst, it would have raised the 
costs of production for the Russian producer to the benefit of the 
foreign inporter. Ihis was hardly the expected practice of an
economically rational "late developer"! Ihus to sum ip, vhilst the 
Russian state entered the production process in order to fund its 
budget, it simultaneously disrupted and undermined elements of the 
economy. Ihis was typical of patrimonial bureaucracy, vMch 
ultimately soumit to prevent the growth of a strong bourgeoisie and
economy, in order to remain despotically autonomous. Ihus the British
state's strategy enabled economic development, \Ailst Russian
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autocracy sought to limit and block it. The irony of these different 
approaches was that autocracy became ultimately unstable precisely 
because of its despotic strategies. In this respect, the British 
state was strong vMlst the Russian state was weak. This can be 
revealed by a conparative analysis of the different tax regimes 
adopted.
As tables 6. 2 and 6. 3 show, after 1880 the two tax regimes moved in 
opposite directions. Thus Britain moved rapidly to direct taxes, 
whilst Russia moved to an indirect tax regime. Comparing the relative 
rates of Russia and Britain respectively, in 1913 regressive taxes 
were at least 225: 100, vMlst direct taxes were approximately 100: 
225, (though this latter ratio would have been much wider than this, 
because Russian direct taxes were actually regressive). These tax 
regimes reflect different ruling class strategies. The British state 
attenpted to incorporate the working classes by granting the basis of 
fiscal citizenship. The Russian state hcwever showed only contenpt 
for the lower classes through adopting a highly regressive tax 
regime. Furthermore, regressive taxes in Russia consumed over 8% of 
national income. In Britain the figure was approximately 3. 2%. This 
meant that the lower orders in Russia paid much hi^ier taxes than 
their British counterparts. These tax strategies were inportant to 
questions of regime maintenance. The British strategy cemented the 
working classes to the state, \Mlst the Russian state merely 
alienated such groups. This was one reason for the overthrew of the 
state in 1917, vMch had exploited the workers throu^ high and 
regressive taxes.
The British state's fiscal policy secured internal compliance, and 
was unequivocally strong. Thus the fact of embeddedness within civil 
society did not lead to a weak dependent state. Similarly, 
autocracy's insularity enabled the state to repress much of civil 
society - the source of the regime's weakness This was also reflected 
in her expenditure policy. Even if we ignore extraordinary 
expenditures, Russian levels were still hi^ier than the British in 
most years. (Both regimes are cocpared in the charts below)
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Table 6.5 Total Government ExoeiVii-hires (as a proportion nf na-hinnal
income) in Britain and Russia
Russia Britain
Year Central Total Central Total
1885 11. 9 12. 9 7. 9
1890 12. 7 13. 7 6. 5 9. 4
1895 14. 7 15. 7 7.0
1900 14. 7 15. 7 8.2 16.0
1905 22. 7 23. 7 8.4
1910 15.0 16.0 7. 9 13.7
1911 17. 7 18. 7 8. 1 13.0
1912' 17. 8 19.2 8.0 13.0
1913 17. 7 19.2 8. 1 14.0
Source:
Russia Central expenditures - P. A.Khranov (1950)
Local expenditures - Miller (1926: 1*42). These figures are only
available for 1912 and 1913. These consumed approxiinately 1% of 
national income. This figure has been used as the basis of local
expenditures for all years in the chart.
National income - see Appendix la. Table 1. 1
Britain Central expenditures - Mitchell & Deane (1962). Local
expenditures - Peacock & Wiseman (1961: 42). National income - see
'.^ jpendix lA, Table 1. 4
On the evidence of this fiscal analysis, we can appraise a recent 
theory of fiscal historians. Patrick O  Brien and Peter Mathias 
(1976), in vtot has become a classic article, argued that in the 
eighteenth century, the liberal-parliamentary British state extracted 
far higher levels of taxation than her French absolutist neighbour. 
These figures have been used to support the inportant recent 
theoretical claims of Margaret Levi (1988) and John Brewer (1988). 
Both authors have argued that this differential fiscal-extraction 
capacity was linked to the various forms of state regime. Thus they 
argue that the fact of Britainf s liberal-parliamentarism enabled the 
state greater social conpliance to levy high taxes. Conversely, 
because of the low societal conpliance under French absolutism, the 
state was unable to extract such h i ^  taxes (Brewer 1988: 88-134; 
Levi 1988: 95-145). In short, "Parliamentary consent made public
resistance to tax collection extremely difficult” (Brewer 1988: 132);
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though it should be noted that both Brewer and Levi add that there 
were inportant bureaucratic/infrastructural factors v^ch contributed 
to these differential extraction capacities. The upshot of such 
analyses is to attribute strength to the British state, because not 
only could it levy higher taxes, but also because it did not give 
rise to a revolutionary moment, (unlike its absolutist counterpart). 
This echoes the classic analysis of Montesquieu, v^o claimed that,
"In moderate states (democracy), there is a compensation for heavy 
taxes; it is liberty. In despotic states there is an equivalent for 
liberty; it is modest taxes" (Spirit of the Laws 1748/1989: 221)
The upshot of the analysis presented in this thesis is that the 
British state was strong in conparison to autocracy precisely because 
it was able to levy 1cm taxes. This strength was also determined by 
its capacity to adopt a relatively progressive tax regime (from a 
coiparative perspective). This analysis of British fiscal strength 
can be linked to the regime's strength in economic matters. That is, 
the state's enabling strategies for economic development were in part 
responsible for strong national income growth. This enabled the state 
to extract sufficient taxes at relatively lew cost to the economy or 
populace. Autocracy, having blocked much potential economic growth 
had to levy taxes which consumed relatively h i ^  amounts of national 
income. However, it would be quite wrong to assume that low British 
taxes were siitply a function of h i ^  national income, and Russian 
high taxes were a function of lew national income [as assumed by many 
authors] (see for exanple, dive Trebilcock 1981). For such a 
conclusion fails to recognise the ability of the different states to 
maintain conpliance. That is, the Russian state levied h i ^  taxes, 
and as a result sewed the seeds of its ewn future demise. The British 
government sinply could not have got away with levying such h i ^  and 
regressive taxes. This factor was linked therefore, not just to 
national income levels, but also the differential abilities of these 
states to maintain conpliance, and ultimately to maintain their rule.
There is some sipport for this theory at a more general level. Thus 
in the period between 1890 and 1913 liberal American expenditure 
levels consumed between 8-10. 5% of national income. These were even 
lower than the levels spent in Britain. The tax regime was also
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slightly progressive (particularly in conparison to the German and 
Russian regimes). Moreover, authoritarian Germany spent high amounts 
as a proportion of national income, ranging from 15% in 1890 to 17. 2% 
in 1910, and 19. 8% in 1913. Furthermore, the German tax regime was 
considerably regressive. There is therefore rudimentary evidence for 
this theory when covering the four countries - Germany, Russia, 
Britain and America.
This analysis contrasts with the classic analysis made fcy Krasner 
(1978), vhere he argued that modem states can be arranged along a 
continuum of strong and weak polities. This involved a typology 
involving three aspects of State pc^^r. Ihese included the state's 
ability to firstly, resist private pressure; secondly, to change 
private behaviour; and thirdly, to change the social structure (1978: 
55-57). According to this typology, for Krasner, autocratic Russia 
would have probably been cast as "strong", whilst liberal America and 
Britain would have been "weak'. The analysis presented here would 
invert this typology, such that liberal Britain and America were 
strong, vMlst Russia was weak, vhilst Germany was probably closer to 
the Russian pole in some respects, and closer to the liberal end in 
others. This is the paradox of state strength; that embedded liberal 
states, dependent on society, are strong, vMlst isolated autocratic 
states, with a certain amount of despotic power were fundamentally 
weak. This analysis is commensurate to the recent findings of John A 
Hall and G. John Ikenberry. Indeed Ikenberry aptly describes this 
phenomenon as the "irony of state strength" (1986: 106, 134-137;
1988a: 160-163, 175-177; 1988b 219-221; see also G. J. Ikenberry and
J. A. Hall 1989: 12-14,38,94-97; J. A. Hall 1986).
This notion of state capacity is also linked to the fifth aspect of 
political power; namely the concept of fiscal displacement factor 
potential. This is mainly linked to the concentration of the state. 
The concept refers to the ability of the central state to effect a 
change in the relations of extraction That is, the ability to shift 
the tax burden onto various groiçs throu^ shifting the tax base. 
Central federal states, as e^qilained above, had only a very limited 
ability to extract direct taxes. Thus they tended to rely almost 
vholly on regressive indirect taxes. Even the Bismarckian strategy of
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seeking to provide tax relief for the upper income earners at local 
level was relatively ineffective.
Thus in the period upto 1913, federal states were locked into levying 
indirect taxes at central level. This contrasted strikingly with the 
central governments' policies in unitary regimes. The British state 
shifted towards a more direct tax regime at central level. This was 
sinply not possible in federal America or Germany. Russia however 
chose not to raise direct taxes, and instead relied on regressive 
indirect revenues. Thus the two unitary states (highly concentrated) 
had high displacement factors, in contrast to the weakly concentrated 
federal states, vhich had similarly weak displacement factors. The 
notion of capacity is also relevant here, since the mode of 
domination affected the nature of the displacement factor in the 
hi^ily concentrated unitary states.
The British state was able to produce a fiscal revolution in the 
Edwardian era, vAiereby the hitherto relations of extraction were 
overthrown. Thus in 1909 the British state in effect attacked the 
hitherto fiscal privilege of the ipper income groups. The result of 
the 1909 fiscal revolution was to produce an evenly progressive tax 
regime in relation to the lower and upper income groups (though there 
was some regression in the middle income groups ). In effecting such a 
fiscal strategy, the state was able to maintain itself in power, as 
well as secure solid internal conpliance. The Russian state also had 
a h i ^  displacement factor potential, but chose to use it in order to 
repress the lower income groups. Thus British "strength" was a 
function of the overlapping of several aspects of state power; those 
of a liberal embedded mode of domination with strong capacity 
together with its hi^üy concentrated unitary nature, with its high 
displacement factor potential.
This points to a further irony of state strength;. that the liberal 
British state, ^Aich was embedded within (capitalist) society was 
able to withdraw the fiscal privileges of the "dominant" class. In 
particular, this contrasted with the authoritarian German state, 
vAiich was not embedded within society and was unable to withdraw the 
fiscal privileges of the Junkers (and the members of high
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agriculture, even though there were various members within the state 
vÆio wanted to instigate a fiscal revolution against such privilege - 
most notably Johannes von Mi quel in the finance ministry). Even 
though the Reich had only a very limited fiscal displacement factor 
potential, the fact was that the central state had a very weak will 
to tax the Junkers and high agrarians. The irony was that it was 
precisely because the liberal state was embedded within society that 
it was able to instigate just such a fiscal revolution.
To return to I-fennf s dichotomy between despotic and infrastructural 
power, it is clear from the above analysis that such a 
characterisation tends to obscure several inportant concepts of state 
autonomy/pc^^. In particular, the dichotcny casts little li^it on 
the fact that the British state, vÆiich was embedded within civil 
society, was able to effect a major fiscal shift against the 
fundamental wishes of the dominant class. Clearly this was not an 
exanple of despotism; nor was it a sinple exanple of infrastructural 
power. Thus the concepts of state autonomy have been developed above 
in order to be able to shed li^t on these fundamental political 
powers.
There is one further "irony" of state autonomy to be explained. That 
is, v^lst it is being claimed here that the state has autonomous 
powers, it is the case that we cannot describe the state as an 
"actor". The term "actor" inplies that the state is a unified body 
with a homogeneous bureaucratic constituency, which acts in a long­
term rational way. This is to be rejected. As was noted in chapter 3, 
state ministries in Russia were more like satrapies, each vying for 
the Tfear's favour. From a more general perspective, each ministry had 
its own specific goals and set of policy preferences. These often 
clashed with the goals and policies of other ministries. The Finance 
ministry may have been "rational" as Gerschenkron argued. But overall 
state economic policy was not sinply the outcome of Finance Ministry 
decision making. Economic policy was determined by the overlapping of 
policies of various ministries and in particular, autocracy. More 
often than not, these ministries contradicted each other, such that 
final economic policy rarely had a consistent and rational pattern. 
This was conplicated further by the fact that political goals often
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cross-cut economic rationalities, Ihus vMlst the various finance 
ministers attenpted to instil a rational plan of capitalist 
development, autocracy ultimately blocked this path, in order to 
remain despotically autonomous,. Thus much state policy was determined 
by the overlapping effect of economic and political rationalities, 
generated by a highly differentiated "state elite". Furthermore, 
policies were as often developed for short term rather than long-term 
goals. The final irony therefore, is that a differentiated "state 
elite" leads to heightened (rather than weakened), political/state 
autonomy.
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^jpendices
AppPTY^iv 1A»
National T n r n m p  f R u g s i a .  n p r m a n y .  F r a n n P .  R r i  t-jgi n. A m p r i  r a l
All national income statistics have been standardised as Net National 
Product at factor cost (NNP/NNI).
Russian Net National Income 1885-1913
Paul Gregory has SL^^ied net national product at market prices. He 
has used two sets of figures, vMch .cure differentiated by varying 
price indices. I have used Variant 1, vMch is based on the Moscow- 
Petershurg index [as opposed to the Podtiagin index] (1982: 55-56). It 
is significant that for most years after 1900 the Mosccw-Petershurg 
index leads to higgler income figures [and in certain years, 
considerably higher].
To derive NNP at factor cost (NNI) the following calculations have 
been made.
(a) G. N. P. LESS depreciation (capital consuitption) = NNP
(b) N  N. P. [at market prices] LESS indirect taxes NETT of subsidies, 
LESS government enterprise sui^us = N  N. P. at factor cost.
Thus Table 1. 1 presents the final NNE figures. Table 1. 2 presents the 
calculations for Column 2 of Table 1.1
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Table 1. 1
Year ' (1)
NNP
(at market 
prices)
(2)
Indirect 
taxes 
Net of 
subsidies
(3)
NNP
(at Factor 
cost)
1885 7904 219. 3 7684. 7
1886 7732 252. 1 7479. 9
1887 9210 273. 8 8936. 2
1888 9012 350. 1 8661. 9
1889 8527 370. 4 8156. 6
1890 8572 282. 9 8289. 1
1891 7917 330. 8 7586. 2
1892 8739 323. 7 8415. 3
1893 10069 369.0 9700. 0
1894 11533 455.4 11077. 6
1895 10766 409. 7 10356. 3
1896 11950 461. 4 11488. 6
1897 11842 451.3 11390. 7
1898 12356 550. 1 11805. 9
1899 13312 547.0 12765. 0
1900 13327 385.0 12942. 0
1901 13869 413.5 13455. 5
1902 15293 322. 5 14970. 5
1903 14438 370.3 14067. 7
1904 16196 443. 2 15752. 8
1905 14646 517. 5 14128. 5
1906 14184 746.7 13437. 3
1907 13915 674. 8 12520. 2
1908 15452 634. 3 14817. 7
1909 16623 729.8 15893. 2
1910 18194 936.4 17257. 6
1911 17126 1047. 3 16078. 7
1912 18953 1107. 7 17845. 3
1913 20266 1156.0 19110.0
Col. (1) NNP figures (at market prices) from P. R  Gregory (1982: Ch. 3 ) 
Russian Nai-ir>nai Tnrrm^ 1885-1913 Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Col. (2) These figures are derived belcw in Table 1. 2.
Col. (3) Gregory estimated NNP at factor cost for the yesu: 1913 only. 
His figure was sli^tly smaller than the one presented here (ly 
approximately 3%). This difference would be insignificant when making 
the various calculations made in this thesis.
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Table 1. 2 Deriving NNP at factor cost from NNP at market prices
Year (1) (2)
Total Ibtal 
State M oflop. Monopoly 
Expenditure Revenues-
(3)
Difference 
(2)-(1 )
(4)
Subsidies
(5)
Total
[(3)-(4)]
1885 102. 2 421. 5 319. 3 100 219. 3
1886 110. 9 463.0 352. 1 100 252. 1
1887 93. 3 467. 1 373.8 100 273. 8
1888 88. 9 539.0 450. 1 100 350. 1
1889 97. 5 567. 9 470. 4 100 370. 4
1890 194. 5 578.4 382. 9 100 282. 9
1891 124. 9 555. 7 430. 8 100 330. 8
1892 192. 4 616. 1 423. 7 100 323. 7
1893 164. 2 633. 2 469.0 100 369.0
1894 204. 4 759. 8 555. 4 100 455. 4
1895 294. 5 804. 2 509. 7 100 409. 7
1896 360.0 921.4 561. 4 100 461.4
1897 390. 9 942. 2 551. 3 100 451. 3
1898 449. 9 1100. 0 650. 1 100 550. 1
1899 490. 9 1137. 9 647.0 100 547.0
1900 652. 8 1137. 8 485.0 100 385.0
1901 714.0 1227. 5 513. 5 100 413.5
1902 898. 6 1321. 1 422. 5 100 322. 5
1903 949. 0 1419. 3 470. 3 100 370. 3
1904 874. 3 1417. 5 543.2 100 443. 2
1905 832. 1 1449. 6 617.5 100 517. 5
1906 836. 3 1683. 0 846.7 100 746. 7
1907 952. 7 1727. 5 774. 8 100 674.8
1908 1014. 0 1748. 3 734. 3 100 634.3
1909 987. 3 1817. 1 829. 8 • 100 729.8
1910 950.0 1986. 4 1036. 4 100 936.4
1911 974.2 2121. 5 1147. 3 100 1047. 3
1912 1011. 2 2218. 9 1207. 7 100 1107. 7
1913 1165.0 2421. 0 1256. 0 100 1156.0
Cols. (1) and (2) taken from P. A. Khromov (1950 ) Ekoncmicheskoe
razvitie Foeii V XIX-XX Vekakh 1800-1917 Institute of Economics,
Acadeiry of Sciences, USSR
Col. (4) Gregory has shcMvn that in 1913, government subsidies to
private enterprise was approximately 98m roubles. Since there are no 
available figures for the previous years, I have assumed that 
subsidies were 100m roubles throughout this period.
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Tabla 1.3 Imperial Germany; Net Nal-innal Tnr^me
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
1855 6997 1891 20470
1860 7937 1892 21043
1865 8582 1893 21144
1870 10433 1894 21297
1871 11329 1895 21784
1872 12748 1896 22978
1873 13979 1897 24732
1874 14718 1898 26503
1875 14234 1899 27475
1876 14535 1900 28855
1877 14219 1901 28241
1878 14004 1902 29128
1879 13746 1903 30505
1880 14435 1904 32023
1881 14650 1905 34310
1882 14795 1906 36170
1883 15472 1907 38664
1884 15778 1908 38542
1885 15928 1909 39508
1886 16279 1910 41885
1887 17140 1911 44194
1888 18051 1912 47298
1889 19158 1913 48806
1890 20590
Figures taken from K &  Hoffmann (1965) Das Vfeichstum der Deutschen 
mrtschaft gp-it mitte des 19 Jahrfaunderts. Springer Verlag, New 
York, pp. 506-509
See also W. G  Hoffmann & J. H. Muller (1959) Das Deutsche Volkseinkommen 
1851-1957 Tubingen, pp. 14,18. These figure favour comparably with 
those of national income presented in P. Jcstock " The Long-Term Growth 
of National Income in Germany Income and Wealth Series 5 Bowes & 
Bowes, London (pp. 79-122.) These figures are a modified version of 
those presented in Statistiches Reichsamt "Das Deutsche 
Volkseinkommen vor und nach dem Kriege ELnzelschrift Nr>. 24 Zur 
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs Berlin 1932, pp. 67
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A 1. 4 Net Natinral Tncome in Britain 1855-1914
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
1855 636 1891 1373
1860 694 1892 1335
1865 822 1893 1339
1870 936 1894 1418
1871 1015 1895 1447
1872 1072 1896 1484
1873 1149 1897 1538
1874 1126 1898 1618
1875 1113 1899 1700
1876 1099 1900 1750
1877 1089 1901 1727
1878 1059 1902 1740
1879 1032 1903 1717
1880 1076 1904 1704
1881 1117 1905 1776
1882 1160 1906» 1874
1883 1153 1907 1966
1884 1124 1908 1875
1885 1115 1909 1907
1886 1136 1910 1984
1887 1185 1911 2076
1888 1259 1912 2181
1889 1350 1913 2265
1890 1385
Figures taken from CliFeinstein (1961) "Income and Investment in the 
United Kingdom, 1856-1914" Economic iTonmal No. 282, Vol. 71 (June, 
pp. 367-385). In relation to all the calculations made in this thesis, 
it is iirportant to note that these are consistently the lowest 
estimates in the general literature of British national income. This 
is demonstrated by a presentation of the main income estimates, 
below.
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Tah1c> 1 5 Ihe Major Estimates of British Ma-hional Income
Year Deane&
Cole
Deane Jefferys & 
Walters
Prest Feinstein
1850 684 755 - - 694
1865 811 942 - - 822
1870 923 1037 965 929 936
1875 1085 1220 1124 1085 1113
1880 1079 1229 1104 1073 1076
1885 1124 1239 1149 1118 1115
1890 1405 1396 1431 1399 1385
1895 1449 1431 1472 1442 1447
1900 1768 1832 1791 1756 1750
1901 1735 1869 1759 1724 1727
1902 1750 1861 1775 1738 1740
1903 1736 1837 1751 1714 1717
1904 1754 1857 1779 1742 1704
1905 1832 1915 1857 1818 1776
1906 1952 1976 1978 1939 1874
1907 2050 2054 2076 2035 1966
1908 1940 2038 1967 1926 1875
1909 1987 2042 2016 *■ 1973 1907
1910 2078 2106 2108 2063 1984
1911 2154 2204 2185 2140 2076
1912 2288 2297 2318 2268 2181
1913 2395 2395 2424 2368 2265
1914 2294 2372 2312 2266 2209
Source: Col. (1) P. Deane and W. A  Cole (1969) RH t-i mh Economic Growth. 
1688-1959: Trends and Structure Cambridge Itaiversity Press,
Cambridge.
Col. (2) These figures are derived from P. Deane (1969) "New Estimates 
of Gross National Product for the Itoited Kingdom 1830-1914" The 
Review of Income and Wealth Series 14, No. 2 (June, pp. 95-112). 
These figures are of GNP. I have converted them to NNP at factor cost 
by deducting capital consunptioa Depreciation figures are presented 
in Feinstein 1961: 374, Table 2.
Col. (3) J. RJefferys and D. Walters (1955) "National Income and 
Expenditure of the United Kingdom, 1870-1914" Income and Wealth
Series 5 Bowes and Bowes, London (pp. 1-40)
Col. (4) A  R. Prest (1948) "National Income of the United Kingdom
1870-1946" Economic .Tournai Vol. 58, No. 229, pp. 31-62
Col. (5 ) C  H. Feinstein [see table 1.4 above]
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TrM p- 1.6 French Nat-innal income 1870-1913 
( in Fr.)
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
1870 18738
1875 20597
1880 20406
1885 19221
1890 21221
1895 20813
1900 25145
1901 24628
1902 23802
1903 25275
1904 25509
1905 26595
1906 27632
1907 , 29942
1908 29211
1909 30064
1910 31711
1911 34069
1912 37736
1913 38109
Source M. Levy-Leboyer (1990) Ihe French Economv in the Nineteenth 
Century Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (pp. 314-316).
^biP. 1. 7 American National Income 1870-1910 
( in $ )
Year NNP
(at Factor 
Cost)
1870 5200
1880 8600
1890 10900
1900 15300
1910 27500
Source Figures taken from S. Ruznets (1952) "Long-'Iterm Changes in the 
National, Income of the Ifaited States of America since 1870" Income 
and Wealth of the United States; Trends and Structures Series 2. 
Bowes and Bowes, London (pp. 240). It is significant that Kuznet's 
figures are approximately 10% higher than those found in W. I. King 
(1915) The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States 
MacMillan, New York.
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Appendix IB
Tabi ft 1 ■ ft Oirrericv conversion
National
Currency
£1 (Sterling)
U.S. $ 4. 867
France Fr 25. 22
Germany Dm 20. 429
Russia Rb 9. 45
Source R. L. Bidwell (1970) Currency Conversion Tablas; A vp-ar?^
of Chancre Rex Collings, London. Note that these figures are Pre-War 
Parities. Because there are no figures for individual years prior to 
1913, currency conversion is only approxiinate. This mainly affects 
the calculations made in Tables 4. 4 and 4. 5
Table 1. 9 Populations in the Great Powers 1880-1913
Year Russia Germany France Britain
1880 97. 9 45.1 37. 5
1885 108.8 46.7 38. 1 36.0
1890 117.8 49.2 38.4 37. 5
1895 123. 9 52.0 38. 5 39. 2
1900 132. 9 56. 5 38.9 41.2
1905 143. 9 60. 3 39.2 42. 9
1910 160. 7 64. 6 39.5 44. 9
1911 163. 9 65.4 39.6
1912 167. 9 66. 1 39. 7
1913 170. 9 67.0 39.8 45. 6
Source Russia These figures are taken from P. A. Khromov (1950: 
452,454). These are siçplied by the Statistical Yearbook of Russia 
1916 1st edition, (1918: 85). The remaining figures are found in
P. Flora (1987b) State. Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815- 
1975 Vol. 2 (pp. 17-145) MacMillan, London
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^3penâlx 2
Table 2.1 The Decline and Recovery of Grain
Prices (Wheat and Rye) :1870-1913
in Germany
Years Wheat Rye
1870 204 139
1871 231 156
1872 247 162
1873 265 185
1874 240 186
1875 196 152
1876 214 162
1877 235 164
1878 204 135
1879 204 138
1880 221 185
1881 225 195
1882 206 152
1883 184 141
1884 166 144
1885 166 • • 141
1886 162 130
1887 170 120
1888 180 133
1889 186 152
1890 198 165
1891 255 203
1892 181 175
1893 156 131
1894 138 115
1895 144 122
1896 158 122
1897 172 133
1898 190 149
1899 160 146
1900 158 139
1901 168 139
1902 166 143
1903 158 133
1904 172 131
1905 176 144
1906 180 159
1907 206 187
1908 210 179
1909 231 171
1910 204 149
1911 204 167
1912 217 185
1913 198 162
Source : W.G. Hoffmann (1965) Das Wachstum
der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des
19 Jahrhunderts New York (pp.552-554; 
Table 135)
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( Germany )
Tahlft 3. 1 Importation of Grain. 1870-1900 
(In millions of OiiaTi-Prg)
Wheat 
Qts 4801bs
Rye
Qts 4801bs
Barley 
Qts 4001bs
Oats
Qts 3041bs
Maize 
Qts 4801bs
1870 1. 415 1. 975 0. 650 1. 314 -
1871 2. 017 1. 920 0. 689 0. 687 -
1872 1. 406 2. 526 0. 997 0. 385 0. 082
1873 1. 681 3. 583 1. 555 1. 321 0. 133
1874 1. 874 4. 364 1. 604 2. 206 0. 260
1875 2. 292 3.215 1. 356 1. 691 0. 520
1876 3. 146 5. 099 1. 483 2. 322 0. 896
1877 4. 318 5. 466 2. 696 2. 598 0. 818
1878 4. 069 4. 341 2. 398 2. 105 0. 524
1879 4. 209 6. 749 1. 733 2. 298 0. 920
1880 1. 045 3. 168 1. 225 1. 173 1.565 '
1881 1. 663 2. 643 1. 366 1. 906 1. 977
1882 3. 157 3. 024 2. 054 1. 995 0. 444
1883 2. 949 3. 569 1.772 *• 1. 887 0.814
1884 3. 466 4.417 2. 426 2. 659 0. 882
1885 2. 630 3. 536 2.415 1. 583 0. 902
1886 1. 255 2. 597 1. 951 0. 588 0. 778
1887 2. 514 2. 933 2. 820 1.216 0. 733
1888 1. 561 2. 999 2. 452 1. 315 0. 433
1889 2. 374 4. 898 3. 591 1. 872 1. 445
1890 3. 090 4. 042 4. 053 1. 362 2. 581
1891 4. 159 3. 871 4. 006 0. 870 1. 876
1892 5. 954 2. 876 3.215 0. 637 3. 296
1893 3. 231 1. 030 4. 695 1. 763 3. 496
1894 5. 300 3. 003 6.015 2.921 . 2. 679
1895 6. 147 4. 630 5. 121 1. 732 1. 488
1896 7. 591 4. 734 5. 667 3. 586 3. 773
1897 5. 418 3. 936 5. 862 3. 976 5. 817
1898 6. 789 4. 199 6. 356 3.311 7.260
1899 6. 299 2. 575 6.088 1. 879 7.472
1900 5. 944 4. 103 4.307 3. 355 6. 358
1901 9. 803 3. 967 4. 960 2. 994 5. 482
1902 9. 582 4. 483 6.216 2. 824 4. 134
Source: The C o m  Trade Year Book (1904: 78); see also H. a  Farnsworth 
(1934) "Decline and Recovery of Wheat Prices in the 'Nineties'" 
Wheat Stixii AA of the Food Research Insitute Vol. 10, Ncs 8 and 9, 
(pp. 348, Table 4b); N. Jasny (1936) "Wheat PrdbLems and Policies in 
Germany" Wheat Studies of the Food Resecurch Institute Vol. 13, No. 3 
(pp. 140, Table 8); V. TLitoshenko (1928) Wheat Prices and the World 
whAAt MarkP-t- Cornell University Press, Ithaca (pp. 96, Table 31).
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Appendix 4
Table 4. 1 The Fiscal Balance of Payments (Mai-Hmiiar Cnnt/ri butions ) 
of the Prussian state vis-a-vis the Reich
Year (1)
Matricular
contribution
(2)
Subsidy
from
Reich
(3)
Balance
[(2)-(l)]
(4)
Total
Net
Ordinary
Income
(5)
Balance 
as %age of 
Total Income 
[(3)/(4)xl00]
1871 55 - -55 335 -16
1872 52 - -52 480 -11
1873 34 - -34 366 -9
1874 33 - -33 309 -11
1875 33 - -33 297 -11
1876 32 - -32 223 -14
1877 37 - -37 266 -14
1878 42 - -42 304 -14
1879 46 - —46 414 -11
1880 40 25 -15 230 -7
1881 53 45 —8 427 -2
1882 53 55 +2 392 +1
1883 46 56 +10 484 +2
1884 41 69 +28 456 +6
1885 63 77 +14 498 +3
1886 72 90 +18 602 +3
1887 102 116 +14 665 +2
1888 128 183 +55 746 +7
1889 134 234 +100 796 +13
-1890 183 248 +65 763 +9
1891 191 253 +62 773 +8
1892 192 233 +41 821 +5
1893 225 224 -1 902 0
1894 234 252 +18 925 +2
1895 233 264 +31 983 +3
1896 245 273 +28 1031 +3
1897 256 286 +30 1044 +3
1898 278 308 +30 1110 +3
1899 298 315 +17 1189 +1
1900 321 336 +15 1191 +1
1901 350 367 +17 1183 +1
1902 356 366 +10 1135 +1
1903 347 358 +11 1275 +1
1904 135 129 -6 1003 -1
1905 131 125 -6 1080 -1
1906 142 136 —6 1025 -1
1907 141 129 -11 938 -1
1908 137 129 —8 815 -1
1909 105 80 -25 923 -3
1910 142 119 -23 1092 -2
1911 132 108 -24 1112 -2
1912 154 129 -25 1144 -2
1913 160 134 -26 929 -3
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Table 4.2 Graphic Representation of the Fiscal Balance 
of Payments of the Prussian State vis-a-vis 
the Reich
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Source Col. (1) Ma-hricular Con^ributions from M. Prochnow (1977) 
" Staat in Wachstunt Versuch einer Flnanzwirtschaftiichenn Analyse der 
preussischen Haushaltsrednungen 1871-1913" PhD Diss, University of 
r-îunster (pp. 40).
Col. (2) Subsidy from Reich calculated from the figures in Gerloff 
(1913) Finanz und Zollpolitik des Deutschen Reiches (pp. 522), and 
Statistiches Jahrbuch fur t^ mitsche Reich: the latter quoted in 
M. Newcomer (1937) Central and Local Finance in Germany and Enalard 
Columbia University Press, NY. Ihe Prussian figure was calculated on 
the basis of 66% of the total subsidy figure.
Col. (4) Total Net ordinary i nnnmA is calculated from M. Prochnow 
(1977: 40).
Net Income had state property expenditures deducted from the total 
figure.
Table 5.1 British State Revenues. 1860-1913
Year Direct Indirect State
Property
Total
1860 12. 8 44. 9 6.0 70. 1
1865 11.3 41.6 8. 1 68. 7
1870 19.2 43.3 2. 6 73.7
1875 12. 3 46.7 3.2 73. 6
1880 18. 1 44. 6 4.0 73. 3
1885 22. 7 46.9 4.0 88.0
1890 24. 9 47.6 5.8 94. 6
1895 29.0 51. 1 6.2 101.8
1900 39.8 61.4 9. 6 129. 9
1905 50. 8 72.0 8. 9 153.2
1910 35. 8 61.3 9. 1 131. 7
1911 88. 9 73. 1 10. 6 203. 9
1912 70. 1 72.0 10. 7 185. 1
1913 69. 1 71.5 12. 1 188.8
Source B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane (1962) Abstract nf Rrit-ish 
Historical Statistics: Public Finance Tables). Note that these 
figures do not add up to the "total" (Col. 4) because State Property 
revenues are NET. That is, e:q)enditures have been deducted. The total 
figure has GROSS state property revenues included.
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